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Oil, Gas, 
and Mining
The Extractive Industries Source Book (EISB) is a free 
online interactive source (http://www.eisourcebook.org) 
that is built upon a coherent and incisive narrative analysis 
of the extractive sector as a whole, supplemented by hun-
dreds of downloads and other web resources, including 
specially commissioned reports, summaries, and briefs. The 
EISB provides end-users with technical understanding and 
practical options around oil, gas, and mining sector devel-
opment issues. The end-user community using this resource 
is diverse, and includes representatives of government, 
industry, academic institutions,  nongovernmental organi-
zations, and individuals. 
The online EI Source Book platform was conceived and 
launched by Michael C. Stanley, Global Lead for Extractive 
Industries at the World Bank, using a Development Grant 
Facility (DGF) grant prepared to foster a partnership 
between the World Bank Group and a Global Knowledge 
Consortium. This collaboration includes a group of policy 
centers in universities and other organizations, all focusing 
on practical solutions to extractive industries challenges, led 
by Professor Peter D. Cameron at the University of Dundee, 
United Kingdom. This print version was made possible 
through the many achievements of the online EI Source 
Book to date.
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This new Sourcebook admirably illuminates the spectrum of 
integrated policy interventions necessary to transform natu-
ral resource wealth into sustainable development, ranging 
from the allocation of resource extraction rights to the use 
and distribution of revenues. It recognizes and emphasizes 
the importance of the political and institutional context. 
The Sourcebook ably breaks down the implications of the type 
of natural resource, describes the organization of the indus-
try, and provides illustrative examples and useful citations 
from the literature.
This work is especially timely. In September 2015, the 
world’s governments adopted the 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), defining the world’s shared 
agenda for sustainable development through 2030. Readers 
of this Sourcebook will no doubt note that mineral and 
energy resources play a major role across the 17 SDGs, and 
that the SDGs offer a crucial orientation to the mining 
sector. 
First, sustainable development depends on the minerals 
mined from the earth. The development and rapid scale-up 
and deployment of renewable energies will further increase 
demand for a variety of minerals and metals. So too will 
the ubiquitous mobile Internet technologies, which utilize a 
range of mineral products to enable our new global infor-
mation society. 
Second, for mineral-rich countries, the rents generated 
from the extraction of their resources can fund public 
investments in health, education, infrastructure, and other 
public goods that are critical for the achievement of the 
SDGs. Strategic linkages from the extractive sectors to other 
sectors of the economy can also help to advance employ-
ment and innovation. 
Third, the management of the extractive sector, and the 
policies and practices of both governments and their private 
sector partners, determine the impacts of the extractive pro-
cesses on air and water quality, biodiversity, gender-based 
and other forms of inequality, public health, and human 
rights. In the past, extractive industries have often damaged 
the environment, created social tensions, and contributed to 
poor governance through bribery, capital flight, and the waste 
of resource rents. The SDGs provide key guideposts for 
sustainable management of extractive resources in relation to 
both people (with regard to inclusive processes and access 
to information, for instance) and the environment. 
Fourth, SDG 13—to take urgent action to combat cli-
mate change and its impacts—will require a deep and rapid 
shift in how the world approaches its hydrocarbon resources. 
Known reserves of coal, oil, and gas greatly exceed the levels 
that can be burned in line with the Paris Climate Goal (part 
of SDG 13) of keeping global warming “well below 2 
degrees C.” The world must therefore make a quick transi-
tion to low-carbon energy and create effective and fair 
mechanisms to share the adjustment burden. How will we 
handle the global challenge of which assets to strand, paying 
particular attention to the needs of developing countries? 
How individual governments, companies, and the 
world as a whole approach the management and gover-
nance of mineral and energy resources will be important in 
determining the success or failure of the SDGs. And yet, 
the complexities of harnessing natural resources for sus-
tainable development are great. Technical solutions are 
complex and highly context specific; the political chal-
lenges are vast and made difficult by geopolitics and a 
tendency toward short-termism. Many of the social and 
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environmental risks are large, difficult to calculate, and 
perhaps irreversible in impact.
Fortunately, the past decade has seen a groundswell of 
research and debate about how best to put natural resource 
wealth at the service of sustainable development. The SDGs 
have brought together governments, the private sector, civil 
society, and academia in thoughtful and productive discus-
sions about how to ensure that mineral and energy resources 
help to advance the SDGs, and about the respective roles of 
each partner, nationally and globally. 
To support these ongoing discussions, the authors of this 
Sourcebook have taken the critical step of beginning to assem-
ble a knowledge consortium, bringing together research 
institutions from around the world to share research on good 
practice and to mobilize expertise to address remaining and 
new “knowledge gaps.” Indeed, several of the topics covered 
in the pages herein are controversial, and we and others will 
not agree with all of the positions taken. In some cases, the 
controversy is made explicit; in others, the controversy is only 
implicit, and will be clarified by subsequent debate. The rap-
idly evolving nature of this field also means that some critical 
topics, such as the implications of climate change for the 
future of hydrocarbon extraction, are not yet deeply explored. 
No doubt the Sourcebook will continue to evolve as the 
debates over these topics intensify in the future. 
Given the breadth of the SDGs and the targets therein, as 
well as the myriad challenges of natural resource gover-
nance, the new Sourcebook and the community of research-
ers and practitioners that continues to grow around it will 
help to shed light on the path ahead. Our work in achieving 
the SDGs is ongoing, and the Sourcebook will be an impor-
tant new tool in our hands.
Jeffrey D. Sachs
Director, Center for Sustainable  
Development, Columbia University
and 
Special Advisor to the United Nations Secretary-General 
on the Sustainable Development Goals 
Lisa Sachs
Director, Columbia Center on  
Sustainable Investment, Columbia University
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This Sourcebook has been sponsored by a Development 
Grant Facility, under the Extractive Industries–Technical 
Advisory Facility, a multidonor trust fund managed by the 
World Bank. The project has been managed by a consor-
tium headed by the Centre for Energy, Petroleum and 
Mineral Law and Policy (CEPMLP) at the University of 
Dundee (U.K.). The final version of the Sourcebook was 
written by Peter D. Cameron, director of the Sourcebook 
project, drawing upon the important contributions of 
Charles McPherson, Honoré Le Leuch, and particularly 
Michael C. Stanley, Global Lead for Extractive Industries in 
the World Bank’s Energy and Extractives Group. In his role 
as the principal contact and adviser at the World Bank 
throughout the project, Michael provided a continuous 
flow of suggestions, advice, and assistance, not least by 
mobilizing colleagues at the Bank and his many contacts in 
government and civil society around the world.
From the outset, a driver behind this Sourcebook has 
been to secure as much balance and independence in its 
content as possible. Strong input from a number of highly 
reputable policy and research centers, mostly linked to 
universities, has been important to its establishment and 
further development. In many instances the substantive 
inputs are expressly acknowledged in the text itself but the 
greatest contribution of all from these centers was proba-
bly in the integrity and rigor of their work. It set a high 
standard which was a constant source of inspiration to the 
Sourcebook team.
The first draft of this narrative text was prepared primarily 
by Charles McPherson, formerly senior adviser and manager 
at the World Bank, technical assistance adviser in tax policy 
at the Fiscal Affairs Department of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and member of CEPMLP’s Global Faculty. 
Charles’ early work on the draft brought insights based on his 
many years advising a diverse range of governments in all 
continents and contrasting circumstances on how to make 
the most of their oil and gas resources. Both Charles and 
Michael Stanley were able to draw upon and share their 
direct experience in advising governments and their depth of 
understanding of the corporate sector of oil, gas, and mining. 
This background contributed to elements of practicality and 
balance in the Sourcebook project that we have sought to 
carry over into this version.
Between the first and final drafts, the Sourcebook text 
was extensively reworked to address more thoroughly the 
key issues in oil, gas, and mining. Each of several drafts 
was modified in response to comprehensive feedback and 
suggestions, sometimes delivered anonymously, as part of 
a peer review process. This circuit of writing, review, and 
revision was aimed at realigning our efforts to meet a 
high quality standard across a broad subject, reflect 
diverse areas of specialized expertise, and produce a cohe-
sive text. We have sought to avoid turning the Sourcebook 
into an edited collection of discrete materials covering 
various subjects and crossing disciplines, loosely organ-
ized around the Value Chain concept. Rather, we believe 
this publication is a highly cohesive work centered 
around the Value Chain core and, in its tone, avoids the 
“lecturing” approach in some writings on Good or Best 
Practice.
The final text benefited from the work of other contribu-
tors on particular topics: Jon Hobbs (World Wildlife Fund) 
and Rachel Perks (World Bank) ensured that the coverage 
of artisanal and small-scale mining reflected the work in this 
field by a variety of organizations over the past decade. Jon 
advised us, too, about the latest trends in thinking about 
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sustainability issues. Jon was an important and constructive 
critic of the treatment of sustainable development imple-
mentation in the Extractive Industries Value Chain. 
Contributions on mining were made to the chapters in 
part II by John Strongman, formerly a senior economist at 
the World Bank. The aim—and the challenge—was to com-
pare and contrast mining with oil and gas and, in that way, 
to make a real attempt to contribute to the growing litera-
ture on extractives. David Humphreys, another CEPMLP 
Global Faculty, was invaluable in noting how the contrasts 
between mining and hydrocarbons could be more sharply 
drawn. Kasey McCall Smith played an important role in an 
earlier version of chapter 8 on transparency and accounta-
bility, and Eddie Rich of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative was of enormous help in ensuring 
that we updated the sections on that important initiative. 
The chapters on law, contracts, and sector organization 
would have been poorer without the comments of 
Paul Griffin, Honoré Le Leuch, and Peter Roberts, among 
the best lawyers and contract specialists anywhere in the 
world. Armando Zamora contributed insights into regula-
tion in Latin America, and Honoré Le Leuch shared his 
insights into  fiscal design. Any errors or shortcomings that 
remain are not in any way attributable to them.
During its more than three years of gestation, the 
Sourcebook has had to take into account the fast pace of 
debate on the role of extractives in development. It has 
had to respond to the reshaping of challenges in under-
standing oil, gas, and mining activities as the commodities 
downturn turned out to be longer and deeper than any-
one had expected. It has been exciting to note how the 
pace and trend of research has not slowed or weakened; on 
the contrary, it has become more detailed and more con-
cerned with the uniqueness of country experiences, and it 
has produced a greater diversity of tools and instruments 
for applied knowledge than many could have expected. 
The Sourcebook partner organizations, particularly the 
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI) and 
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), have, in 
pursuing their own unique studies and research, played a 
key role in alerting us to changes that we needed to make 
in the text to provide users with knowledge that is fresh 
and leading.
The Sourcebook’s subject matter crosses law, economics, 
and resource management, so feedback from peer review by 
specialists played an important role in its development. The 
principal manner in which the text developed from its starting 
point was through the application of a very rigorous peer 
review policy, coordinated by Kasey McCall Smith of the 
University of Edinburgh. We are extremely grateful to the 
anonymous reviewers and to those additional reviewers, such 
as Rolando Ossowski (formerly senior economist at the IMF), 
Alan Gelb (senior fellow at the Center for Global Development), 
Peter Roberts (editor, Journal of World Energy Law and 
Business), and Philip Daniel (formerly senior adviser to the 
Fiscal Affairs Department at the IMF), who generously pro-
vided advice and suggestions.
The Sourcebook project was supported at CEPMLP by 
Daniel Gilbert, the research fellow for the project, and at the 
World Bank by Noora Aarfa, Norma Garza, Paolo de Sa, and 
Peter van der Veen. Various CEPMLP students assisted from 
time to time including Gaspar Andre, Marcia Ashong, Job 
Kahigwa, Agostina Martinez, Babatunde Osadare, Georgia 
Panagiotidou, and Mauro Amilton de Celestino Pedro. Peter 
Cameron is grateful to all his colleagues at CEPMLP for 
their continuous and robust support, and to Qiumin Li and 
Alexander and Sophie Cameron, whose optimism about the 
future influenced the tone of this text. A special mention is 
made for our friend Michael Levitsky, whose comments and 
insights were helpful to the authors at the early stages of this 
project and were much appreciated. At the production stage 
we are most grateful for the work done by Patricia Katayama, 
Janice Tuten, and Aziz Gökdemir. None of the above bears 
responsibility for the final text.
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C H A P T E R  T H R E E
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Oil, gas, and mineral resource wealth is widespread among 
developing states, where it frequently accounts for a large 
share of gross domestic product, export earnings, govern-
ment revenues, and jobs.1 Its potential for economic and 
social transformation is evident for any country capable of 
harnessing it.2 Done effectively, in a single generation con-
verting these nonrenewable natural resources into capital 
can allow a country to transition from poverty to at least 
middle-income status and enable its citizens to enjoy a 
 better quality of life.
For low-income countries dependent on aid, a policy 
shift toward the extractive industries (EIs) offers the pros-
pect of an economy more diverse than one defined by sub-
sistence agriculture. It can help lead the way toward a 
balanced budget, a reduction in foreign debt, savings, and 
an opportunity to develop new industries. For countries 
emerging from serious conflict or severe economic misfor-
tune, such a shift offers the prospect of a fresh start. It is not 
surprising that the number of countries seeking to use oil, 
gas, and mining resources to undergird social transforma-
tion is increasing significantly.3 No fewer than 81 countries 
now have economies driven by these resources,4 and almost 
80 percent of them have per capita income below the global 
average—the incentive for their efforts.
Yet EI is a sector that has aroused far more controversy 
than most and that raises many cautionary flags to newcom-
ers. Contrary to expectations, a significant feature of natural 
resource development is that over half of the economies it 
has driven are not catching up (McKinsey Global Institute 
2013, 6). Since 1995 they have failed to match the global 
unweighted average per capita growth rate. Even among 
those economies that have experienced long-term, above- 
average economic growth, it can be argued that they have 
not always enhanced prosperity in the wider sense: growth 
in productivity, resilience, and connectivity, for example.
For many years EIs’ relationship to sustainability has 
been questioned. In a fair number of cases these indus-
tries have brought a surge of activity and investment that 
has triggered high expectations, only to disappoint, as the 
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benefits are retained by a few and the costs are borne 
by many. They have been called a “resource curse.”5 
Development of the country in which the operations take 
place may not necessarily follow large-scale investment, at 
least not in the sense that investment generates long-term 
development impacts. In some cases, the country may 
even become worse off, depending on the human develop-
ment indicators used, particularly environment-related 
indicators. This has led some to conclude that the discovery 
and development of oil, gas, and minerals is not a blessing 
at all or even a source of opportunities to accelerate eco-
nomic and social development.
This debate has been thrown into sharp relief by the 
 sudden end of the long commodities boom that benefited 
resource-rich countries during the early 2000s, when oil 
and metal prices reached historic highs. The reversal in com-
modity prices has underlined the vulnerability of this industry 
to volatility, unpredictability, and periodic shocks. Preparation 
for downward swings as well as upward swings is an essential 
task for any existing or aspiring resource-rich state.
If a single lesson has been learned from this debate, it is 
the need for governance structures that can ensure that 
short-term benefits are not obtained at the expense of long-
term sustainability. Yet many citizens will find that the chal-
lenges of natural resource management are ones for which 
their governments are not well prepared.
Moving forward is more than a matter of installing or 
building “capacity.” It requires governments to understand 
how what is commonly described as “good practice” is con-
tinually modified and improved by research and compara-
tive analysis, to test fresh approaches in a country’s unique 
context, and at the same time to persuade vested interests of 
the need for change. In practical terms, governments in 
resource-rich countries and countries that appear to have 
good resource potential will often inherit legal and institu-
tional frameworks for EI activity that need to be reformed. 
In some countries, there may be only a patchwork of 
 contracts in place, hardly meriting the consistency and 
cohesion implied by the commonly used notion of a frame-
work. Policies that envisage long-term, resource-led devel-
opment will often have to be designed from scratch.
In tackling these policy challenges, governments of 
resource-rich developing countries will quickly become 
aware of the current wide range of opinions and perspec-
tives on resource-led development, bolstered by an impres-
sive number of case studies and volumes of empirical data.6 
Some will caution them that negative economic, environ-
mental, and social effects can outweigh the potential bene-
fits of natural resource development. However, recent 
research has shown that there is nothing inevitable about 
either negative or positive links.7 A growing body of opin-
ion, discussed in this and in the following chapters, argues 
that discoveries of oil, gas, or minerals can contribute posi-
tively to a country’s overall agenda for social and economic 
development if the challenges of resource management can 
be met successfully within the constraints imposed by envi-
ronmental considerations. Many of those challenges are 
now thought to lie within the institutional or governance 
frameworks of the countries themselves. Governments and 
citizens in countries seeking to promote resource-led devel-
opment must ask themselves, What should our priorities be 
and what choices are open to us?
The first question they should address is whether oil, gas, 
or other mineral exploitation is a good course of action or 
not. This is especially true in areas of high conservation 
value. There will be some situations where environmental 
(or social and cultural) factors are so significant, or occa-
sions when the negative impacts cannot be reliably pre-
dicted, that oil, gas, and mining must be considered an 
incompatible option and a cautious approach should be 
adopted.
1.2 THE DEMAND FOR KNOWLEDGE
Not so very long ago, governments in many parts of the 
world were entirely dependent on international firms for 
the development of oil, gas, and mineral resources. The 
assumption of control by sovereign states is quite recent, as 
is their experience of designing and implementing their 
own policies addressing these resources.
For the first generation of states in the postcolonial 
world, knowledge of the optimum practices for their oil, 
gas, and mineral industries was often not readily available. 
As a result, these states were frequently dependent on and 
even had their policies shaped by the advice of international 
institutions and other outside bodies. Their legal and fiscal 
frameworks often reflected a colonial legacy or a reaction to 
it by pioneering new relationships with foreign investors 
designed to increase the state share of the expected benefits. 
Some of these innovations worked, such as the introduc-
tion of production sharing in the oil industry, and others 
were less successful, such as the use of state-owned compa-
nies in mining.
In the twenty-first century, on the crest of a wave of high 
prices and robust investment, a new generation of states 
joined or seemed about to join the club of petroleum and 
mineral producers (see figure 1.1).8 The new arrivals have 
diverse origins: some states have emerged from armed 
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Figure 1.1 Share of Natural Resources Receipts in Government Revenues (averages, 2000–11)
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conflicts and are hungry for reconstruction and growth; 
others have shaken off political ideologies that constrained 
policy choices and stifled initiative. Compared to their pre-
decessors, the prospective resource-rich states are more 
open, pluralistic, and confident societies. At least 35 percent 
of them are low-income or lower-middle income countries 
(Dietsche et al. 2013, 7). Many of them are in Africa. No 
one needs to tell them of the potential that oil, gas, and 
mining operations offer to kick-start or accelerate develop-
ment. They face a wider range of potential investors than 
ever before; new markets in Asia hungry for their exports; 
new areas available for exploration due to technological 
innovation, such as deepwater drilling; the potential for 
developing new sources such as shale gas and other uncon-
ventional petroleum resources; and the impact of new 
products and materials that require expanding rare miner-
als production. The number of prospective resource-rich 
economies can be expected to grow because large amounts 
of resources remain to be discovered, not least in Sub-
Saharan Africa, where relatively little is known about the 
value of subsoil assets.
Yet for many of the new generation of resource-rich 
states, clouds have darkened the prospect of hosting large-
scale foreign investment. Price volatility raises urgent 
questions about the right way to stabilize revenue streams 
and other benefits in the face of sharp falls in commodity 
prices. Moreover, the prevalence of decades-old mining 
codes, inadequate or absent hydrocarbons laws, and a 
patchwork approach to the conclusion of agreements with 
investors has pushed reform to the top of states’ agendas. 
The complex implications of large new developments, 
notably in oil, gas, and iron ore, are also creating unfamil-
iar challenges for several low-income countries, with 
implications for their overall economic performance. For 
those states that have recently joined or that are about to 
join the club of resource-rich economies, there is an 
urgent need for guidance about what constitutes good 
practice in resource management and how to apply it 
while avoiding the much-publicized mistakes of many of 
their neighbors.
The aspirations and the needs of these states have stimu-
lated the launch of a knowledge project called Oil, Gas, and 
Mining: A Sourcebook for Understanding the Extractive 
Industries.
For the new generation of petroleum and mining 
states, from Colombia to Ghana, from Timor-Leste to 
Mozambique, gaining knowledge itself is a major challenge. 
As noted earlier, there has probably never been so much 
knowledge available about the complex legal, economic, 
contractual, and institutional issues that governments must 
address. There is a plethora of analyses, remedies, and rec-
ommendations. Most of this information is accessible, at 
least potentially, in hard copy or electronically, from almost 
anywhere in the world. However, it often carries the warn-
ings mentioned earlier. The surfeit of knowledge sits along-
side a body of literature replete with declarations about the 
dangers of reliance on these industries for development. 
Many prospective resource-rich countries have neighbors 
that have encountered difficulties in their resource develop-
ment; even without familiarity with the extensive literature, 
countries interested in EI development become aware that 
significant risks can face the unwary. This is also a context 
in which the familiar shortage of staff with specialist skills 
and expertise acts as a constraint on the development of 
policy, the operation of proper institutions, and, of course, 
the absorptive capacity and interpretation of this wealth of 
available knowledge. In countries new to oil, gas, and min-
ing development, there is uncertainty about where to find 
data relevant to their needs and about the reliability of 
many available sources, and there are concerns about a 
shortage of qualified staff to assemble, analyze, and utilize 
such knowledge and about the cost of accessing it.
By contrast, companies engaged in the international oil, 
gas, and mining business usually have an established body 
of knowledge and data, as well as an awareness of how to 
enhance them and the costs involved in doing so. Many 
companies have their own training centers and even “cor-
porate universities.” They are accustomed to working with 
a plethora of standards, codes, and guidelines, which pro-
vide them with benchmarks of good international industry 
practice, established themselves or through associations, or 
both. The result is an all too familiar asymmetry of specialist 
knowledge between the two traditional sources of demand: 
international investors on the one hand, and government 
departments and agencies in resource-abundant societies 
on the other. In the contemporary international economy, 
asymmetry is exacerbated by the global dimension of for-
eign investment. Corporations operate across jurisdictions 
and through highly complex structures of local subsidiaries, 
affiliates, and a web of offshore entities. As the authors of 
the Africa Progress Report have put it, the “combination of 
complexity, different disclosure requirements and limited 
regulatory capacity is at the heart of many of the problems” 
and “facilitates aggressive tax planning, tax evasion and cor-
ruption” (APP 2013, 51). As a result, a robust national 
response has to be supplemented by cooperation among 
governments, regional organizations, and the wider inter-
national community.
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For the earlier generation of resource-rich states, this 
asymmetry of knowledge is all too familiar, and most have 
not entirely escaped it. Even with established EI sectors, 
countries such as Algeria, the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Mexico, and Nigeria have felt it necessary to explore new 
institutional structures for their EI sectors. Even for the two 
categories of country identified by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) as being less at risk from the effects 
of the resource curse— (1) upper-middle-income, resource-
rich economies and (2) high-income countries that are rich 
in natural resources—there is ongoing examination of legal 
and fiscal frameworks, revenue management, and the 
implementation of measures to ensure wide sustainable 
development of these exhaustible resources.9 For the IMF’s 
group of 29 resource-rich developing countries, the need 
for policies to be informed by independent, critically 
assessed knowledge is more obviously immediate.
Demand from whom?
The states that can be described as resource-rich and as sources 
of demand for knowledge of EI are found in  figure 1.1. The 
IMF distinguishes four kinds of resource-rich state: in addi-
tion to resource-rich developing countries, it distinguishes 
prospective natural-resource -exporting low- or lower-middle-
income countries, upper-middle-income resource-rich econ-
omies, and high-income resource-rich countries. The kind of 
knowledge that each group requires will differ. For the poorest 
of them, for example, it may not be wise to follow Norway’s 
example of saving funds offshore for future generations, when 
immediate development imperatives focused on poverty 
reduction exist today.
In practice, the present demand for specialist knowledge 
is driven by more than the needs of state governments. The 
new sources of demand for knowledge include national and 
regional parliaments; local nongovernmental organizations; 
new media; universities; technical experts; and the various 
donors of technical and financial assistance, such as national, 
regional, and global development institutions, and formal 
and informal civil society networks. Indeed, two leading 
development economists have observed that “the power 
and informational advantages of the major international oil 
companies are far less than before, except perhaps in techni-
cally highly demanding fields” (Gelb and Turner 2009, 40). 
As a result, there is a greater risk of misalignment of incen-
tives. These remarks apply equally to the mining sector. 
Weaknesses in governance mechanisms can constrain gov-
ernments’ ability to be accountable to their citizens. Indeed, 
governments may in some cases even collude with 
international investors—or with national EI companies 
where these exist—to act in ways that are contrary to their 
citizens’ interests.
The kind of knowledge required by these groups is differ-
ent from and more complex than the knowledge that inves-
tors typically seek. It is influenced by the negative experiences 
of other countries in developing their oil, gas, and mining 
resources. (For donors, it may be influenced by previous EI 
interventions in those countries.) These groups are aware 
that poor outcomes have often resulted from bad decision 
making by governments, and they want to ask questions 
that will help them mitigate the risk of such decision making 
in their own country. They will have a keen  awareness that 
resources are finite and present a one-off opportunity for 
social and economic transformation.
This concern with accountability and transparency is 
often accompanied by high expectations of benefits from 
extractive resource development. A high priority is placed by 
local communities and most civil society groups in resource-
rich regions on employment and, close behind, on the devel-
opment of a domestic private sector. The credibility of 
governments will turn on their ability to create jobs. The 
influence of such groups is evident in current policies on 
inclusiveness, promotion of the purchase of local goods and 
services by investors, and calls for the elimination of the cul-
ture of secrecy that has often shrouded publicly held EI data 
from citizens. All too often, however, the learning curve of 
these groups is stunted by either a lack of relevant data (con-
tracts or numbers) or a surfeit of data that can be fully under-
stood only by those already in possession of specialist skills.
Five key knowledge areas
Apart from the hard technical knowledge provided by engi-
neers and geologists, the knowledge of oil, gas, and mining 
typically sought by groups in their dealings with investors 
can be broadly classified in five content areas:
1. Policy and legal framework
2. Organization and regulation
3. Fiscal design
4. Revenue management
5. Sustainability, in the sense of environmental and social 
planning and management and the linkages of these 
activities to broader impacts across the economy
Each of these categories refers to combinations of levers 
that are crucial to successful EI development. Each refers to 
much more than operational knowledge that aspiring 
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technocrats need to master; each of these categories is 
informed by changing theoretical frameworks, principles, 
and lessons from incremental experience. Sometimes decep-
tively called “good practice,” this body of knowledge is 
continually adapted and is increasingly influenced by the 
development challenges of the new and prospective 
resource-rich countries.
The most basic strategic challenge that a government 
faces is whether to exploit the resource or to leave it in the 
ground. In some instances, the benefits of mineral resource 
extraction will outweigh the environmental and social costs. 
However, this is a decision that needs to be arrived at 
through a transparent and inclusive process, which will 
improve the quality of decision making. Yet, one cannot 
simply take for granted the decision to exploit the resource. 
There may be occasions when the environmental and social 
context is too sensitive or when not enough scientific evi-
dence exists on the potential negative impacts of develop-
ment. The choice is made more complex by the number of 
unknowns involved, not least about the geology.
The Sourcebook seeks to intervene in this knowledge 
challenge. It promotes a rebalancing of knowledge in the 
noted five categories in favor of those governments and 
stakeholders with the greatest need and the least means to 
access it.
This complexity of the demand for knowledge in key 
policy areas has one important consequence: the potential 
for volatility in policy design and implementation for long-
term EI projects has never been greater. The key decisions 
in developing extractive resources largely remain ones made 
by governments and investors. Usually, the governments 
are highly centralized institutions, albeit ones that have 
varying interests and expectations about natural-resource-
led development. Each of these institutions tends to rely on 
specialist agencies for knowledge inputs, policy implemen-
tation, and financial management. These bodies remain 
vulnerable to the long-standing asymmetry of specialist 
knowledge between themselves and international investors, 
evident from the moment that a contract negotiation com-
mences. This familiar challenge is exacerbated by the fact 
that more than ever before, the constituencies that govern-
ments must respond to are highly diverse and inchoate; 
companies, too, are increasingly accountable to a broad 
stakeholder base rather than simply a body of shareholders 
and a company board. Both states and investors have a keen 
interest in the design of a fair and efficient fiscal regime 
and in the techniques for optimal management of resource 
revenues. However, the challenges facing any government 
in policy design are complicated by the fact that its 
“shareholders” are a potentially large and diverse group, 
with shifting expectations of what can and should be 
achieved from the development of extractive resources. As a 
result, its goals are likely to be subject to change and to 
involve a mix of short- and long-term benefits. Whatever 
their form of government, people are likely to enjoy greater 
access to information about the opportunities and risks of 
oil, gas, and mining development than in any previous gen-
eration. Without a knowledge map for resource manage-
ment, the potential benefits of this new supply are likely to 
fail to meet demand.
1.3 THE SUPPLY OF KNOWLEDGE
Ironically, in this shifting context of knowledge demand 
there remain common, almost universal problems that 
most countries will face as they explore for and develop 
extractive resources. Some of the fundamental challenges 
have not changed for many years, and ways of addressing 
them are long settled. For example, much scholarship and 
applied knowledge is available about the principal forms 
of state contract that allow states to cooperate with for-
eign investors in oil, gas, and mining activity. The main 
provisions of a mining or petroleum law, which allows 
states to set a stable framework for these activities, are 
also easy to identify. There is a consensus, too, about the 
main issues that governments must tackle when designing 
a fiscal regime to achieve a fair share of the benefits or an 
impact assessment to ensure protection of their 
environment.10
The established character of such knowledge is likely to 
be evident in each of the five areas identified as essential for 
governance of the extractive sector: policy and legal frame-
work, organization and administration of the sector, fiscal 
design, revenue management, and implementation of sus-
tainable development. The fundamental legitimacy of the 
extractive industries’ engagement with the sustainability 
dialogue is also well established: since oil, gas, and mining 
resources are not renewable, the conversion of nonrenew-
able natural capital into other forms of (renewable) capital 
is the fundamental objective.
There are many commonly used expressions for the 
body of principles and industry practice in its guise as a 
knowledge benchmark: it can be good practice, best practice, 
or even good-fit practice. The authors of the Sourcebook 
 prefer the term good practice, because governments will be 
the proper judges of what is best for them in their unique 
contexts. The very best knowledge of welfare-promoting 
policies, institutions, and governance, demonstrated by 
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international experience, always needs to be applied to a 
particular context.
Such knowledge is continually tested in more than a hun-
dred countries around the world, yielding lessons that may 
influence or change current thinking. It is dynamic. Experience 
also shows that successful application of this evolving body of 
generally accepted principles and techniques is heavily influ-
enced by contextual factors, such as institutional framework 
or political economy. It is increasingly shaped by the growing 
number of countries using EIs as a development vehicle and 
the new thinking about development policy they are exposed 
to from donors, civil society, and media.
The supply of this kind of knowledge has become highly 
fragmented, with a growing number of organizations offer-
ing contributions. They include international financial 
institutions, development aid agencies, civil society groups, 
think tanks, and universities.11 The institutions set priorities 
appropriate to their objectives and constituencies; their 
educational programs and publications reflect these. For 
some suppliers, it is the economic issues of fiscal design and 
revenue management that are of paramount importance; 
for others, it is the issues of revenue or contract  transparency. 
A significant theme in the literature is the need for states to 
take the kind of measures that will avoid the so-called 
resource curse. Similarly, they are likely to emphasize and 
advocate inclusiveness in decision making by governments. 
The result is that knowledge of EI development available to 
a resource-rich state has vastly increased but has also 
become more fragmented and potentially confusing.
A major benefit of these new sources of supply, however, 
is that they allow comparisons of policies adopted by differ-
ent states. It is crucial that any government absorb lessons 
from its neighbors and others farther afield, identifying 
policies that have delivered positive outcomes and avoiding 
the others. One must filter what can seem like an ocean of 
data offering contradictory assessments. Access to at least 
some of this body of comparative knowledge has typically 
been more challenging to a resource-rich government than 
to an internationally operating company in the extractives 
sector. The capacity to form an integrated view, to extract 
lessons appropriate to one’s circumstances, and to apply 
knowledge will still not exist in some states or in those bod-
ies identified as new sources of demand for EI knowledge, 
such as civil society groups at the national and regional 
levels or parliaments, despite what may well be their urgent 
need for knowledge.
International norms and standards have also burgeoned 
in recent years, with the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) Standard as one of many dozens of 
examples. They affect not only governments but also the 
investors they will typically work with. Efforts to document 
or map the diversity of initiatives to make them more 
accessible to governments and limit duplication are also 
under way.
The aim of the Sourcebook is to synthesize cutting-edge 
research with direct experience in tackling the major issues 
in oil, gas, and mining development and to link the results 
to the holistic and integrated scheme of the EI Value Chain. 
Taking context into account, it examines the toolkit avail-
able to policy makers and their advisers to tackle these 
issues, and it reviews the options generated from successful 
resource experiences and those less likely to achieve positive 
outcomes.
For many of the new seekers of knowledge, access is 
likely to be most effective by means of electronic media. An 
online supply will offer resources of knowledge far greater 
than any printed version. However, the supply of data in 
this form is likely to be a patchwork and add to the modern 
dilemma of an information surplus and an understanding 
deficit. For local communities, civil society groups, and 
indigenous peoples, the supply of knowledge needs to be 
accompanied by a program of education. Publication of a 
production-sharing contract between a government and a 
foreign investor will not in itself lead to understanding or an 
ability to critically evaluate the contents of such a contract 
(although it may be a prerequisite). The reader needs to be 
equipped with an understanding of the key issues that such 
a contract typically addresses and acquire the basic tools for 
critical engagement with them.
Understanding the links in the chain of resource man-
agement requires a grasp of interrelations among several 
disciplines and a channeling of law, economics, and institu-
tional design into policy making. Environmental criteria 
too must be included to underwrite the sustainability of the 
development. Knowledge of these links and their relations 
is crucial if a government is to meet the challenges of man-
aging global extractive resources in a long-term, sustain-
able manner. However, a failure to understand and think 
through the linkages with other levers is likely to have 
adverse consequences. In particular, proper weight has to be 
given to the role of law, contract, and regulation, as well as 
the links that address economics and environmental and 
social sustainability. The latter link has too often been given 
only token recognition in the study of extractives-led 
development.
The central premise of the Sourcebook is that sound 
technical knowledge and awareness of practical options 
can lead to better political, economic, and social choices 
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with respect to sector development and the related risks 
and opportunities. Such choices are effective, however, 
only if they are closely linked to institutional capacity and 
country context.12
There is a necessary caveat to these remarks about the 
supply of knowledge in the EI field. Throughout, the 
assumption is made that the main players on the gover-
nance stage, and governments in particular, are able to rec-
ognize their need for greater knowledge of the EI sector and 
are willing to do something about it. A great deal is known 
about how to avoid the negative effects of oil, gas, and min-
ing development, and even more knowledge is now in the 
mainstream about how to tackle legal, contractual, fiscal, 
and revenue management issues. However, there will always 
be some who will prefer opaque arrangements that leave 
scope to conclude deals on terms that are rarely published. 
Such arrangements may be concluded by governments, 
companies, or individuals within them for short-term busi-
ness or personal advantage. They are unlikely to prove sus-
tainable or capable of delivering benefits to the country or 
its peoples. The Sourcebook is not intended for those who 
are unwilling to harness specialist knowledge in the interest 
of sustainable economic and social development.
1.4 BRIDGING THE KNOWLEDGE GAP
The Sourcebook has been developed as a contribution to the 
new sources of demand. Drawing on many new sources of 
knowledge, particularly on an emerging network of knowl-
edge centers and suppliers, it strives to present a compen-
dium of established good practice. It is informed by recent 
research, includes a critical exposition of principles, and 
provides analysis of relevant experiences and commonly 
used instruments. It seeks to meet demand by presenting 
knowledge in both print and electronic forms, providing a 
concise, comprehensive, and dynamic guide that nonethe-
less notes the diversity of opinion and experience. It is 
guided by the awareness that without good governance and 
management, dependence on extractive industries can lead 
to poor development outcomes, including environmental 
degradation and social dysfunction that will undermine the 
sustainability of development.
The Sourcebook is therefore much more than an assem-
bly of knowledge. It brings together diverse kinds of 
knowledge on the kind of operational issues that are driv-
ing demand and frames them in a new way. It advances 
and expands the knowledge base on practical approaches 
to the management of resource wealth. Its “creation” of 
knowledge includes rigor, accessibility, and the manner in 
which it shares knowledge and information with users. 
Further, it aims to provide an overarching framework for 
the program of education now needed in this field, to 
guide knowledge exchange in the form of workshops, 
seminars, and symposia.
The Sourcebook is based on four premises:
1. The oil, gas, and mining—or extractives—industries, or 
“extractives,” have sufficient common characteristics to 
justify a unified assessment: the resources are taken from 
below the surface of land or seabed by human efforts and 
converted into sustainable opportunities. Key elements 
follow from this: the importance of geology, ownership 
by a surface owner, and the need for some degree of 
complex technology. The infrastructure-heavy linkages 
to extractives, such as transportation networks or grids, 
and complex manufacturing processes (crucial to both 
gas and mining) have fewer claims to homogeneity and 
can be treated as analytically distinct.
2. Successful management of the oil, gas, and mining sec-
tors requires that all stages of the value chain, and any 
cross-cutting themes such as transparency and account-
ability, be carefully considered and viewed as belonging 
to a whole. Neglect of one aspect may undermine success 
in dealing with another.
3. No single approach will suit all states. The Sourcebook is 
a guide to good practice, which will require adjustments 
to differing state contexts. The arbiters of that adjust-
ment process reside in the states. Not only will they need 
to tailor good practice to a particular national context, 
but also a particular policy is unlikely to suit each prov-
ince or project or be suitable over time if circum-
stances—for example, prospects for extraction—change.
4. A focus on applied knowledge will serve the user well 
only if it is accompanied by a discussion of principles or 
general theory. Even if the Sourcebook provides the user 
with a very brief introduction to those general principles 
as they apply to topics such as awards of rights or reve-
nue management, and furnishes guidance on further 
reading, it seeks to introduce and share with the user the 
core assumptions that often guide practice in the extrac-
tive industries.
The value chain
The concept of a value chain for the extractives sector helps 
drive the Sourcebook’s structure. This framing device cap-
tures both the comprehensiveness and the integration of 
core activities. See figure 1.2.
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The EI Value Chain emphasizes five distinct but related 
features in the sector management process (Alba 2009). 
Every resource-dependent state has to move through each 
of these if resource-led development is to take place.13 They 
cover (1) the establishment of a legal framework that will 
convey and enforce rights to investors within a broad policy 
for development of publicly owned resources, (2) the insti-
tutional organization of the sector and particularly the reg-
ulation and monitoring of operations in the public interest, 
(3) the design and collection of taxes and royalties, (4) rev-
enue management and distribution, and (5) the implemen-
tation of sustainable development policies.
The EI Value Chain concept allows the Sourcebook to 
illustrate how good practice policy interventions must be 
made in an integrated manner if natural resource assets are 
to be transformed into resource wealth along a sustainable 
path. Public policy decisions have to be made at the vari-
ous points in the chain; sometimes it may resemble a deci-
sion chain. A failure in decision making at one stage in the 
chain disrupts the sequence and affects the value of the 
resource assets as they are transformed along the chain. 
Policy makers need to take a holistic approach to EI sector 
development.
For each link of the EI Value Chain there are common 
problems that arise and practices that have evolved to 
address them. Knowledge of these problem-solving practices 
and their continuing evolution is the Sourcebook’s principal 
subject matter. Understanding entails more than an assem-
bly and description of practices, instruments, and principles. 
It requires interpretation and contextualization for a proper 
understanding and appraisal. The dynamic of shifting public 
policy priorities in problem solving— sometimes in response 
to international or regional  developments—also has to be 
taken into account.
T h e  f i f t h  c h e v r o n — s u s t a i n a b l e  d e v e l o p m e n t 
 implementation—attempts to capture related policy con-
siderations that address the challenge of developing 
resources in a sustainable way. This chevron differs from 
the others in that it is primarily policy based rather than 
rule based. It presupposes that a strategic choice has 
already been made to exploit resources as the most sustain-
able scenario, with trade-offs and costs weighed in a trans-
parent manner.
There are two parts to the approach to implementa-
tion. First, because the resources are finite, states must ask 
whether policies should be designed so that future genera-
tions benefit from their development. Are the resources to 
be developed rapidly without concern for possible spinoffs 
in infrastructure or other economic development? Or are 
these considerations to be built in to maximize benefits 
over the long term and attempt a wider economic and 
social transformation? Second, it aims to capture environ-
mental and social impacts of oil, gas, and mining activi-
ties. Although these are evident at earlier stages of the EI 
Value Chain, where sustainability criteria should be devel-
oped, they are likely to be weighted more to this end of the 
chain, once production has commenced and revenues are 
flowing.
Three features of our approach to the EI Value Chain in 
the Sourcebook should be noted:
1. It includes a cross-cutting feature on transparency and 
accountability to reflect their significance (see chapter 8).
2. It attaches enhanced significance to the establishment of 
a legal and contractual framework (the rule of law), in 
contrast to some other versions of the value chain.14
3. It emphasizes the need to ground the good practice rec-
ommendations of the Sourcebook in a political economy 
context—that is, the constellation of specific institu-
tional and governance features that will shape the appli-
cation of good practice and require such practice to fit if 
it is to achieve its intended aim.
In a recent study of results chains and logical frameworks 
applied to the extractive industries, the authors emphasized 
the risks of their becoming “rigid frameworks (blueprints) 
Figure 1.2 The EI Value Chain
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that give people reason to be lazy in their thinking” 
(BMZ and GIZ 2011). To avoid this, “causal relationships, 
underlying assumptions and the measurement of change 
should be the objects of permanent, critical and self-critical 
debate.” The Sourcebook accepts that advice and seeks to 
implement it in the application of the EI Value Chain. In 
addition to the preceding comments about our distinct 
approach, three caveats about the EI Value Chain concept 
should be noted; they have influenced its application in the 
Sourcebook:
1. Starting point. Very few countries will be able to 
approach the design of their petroleum or mining 
regimes as if they were starting at the first chevron with 
a clean slate. All too often they will inherit old, poorly 
drafted laws and a patchwork of agreements in need of 
revision. The value chain used in the Sourcebook needs 
to be adapted to less than ideal circumstances, which all 
too often impose constraints on policy makers and 
their advisers.
2. Governance. The EI Value Chain assumes that a mini-
mum level of governance or potential for governance 
of the EI sector is in place.15 In certain states where 
there has recently been a high level of conflict or where 
the state itself might be classified fragile, this assump-
tion may not be tenable. Moreover, a feature of the 
EI sector that has attracted increasing comment is 
what may be called fragmented governance, the often 
fragile relationships between central and local organs 
of authority, which can be exacerbated when expecta-
tions are boosted by the prospects of resource wealth. 
Again, this context will impose limits on the assump-
tions about governance that the EI Value Chain 
makes. Finally, the Value Chain tacitly assumes a 
 consensus about the kind of governance that is appro-
priate to optimal EI development. This is a brave 
assumption to make when (1) experience shows 
plenty of evidence of failure in institutional design, and 
(2) contemporary governance requires a much greater 
level of integration of players for governance to be 
sustainable.
3. Player diversity. The sequential value chain approach of 
the Sourcebook should not obscure an important feature 
of the EI industries. The dynamics of the EI sector mean 
that the same players are not always present at the vari-
ous stages of the chain in a particular project. In practice, 
there are different types of players that are prepared to 
engage in EI activities, and as a result different business 
models are in play.
Chapter structure
Chapters 1 and 2 of the Sourcebook introduce the key topics 
with a brief discussion of the opportunities and challenges 
associated with resource wealth. This is an important and 
often contrasting balance, given the vivid examples of coun-
tries that have squandered resource wealth or have seen a 
significant rise in conflict following discoveries of minerals 
and/or hydrocarbons. Yet for any country that finds itself 
with geological good fortune, there is the prospect of a new 
beginning in the development cycle, of a chance to bypass 
decades of grindingly slow progress and join the world’s 
wealthier nations in a generation rather than a century. 
Realizing this vision requires learning lessons, and not only 
those from the past: some countries with natural resource 
discoveries may have no past in the extractive industries. It 
requires a careful assessment of the experiences of other 
countries, often neighbors, whose policies were designed to 
reflect different (and sometimes very different) circum-
stances, constraints, pressures, and hopes. The Sourcebook 
directs attention to the problems that any country embark-
ing on natural resource development will need to address; it 
pays particular attention to the detail of operations and 
gives less attention to matters of high principle, leaving oth-
ers (perhaps better qualified than we are) to address those 
important matters.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the distinctive and 
relevant features of the oil, gas, and mining sectors. The 
concept of extractives—of different products entailing simi-
lar development challenges—gained wide currency only in 
recent years. Previously, oil and gas were seen as very differ-
ent from mining, an industry with a much smaller market 
capitalization but with a much larger propensity for contro-
versy in its social and environmental impacts. To an out-
sider, however, it is self-evident that these sectors have 
much in common, and that insight lies behind their treat-
ment in the Sourcebook. For those who wish to learn about 
the specifics of each sector—natural gas development, for 
example, has many differences from oil—the treatment in 
various chapters attempts to provide this. Laws, policies, 
and fiscal frameworks need to understand and reflect these 
real differences while at the same time benefit from an 
awareness of their similarities. In development terms, the 
extractive industries are not just another economic sector—
where they predominate in a country’s economy, they have 
a potential to transform the host state like very few other 
industries. For all states in the global economy, the extrac-
tives have a role that is of fundamental importance, one that 
appears very unlikely to change in the near term. It is all the 
CHAPTER 1: SHIFTING PATTERNS OF DEMAND AND SUPPLY 13
more important to ensure that their role is as benign as pos-
sible for all parties concerned.
Chapters 4 to 7 follow the first four of the five links in the 
EI Value Chain. They examine in detail each of its chevrons: 
legal and policy frameworks, conditions for access to min-
eral resources, regulation and monitoring of operations, 
revenue collection, and management and investment. This 
body of knowledge is the most important and in our view 
the original contribution of the Sourcebook to current 
debates on the role of EI in development. The four chapters 
adopt a problem-solving approach, emphasizing the issues 
that countries typically encounter in EI development and 
providing options in addressing them. The diverse material 
is linked by means of the value chain concept. It underlines 
the importance of an integrated view to EI development and 
implicitly cautions against a piecemeal approach to policy 
and regime design, however tempting that may be, given the 
many unknowns that exist about the exact resource poten-
tial of oil, gas, and minerals.
Chapters 8 and 9 provide a review of issues that cut 
across all of the links in the EI Value Chain: on the one 
hand, transparency and accountability, and on the other, 
the implementation of sustainable development policies 
and projects, including environmental and social consider-
ations. The latter is usually seen as a fifth chevron in the 
value chain and is presented as such in the Sourcebook. 
However, in reality its subject matter crosses all of the other 
chevrons, and in this book we have elected to treat it sepa-
rately to emphasize this cross-cutting character. With 
respect to the transparency and accountability, enormous 
efforts have been made in recent years to employ them in 
the extractive industries, following increasing evidence of 
spectacular abuse of revenues in certain countries. In this 
very important area, the Sourcebook gathers data and 
knowledge of existing initiatives, such as EITI and Publish 
What You Pay. The impacts of such initiatives will be felt 
increasingly with respect to regulatory compliance by the 
extractive industries. These are not the only cross-cutting 
topics, but they cover the most important ones.
Chapter 10 addresses issues of governance that bring 
together several strands in the Sourcebook and look forward 
to practical implementation of this body of knowledge in 
specific contexts.
Accessing the Sourcebook
The Sourcebook has two principal ways of meeting demand 
for specialist knowledge. It has an electronic version (www 
.eisourcebook.org) and a printed version. In many 
countries access to electronic media is easier and faster than 
access to a printed copy. The scope of an online version is 
also as broad as the imagination of the persons creating and 
operating it and as deep as the demands its users dictate. It 
can provide a guide but also supply the user with case stud-
ies and examples of primary and secondary source material 
on a large scale. It can lay the foundations of a dedicated 
program of education in specific areas such as revenue 
management or contract design. It can allow the 
Sourcebook’s objectives to be met in a way that the printed 
copy cannot.
The electronic version taps the potential of a medium 
ideally suited to building a compendium of knowledge, 
using open-source architecture to permit new contributions 
from a global end-user community with frequent updates 
based on committee peer review of new submissions. This is 
reinforced by hundreds of examples of contracts, regulatory 
instruments, development toolkits, and annotated bibliog-
raphies. Third-party comments or contributions are invited 
and are posted subject to light review. Research papers are 
specially commissioned from Sourcebook partners to address 
knowledge gaps and are publicly available.
Since its launch in late 2012 the online version of the 
Sourcebook has grown to reach an audience of almost 10,000 
unique users a month, including visitors from all of the 
continents and most of the resource-rich countries on the 
IMF list.
The online version of the Sourcebook is also intended to 
facilitate end-user dialogue and discussion; it includes an 
interface for comments and interacts effectively with several 
other web platforms. One of these is the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and World Bank Institute’s 
Governance of Extractive Industries (GOXI) website.16
The print version complements the online version but 
has a style and content that matches the potential and the 
limits of this form. It recognizes not only some readers’ 
individual preferences for print but also the fact that in 
some countries Internet connections are not yet reliable 
enough to permit regular access to the online Sourcebook. 
For teaching purposes, a hard copy also has some advan-
tages over an electronic form.
Both the hard copy and the electronic versions use a box 
feature to highlight particular issues, national experiences, 
or special initiatives.
Irrespective of the form, knowledge in the Sourcebook is 
layered like a geological structure. The principal layer or 
bedrock is the narrative contained in each of the Sourcebook’s 
chapters. This is the principal content of the hard 
copy version and is also available in the online version. 
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This layer is the foundation for comments and diverse views 
and experiences that are added to the online version by 
users. In the hard copy, such examples of diverse views and 
experiences are provided in the text, the footnotes, and end-
of-chapter suggestions for further reading (“Other 
Resources”). The online version also provides access to an 
annotated bibliography, linked to brief summaries of docu-
ments, comprising both primary and secondary source 
material. A further level is provided in the online version by 
the growing body of attachments containing annotated 
sample texts and documents, such as laws, model contracts, 
and actual contracts; commentaries and studies by indepen-
dent bodies, industry associations, and advocacy groups; 
and policy documents. This is in turn supplemented by a 
layer comprising papers on knowledge gaps; these docu-
ments have been commissioned by the Sourcebook to 
address issues that our consultations have identified as 
inadequately researched or that have acquired a new signifi-
cance in the existing body of knowledge. The cumulative 
effect of the layering approach is to allow the user to dig ever 
more deeply into a particular topic of interest.
1.5 OUR APPROACH
Globally, there are a number of knowledge centers or policy 
institutes that specialize in the development issues that the 
Sourcebook has identified as priorities. Usually, these are 
institutions or units with extensive exposure to societies 
where there is strong demand for knowledge about EI 
development. The knowledge centers have provided them 
with assistance in contract negotiation, on-site workshops, 
and long-term advice on legal and fiscal arrangements. In 
virtually all cases, they are responding to a need for addi-
tional capacity in the state requesting assistance. Their goal 
is to apply specialist expertise to specific problems that 
urgently need to be addressed, and these fall within the cat-
egories of the EI Value Chain.
In developing its compendium, the Sourcebook project 
has taken a first step toward establishing a global knowledge 
consortium that brings together specialist centers and uni-
versities, convenes discussions, and participates in knowl-
edge management. It has showcased their research into the 
core subjects of the debate on development in the EI sector. 
The lead partner in the Sourcebook consortium is the 
University of Dundee’s Centre for Energy, Petroleum, and 
Mineral Law and Policy in the United Kingdom. 
From a core of partners, the Sourcebook consortium has 
grown to include more than a dozen centers and aims to 
expand further to ensure a genuinely international 
collaborative approach. The key criterion for inclusion has 
been international recognition of the organization’s research 
relevant to the EI sectors. The disciplines are varied, from 
economics and law to environmental and policy analysis. As 
a result, an embryonic international network of diverse 
institutions with specialist knowledge is now developing. Its 
goal is to incorporate a set of varied inputs on good practice 
around the world into the Sourcebook, which lies at the 
heart of the network.
In its first phase, the international partners included the 
Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining at the University 
of Queensland (Brisbane, Australia), the Center for 
Sustainability in Mining and Industry at the University 
of Witwatersrand (Johannesburg, South Africa), the 
World Bank and a partnership with the Mining Committee 
of the International Bar Association (London, United 
Kingdom). This grouping has developed significantly since 
the Sourcebook was launched in September 2011. Partners 
now include WWF International; the Columbia Center on 
Sustainable International Investment, a partnership between 
Columbia Law School and the Earth Institute at Columbia 
University (New York); the University of Bourgogne’s Centre 
de recherche sur le droit des marchés et des investissements 
internationaux (Center for International Investment Law) 
(France); the Energy and Minerals Institute at the University 
of Western Australia; the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative; and the University of Calgary’s School of Public 
Policy (Canada). Civil society groups that have joined 
include Global Witness, PACT (a not-for-profit international 
development organization), OpenOil, and the Natural 
Resource Governance Institute. Leading capacity-building 
bodies now affiliated include the African Center for Economic 
Transformation (Accra, Ghana), the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, Evidence and Lessons from Latin America 
(ELLA), the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, 
Metals and Sustainable Development, and Adam Smith 
International (London). Well established as the foremost 
source of standards in transparency are the World Bank and 
the Inter-American Development Bank. To ensure that the 
Sourcebook properly accesses industry practice, partnership 
status has also been given to leading associations of compa-
nies in the EI sector or related bodies: the International 
Council on Mining and Metals, the International Tax and 
Investment Center, and the International Petroleum Industry 
Environmental Conservation Association.
A feature of the research collaboration within the 
Sourcebook consortium is that a partner may bid for work 
that fills an identified knowledge gap. Such work may be 
specially commissioned for inclusion in the online version 
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of the Sourcebook. Works carried out to date by Sourcebook 
partners are referenced in this narrative and are available in 
full on the Sourcebook website. These are accompanied by 
Sourcebook briefs, which summarize the objectives, con-
tents, and conclusions of each of these specially commis-
sioned works.
Reaching out
In reaching out to its target audience, the Sourcebook com-
plements a number of valuable, related initiatives directed 
at improved governance of the EI sectors.17
Overarching principles have been produced in recent 
years by various expert bodies, from the Africa Mining 
Vision and the EITI to the Intergovernmental Forum on 
Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development 
and the Natural Resources Charter. A selection of these 
initiatives is listed in the readings at the end of the chapter, 
and comprehensive mapping of many of these initiatives 
has been included in the online version of the Sourcebook.
These principles for the most part center on good gover-
nance and achieving a positive, sustainable developmental 
impact and a reduction in poverty through careful attention 
to the management of the EI sectors. Success in implement-
ing them depends on a range of what may be considered 
technical inputs or practices, primarily legal and economic, 
covering the EI sector value chain, and success will necessar-
ily be constrained by political economy considerations, 
which will vary from state to state. These goals and these 
paths are the subject matter of the Sourcebook.
1.6 CONCLUSIONS
The principal justification for EI lies in its power to convert 
natural capital into other assets that can rapidly accelerate 
the shift away from poverty in many of the world’s develop-
ing countries. To be effective, however, this transformation 
needs to take place within a transparent framework of 
sound institutions established to ensure that EI develop-
ment puts more into societies than it takes out.
The rapidly growing number of states that rely on oil, 
gas, and mining for much of their revenue has created an 
urgent need for practical knowledge that draws on the most 
recent research and experience. Some of this research and 
experience challenges established knowledge in the five EI 
Value Chain areas identified as crucial by the Sourcebook 
project. However, many techniques, instruments, and poli-
cies have been tried and tested over the years and remain of 
value to nascent and established resource-rich states.
The Sourcebook relies upon capture of the existing knowl-
edge frontier in five key areas across several disciplines; it 
seeks to equip its users to better respond to the issues that 
challenge EI sector management and development. Through 
its online and printed versions, the Sourcebook can contrib-
ute to unlocking the opportunities offered by EI and so 
transform policy interventions for the better.
The Sourcebook’s premise is that no two resource-rich coun-
tries can or should manage their resources in the same way, 
leaving each country with important choices about the type of 
regime that suits its unique combination of circumstances, 
including its institutional structure and level of social and eco-
nomic development. For decision makers and their advisers, 
for parliamentarians charged with oversight of these decisions, 
and for others such as civil society groups, the Sourcebook is a 
guide to good practice in the management of upstream oil, gas, 
and mining sectors, across the entire EI Value Chain, from the 
award of rights to the expenditure of resource revenues.
NOTES
 1. “Resource-rich” countries make up one-third of the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) members; they are 
dependent on extractive industry revenues for their future 
prosperity (IMF 2012a, 6). The IMF has distinguished four 
groups of these countries: 29 resource-rich developing coun-
tries; 12 prospective natural-resource-exporting, low- or 
lower-middle-income countries (defined according to a 
World Bank classification); 14 upper-middle-income, 
resource-rich economies; and 8 high-income, resource-rich 
countries (IMF 2012b, 47–49). In earlier research, it identi-
fied over 35 developing states as “petroleum rich” and 20 
states as “mineral rich based on the following criteria: (1) an 
average five-year share of petroleum or mineral fiscal reve-
nues in total fiscal revenues of at least 25 percent or (2) an 
average share of petroleum or mineral export proceeds of at 
least 25 percent. In most cases the observed shares are well in 
excess of 25 percent” (IMF 2007, app. I).
 2. For example, the Africa Progress Panel notes, “Far from 
being hostage to a noncurable resource curse, this generation 
of political leaders has an opportunity to harness resource 
wealth for a transformation in human development” (APP 
2013, 8). Even for a high-income, resource-rich, diversified 
economy, such as the United States, the economic benefits of 
large-scale development of unconventional oil and gas 
resources have been spectacular.
 3. Throughout the Sourcebook, “mining” excludes petro-
leum products and natural gas, although these are also 
minerals and are “mined.” This is a conventional definition, 
which includes coal and uranium and which the Sourcebook 
follows.
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 4. The McKinsey Global Institute (2013), defines resource-
driven countries as those economies where the oil, gas, and 
mineral sectors play a dominant role, using three criteria: 
(1) resources account for more than 20 percent of exports, 
(2) resources generate more than 20 percent of fiscal 
revenue, or (3) resource rents are more than 10 percent of 
 economic output.
 5. The literature on this subject is vast, with the term being 
used by a large number of writers. It is discussed further in 
chapter 2 of the Sourcebook. One of the earliest examinations 
of the thesis is in Richard Auty’s (1993) Sustaining 
Development in Mineral Economics: The Resource Curse 
Thesis.
 6. Here “resource-rich developing countries” means the 
low- and middle-income countries with exhaustible natural 
resources (such as oil, gas, and minerals) that comprise at 
least 20 percent of total exports or 20 percent of natural 
resource revenues (IMF 2012b, 6).
 7. There are many sources of evidence for this. For exam-
ple, an IMF (2012b, 6) paper states, “A natural resource 
‘curse’ is neither universal nor inevitable; growth may 
depend heavily on other factors, such as policies and the 
quality of institutions.” See also APP 2013.
 8. The IMF (2012b, 47) listed among “prospective natural 
resource-exporting developing countries” the following: 
Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Madagascar, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra 
Leone, Tanzania, and Togo.
 9. The robust debate about future resource management in 
Norway, widely recognized as one of the world’s best man-
aged resource-rich economies, is illustrative of the continued 
dynamic that these issues foster.
 10. Environmental assessment is present not only at the 
project proposal stage. It is typically applied to policy choices 
and to regional planning, to assess the cumulative impacts of 
numerous projects within the same catchment area.
 11. These include Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation, AusAid, Canadian International Development 
Assistance, Commonwealth Secretariat, U.K. Department 
for International Development, and African Center for 
Economic Transformation.
 12. Recommendations for environmental and social impact 
assessment, for example, will make little sense if they are sub-
mitted to governments with no capacity to implement them.
 13. As a recent study notes, “The credibility, quality, trans-
parency, and accountability of policy-making processes, 
public institutions, the legal and regulatory climate, and sec-
tor governance are major determinants of how successfully 
countries can channel their resource wealth into sustainable 
development” (Barma et al. 2012).
 14. In some versions of the value chain the emphasis is on 
the decision to extract and getting a good deal as the first 
links in the chain or award of contracts and licenses. This 
version takes explicit account of the need for a legal frame-
work without which no investor will have security of ten-
ure and will therefore be unable, in most cases, to secure 
financing to commence extraction in the event of a com-
mercial discovery. The need to have such a legal structure 
in place may be assumed by the notion of award of con-
tracts and licenses, but this underplays the influence of EI 
laws and model contracts at the prediscovery stage in 
attracting investment into the host country. In this respect, 
the Sourcebook follows the work of Mehlum, Moene, and 
Torvik (2006), who use a measure of institutional quality 
that takes into account the rule of law, bureaucratic qual-
ity, government corruption, a risk of expropriation, and 
government repudiation of contracts (all common to 
political risk analysis) and conclude that the main reason 
for diverging country experiences of EI resource develop-
ment is differences in the quality of institutions. There are 
no direct measures of democracy or accountability used in 
this analysis.
 15. A recent research tool in this area is the World Bank’s 
Mining Governance Assessment (MGA) tool, designed to 
facilitate understanding of the convergence of governance, 
competitiveness, growth, and investment issues related to 
the mining sector in developing countries. It was launched at 
the Cape Town Indaba on February 9, 2015.
 16. UNDP and World Bank Institute, Governance of 
Extractive Industries (GOXI) website, www.goxi.org.
 17. See Other Resources at the end of this chapter.
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
The strategic character and macroeconomic significance 
of the extractive industries (EIs) is not in doubt. They con-
cern economically crucial natural resources—oil, gas, and 
minerals— located underground or beneath water and capable 
of being extracted and marketed by human endeavor. Their 
extensive applications in the modern, globalized economy are 
well known. Looking ahead, minerals from hard-rock mining 
will provide critically important materials for more sustain-
able economies of the future. The same cannot be said of oil 
and coal, even if a pragmatic approach suggests we may have 
no choice but to continue their development.
Chapter 2 reviews some of the dominant thinking about 
the opportunities and challenges of resource-led develop-
ment and explains in detail the approach of the Oil, Gas, 
and Mining: A Sourcebook for Understanding the Extractive 
Industries. It charts the emergence of the “development 
model,” which sees positive outcomes from EI activity if 
certain conditions are fulfilled. It also provides a summary 
of the main themes in a very extensive and rich body of lit-
erature, in ways that might benefit those unfamiliar with it 
or who are unable to access much of it.1 It has no preten-
sions to being more than an introduction.
Current thinking on the interaction between natural 
resource policy and development policy is still evolving in the 
light of research and lessons from practice. The end of the 
long boom from around 2003 to 2012–13 has triggered 
rethinking and fresh analysis. Further insights and policy 
recommendations can be expected. Changing perspectives 
on mining over the past 15 years have significantly shifted the 
focus from large-scale, capital-intensive mining operations to 
the mining sector as a whole, including artisanal and small-
scale mining, in assessments of sustainable futures. Other 
examples of changing perspectives include diverse efforts at 
integration of extractive industry investments into local com-
munities and the regional economy. These efforts include, for 
example, the design of local benefit policies on procurement 
and “resources-for-infrastructure” deals championed by 
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investors from various countries, including, notably, China. 
(See the Angola model, discussed under “9.3 Challenge 1: 
Leveraging EI Investments for Development” in chapter 9).
For the various governmental and nongovernmental 
bodies now seeking to influence or shape their domestic 
extractive industries, familiarity with the themes in this 
body of research can be useful. They inform—sometimes 
only implicitly—virtually all of the contemporary discus-
sion on policies for resource-led development. In effect, 
they set the parameters within which the initial strategic 
decision is made whether or not to engage in development 
through extraction. They also inform the design and choice 
of specific operational techniques and instruments, such as 
decisions on the kind and scope of rights allocated to inves-
tors, the way in which they are awarded, and the appropri-
ate schemes for sharing benefits among public and private 
parties. Their impact on our understanding of good practice 
has influenced the approach taken by the Sourcebook.
2.2 THE OPPORTUNITIES ARISING FROM 
RESOURCE ABUNDANCE
Wealth on the scale experienced in some resource-rich states, 
both absolute and relative, can generate significant positive 
development outcomes. Even for states with modest abun-
dance or prospects for petroleum or mineral deposits, the 
outcomes from resource development could be transforma-
tive. The potential to attract significant investment also exists. 
In the first decade of the 21st century, investments in mining 
were estimated at about US$80 billion, with much of this 
destined for iron ore and copper. Investments in hydrocar-
bons exploration and development by the largest 70 interna-
tional oil companies increased from US$315 billion in 2007 
to US$480 billion in 2011 (Ernst & Young 2012).
It is scale more than anything else that is the key to the 
flow of revenues in the EI sector. For lower-income coun-
tries, revenues resulting directly from the exploitation of 
resource wealth have the potential to exceed official aid flows 
by a very wide margin. In principle, such revenues could 
unlock the constraints of foreign exchange, savings, and 
public finance and support a broad range of social and physi-
cal infrastructure priorities common to developing states. 
These can include initiatives in the health, education, trans-
port, and telecoms sectors. Increased, well-designed public 
expenditure of resource revenues can promote both local 
employment and local ownership in economic activities, 
contributing not only to economic diversification, growth, 
and well-being but also to social and political stability. More 
and more countries face this prospect.
Figure 1.1 (chapter 1) depicts natural resources receipts in 
57 countries: oil, gas, and mining revenues made a significant 
contribution to the public finances of a growing number of 
countries from 2000 onward. In a study of 36 petroleum-rich 
countries, the portion of government revenues drawn from 
oil and gas operations ranged from 10 percent to 97 percent, 
with the average at 50 percent overall (Boadway and Keen 
2010). A separate listing of 10 mining-rich countries showed 
that mining’s share of total government revenue ranged 
between 1 percent and 44 percent, averaging 11 percent over-
all. Of the 35 countries most dependent upon mining, all but 
Australia and the Republic of Korea can be classified as devel-
oping countries, and of the top 70, no fewer than 63 are low-
income countries that could leverage their development 
prospects through mining (ICMM 2015).
The literature on resource development notes the many 
states that have already benefitted from the development of 
their petroleum and mineral resources. As Alan Gelb (2010) 
comments, “Developing countries as a whole have been 
remarkably successful in diversifying their economies and 
their export structures.” In the 1960s, he writes, about 
80 percent of developing country exports were primary 
commodities; 50 years later, almost 80 percent were indus-
trial products. Some have become major industrial powers; 
others have diversified within resource-based sectors (fresh 
produce, fish, and tourism, for example). For developing 
countries that are dependent on the export of minerals, 
however, it has proved harder to break free from depen-
dence on their dominant resource. Indeed, the number of 
countries heavily dependent on minerals for fiscal revenue 
and exports appears to be increasing (Gelb, Kaiser, and 
Vinuela 2012). Even so, in terms of economic development 
based on the extractive sector, there are undeniable success 
stories, including selected states in the Middle East and 
North Africa, Colombia and Peru in South America, and 
Malaysia in Southeast Asia. In the mining sector, Chile, 
Botswana, Brazil, Ghana, and South Africa are much-cited 
examples of states that have used their resource wealth ben-
eficially. In both India and China, the rapid pace of eco-
nomic growth in recent years is largely attributable to their 
access to large amounts of inexpensive energy through coal 
mining (which nonetheless internalizes environmental 
externalities). In later chapters, the Sourcebook will elabo-
rate on some of these examples of positive development.
Within this group, there are important differences in the 
development and diversification options open to countries in 
particular regions, a fact that has generated significant com-
ment. Export states of oil, gas, and other minerals can differ 
in many respects, such as population, labor force and skills, 
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location, levels of income, reserves, and the potential for 
other employment. This has a major impact on development 
and diversification policies. The oil-rich and labor-importing 
countries of the Persian Gulf have different priorities and 
challenges from oil-rich and labor-abundant countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. For low- or middle-income countries 
with substantial populations, large development needs, and a 
dominant resource sector, the entire approach to benefiting 
from resource development is different still. In their cases, a 
policy of short- to medium-term industrialization is unlikely 
to be a driving force. Moreover, the shortage of capital in 
such countries encourages them to draw on resource reve-
nues for domestic investment; in turn they will need strate-
gies for “investing in investing,” or building an institutional 
capacity to make good investments (Collier 2011, 127–29).
Nonetheless, there is an increasing appreciation among 
established and prospective resource-rich countries, civil 
society and donors that EI sector development can generate 
benefits to the economy beyond the direct contribution of 
revenues, through its links to other sectors. It can act as a 
catalyst for job creation, poverty reduction, and the estab-
lishment of forward and backward linkages (Liebenthal, 
Michelitsch, and Tarazona 2005, 1). The former can entail 
support for local or national small and medium-sized enter-
prises in building a role in the investors’ supply chains and 
developing nonresource dependent clusters of industrial 
activity. Backward linkages entail measures to process the 
resources or to use the resources to build local industry. 
Although the idea that governments should intervene to 
support broad-based economic growth is not new, the extent 
and type of intervention has evolved into policies designed to 
establish these linkages.
Benefits for the host country
The guiding idea is that in the long run a diversified econ-
omy can do better than one locked into resource exports. 
Three kinds of initiatives for harnessing a growing EI sector 
to reach development goals follow.
Local benefit policies. These are now seen as one way to 
create favorable linkages and build economic capital at the 
national and subnational levels (Tordo et al. 2013; World 
Bank 2015; Esteves, Coyne, and Moreno 2013). Large EI 
companies with millions of dollars of annual procurement 
can provide a significant business opportunity to the lo-
cal economy if they are prepared or encouraged to include 
local small and medium-size companies in their supply 
chain. In many respects, the EI sector is a small contributor 
to employment creation, but through indirect and induced 
employment in the supply chain and through the provision 
of support services, a specialized labor force may be built. It 
presents a window of opportunity, but attention to be paid 
to its long-term sustainability (for example, when facilities 
close down).
Resources for infrastructure. Infrastructure presents a 
viable opportunity when countries seek multiplier effects in 
the local economy from EI development. Its expansion can 
open up opportunities in other industries, including agri-
cultural exports and tourism. Yet gaps in infrastructure are 
one of the main bottlenecks to growth in developing coun-
tries. By leveraging investments and developing new initia-
tives, EI projects can create or expand critical infrastructure 
and unlock regional development potential.2 This can include 
improvements in power, roads, rail, ports, and information 
and communication grids. In practical terms, financing is a 
key issue. In Africa, this has been a particularly acute problem. 
Some new investors have been willing to finance infrastructure 
(mostly hydropower projects and railways) in return for rights 
to natural resource exploitation and contracts in “resource for 
infrastructure” transactions and for diplomatic ties with the 
host government. Some of the major transactions have been 
government-to-government ones between the China Export-
Import Bank and countries in Africa, such as the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, that are unable to provide adequate finan-
cial guarantees to back their loan commitments. The thrust 
of such transactions is that the country’s resources act as col-
lateral to expand production, to rationalize transport, and to 
make exports more efficient through the grant of finance.
Resource corridors. The effect of investment opportuni-
ties on infrastructure can be both long term and regional, 
creating multistate zones and so-called resource corridors. 
The idea behind this spatial development initiative is to 
counter the enclave (small-scale, local, geographically lim-
ited) impact that is typical of hydrocarbons and mining 
projects by using large, commercial oil, gas, and mineral 
investments (and their need for infrastructure and goods 
and services) to anchor opportunities for broader economic 
growth and diversification within the immediately impact-
ed communities. The policy goal is a viable and diversified 
economic space, which would not occur through market 
forces alone.3 Meeting the goal requires two key elements: 
the establishment of a viable financial framework based on 
the expected increase of government revenues as a result 
of EI activity, and capacity building among government, 
private sector, and civil society to develop and implement 
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 development plans. This approach would be inclusive of the 
impacted communities.
For an ambitious government, EI sector activities can be 
leveraged to generate economic development that may be 
wider and longer lasting than the EI sector activities them-
selves. This includes beneficial impacts that may well be 
regional as well as national in character. In combination, 
they provide an important justification for supporting the 
EI sector in spite of the challenges that this presents to many 
governments (discussed in section 2.3).
Local benefits are considered at greater length in chapter 
9 of the Sourcebook. We also note the shifts in thinking about 
mining, particularly the sector known as artisanal and small-
scale mining (ASM), that have taken place in recent years. 
These create the potential to open opportunities for the 
inclusion of this sector in overall plans for the development 
of the mining sector in resource-rich countries (see box 2.1).
Grounds for optimism about the likely success of these 
linkages to development policy are provided by the following 
considerations:
The contribution of investors
Resources-for-infrastructure transactions underline an 
important trend over the past decade: the growing partici-
pation of private and other corporate investors in promot-
ing integrated sustainable development at local regional 
levels, locating their transformative investments in a devel-
opment context. An early lead in this was taken by Chinese 
companies in Africa (see discussion in chapter 9). However, 
industry associations in the oil, gas, and mining sectors 
remain active in developing guidelines, toolkits, and manu-
als for and with their members to raise the level of best 
practice in their operations, especially in terms of their 
social and environmental impacts.
A failure to do so is increasingly perceived by investors as 
creating a risk to their “social license to operate.” To counter 
this, they will typically seek to harness the synergies between 
public and private investment to ensure that EI projects in 
poor regions contribute to optimizing the development 
potential of local, national, and regional communities affected 
by these transformative projects. This requires industry and 
government to engage in avoidance, mitigation, and amelio-
ration of environmental and social damage. At the very least, 
community consultations must occur.4 Oil, gas, and mining 
companies could also demonstrate good corporate citizen-
ship through policies of local sourcing. The Sourcebook 
includes examples of their willingness to engage with host 
governments in maximizing social benefits from EI activities.
Discovery and development
Recent research has documented the frequency and scale of 
new discoveries of hydrocarbons and minerals and the role 
of enhanced development in expanding known resource 
reserves and supplementing them with, for example, shale 
gas and oil (Gelb, Kaiser, and Vinuela 2012). Further, as a 
result of technological changes, the market value of known 
natural resources can change by making them easier to 
extract or by increasing the amounts that may be 
Box 2.1 Changing Perspectives: Reframing the ASM Debate
Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) has under-
gone reframing by the international community over 
the past few decades (see chapter 9). This affects the 
understanding of what ASM is, how it is organized, 
and what type of activity it undertakes. The new 
framing has had significant impacts on approaches to 
resolving challenges that face this subsector, leading 
to a variety of different approaches. For example, if 
one considers ASM a poverty-alleviation strategy, 
then approaches typically focus on it as a develop-
ment opportunity, a practice in need of a policing 
exercise, or one requiring ways to transition practi-
tioners out of mining and into economic alternatives. 
By contrast, if ASM is considered a viable economic 
activity, then the focus of the agenda becomes 
increasing productivity through technology, access 
to finance, and better organizational representation. 
Policy choices may cover a range of these perspectives 
depending on the national ASM demographic. The 
first question to ask is whether the people wish to 
remain as miners or to leave for opportunities else-
where. New research suggests that many miners now 
consider such mining a profession (Hilson 2010; 
Hayes and Perks 2011). This has implications for the 
design of policy.
The challenge of the ASM sector becomes a question 
of how one sees ASM in the first place: as an opportunity 
or a problem.
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discovered. Calculating a resource horizon for extractive 
industries can therefore be a challenge, as the horizon often 
recedes into the future (Daniel et al. 2013). Many geological 
parts of Africa are also seriously undermapped, suggesting 
that a great deal of resources remain to be developed.
2.3 THE CHALLENGES
Many observers have noted that, all too frequently, develop-
ment outcomes in the EI sector are less potent and less benefi-
cial than expected.5 Indeed, the outcomes can become highly 
damaging to the resource-rich state. Resource-rich develop-
ing states typically underperform economically relative to 
non-resource-rich peers. They score badly against critical 
human development indicators, experience environmental 
degradation, and see more than their fair share of social and 
political instability and violent conflict. Taken together, fac-
tors such as these have led some to describe the outcomes as 
the “resource curse” or the “paradox of plenty” (Auty 1993; 
Karl 1999).6 This linkage of oil, gas, and mining development 
with negative outcomes has become common currency 
among policy makers, academics, civil society members, and 
the media.7 Probably due to the very large rents in the oil sec-
tor, it fares particularly unfavorably in such negative out-
comes as violent conflict and corruption.8 Research into these 
negative—or at least disappointing—outcomes has generated 
a rich and diverse literature of case studies and theoretical 
perspectives for analysis of the challenges that undoubtedly 
arise in the extractive industries (Humphreys, Sachs, and 
Stiglitz 2007; Hogan and Sturzenegger 2010). However, a 
body of opinion has emerged countering the idea that nega-
tive outcomes are inevitable.9 It seeks to identify the features 
of EI development that may lead to those negative outcomes, 
with a view to facilitating interventions in policy that may 
mitigate their effects.10 The most commonly observed nega-
tive features are reviewed briefly in the following material.
Technical factors
The three technical or nonpolitical factors most commonly 
identified as contributing to the resource curse are (1) revenue 
volatility, (2) the so-called Dutch Disease, and (3) resource 
exhaustion.
Revenue volatility. The volatility of petroleum and min-
eral prices and hence a large proportion of revenues is well 
documented, but arguably the challenges facing resource-
rich economies of managing the long-term uncertainty of 
commodity prices have been underestimated. For some 
researchers, this has been identified as “one of the most 
damaging aspects of resource dependence” (van der Ploeg 
and Venables 2011, 18). Over the past 15 years, the price of 
oil has increased fivefold, fallen 50 percent, and then dou-
bled again (see  figure 2.1), only to trend downward and 
then drop by almost 50 percent in the second half of 2014. 
Over a longer period, the average annual change in oil prices 
has been close to 30 percent (Lipsky 2009). Mineral prices 
have shown similar volatility (see figure 2.2). Between early 
2011 and early 2015, iron ore prices had fallen by 70 per-
cent, coal by 54 percent, and copper by 40 percent (Sachs 
and Maennling 2015). This will translate into more volatile 
budgetary revenues for  exporters of these resources. Indeed, 
revenues are on average at least 60 percent more volatile for 
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resource-rich countries, and spending volatility has been 
even greater, according to an IMF (2012, 12) study.
Natural gas prices are based on markets that have a 
regional character in contrast to crude oil, rooted in the dif-
ficulties and cost of moving it across long distances. As one 
observer has noted, “[There is] no particular reason why 
different regional markets for natural gas need to move in 
step with one another—and they frequently do not—but 
natural gas shares many of the same demand drivers as oil, 
and indeed other commodities, and over time, tends to 
experience similar price cycles” (IMF and World Bank 
[2017], illustrated by figure 2.3).
Volatility on this scale makes macroeconomic manage-
ment difficult under the best of circumstances. Among the 
consequences are budget deficits and increased borrowing; 
painful fiscal adjustments and the need for systems to manage 
them, lower capital investment and delayed or cancelled proj-
ects, lower rent generation and pressures for fiscal incentives 
to maintain investment, and exchange rate fluctuation.11 The 
challenge of volatility is compounded by the fact that the scale 
and direction of price changes are unknown, or at least very 
uncertain. As an IMF source has noted, “Booms and busts can 
involve prices moving by as much as 40–80 percent for as long 
as a decade” (IMF 2015b, 2). Price forecasts in the resource 
sectors have also been notoriously inaccurate (see figure 2.4). 
As a leading petroleum expert noted, “What is remarkable 
about the 2014 price rout is not that it happened, but that it 
seemed largely unexpected by market commentators and 
financial institutions” (Skinner 2015, 1). In this broad histori-
cal context, we can safely assume that disruptive boom-bust 
expenditure cycles are a likely risk in the extractives sector.
Figure 2.4 A Poor Record of Forecasting Oil Prices
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While price volatility is the most common source of 
resource revenue volatility, volatility may also result from 
the discovery and exploitation of major new and unexpected 
resource deposits.
Dutch disease. This phenomenon involves significant ap-
preciation of a resource-rich state’s real exchange rate.12 This 
appreciation puts upward pressure on domestic prices, is at-
tributable to a sudden and major inflow of foreign exchange 
associated with resource exports. As a result, preexisting 
nonresource exports and import-competing industries lose 
their competitiveness, and domestic labor and capital shift 
to the resource and nontradable sectors, which diminishes 
the host state’s economic diversity. This shift often comes 
with adverse consequences on employment because shrink-
ing sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing are labor-
intensive and the expanding resource sectors typically are 
not. In addition to restraining economic diversification, 
Dutch Disease also increases a state’s vulnerability to shocks 
stemming from the resource sector. These shocks frequently 
precipitate social and political unrest, particularly between 
resource-producing and non-resource-producing regions 
within countries. This underscores the importance of policy 
responses to exchange rate appreciation.
Resource exhaustion. Oil, gas, and mineral resources are 
by their nature exhaustible, and by implication so are the 
exports on which the countries depend. This requires policy 
makers to plan in advance for resource decline and even-
tual exhaustion, identifying a resource horizon.13 It requires 
recognition on their part that EI-generated revenues are the 
transformation of assets in the ground into other assets. As 
one authority on mining commented, “Once such resources 
have been extracted their physical form is profoundly altered 
and they can never be replaced in the same state” (Crow-
son 2009). However, planning for the decline and eventual 
end to resource exploitation and associated revenues is a 
difficult task that is rarely executed in resource-rich states. 
A failure to plan, however, is likely to result in a need for 
wrenching and destabilizing economic adjustments. Of the 
three technical factors, exhaustibility is often seen as unique 
to EI, because the resources are nonrenewable.14
Political factors
In addition to the technical factors that contribute to nega-
tive outcomes from resource development, political factors 
play a role. These have proven even more difficult for policy 
makers to address. As a leading development economist 
noted, “Although the initial explanation for the resource 
curse, Dutch Disease, was purely economic, it has gradually 
become evident that the key issues are political” (Collier 
2010, 1105).
A common thread in much of the recent literature is the 
central role of government behavior: for example, in col-
lecting, managing, and distributing revenues.15 At the same 
time, there is an element of critique: “Governments have 
not always been the best stewards of these resources, 
increasing the clamor for better governance and social 
accountability for natural resource use” (Canuto 2012, xi). 
To operationalize this critique and encourage improve-
ments, efforts have been made to measure the quality of 
governance in the oil, gas, and mining sectors of many 
countries. One example is the Resource Governance Index 
produced by the Natural Resource Governance Institute.16 
Taking a sample of 58 countries that collectively produce 85 
percent of the world’s petroleum, 90 percent of its dia-
monds, and 80 percent of its copper, it is a diagnostic tool 
to help identify good practices and governance shortcom-
ings. An initial finding is that more than half of the top 
performers are middle-income countries: Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago. This 
suggests that being a wealthy country is by no means a pre-
condition for good governance.
Underlying this concern with governance is an aware-
ness of a dynamic that links EI activities to the formation or 
exacerbation of institutional weakness.17 When a state’s 
primary revenue stream is coming from natural resource 
rents, tax revenue from other economic sectors becomes 
less important.18 There are likely to be few linkages with the 
rest of a resource-producing state’s economy due to the 
capital-intensive nature of the EI sector industries, and the 
fact that, in many cases, the industry is dominated by for-
eign entities. Dependency on the EI sector for revenue can 
weaken a state’s taxation system, which in turn may under-
mine the accountability of its rulers.19 Resource-rich states 
can substitute tax revenues with resource revenue, distort-
ing the relationship between taxation and representation.
This “independence” of resource revenues from the gen-
eral population can make it easier for elites in some states to 
manipulate those revenues for personal or political gain at 
the expense of the public good.20 Furthermore, the com-
plexity and opacity that is characteristic of many resource 
sector operations tends to obscure waste and abuse. The 
sheer scale of resource revenues, whether measured in abso-
lute terms or in terms of the margins they generate, has also 
proved a lightning rod for graft and corruption (Le Billon 
2011, 2).21 In fragile states where property rights are not 
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strongly rooted, the prospect of large resource revenue 
flows can trigger destructive rent-seeking competition.
Such considerations can erode accountability not only in 
the resource sectors, but also in society and the economy as 
a whole (Le Billon 2011, 3). When scored against almost 
any indicator of good governance, country comparisons 
usually find developing states with a high dependence on 
resources for their development in the bottom third of any 
list.22 However, it is sometimes argued that failures to prop-
erly manage resource wealth are the consequence of preex-
isting governance problems. This merits some consideration. 
On the one hand, there appears to be ample evidence to 
support the claim that causality runs from resource wealth 
to weakened governance (Le Billon 2011, 3, n. 11). On the 
other hand, evidence suggests that the strength of this link 
is influenced by a state’s political and institutional context 
(Le Billon 2011, 10). If it was institutionally weak before the 
resources were developed, it will tend to become weaker. 
The key point here, however, is not that institutional qual-
ity can be impaired by the impact of resource wealth but 
that little of this effect is attributable to natural resource 
endowments per se.
Global norms and standards can play an important role 
in strengthening accountability in the extractive industries 
and their development impacts at a country and project 
level. The ways in which key stakeholders have sought to 
strengthen sector governance norms and standards are con-
sidered in chapter 8 of the Sourcebook. Among the many 
examples, note the promotion of transparency in resource 
revenue management by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF 2007, app. I). These multilateral and donor-led initia-
tives attempt to promote inclusive and equitable outcomes, 
taking into account distinct producer and investor country 
concerns, and to reduce the potentially substantial costs of 
nontransparent practices. The trend is now to explore spe-
cific requirements for contract transparency and the assess-
ment of economic, social, and environmental impacts.
Other challenges facing policy makers
guarantees of long-term stability. What guarantees 
of fiscal, legal, and regulatory regime stability should a gov-
ernment provide to a foreign entity investing in that state’s 
resource sector? What kind of limitations to its freedom to 
make changes at a later date can, or should, a government 
agree? Such guarantees will usually be sought by foreign 
investors at the initial stage of contract negotiations when 
resource-rich states are normally eager to agree to terms 
that will induce an investment commitment. They tend to 
be offered by states with an eye to similar efforts by neigh-
boring states to attract capital investment. However, these 
stability provisions often come under strain at later stages of 
the investment if a significant geological or commercial suc-
cess is realized. This phenomenon has been characterized 
differently by commentators from various disciplines: by 
economists as “time inconsistency,” by lawyers as “stability 
of contract,” and by political scientists as “the credibility of 
intertemporal commitments.”23 These issues are discussed 
in detail in chapter 4 of the Sourcebook.
Defining a fair share. How is a government to ensure 
that a fair share of economic rent goes to the resource owner 
(the public citizens of the host state vis-á-vis private inves-
tors) without undermining the investor’s confidence in un-
dertaking the risk?24 This is comprehensively discussed in 
chapter 6 of the Sourcebook. In practice, many factors affect 
how economic benefits are split, including considerations 
such as the maturity of the EI sector in a state, the amount of 
real and perceived political risk, and the types of commod-
ity involved. The growing impact of measures to promote 
transparency is relevant here.
Designing a competitive legal framework. In view 
of the global competition for capital, how does a govern-
ment design a legal and regulatory regime that can be com-
petitive with those in similarly situated resource-producing 
states elsewhere? There is an international dimension to the 
design of legal and regulatory frameworks in resource-rich 
states. On the one hand, they should be designed in a man-
ner that fosters gradual and sustainable growth at home, 
including diversification into non-EI sectors (World Bank 
2006). On the other hand, they need to attract investors 
who shop around on the international market for places to 
locate their investments. This challenge is comprehensively 
discussed in chapter 4 of the Sourcebook, while aspects of 
international taxation are discussed in chapter 6.
Energy conservation and environmental  protection. 
How is a government to improve the efficiency of operations 
and reduce emissions and other impacts on the environment 
by means of well-defined policies and appropriate guidelines? 
This and other issues relevant to sustainability, such as maxi-
mizing positives from extractives development and avoiding 
negatives, are discussed in chapter 9 of the Sourcebook. Even 
in cases where EI sector development has made positive 
economic contributions in resource-rich states—such as 
in Guyana and the Philippines—environmental costs have 
been high and have not been well managed and  mitigated. 
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 Nowadays, good practice in petroleum and mineral develop-
ment argues strongly in favor of mechanisms that minimize 
negative environmental and social impacts. However, the 
way in which this is done involves a critical appraisal of the 
institutional structure, because that is where the problems 
often commence.
2.4 UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGES: 
CHANGING PERSPECTIVES
Research into the benefits and costs of extractive resource 
development has been voluminous and has gone through a 
number of phases over the years, influenced by real country 
experiences, such as the sudden wealth acquired by Middle 
East oil states in the 1970s and early 1980s.25 The principal 
indicators used by researchers have been growth, conflict, 
and democracy. Initial work by development economists in 
the early 1960s was broadly optimistic about the benefits, 
arguing that natural resource abundance would enable 
developing countries to make the transition from underde-
velopment to an industrial take-off. A decade later the trend 
had begun to swing sharply against this view, influenced by 
the Dutch Disease phenomenon. Natural resource wealth 
became associated with slower growth, greater inequalities, 
and impoverishment in rural areas, as well as bad institu-
tions and increased risk of civil conflict in the literature of 
the 1990s.26
Some of the assumptions on which the resource curse 
literature is based have not stood up well. The influential 
thesis by Sachs and Warner (2001) that there is a robust 
inverse relationship between growth and resource riches 
was qualified by Hausmann and Rigobon (2003), who point 
out that oil-rich economies performed well economically in 
the 1980s when oil was doing well, contrary to what one 
would expect from the Dutch Disease thesis. Lederman and 
Maloney (2007) have argued, drawing on case studies, that 
resource wealth combined with appropriate policies and 
institutions can contribute significantly to long-term 
growth. Alexeev and Conrad (2009) argue that the resource 
curse with respect to oil is elusive, and this conclusion 
applies to the alleged impact on institutions. They argue 
that econometrics used in previous studies contained 
flaws.27 More recent work has become markedly more posi-
tive, probably because it adopts a longer historical time 
series on natural resources than earlier research did. It 
focuses on isolating the within-country relationship 
between natural resource revenues and economic growth or 
democracy, and finally it employs measures of resource 
abundance per se, instead of economic dependence upon 
natural resource wealth. Attention has also shifted to other 
important issues, not least the capacity of institutions in 
host countries to manage EI activity. As van der Ploeg and 
Poelheke write, “Natural resources can be a blessing for 
countries with the institutional means to spend the pro-
ceeds wisely (van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009, 19).
Political economy
The linkage of economics to politics has provoked a grow-
ing interest in political economy among development spe-
cialists. The line of thought is that a focus on extractive 
resources as the source of problems is mistaken; instead, 
the problems are better understood as arising from institu-
tions or from the interaction between institutions and 
resources.28 In some countries a narrow concentration of 
political power has been identified as an important variable 
in conditioning the potential for negative development 
outcomes. Hence, a political economy form of analysis 
would direct attention to the particular way in which insti-
tutions distribute or concentrate power and examine the 
implications for possible effects of resources on economic 
growth, corruption, conflict, and other variables. This 
approach is thought to capture “the interplay between poli-
tics and valuable natural assets,” which is responsible for 
negative effects: “politics can affect the exploitation of nat-
ural assets, and natural assets can affect politics” (Collier 
2010, 1106).29 It has led economists to focus on the particu-
lar challenges that companies face in striking credible deals 
in weak institutional settings.30 This focus has resulted in a 
number of innovative implications for contract design.31 
Barma et al. (2012) build on the results of several existing 
studies to identify two dimensions: political inclusiveness 
and intertemporal credibility. The first is needed if coun-
tries are to spend rents in a broadly developmental way. 
The second allows countries to contract efficiently with EI 
companies and manage intertemporal volatility. A typology 
using these two dimensions leads to principles for enhanc-
ing the development orientation of the EI sector.
Assessments of political systems and their effects have 
often been skeptical. Among them is the conclusion of 
Collier (2010, 1106) that “the political systems best suited to 
harnessing natural assets are those least likely to develop 
once natural assets have become important in the econ-
omy.” Even democracy proves insufficient: if there are no 
effective checks and balances on power, competition for 
natural resource rents can make democracies malfunc-
tion.32 The management of resource wealth contrasts with 
normal taxation: it does not invite public scrutiny and 
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accountability and encourages the emergence of patronage 
politics (Collier 2008). An alternative view emphasizes 
choices that governments can make, taking context into 
account: “A natural resource boom can have effects that go 
in different directions, and which effects dominate may 
depend on existing institutions, structural and economic 
factors, and other variables” (Dunning 2008). Some research 
has attempted to rank countries according to particular 
forms of political system, rather in the way that some think-
tanks have done so with respect to political risk, albeit with 
the difference that the audience for the former kind of 
research is not primarily one of corporate investors.33
For those institutions engaged in the provision of devel-
opment assistance, the political economic approach has 
proved attractive. A World Bank senior official has stated, 
“A consensus is emerging that policies will be effective in 
leveraging natural-resource-led development only when 
they are compatible with the level of institutional quality 
and the political economy context of the country in ques-
tion.” They have generally endorsed the conclusion of 
political economy scholars that “it is futile to try to change 
economic institutions without considering the underlying 
political forces through which they emerged and are sus-
tained.”34 Yet those are the very institutions that need to be 
targeted if the negative effects of resource development are 
to be avoided. As several of the IMF’s leading advisers have 
noted, “The effectiveness of public investments depends 
upon institutional factors, such as the capacity to select, 
implement, and evaluate projects” (Daniel et al. 2013, 21). 
Without a thorough, critical analysis of the political econ-
omy of those institutions, specific interventions by develop-
ment institutions may well fail. An example of political 
economy analysis in use by a development institution is 
provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development in relation to fragile states. Its general 
view was that state-building should be the central objective 
of assistance and that the best way to achieve it is by focus-
ing on state legitimacy and state-society relations. In a study 
of Kenya, using political economy analysis of this type, three 
dimensions of state legitimacy were identified: how the state 
functions, what the state does, and what the citizens believe 
is legitimate (Sundet and Moen 2009). The results were 
offered to the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (NORAD) as a series of recommendations for 
its current and proposed interventions.
Another strand in research on the resource curse addresses 
measures of resource dependence and resource abundance. 
States in the former group have been viewed as more vulner-
able to the negative effects of natural resource development. 
Yet some research has suggested that once resource abun-
dance (proxied as a measure of natural resource wealth) 
rather than resource dependence (the average national 
income share of natural resource exports over a defined 
period) is used, the effect of natural resources on growth 
performance is positive and thus the resource curse dis-
appears (van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009, 8). Brock Smith 
(2015) has argued that most of the empirical literature on 
the resource curse suffers from two significant identification 
flaws: as a commonly used measure, “resource wealth” is 
better understood as “resource dependence,” and the use of 
cross-sectional data. His conclusions about the impacts of 
major natural resource discoveries on GDP per capita levels 
persisting in the long term are positive. This kind of research 
is significant in the light of twenty-first century trends in 
global demand for natural resources, which have encour-
aged new discoveries of hydrocarbons and minerals and 
intensified extraction of existing deposits in the frontier 
areas of the developing world (albeit less so since 2013–14). 
The east coast of Africa has provided a vivid illustration of 
this push for fresh discoveries and the potential for wider 
impacts on the region. The share of global rents derived 
from petroleum in Sub-Saharan Africa increased sixfold 
from 2000 to 2008, with oil rents representing more than 
two-thirds of the total (Barma et al. 2012, 11). East Asia 
Pacific’s share grew from 9 to 17 percent of the total during 
the same period. This underlines the growing number of 
states that are becoming resource dependent, and the need 
for access to guidance on policy design to counter factors 
that can lead to negative outcomes. As this review shows, the 
risk of such outcomes is more likely to be present among 
poor countries, less diversified than others and with 
fewer institutional resources to cope with the impacts of 
resource development.
Further change?
The end of a long boom period in mining and hydrocarbons 
activities from about 2014 has triggered further reflections 
on the resource curse theme. Just as a consensus appeared 
to have emerged that this seductive but counterintuitive 
idea had too many flaws to be useful, it appears that many 
resource-rich countries have reached the end of this boom 
with little to show for it and with the prospect of years of 
hard times ahead. Why is development for them proving to 
be so hard (Venables 2016)? Has the resource curse idea 
touched on some connection between extractives and devel-
opment that merits further research?35 It is too early to say 
what the new round of inquiry into this theme will yield, 
CHAPTER 2: EXTRACTIVES: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPMENT 29
but the reflections triggered by the downturn are already 
breathing new life into this as a topic for research.
2.5 APPLYING NEW INSIGHTS
The aforementioned perspectives on extractive resource 
development offer insights into the design of good practice 
solutions in the five areas identified as key in the EI Value 
Chain. They also offer a dilemma.
On the positive side, the emphasis on the risks of weak 
institutional quality and the value of political economy 
analysis is accompanied by a sense of great potential in 
natural-resource-led development. Good institutions, good 
laws, and regulatory systems could catalyze a broader-based 
development for prospective and current resource-rich 
economies. This is in alignment with the aspirations of a 
growing number of countries and has been emphasized by 
leading civil society groups, international organizations, 
and industry associations. The Africa Mining Vision, for 
example, has a goal of creating a “knowledge-driven African 
mining sector that catalyzes and contributes to the broad-
based growth and development of, and if fully integrated 
into, a single African market” (AUC, AfDB, and UNECA 
2011, 8). However, more than ever before, the kind of 
reform that is implied is much more of a collaborative, 
coordinated, and consensus-driven one among the govern-
ment agencies and levels and the various players in resource 
development in a country. There are cross-border and 
international dimensions that further underline the collab-
orative scope and nature of any resource-led development 
in the current setting. In this process of change, knowledge 
will play a crucial role in understanding the issues and in 
persuading parties to agree to particular solutions.
The dilemma is this. A limitation on much of the research 
discussed in the preceding section follows from the macro-
level at which it operates. Its relevance to education is 
beyond doubt, but how such insights can be translated into 
applications is less clear and more challenging. Even the 
most concrete form of political economy analysis will 
remain a step away from the world in which governments 
make decisions. Any government will be faced with very 
practical challenges. It will already have decided that the bal-
ance of opportunities and challenges is favorable. Whether 
its own structure can be described as “patrimonial” or 
“hegemonic” will probably be of little interest to it. It will not 
be able to escape such questions as the following: What kind 
of rights should it offer the eager investors knocking at its 
doors? What balance of rights and obligations in a contrac-
tual relationship is appropriate to its unique circumstances?
The learning curve may also be steep. Governments will 
usually find it hard to resist the overtures of foreign inves-
tors seeking contracts for EI activities. Faced with a moun-
tain of legal provisions and economic data that is typical of 
EI contracts and business models, their need for the capac-
ity to interpret, analyze, and negotiate becomes acute. 
Moreover, some grasp of longer-term challenges such as 
revenue volatility and resource exhaustion (and how to 
meet them) is required. All too often, limited capacity on 
the government side results in a deal that offers visible 
short-term benefits but low credibility in the long term, 
reflecting inadequate negotiating skills and a poor under-
standing of how to evaluate a fair deal in a specific setting.
For nongovernmental bodies and individuals, the ques-
tions will also have urgency. How do we understand and 
interpret the contracts that our government is negotiating 
or has negotiated with foreign investors? Are they fair in 
relation to good international practice? Does the proposed 
new law contain all the provisions a good hydrocarbons or 
mining law should contain? Such questions concern long-
standing and much used contractual instruments in the 
extractives industries. Without a thorough understanding 
of the established body of knowledge, policy decisions will 
be impoverished and accountability will be reduced, mak-
ing negative outcomes probable. The need to provide assis-
tance in this area has been recognized by a number of civil 
society groups and policy institutes in recent years; manuals 
of accessible analysis of oil and mining contracts are one of 
the early results (OpenOil 2012; RWI et al. 2013).36
The response of the Sourcebook is to treat in detail the 
principles, measures, and techniques that could allow for a 
better management of oil, gas, and mineral resources in 
the five key areas of the EI Value Chain. This knowledge, 
critically presented and analyzed, can be described as good 
practice: the welfare-promoting policies, institutions, and 
governance that international experience demonstrates are 
likely to deliver effective technical solutions to the chal-
lenges of EI development. It avoids the notion of best 
practice, because ultimately governments know what is 
best for them. Whenever possible, the tone is pragmatic or 
technocratic, presenting options that have worked in vari-
ous settings.
However, good practice has to reflect the latest research 
and policy interventions. In addition, good practice in oil, 
gas, and mining development always must fit a particular 
and usually predetermined context. The approach to good 
practice has to be supplemented by an appreciation of the 
importance of a specific legal and cultural setting. Much has 
been written about the combination of circumstances that 
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has contributed to the success of hydrocarbon development 
in Norway, and the difficulties of exporting a Norwegian 
model to other resource-rich countries (Thurber, Hults, 
and Heller 2010; Al-Kasim 2006). What we may call the 
political economy of a resource-producing state will play a 
major role in the way any good practices are implemented 
and will condition the state’s capacity to exploit its natural 
resource endowment (Socavol 2010). Local variations, 
innovations, and peculiarities in institutional arrangements 
will shape policy on resource development and in turn be 
shaped by them. They need to be taken into account before 
good practice solutions are likely to work. For this reason, 
the Sourcebook includes a number of country case studies 
and examples.
As a number of organizations have already understood, 
the application of research needs to recognize the impor-
tance of new media in reaching out to a potentially vast new 
constituency that seeks knowledge of the EI sector. The 
Sourcebook in its primary electronic form reaches out to 
those in need. As a tool it can contribute to a major collab-
orative process in which lessons can be learned from the 
past (and sometimes the present) so that history does not 
repeat itself.
2.6 CONCLUSIONS
The discovery and development of hydrocarbons and other 
minerals offers the prospect of considerable economic and 
social benefits to countries, but achieving them requires an 
appreciation of the pitfalls into which a number of states 
have spectacularly fallen. Recent research confirms that 
there is nothing inevitable about a resource curse, that 
resources themselves are not to blame for negative out-
comes, and that rent flows do not automatically undermine 
accountability in societies or institutions, particularly if the 
latter were robust at the outset. Indeed, in Botswana’s case, 
resource taxes provided the revenues that allowed the coun-
try to recruit, train, and retain a high-quality civil service 
(Gelb 2014, 4). This positive view is supported by some 
empirical trends: natural resource exporters have recently 
been growing faster than their non-resource-rich counter-
parts. In the first decade of the 21st century, gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita and real GDP growth have been 
higher in the former group, due largely to the combination 
of the commodity price boom in the first decade of the 21st 
century and new discoveries, particularly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (IMF 2012). Institutions have also been improving in 
this region at a faster rate than their counterparts, which 
may go some way to explaining the robust growth.
Rents from minerals and petroleum can create wealth for 
a state, but the extent to which the wealth contributes to 
broad-based development outcomes—rather than being 
captured by the political elite or other vested interests—
depends on a combination of political, cultural, legal, and 
institutional factors. Wealth can be captured through bribes 
for licenses or mineral rights, and through the diversion of 
funds from national resource companies and national 
accounts. Good governance can help prevent the illicit cap-
ture of wealth by putting in place a modern legal, regula-
tory, and contractual framework in line with international 
good practice, and it entails states enacting their own anti-
corruption laws.
The technical reasons for negative outcomes are now 
reasonably well understood, and there is a growing under-
standing of the appropriate remedies that policy makers 
must take in order to address them. Remedies include 
(1) policies to smooth the expenditure of volatile revenues, 
(2) introduction of resource funds for savings and stabiliza-
tion, (3) improvements in macroeconomic planning, and 
(4) forecasting and expenditure policies that improve the 
framework for investment and promotion of economic 
diversification (see chapter 6 and chapter 9 of the Sourcebook).
The political reasons for negative outcomes are also well 
understood and have attracted diverse comments. The 
cooperation of governments in international initiatives has 
been sought, as is discussed in chapter 8 of the Sourcebook. 
The cooperation of foreign investors has also been sought, 
as is evident in chapter 8 and chapter 4. Above all, there is a 
general awareness of the potential contribution of educa-
tion to EI operations and development in the countries 
concerned.
The sociopolitical context of a country can have an 
impact on matters that may, at first sight, be thought of in 
purely technocratic terms, such as the choice of contract 
between government and foreign investor, the award of 
rights, the approach to revenue sharing, and the design of a 
national oil company. These are examined in chapter 4 and 
chapter 9. However, it is important to stress that such issues 
are often the setting for conflicts between a country’s inter-
est groups, including communities and elites and their place 
in the society that is being or is about to be transformed by 
the development of resource wealth. Controversy over the 
content of a proposed petroleum law, for example, is often 
rooted in country-specific factors.
Recent empirical work in political economy finds little or 
no negative relationship between natural resources and eco-
nomic growth or democracy, but it strongly supports 
(implicitly at least) programs of transparency and long-term 
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stability in the policy and contract environment. This 
should not give rise to naïve optimism about extractive 
resource development. One long-standing observer has cau-
tioned: “The problem is not the resources themselves. For 
countries that can manage, the curse is a myth. But this is 
not the case for poor, low-capacity countries—for them the 
curse can be real” (Gelb 2014, 11).
NOTES
 1. The online version of the Sourcebook (www. eisourcebook 
.org) provides links to many more studies on these matters 
than can be provided in this version.
 2. Initiatives undertaken to foster infrastructure develop-
ment include the African Union Commission and United 
Nations Commission for Africa joint initiative, Exploiting 
Natural Resources for Financing Infrastructure Develop-
ment; the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s Perspectives on Global Development; and 
the “Guiding Principles” issued by the World Bank, which 
touch on the subject of mine-related infrastructure. A con-
tribution has also been made by the International Finance 
Corporation and Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory 
Facility: Fostering the Development of Greenfield Mining-
Related Transport Infrastructure through Project Financing 
(IFC 2013).
 3. This subject is considered at length in a Sourcebook 
paper, “Resources Corridors: Experiences, Economics and 
Engagement: A Typology of Sub-Saharan African Corridors” 
(Mtegha et al. 2012). It considers in depth the cases of 
resource corridors in Mozambique, Tanzania, and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.
 4. An example is the dialogue involving the World Gold 
Council, the World Bank, and civil society partners, the con-
ference “Gold for Development: Investing in Mining Indaba, 
2012” (World Gold Council and World Bank 2012). The 
focus was on the contribution of large-scale gold mining to 
economic and social development, with case studies from 
Tanzania, Peru, and Ghana. The International Council on 
Mining and Metals (ICMM) has produced a number of 
reports summarizing its activities in this respect, such as the 
Minerals and Metals Management 2020 Report (ICCM 2012).
 5. For example, the IMF has claimed that many resource-
rich developing countries have failed to realize the full 
development potential of their natural resources. In a num-
ber of them, “economic growth has been disappointing” 
(IMF 2012). “Many resource-rich countries disappoint in 
their performance on economic and human development 
indicators” (IMF 2010, 4). As a result, the IMF has increased 
its technical support to governments to develop an improved 
in-house resource management capability on fiscal matters, 
making 85 missions from 2006 to 2012, and planning doz-
ens more (Smith 2012, 3).
 6. The critical country attribute for purposes of the dis-
cussion that follows is resource dependency rather than 
absolute levels of resource wealth. Recent research suggests 
that states with high absolute resource endowments do tend 
to grow faster than those without. However, the same 
research finds a significant correlation between resource 
dependency and underperformance (Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte 2006).
 7. It provides a driver for civil society assistance, evident 
in, for example, Copper Bottomed? Bolstering the Aynak 
Contract: Afghanistan’s First Major Mining Deal (Global 
Witness 2012a); and Donor Engagement in Uganda’s Oil and 
Gas Sector: An Agenda for Action (Global Witness 2010).
 8. For example, in the academic literature see van der 
Ploeg 2016; Ross 1999; Bannon and Collier 2003; McPherson 
and MacSearraigh 2007; and Berman et al. 2014. For NGO 
views, the following reports from Global Witness are not 
atypical of the tone: Curse or Cure? How Oil Can Boost or 
Break Liberia’s Post-War Recovery (2011); and Rigged? The 
Scramble for Africa’s Oil, Gas, and Minerals (2012b). This has 
provoked various ripostes, such as Luong and Weinthal 
(2010), Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and 
Institutions in Soviet Successor States.
 9. The high point in support for the negative view is prob-
ably an influential article by Sachs and Warner (2001), 
“Natural Resources and Economic Development: The Curse 
of Natural Resources.” The more recent approach (against 
the inevitability of the resource curse) is evident in IMF 
(2010, 6), “Macroeconomic Policy Frameworks for Resource-
Rich Developing Countries,” which notes, “A natural 
resource ‘curse’ is neither universal nor inevitable; growth 
may depend heavily on other factors, such as policies and 
the quality of institutions.” The latter is also represented by 
Lederman and Maloney (2007), Natural Resources: Neither 
Curse nor Destiny, which through a series of case studies 
argues that resource wealth, if coupled with appropriate 
institutional and policy choices, can be a significant advan-
tage in achieving long-term economic growth.
 10. An example of an industry initiative that has this goal is 
the ICMM Resource Endowment Initiative in mining. It 
developed an analytical framework and focused on gover-
nance processes, incorporating underlying factors and rules 
of the game that affected social and environmental interac-
tions and outcomes. The result was a practical toolkit to 
assess local, regional, and national socioeconomic impacts 
of mining. It also addressed the ways in which mining 
operations affect governance structures, institutions, and 
policy changes at different levels of government. Find more 
on the initiative at http://www.icmm.com/page/84152 
/our-work/projects/articles/resource-endowment-initiative.
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 11. The list is potentially longer. See, for example, NRGI 2015.
 12. Dutch Disease is the name attached to the adverse mac-
roeconomic effects first experienced in the Netherlands fol-
lowing the discovery and exploitation of major natural gas 
reserves. Following the adoption of appropriate policy 
responses, considerable social benefits accrued to the 
Netherlands as a result of its gas discoveries and their subse-
quent development.
 13. This issue affects not only the EI sector. Shifts in interna-
tional competitiveness can lead once-dominant industries to 
meet a natural end due to some structural change in the 
economy. Examples of this are evident in the developed 
world’s manufacturing and automobile production indus-
tries, where shifts in economic conditions can bring certain 
sectors to a sudden end. One advantage that the EI sector has 
over other economic sectors is the clarity about its ultimate 
closure. This known inevitability should help place this plan-
ning issue firmly on the government agenda. Moreover, there 
are very few examples of countries that have actually 
exhausted their oil, gas, or mineral resources: the island state 
of Nauru being a spectacular exception. It is easier to identify 
states that have experienced major damage from environ-
mental mismanagement, deforestation in Easter Island for 
example. At the project level, however, the future exhaustibil-
ity of the resource can be a major concern, and at the policy-
making level it can encourage fiscal discipline.
 14. The recyclability of some natural resource materials 
should not be forgotten, however.
 15. For example, a comprehensive study by the IMF con-
cluded, “The evidence suggests that the quality of institu-
tions matters for fiscal outcomes… (and that) priority 
should be given to enhancing PFM (public financial man-
agement) systems where appropriate” (Ossowski et al. 
2007). In addition, “A consensus is emerging that policies 
will be effective in leveraging natural resource-led develop-
ment only when they are compatible with the level of insti-
tutional quality and the political economy context of the 
country in question” (Canuto 2012, x).
 16. Available at http://www.resourcegovernance.org 
/resource-governance-index/report. The indicators used to 
evaluate resource governance are institutional and legal 
setting, reporting practices, safeguards and quality con-
trols, and enabling environment. The index assigns a 
numerical score to each country and divides them into four 
performance ranges: satisfactory (71–100), partial (51–70, 
weak (41–50), and failing (0–40). The 2013 index revealed 
“a striking governance deficit in natural resource manage-
ment worldwide,” with only 11 countries earning an overall 
score above 70, and the “vast majority of countries” exhib-
iting “serious shortcomings in resource governance.” The 
bulk of these countries meet the IMF’s classification as 
“resource rich.”
 17. Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) use a measure of 
institutional quality that takes into account the rule of law, 
bureaucratic quality, government corruption, a risk of 
expropriation, and government repudiation of contracts 
and conclude that the main reason for diverging experiences 
is differences in the quality of institutions. Natural resource 
abundance will lower incomes in economies if weak institu-
tions push scarce resources into unproductive activities by 
encouraging rent-seeking behavior. The link has also been 
explored by Auty (2001) and Gelb (1988). These institutions 
are usually characterized by at least a limited capacity and 
poorly developed policies.
 18. See the section on “Technical Factors” in this chapter.
 19. A recent World Bank note states, “With the exception of 
a few developed [and developing] countries, the governance 
record of most oil exporters is at best mixed. . . . [Most of 
the] common problems that confront countries with new oil 
discoveries include rent-seeking behavior and corruption, 
political patronage, lower entrepreneurship and capacity for 
investment, and increased authoritarianism and civil con-
flict” (Dessus 2011).
 20. “Over dependence on oil exports is strongly associated 
with weak public institutions that generally lack the capacity 
to handle the challenges of petroleum-led development” 
(Karl 1997, 25).
 21. McPherson and MacSearraigh (2007) emphasize the 
role of this factor in the hydrocarbons sector.
 22. An example of the problems in this area is lagging skill 
accumulation and heightened inequality. Since oil and gas 
production is highly capital and technologically intensive, 
it creates few jobs (perhaps 1 to 2 percent skilled) for the 
population, and some of the skilled labor may have to seek 
job opportunities abroad. Mass unemployment and 
inequality may undermine the country’s economic prog-
ress (Karl 2005, 24).
 23. For example, Daniel and Sunley (2010, 405) note, 
“Fiscal stability clauses are generally justified by . . . a lack of 
credibility on behalf of the host country to abstain from 
changing the fiscal rules . . . once the investment is sunk (the 
‘time inconsistency’ problem).” Cameron (2010) examines 
how contract stability operates and is supported by the web 
of bilateral investment treaties. Barma et al. (2012, 11) note 
that the credibility of intertemporal commitment is “the 
degree to which policy stability and bargains over time can 
be enforced and deviations from such agreements are sub-
ject to sanction.”
 24. “Economic rent is the difference between the price that 
is actually paid and the price that would have to be paid in 
order for the good or service to be produced. . . . Anyone 
who is in the position to receive economic rents is fortunate 
indeed, because these ‘rents’ are unrelated to effort” (Stiglitz 
1996, 298–9).
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 25. An accessible overview of the literature is provided by 
the BMZ and GIZ (2011) study, Curse or Blessing—
Development or Misery. Useful overviews of the academic 
literature include Frankel (2010); Rosser (2006); Ross 
(1999); and van der Ploeg (2011).
 26. Resource dependence has been shown to be one of the 
most important causes of civil wars. See the essays in 
Bannon and Collier (2003). Ross (2006, 267) noted, “The 
likelihood of civil wars in countries that produce oil, gas, 
and diamonds rose sharply from the early 1970s to the late 
1990s. So did the number of conflicts in which insurgents 
raised funds by selling contraband resources.”
 27. For a more recent critical view, see Smith (2015).
 28. However, case studies revealed the importance of insti-
tutions in managing resource rents many years ago. The 
insight is not new, but a wide acceptance of its significance 
is. For an early example, see Gelb (1988, 223) on Indonesia: 
“A more accurate statement therefore is that Indonesia’s 
good performance during the oil booms reflected the insti-
tutions developed earlier to nurse the economy back to 
health, the approach to policy set in the Suharto 
Government’s formative years and the unusual degree of 
continuity.” Similar ground was covered but at a more 
abstract level by Auty and Gelb’s “Political Economy of 
Resource Abundant States” in Auty (2001). The primacy of 
institutions has been asserted and supported more recently 
by several leading economists, for example: Arezki, van der 
Ploeg, and Toscani (2016), “Shifting Frontiers in Global 
Resource Wealth: The Role of Policies and Institutions.” 
Cust and Harding (2014) have argued that institutions 
strongly influence where investors drill for oil and gas.
 29. A systematic application of a political economy per-
spective is evident in the World Bank study Rents to Riches? 
The Political Economy of Natural Resource-Led Development 
(Barma et al. 2012). It incorporates more than a dozen case 
studies and examines, in detail, how political economy can 
be applied to resource dependence.
 30. See Hogan and Sturzenegger (2010), which considers the 
issue of seemingly perpetual contractual renegotiations driven 
by commodity price instability and how these pressures could 
be contained within a more stable commercial framework.
 31. Much of the literature has focused on the information, 
finance, and capability asymmetries between developing 
state governments and transnational extractives companies. 
Remedies therefore focus on how to ensure that developing 
country governments use good practice solutions to secure 
a better deal. See Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz (2007).
 32. Collier (2010, 1113) notes that in failing states incumbents 
can win elections by means of technologies that are excluded 
in a conventional election because they are illegitimate: for 
example, vote-buying, voter intimidation, and ballot fraud.
 33. See Barma et al. (2012, 69, figs. 2.6 and 2.7). Compare 
the Fraser Institute’s surveys of mining and petroleum, 
respectively, https://www.fraserinstitute.org/categories 
/mining and https://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/global 
-petroleum-survey-2015.
 34. See Barma et al. (2012, 39), noting in particular the 
work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2010).
 35. For example, Stevens, Lahn, and Kooroshy (2015, 3) note, 
“While it is not inevitable, the resource curse is alive and active.”
 36. With respect to negotiations of mining contracts, two 
contributions are notable: BGR, CCSI, and Kienzler’s (2015) 
Natural Resource Contracts as a Tool for Managing the 
Mining Sector; and Nkot’s (2015), “Fifty Pieces of Advice to 
an Official Who Is Engaged in the Negotiation of Mining 
Contracts.”
REFERENCES
Acemoglu, D., and J. A. Robinson. 2010. “The Role of 
Institutions in Growth and Development.” In Leadership 
and Growth, edited by D. Brady and M. Spence, 135–64. 
Washington DC: Commission on Growth and 
Development and World Bank.
Al-Kasim, F. 2006. Managing Petroleum Resources: The 
‘Norwegian Model’ in a Broad Perspective. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford Institute of Energy Studies.
Alexeev, Michael, and Robert Conrad. 2009. “The Elusive 
Curse of Oil.” Review of Economics and Statistics 91 (3): 
586–98.
Arezki, R., F. van der Ploeg, and F. Toscani. 2016. “Shifting 
Frontiers in Global Resource Wealth: The Role of 
Policies and Institutions.” OxCarre Research Paper 180, 
Oxford, UK, OxCarre. http://www.oxcarre.ox.ac.uk 
/images/stories/papers/ResearchPapers/oxcarrerp 
2016180.pdf.
AUC, AfDB, and UNECA (African Union Commission, 
African Development Bank, and United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa). 2011. “Draft Action 
Plan for Implementing the AMV.” http://www 
. africaminingvision.org/amv_resources/AMV/AMV_Action 
_Plan_dec-2011.pdf.
Auty, Richard. 1993. Sustaining Development in Mineral 
Economics: The Resource Curse Thesis. London: Routledge.
———, ed. 2001. Resource Abundance and Economic 
Development. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bannon, I., and P. Collier, eds. 2003. Natural Resources and 
Violent Conflict: Options and Actions. Washington DC: 
World Bank.
Barma, Naazneen H., Kai Kaiser, Tuan Minh Le, and Lorena 
Vinuela. 2012. Rents to Riches? The Political Economy of 
34 OIL, GAS, AND MINING
Natural Resource-Led Development. Washington, DC: 
World Bank.
Berman, N., M. Couttenier, D. Rohner, and M. Thoenig. 
2014. “This Mine is Mine! How Minerals Fuel Conflicts 
in Africa.” OxCarre Research Paper 141, Oxford, UK, 
OxCarre. http://www.oxcarre.ox.ac.uk/images/stories 
/papers/ResearchPapers/oxcarrerp2014141.pdf.
BGR (Bundesanstalt fuer Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe/
Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources), 
CCSI (Columbia Centre for Sustainable Investment), 
and David Kienzler. 2015. Natural Resource Contracts as 
a Tool for Managing the Mining Sector. 2015. Hannover, 
Germany: BGR.
BMZ and GIZ (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, Germany). 2011. Curse or Blessing—
Development or Misery: Scrambling to the Bottom or 
Scrambling to the Top; Natural Resources, Economic Growth 
and Conflict, A literature Review. Bonn: GIZ. http://api 
.ning.com/files/gGXcxprhp3XY3Xw-D4u7UOdyhJxreZjb 
B2wwokx2SzFzvWTkCWyzMhFVFfr6 XrD5Cxk2qYVya
N7XVOVHB8*gfAmSyjNYzFPI/SWPGIZ resource 
governancestudy2011.pdf.
Boadway, R., and M. Keen. 2010. “Theoretical Perspectives 
on Resource Tax Design.” In The Taxation of Petroleum 
and Minerals: Principles, Problems and Practice, edited 
by P. Daniel, M. Keen, and C. McPherson (London: 
Routledge).
Brunnschweiler, C., and E. Bulte. 2006. “The Resource 
Curse Revisited and Revised: A Tale of Paradoxes and 
Red Herrings.” ETH Working Paper 06/61, Zurich, ETH.
Cameron, P. D. 2010. International Energy Investment Law: 
The Pursuit of Stability. Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press.
Canuto, Otaviano. 2012. Foreword to Barma, Naazneen H., 
Kai Kaiser, Tuan Minh Le, and Lorena Vinuela, Rents to 
Riches? The Political Economy of Natural Resource-Led 
Development. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Collier, Paul. 2008. The Bottom Billion. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press.
———. 2010. “The Political Economy of Natural 
Resources.” Social Research 77 (4): 1105–1132.
———. 2011. The Plundered Planet: Why We Must—And 
How We Can—Manage Nature for Global Prosperity. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Crowson, P. 2009. “Unit 1: Mineral Resources Policy and 
Economics.” Centre for Energy, Petroleum and 
Mineral Law Policy course, An Introduction to Mining, 
Mineral Reserves and Resources. University of Dundee, 
Scotland.
Cust, J., and T. Harding. 2014. “Institutions and the 
Location of Oil Exploration.” OxCarre Research Paper 
127, Oxford, UK, OxCarre. http://www.oxcarre.ox.ac 
.uk/images/stories/papers/ResearchPapers/oxcarrerp 
2013127.pdf
Daniel, P., S. Gupta, T. Mattina, and A. Segura-Ubiergo. 
2013. “Extracting Resource Revenue.” Finance and 
Development (September): 19–22.
Daniel, P., and E. M. Sunley. 2010. “Contractual Assurances 
of Fiscal Stability.” In The Taxation of Petroleum and 
Minerals: Principles, Problems and Practice, edited by 
Philip Daniel, Michael Keen, and Charles McPherson, 
405–424. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
Dessus, Sébastien C. 2011. “The Challenges and Opportunities 
of Ghana’s Offshore Oil Discovery.” Africa Trade Policy 
Notes 14, World Bank, Washington, DC. http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRREG TOPTRADE 
/Resources/14GhanaOilpolicynoteREVISED.pdf.
Dunning, Thad. 2008. “The Political Economy of the 
Resource Paradox: An Overview.” Unpublished manu-
script. Washington DC: World Bank.
Ernst & Young. 2012. Global Oil and Gas Reserves Study. 
London: Ernst & Young. http://www.ey.com/Publication 
/vwLUAssets/Global_oil_and_gas_reserves_study 
/$FILE/Global_oil_and_gas_reserves_study.pdf.
Esteves, A. M., B. Coyne, and A. Moreno. 2013. Enhancing 
the Sub-National Benefits of the Oil, Gas, and Mining 
Sectors. New York: Revenue Watch Institute.
Frankel, J. 2010. “The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey.” 
Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP10-005. 
Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University.
Gelb, A. 1988. Oil Windfalls. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
———. 2010. “Economic Diversification in Resource Rich 
Countries.” Drawn from a lecture at the seminar 
Confronting Old and New Challenges, organized by the 
Central Bank of Algeria and the IMF Institute in Algiers, 
November 4–5. http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars 
/eng/2010/afrfin/pdf/Gelb2.pdf.
———. 2014. “Should Canada Worry about a Resource 
Curse?” University of Calgary School of Public Policy 
SPP Research Papers, University of Calgary.
Gelb, A., K. Kaiser, and L. Vinuela. 2012. “How Much Does 
Natural Resource Extraction Really Diminish National 
Wealth? The Implications of Discovery.” Center for 
Global Development Working (CGD) Paper 290, CGD, 
Washington, DC. http://www.cgdev.org/publication 
/how-much-does-natural-resource-extraction-really 
-diminish-national-wealth-implications.
Global Witness. 2010. Donor Engagement in Uganda’s Oil 
and Gas Sector: An Agenda for Action. London: Global 
Witness.
CHAPTER 2: EXTRACTIVES: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPMENT 35
———. 2011. Curse or Cure? How Oil Can Boost or Break 
Liberia’s Post-War Recovery. London: Global Witness.
———. 2012a. Copper Bottomed? Bolstering the Aynak 
Contract: Afghanistan’s First Major Mining Deal. London: 
Global Witness.
———. 2012b. Rigged? The Scramble for Africa’s Oil, Gas, 
and Minerals. London: Global Witness.
Hausmann and Rigobon. 2003. “An Alternative 
Interpretation of the ‘Resource Curse’: Theory and 
Policy Implications.” NBER Working Paper 9424, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 
MA. http://www.nber.org/papers/w9424.
Hayes, K. and R. Perks. 2011. “Women in the Artisanal and 
Small-Scale Mining Sector of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo.” In High-Value Natural Resources and Post-
Conflict Peacebuilding, ed. Päivi Lujala and Siri Johnson 
Sirleaf. London: Earthscan. http://genderandsecurity 
.org/projects-resources / research/women-artisanal-and 
-small-scale-mining -sector-democratic-republic-congo.
Hilson, Gavin. 2010. “ ‘Once a Miner, Always a Miner’: 
Poverty and Livelihood Diversification in Akwatia, 
Ghana.” Journal of Rural Studies 26 (3): 296–307. https://
www.researchgate.net/publication/223995987_’Once _a 
_Miner_Always_a_Miner’_Poverty_and_Livelihood 
_Diversification_in_Akwatia_Ghana.
Hogan, W., and F. Sturzenegger, eds. 2010. The Natural 
Resources Trap. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Humphreys, M., J. D. Sachs, and J. E. Stiglitz, eds. 2007. 
Escaping the Resource Curse. New York: Columbia 
University Press.
ICCM (International Council on Mining and Metals). 2012. 
Minerals and Metals Management 2020 Report. London: 
ICCM.
———. 2015. The Role of Mining in National Economies. 
2d ed. London: ICCM. http://www.euromines.org/news 
/new-icmm-report-role-mining-national-economies.
IFC (International Finance Corporation). 2013. Fostering 
the Development of Greenfield Mining-Related Transport 
Infrastructure through Project Financing. Washington, 
DC: Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility 
and IFC. http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect 
/ c019bf004f4c6ebfbd99ff032730e94e/Mine+Infra 
+Report+Final+Copy.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2007. Guide on 
Resource Revenue Transparency. Washington, DC: IMF. 
www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/051507g.pdf.
———. 2010. Managing Natural Resource Wealth. Topical 
Trust Fund Program Document. Washington, DC: IMF.
———. 2012. “Macroeconomic Policy Frameworks for 
Resource-Rich Developing Countries.” Background 
Paper 1, IMF, Washington, DC.
———. 2015a. “Background Notes.” Fiscal Monitor, 
October. Washington, DC: IMF. http://www.imf.org 
/external/pubs/ft/fm/2015/02/pdf/fm1502.pdf.
———. 2015b. “The Commodities Roller Coaster.” Fiscal 
Monitor, October. Washington, DC: IMF. http://www 
.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2015/02/pdf/fm1502.pdf.
IMF (International Monetary Fund), and World Bank. 
2017. “Managing Commodity Lifecycles, Petroleum.” In 
Extractives Hub (www.extractiveshub.org).
Karl, T. 1997. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-
States. Berkeley: University of California Press.
———. 1999. “The Perils of Petroleum: Reflections on the 
Paradox of Plenty,” in “Fueling the 21st Century: The New 
Political Economy of Energy.” Special edition of Journal of 
International Affairs 53, no. 1.
———. 2005. “Understanding the Resource Curse.” In 
Covering Oil: A Reporter’s Guide to Energy and 
Development, edited by S. Tsalik and A. Schiffrin, 22–29. 
New York: Open Society Institute.
Le Billon, P. 2011. “Extractive Sectors and Illicit Financial 
Flows: What Role for Revenue Governance Initiatives?” 
U4 Issue 13. http://www.cmi.no/publications/4248 
-extractive -sectors-and-illicit-financial-flows.
Lederman, D., and W. F. Maloney, eds. 2007. Natural 
Resources: Neither Curse nor Destiny. Washington, DC, 
and Palo Alto, CA: World Bank and Stanford 
University Press.
Liebenthal, A., R. Michelitsch, and E. Tarazona. 2005. 
Extractive Industries and Sustainable Development: An 
Evaluation of the World Bank Group Experience. 
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Lipsky, J. 2009. “Economic Shifts and Oil Price Volatility.” 
Remarks at the Fourth OPEC International Seminar, 
Vienna, March 18. http://www.imf.org/external/np 
/speeches/2009/031809.htm.
Luong, P. J., and E. Weinthal. 2010. Oil Is Not a Curse: 
Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor 
States. New York: Cambridge University Press.
McPherson, C., and S. MacSearraigh. 2007. “Corruption 
in the Petroleum Sector.” In The Many Faces of 
Corruption: Tracking Vulnerability at the Sector Level, 
edited by J. E. Campos and S. Pradhan. Washington, 
DC: World Bank.
Mehlum, Halvor, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik. 2006. 
“Institutions and the Resource Curse,” Economic Journal 
116: 1–20.
Mtegha, Hudson, Paseka Leeuw, Sodhie Naicker, and Mapadi 
Molepo. 2012. “Resources Corridors: Experiences, Economics 
and Engagement: A Typology of Sub-Saharan African 
Corridors.” School of Mining Engineering and Centre for 
Sustainability in Mining and Industry, University of the 
36 OIL, GAS, AND MINING
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. http://www.eisourcebook 
.org/cms/files /EISB%20Resources%20Corridors.pdf.
Nkot, Fabien. 2015. “Fifty Pieces of Advice to an Official 
Who Is Engaged in the Negotiation of Mining Contracts: 
A Handbook.” Perth, Australia: International Mining 
for Development Centre. http://im4dc.org/wp-content 
/uploads/2013/07/Negotiation-Handbook.pdf.
NRGI (Natural Resource Governance Institute). 2015. “Ten 
Consequences of Low Commodity Prices for Resource-
Rich Countries.” New York: NRGI.
OpenOil. 2012. Oil Contracts: How to Read and Understand 
Them. Berlin: OpenOil. http://openoil.net/understanding 
-oil-contracts/.
Ossowski, R., M. Vilafuerte, P. Medas, and T. Thomas 2007. 
The Role of Fiscal Institutions in Managing the Oil Revenue 
Boom. Washington, DC: IMF. http://www. webmeets 
.com/files/papers/LACEA-LAMES/2007/806/The%20
Role%20of%20Fiscal%20Institutions%20in%20
Managing%20the%20Oil%20Revenue%20 Boom.pdf.
Ross, M. 1999. “The Political Economy of the Resource 
Curse.” World Politics 51 (2): 297–322.
———. 2006. “A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil 
War.” Annual Review of Political Science 9: 265–300.
Rosser, A. 2006. “The Political Economy of the Resource 
Curse: A Literature Survey.” Institute of Development 
Studies Working Paper 268, University of Sussex, UK.
RWI (Revenue Watch Institute), VCC (Vale Columbia 
Center), ISLP (International Senior Lawyers Project), 
and OpenOil. 2013. Mining Contracts: How to Read and 
Understand Them. New York: RWI and VCC. https://
eiti .org/files/mining-contracts-how-to-read-and 
-understand-them.pdf.
Sachs, D., and A. M. Warner. 2001. “Natural Resources and 
Economic Development: The Curse of Natural Resources.” 
European Economic Review 45 (4–6): 827–38.
Sachs, Lisa, and Nicholas Maennling. 2015. “Resource 
Resilience: How to Break the Commodities Cycle,” 
World Politics Review (May 26). http://ccsi.columbia.
edu/files/2015/11/World-Politics-Review-Resource 
-Resilience-How-to-Break-the-Commodities-Cycle 
-May-26-2015.pdf.
Skinner, Robert. 2015. “A Comparative Anatomy of Oil 
Price Routs: A Review of Four Price Routs between 1985 
and 2014.” School of Public Policy Research Paper, 
University of Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
Smith, Brock. 2015. “The Resource Curse Exorcised: 
Evidence from a Panel of Countries.” OxCarre Research 
Paper 165, Oxford, UK, OxCarre. http://www.oxcarre 
.ox.ac.uk/images/stories/papers/ResearchPapers 
/ oxcarrerp2015165.pdf.
Smith, James L. 2012. “Issues in Extractive Resource 
Taxation: A Review of Research Methods and Models.” 
IMF Working Paper WP/12/287, International Monetary 
Fund, Washington, DC.
Socavol, B. 2010. “The Political Economy of Oil and Gas in 
Southeast Asia: Heading towards the Natural Resource 
Curse?” Pacific Review 23 (2): 225–259.
Stevens, P., G. Lahn, and J. Kooroshy. 2015. “The Resource 
Curse Revisited.” Research Paper, London, Chatham House.
Stiglitz, J. 1996. Principles of Micro-Economics. New York: 
W.W. Norton.
Sundet, G., and E. Moen. 2009. Political Economy Analysis of 
Kenya. Oslo: Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation.
Thurber, M., D. Hults, and P. R. P. Heller. 2010. The Limits 
of Institutional Design in Oil Sector Governance: Exporting 
the Norwegian Model. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Program on Energy and Sustainable Development.
Tordo, Silvana, Michael Warner, Osmel E. Manzano, and 
Yahya Anouti. 2013. Local Content in the Oil and Gas 
Sector. A World Bank study. Washington DC: World 
Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en /2013 
/01/17997330/local-content-oil-gas-sector.
van der Ploeg, F. 2011. “Natural Resources: Curse or 
Blessing?” Journal of Economic Literature 49 (2): 366-420.
———. 2016. “The Political Economy of Dynamic Resource 
Wars.” OxCarre Research Paper 97, Oxford, UK, 
OxCarre. http://www.oxcarre.ox.ac.uk/images 
/stories /papers/ResearchPapers/oxcarrerp201297.pdf.
van der Ploeg, F., and S Poelhekke. 2009. “The Volatility 
Curse and Financial Development: Revisiting the 
Paradox of Plenty.” OxCarre Paper 24, Oxford, UK, 
OxCarre. http://www.oxcarre.ox.ac.uk/images/stories 
/papers/ResearchPapers/oxcarrerp200924.pdf.
van der Ploeg, F., and A. J. Venables. 2011. “Natural Resource 
Wealth: The Challenge of Managing a Windfall.” OxCarre 
Research Paper 75, Oxford, UK, OxCarre. http://www 
.oxcarre.ox.ac.uk/images/stories/papers /ResearchPapers 
/ oxcarrerp201175.pdf.
Venables, A. J. 2016. “Using Natural Resources for 
Development: Why Has It Proven So Difficult?” Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 30 (1): 161–84.
World Bank. 2006. Angola—Memorando Económico do País: 
Petroleo, Crescimiento Alargado e Equidade. Washington, 
DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org 
/curated/en/2006/10/7258355/angola-oil-broad-based 
-growth-equity-country-economic-memorandum -angola 
-memorando-economico-pais-petroleo -crescimiento 
-alargado-e-equidade.
———. 2015. A Practical Guide to Increasing Mining Local 
Procurement in West Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
CHAPTER 2: EXTRACTIVES: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPMENT 37
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated /en/2015/02 
/23980553/practical-guide-increasing -mining-local 
-procurement-west-africa.
World Gold Council and World Bank. 2012. Video panel 
discussion from the conference “Gold for Development: 
Investing in Mining Indaba, 2012,” Cape Town, South 
Africa, March 22. https://www.gold.org/research/gold 
-development-mining-indaba-2012-video.
OTHER RESOURCES
There are many ways that governments can capitalize on the 
opportunities and address the challenges discussed in this 
chapter. These readings provide diverse views and responses. 
Those works marked with an asterisk (*) are available on 
the Sourcebook website.
Auty, R. 2004. Resource Abundance and Economic 
Development. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Collier, P. 2010. The Plundered Planet: How to Reconcile 
Prosperity with Nature. London: Allen Lane.
Collier, P., and I. Bannon. 2003. Natural Resources and 
Violent Conflict: Options and Actions. Washington, DC: 
World Bank.
Gelb, A., and Associates. 1988. Oil Windfalls: Blessing or 
Curse? Washington, DC: World Bank.
Hogan, W., and F. Sturzenegger. 2010. The Natural Resources 
Trap. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Sachs, J., and A. Warner. 1995. “Natural Resource Abundance 
and Economic Growth.” Discussion Paper 517. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard Institute of Economic Research.
Tsalik, S., ed. 2005. Covering Oil: A Reporter’s Guide to 
Energy and Development. New York: Open Society 
Institute. https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites 
/default/files/osicoveringoil_20050803.pdf.
Several websites contain publications, briefings, and other 
materials relevant to chapter 2 of the Sourcebook:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment. http://ccsi 
.columbia.edu/.
Natural Resource Charter. http://resourcegovernance.org 
/approach/natural-resource-charter.
Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies. 
http://www.oxcarre.ox.ac.uk/index.php / Research 
-Papers/research-papers1.html.
Oxford Centre for the Study of African Economies. http://
www.csae.ox.ac.uk/research/.

3.1 INTRODUCTION
Investment in the extractive industry (EI) sectors (oil, gas, 
and mining) presents challenges to policy makers. They arise 
at the policy design and legal framework stage and are evi-
dent in subsequent stages—the management and allocation 
of revenues and, ultimately, the sustainable development of 
these resources. Some, perhaps many of these features are 
common to all three sectors, such as the extraction of 
resources from under the ground or the seabed,1 their 
exhaustibility, or their exposure to a high degree of price 
volatility. Others are unique to each sector. For example, oil 
and gas development are alike at the upstream stage (explo-
ration and production), but natural gas takes on distinct 
characteristics in its transportation and distribution phases. 
From a commercial point of view, oil is riskier to find than 
the mineral deposits typically sought by mining companies, 
but once oil is found in commercial quantities, the risk is 
reduced relative to the commercial risk of producing miner-
als from mining. (Note, however, that this does not apply to 
environmental risk.) Gas is different again, with its risk 
profile requiring a complex, expensive infrastructure and a 
detailed contractual regime to support development. 
Effective management in the public interest requires recog-
nition of both the common and the unique features of EI in 
the design of policies and institutions.
Chapter 3 examines the fundamental characteristics of EI 
sector investment, from a perspective that gives priority to 
public policy making and the design of appropriate institu-
tional arrangements in the public sector. It identifies the 
common features and the key differences among EI sectors 
and in their investment dynamics. It focuses on the relation-
ships that governments have or seek to have with investors 
in the EI sector rather than on how governments themselves 
can respond to the challenges and opportunities of natural-
resource-led development (the subject of chapter 2). Some 
features of the investor-state relationship are relatively con-
stant over time, while others are more dynamic, such as the 
structure of the industry. It has experienced significant 
change and become more complex in recent years, due 
in part to companies from emerging markets making 
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strategic investments aimed at securing future  supplies of 
energy and minerals.
There are many aspects of this investor-state dynamism 
that present challenges to policy advisers and decision mak-
ers in resource-rich states. For example:
What kind of company or pattern of companies is best 
suited to achieve a country’s policy on extractives and develop-
ment generally?
The choice is wide. Alongside long-established companies 
from the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries, there are state-owned 
enterprises from Malaysia, the Middle East, and the Republic 
of Korea and new players from Brazil, China, India, and the 
Russian Federation, all making significant impacts. Significant 
diversity in industry ownership and financing structures has 
emerged from the resulting South-South pattern of invest-
ment; the use of resource-for-infrastructure deals is one 
example of the latter. Moreover, the growing number of 
 so-called junior or mid-cap companies as investors means 
that a focus by policy makers and their advisers on the “super-
major” companies that long dominated the EI sector is now 
inappropriate. This diversity is also evident in the destinations 
of investment, the points along the exploration-to-extraction 
continuum and across energy and other mineral commodities 
(Barma, Kaiser, Le, and Vinuela 2012). A further element of 
 complexity in investor-state relations is the international 
character of investment in the EI sectors. More than ever, 
there are opportunities for investors to structure their opera-
tions, on- and offshore, to take advantage of this context. As a 
result, national tax and regulatory authorities face challenges 
in regime design, monitoring, and enforcement.
3.2 COMMON FEATURES OF THE INDUSTRIES
Long, risky, and costly exploration 
and development
Each of the EI sectors is characterized by long, risky, 
costly, and very capital-intensive development.2 For oil 
and gas, there is additionally a high cost at the exploration 
stage, with dry wells and resulting losses being common. 
A state that wishes to go it alone in the EI sector needs 
significant financial resources and an economy with suf-
ficient diversity to allay concerns about EI sector invest-
ment risk (Boadway and Keen 2010). States that, more 
typically, choose to attract and rely on international 
investment, need to have in place a legal, contractual, and 
fiscal regime that investors can understand and trust. 
These states must also have a political track record that 
provides investors with reasonable assurances against 
adverse changes when a major discovery is made and/or 
exploitation is under way (see chapter 4).
Conditions and assumptions that exist at the beginning of 
a project—at the time when laws are drafted and contracts 
awarded—are almost certain to change over the course of the 
project investment. Initial decisions are usually made when 
there is great uncertainty about the sector’s potential, based 
on what is known about the geology at the time of explora-
tion. There is also uncertainty about the future economics, 
markets, risks, and politics that will affect the project. The 
incentive for a state to revisit the terms of the initial bargain 
struck is increased by the shift in bargaining power that 
occurs in the event of a commercial discovery and a sub-
stantial investment by the foreign investor.
Sophisticated management and specialized 
technology
A second common feature is the dependence of the EI 
 sectors on sophisticated management and specialized 
technology.3 This dependence affects the development of 
host-state institutional capacity. States developing their EI 
sector must have sufficient institutional capacity to ade-
quately oversee sector operations and for adopting the com-
petitive licensing, contractual, and fiscal regimes required to 
attract needed skills and technology (see chapter 5).
The challenge here lies in finding ways of enabling a trans-
fer of expertise and sourcing of business to local firms in order 
to ensure a long-term benefit to the domestic economy.
Asymmetric access to information
Partly due to the complex management skills and technol-
ogy that characterize the EI sectors, governments are at an 
informational disadvantage vis-à-vis international inves-
tors and operators (Stiglitz 1989; Nutavoot 2004). The 
government is likely to be informed about its future fiscal 
intentions, but the private investor undertaking explora-
tion and development will probably be better informed 
about technical and commercial aspects of a project. This 
has important implications for the design of license or 
contract award procedures, fiscal design, and fiscal admin-
istration as well as the engagement of outside technical 
assistance. It can also be the root of subsequent dissatisfac-
tion by a government about the terms negotiated with 
investors by its predecessor(s) and trigger demands for a 
review of those terms.
With increasing sources of competition in the EI sector, 
and the role of national resource companies, this is less of a 
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problem than it once was. Access to information remains a 
challenge, however, for many governments in resource-rich 
economies and is compounded by a tendency of some of them 
to be overly secretive about such information once it has been 
obtained.
Price volatility
A fourth feature common to both the petroleum and min-
ing sectors is the volatility of prices, costs, and rents. The 
extreme volatility of prices not only poses macroeco-
nomic management challenges but also raises issues about 
the design of fiscal terms. A fundamental policy issue with 
which governments must constantly grapple is the ques-
tion of how the burden of the risk of price and revenue 
volatility should be divided between the investor and the 
government.
Volatile commodity prices can also have dramatic 
impacts on a country’s exchange rate, with the effect of driv-
ing up the value of the currency if commodity prices are 
rising and pushing it lower when they fall. This will be wors-
ened by capital inflows and outflows.
The volatility or variability of costs receives much less 
attention, but deserves more. EI costs vary widely across 
time and across projects, creating significant issues for both 
the design of fiscal regimes and their administration. When 
costs soar for investors, as can happen in both the mining 
and hydrocarbon sectors, tensions with governments are 
likely to result from the necessary remedial actions. Rents 
(discussed in the following subsection) are also volatile as a 
result of dramatic fluctuations in price. (See figure 2.1 on oil 
prices in chapter 2.)
The challenge lies less in the wide variability of prices than 
in the difficulty in predicting them. Most forecasts about pric-
ing turn out to be wrong (IMF 2012, 10). The consequences 
can be severe. Besides the impacts of variation on the size of 
resource rents (which creates difficulties for planning), long-
term price trends can make it economically unfeasible for 
investors to extract reserves, even if technology has improved. 
This can leave assets stranded.
Substantial rents
Both the petroleum and mining sectors are capable of gen-
erating very substantial economic rents. By rent is meant the 
revenues in excess of all costs of production, including those 
of discovery and development, as well as the normal return 
to capital. The cost of extraction can be significantly less 
than the price that the resource can obtain on the market, 
not least when there is an important oligopolistic element in 
world markets, as is the case with oil.
These rents can be a very attractive tax base for govern-
ments on both efficiency and equity grounds (IMF 2012, 10). 
Securing rent for the state requires care in the design of the 
fiscal regime, to avoid disincentivizing investors and because 
rent revenues can be highly volatile. To illustrate, the average 
profit measured in percentage of revenues among EI compa-
nies was between 25 and 30 percent in 2006. This compares 
with less than 20 percent for the pharmaceutical industry and 
with a mere 5 percent for the EI sector in 2002 (Ericsson 
2012, 1). However, while rents in mining can occasionally be 
high, this is only at the peak of cycles (as in 2006). For large 
parts of the oil industry these rents are structural. There is 
nothing in mining that equates to the US$8 per barrel produc-
tion costs of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The challenge for some states is in the volumes of resource 
wealth, which will strain the capacity of the existing state sys-
tem, aggravate capacity problems, and create tensions in its 
relations with investors.
Adverse environmental and social impacts
The EI sectors can have major adverse environmental and 
social impacts. In the past, these issues have not always been 
well recognized or addressed by governments, but good 
practice has improved greatly since the end of the 20th cen-
tury. Avoiding or mitigating these impacts depends on 
appropriate legislation or regulation, enforcement capacity, 
and fiscal regimes that incentivize good behavior by the 
investor, while recognizing the costs involved and the need 
to internalize those costs.
As more and more EI companies sign on to international 
environmental and social standards or implement their own, 
the challenge for many governments is to ensure that local 
communities, indigenous peoples, and other affected citizens 
are able to participate in decisions relating to the exploitation 
of the resource and benefit from the development of the 
resource.
Resource exhaustion
By their nature, oil, gas, and mining resources are nonre-
newable.4 They will eventually be exhausted. This distin-
guishes these industries from most, perhaps all others and 
presents policy makers with a number of important issues, 
ranging from decisions on optimal rates of exploration, 
development, and exploitation (through fiscal regime 
design) to appropriate frameworks for macroeconomic 
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planning. It can encourage fiscal discipline and long-term 
planning about how much of the resource wealth to con-
sume and how much to save or invest.5
The challenge for governments is to take the finiteness of 
presently identified resources into account in their domestic 
planning and in their dealings with foreign investors, rather 
than to prepare for some kind of unlikely “resource apoca-
lypse” when exhaustion occurs.
Prominent political profile
Long viewed as strategic because of their pervasive influence 
on the economy and the scale of the revenues they generate, 
the petroleum and mining sectors have always attracted 
political attention. In certain circumstances, this attention 
can frustrate, or at least increase the difficulty of introduc-
ing, good sector management practices (van der Ploeg and 
Venables 2009).
Transparency may present challenges to both governments 
and investors but helps diminish the risk of rumor and specu-
lation among citizens about resource wealth management.
Enclave status
The production of minerals and hydrocarbons is often done 
in economic areas that are small in scale and geographically 
limited, with relatively few linkages to the rest of the econ-
omy. For offshore petroleum (both oil and gas), the remote-
ness from centers of population is even more evident.
There is generally agreement now that the challenge for 
governments and investors is to ensure that such investments 
are designed or shaped to trigger wider developmental impacts.
Lack of location mobility
In contrast to many other economic sectors, the extractives 
industries have few choices about locations. They have to 
locate where the resource is, increasing the prospects for 
conflict.
This feature underlines the importance of community and 
local engagement if a project is to enjoy a sustainable relation-
ship in the long term.
Innovation
Both hydrocarbons and mining industries are characterized 
by a high degree of innovation. In the former, for example, 
the introduction of hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” on 
a commercial scale has made their extraction more similar 
to conventional mining. By contrast, most innovation in 
mining comes in the form of low-key incremental improve-
ments in existing processes. Disruptive technologies 
are uncommon. The development of solvent-extraction 
 electro-winning in copper production stands out as an 
exception. It has increased processing efficiency signifi-
cantly, and, as a result, production has continued to 
increase in spite of a decline in the quality of grades of ore 
mined. Mining does however show a trend toward becom-
ing higher tech: in Western Australia iron ore mines make 
extensive use of driverless trucks, and more and more 
underground mining is being carried out remotely.
The greatest challenge to governments lies in the unex-
pected implications of innovation for policy design. For 
example, unconventional oil and gas discoveries on a large 
scale in the United States have implications for coal use in Asia 
and for the prospects for new gas discoveries in East Africa.
3.3 KEY DIFFERENCES OF THE INDUSTRIES
Differences within the extractives sectors
It is a mistake to assume too much homogeneity within 
each of the main extractives sectors. Within the hydrocar-
bons sector, there are significant differences between oil 
and natural gas and between conventional and unconven-
tional hydrocarbons. Within mining, diversity is signifi-
cant. In the small-volume, high-value category there are 
gemstones, gold, and the platinum group of metals. In the 
high-volume, low-value category are the industrial miner-
als such as coal, iron ore, copper, nickel, tin, bauxite, and 
soda ash, for example. There are also construction materi-
als such as sands, gravels, granite, and dimension stone. 
Part II of the Sourcebook makes every effort to note these 
distinctions and explain their significance. The many dif-
ferences ensure that very few one-size-fits-all prescriptions 
or options are feasible.
Differences of degree
Some of the differences among the EI sectors are matters 
of degree rather than of quality. For example, all of the 
EI sectors will leave environmental and social footprints, 
but some will be larger than others. Historically, the min-
ing sector has been the most contentious in this regard, 
because its operations are entirely land based, often 
involve moving large masses of land, and affect local com-
munities living or working in the area, sometimes over 
very long periods. However, there are exceptions, with 
environmental degradation from oil spills in sensitive 
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ecosystems being a prime example. Spills include those in 
the Niger Delta, Prince William Sound in Alaska (the 
Exxon Valdez tanker spill), and the Gulf of Mexico (the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster). Such events may suddenly 
and radically change perceptions about the environmental 
footprint of EI projects. Similarly, all EI sectors generate 
rents, but rents in the natural gas and mining sectors are 
generally more modest than those obtained in the oil sec-
tor. These differences, even where they are only matters of 
degree, are often reflected in legislation or fiscal regimes.6
Exploration
At the exploration stage of EI sector development, there are 
two areas where differences are identifiable: (1) procedures 
for contract award and (2) security of tenure. Mining 
exploration often takes place in a context of extremely 
limited prior geological knowledge or data. There are very 
many minerals and they can occur pretty much anywhere. 
By contrast, oil is confined to sedimentary basins and so is 
more geographically confined. The information necessary 
to assess the commercial potential of an area for mining is 
acquired incrementally, at relatively low cost, over an 
extended period. This appears to have led to the practice of 
awarding contracts on a first-come, first-served basis (that 
is, noncompetitive), and to the separation of exploration 
and exploitation rights. However, recent trends in the 
 mining sector indicate that the practice of integrating 
exploration and exploitation rights (as is common in the 
oil and gas industry) is emerging, and, increasingly, mining 
exploration is unlikely to take place if an investor does not 
have reasonable confidence that a developmental right is 
ensured.
In the petroleum sector, where more attention is paid to 
the compilation of preaward geological information and 
where the data required to form a preliminary opinion 
on commercial potential can be more quickly compiled, 
licenses are typically awarded by negotiated bid or auction 
(Reece 1978). Further, in contrast to the historical practice 
in the mining sector, the award of exploration rights in 
oil and gas seamlessly guarantees rights to develop and 
 produce in the event of commercial discovery. This is usu-
ally attributed to the fact that definitive demonstration of 
 commercial potential in petroleum requires substantial 
investment outlays in the drilling of risky and expensive 
exploration wells, which often result in failure. These are 
generally considered risks and expenditures that would not 
be undertaken without security of tenure (Barnett and 
Ossowski 2002, 8–9).
However, the appraisal stage in petroleum is character-
ized by fewer risks than mining. For mineral deposits, there 
is a wide range of uncertainties about the ability to mine and 
process a deposit and market a suitable product, requiring 
further work. Once petroleum has been identified in com-
mercial quantities, any further appraisal is mostly limited to 
achieving optimal recovery (Land 2007, 257).
Degree of market integration
The absence of competitive global or even regional mar-
kets makes it difficult to commercialize natural gas. This 
has led to contract and fiscal provisions specific to the 
natural gas sector. The absence of markets has meant that 
natural gas deals have to integrate vertically all phases of 
commercialization from the point of extraction to the 
point of final consumption, often across international 
boundaries and with various investor groups. This is chal-
lenging for regulation, pricing for fiscal purposes, and the 
design of fiscal terms. By contrast, even though oil compa-
nies are often vertically integrated from exploration to 
selling retail products at the gas pump, the difficulties 
raised by vertical integration do not usually occur in the 
oil sector, because it is characterized by broad competitive 
markets at each segment in the value chain. Minerals are 
more like oil in this respect. While some mineral produc-
ers are vertically integrated from mine to refinery, there 
are large and liquid markets in intermediate products such 
as copper and zinc concentrates, bauxite and alumina, and 
above all, iron ore.
Variety of operations
The wide variety of operations in the mining industry, 
from the very small to the very large, has implications for 
the design of an applicable legal framework. Mining laws 
and regulations usually specify great detail regarding pro-
cedures and institutional structure, roles, and mandates, 
because they have to apply across a diverse sector. In the 
oil sector, there is also a considerable diversity of opera-
tions, but less so than in mining. For example, processing 
constitutes an important and complex part of the mining 
production process, increasing the exposure to production 
performance risks. External inputs, support infrastructure, 
and labor are all present to a greater degree in mining than 
in petroleum, increasing the risks of costs caused by inter-
ruption. This may explain why petroleum sector laws and 
regulations tend to be less intricate but are usually fol-
lowed by a detailed contractual approach to rule making. 
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Nonetheless, the frequent use of model contracts suggests 
a similar need for standardization in the oil and gas sector. 
The recent publication of a model contract for mining 
development shows that this approach is also applicable to 
mining (IBA 2011).
Institutional differences
Among the various institutional differences among the 
EI sectors, three deserve mention because of their visibil-
ity. First, the use of national resource companies (NRCs) 
has been significantly less successful to date in mining than 
in oil and gas. A push for NRCs in mining and nationaliza-
tion programs in the 1970s resulted in a reversal a decade 
later, but a similar reversal did not take place in the oil 
industry. Gas companies have usually included a signifi-
cant state element in transportation and distribution and 
sometimes in exploration and production. The effect of 
state involvement is therefore a contrasting feature between 
the mining sector and the oil and gas sectors. A study on 
state ownership concludes that poor performance in min-
ing “is not a corollary of state ownership. . . . The success 
of a state-owned mining company is determined by the 
governance framework/structure, assets, and capital base” 
(RMG 2011, 33).
A second difference is that, with respect to revenue col-
lection, a national taxation authority will usually tend to 
have a greater influence than the Ministry of Finance in the 
mining sector.
Third, the commercial structures in the sectors will dif-
fer. In petroleum projects, unincorporated joint ventures 
(JVs) are common, for tax or financing reasons, such as risk 
spreading or possibly reasons connected with technology. 
Capital is provided separately by the parties to the JV and 
the benefits are shared among them. Tax authorities have an 
interest in understanding these arrangements (see chapter 5), 
not least to monitor costs. By contrast, in mining, such JVs 
are much less common and are set up after discovery and 
appraisal of a deposit to facilitate commercial development. 
Often, major companies tend to take majority ownership 
stakes in locally incorporated vehicles.
Artisanal mining
A significant feature of the mining industry is the preva-
lence of large numbers of artisanal miners. This is a com-
mon feature of many developing countries in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America. The diversity of artisanal and small-
scale mining (ASM) should not be underestimated. The 
category embraces any mining that is conducted with little 
machinery and by miners who possess few if any legal rights. 
Such mining is often the only means of survival for the min-
ers and their dependents, thus having a close correlation 
with poverty. It is notorious for its negative environmental 
impacts, lack of safety, and social impacts. Previously, the 
dominant policy approach was to criminalize ASM activi-
ties, but increasingly they are seen as important in the over-
all development of a country’s mining sector. This has no 
counterpart in the petroleum sector.
The influence of these special characteristics of EI poli-
cies and practices will become apparent in the chapters in 
Part II on the EI Value Chain. The key differences between 
the two main EI sectors and specifics of each are summa-
rized in boxes 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.
Box 3.1 Key Differences between the Petroleum and Mining Sectors
 1. The overriding significance of exploration in invest-
ment in the petroleum sector contrasts with  mining 
(linked to searching for oil in large sedimentary 
basics deep underground and related costs). In min-
ing, systematic drilling follows a slower, deductive 
process of surveying and surface sampling over a 
relatively smaller area.
 2. The scale of rents is often much higher in oil than 
in mining. This is linked to a different structure of 
risk and reward, with oil having more of both.
 3. Procedures for contract award and security of ten-
ure differ (see chapter 4).
 4. Legal frameworks: detailed legislation is favored in 
mining while similar detail is typically found only 
in model contracts in the oil and gas sectors.
 5. State-owned companies have been much less 
prominent in the mining sector than in the hydro-
carbons sector.
 6. The petroleum sector often uses a production-sharing 
contract, which is nonexistent in the mining sector.
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Box 3.2 Features Specific to the Oil and Gas Sectors
 1. National resource companies remain popular in 
most oil- and gas-producing countries, more so 
than in the mining sector.
 2. Usually, distinct laws will be made for oil and 
gas activities and for the mining of other miner-
als. Inevitably, this difference in choice of legal 
design appears to suggest the existence of underly-
ing  differences between the two sets of extractive 
industries.
 3. In the oil and gas sector, a framework approach 
to legislation is often preferred, with a higher 
degree of reliance on a related model or standard 
contract for exploration and exploitation than in 
mining.
 4. Three types of agreement govern the relation-
ship between a host government and investors in 
upstream oil and gas activities: the concession or 
license, the production-sharing agreement, and the 
risk service agreement. Only the first is commonly 
found in mining.
 5. Most oil and gas agreements require the contrac-
tor to purchase a proportion of its needed goods 
and services in the host country from local sup-
pliers to promote linkages to the local economy. 
Similarly, they require a hiring preference for 
nationals of the host country and the use of 
training programs to transfer skills and create 
employment.
 6. Stabilization clauses are commonly used in oil and 
gas agreements.
 7. Natural gas discovery and development is com-
monly treated differently from oil in the basic 
agreement, with a longer period being given to the 
appraisal of a gas discovery and fiscal provisions 
being designed to reflect its different profitability.
 8. Contract provisions may require priority alloca-
tion of gas to the domestic market and/or set con-
ditions for the authorization of export sales.
 9. Gas contracts contain detailed valuation clauses set-
ting out how wellhead prices are to be determined.
10. In award procedures, it is a desirable and increas-
ingly common practice to prequalify applicants for 
awards.
11. Where significant geological data are available and 
investor interest is high, a competitive auction is 
generally considered the best option for awarding 
contracts.
12. In the award of oil and gas rights, it is the work 
program that generally has the most influence in 
decision making, usually combined with a finan-
cial variable, such as a bonus, royalty, or profit/ 
production share.
Box 3.1 Key Differences between the Petroleum and Mining Sectors (continued)
 7. The prevalence of artisanal miners distinguishes 
mining from petroleum and presents important 
policy issues.
 8. Taxation in mining tends to favor royalty and 
profits taxes, while in the petroleum sector the 
widespread use of production-sharing presents a 
more complex picture, with a wider range of taxa-
tion rates being common, too.
 9. A different balance of capital and operating costs in 
the oil industry makes costs higher at the front end 
(to establish production facilities and pipelines); 
mining has high capital costs but needs more 
people during production, ongoing equipment 
investment, and continuous management of local 
environmental impacts.
 10. Mining is more fragmented and geographically 
spread than oil; it has numerous products in differ-
ent forms instead of a few relatively homogeneous 
products.
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Box 3.3 Features Specific to the Mining Sector
 1. Access to land is the starting point for the mineral 
exploration and mining process.
 2. Ownership of subsoil resources needs to be legally 
specified.
 3. The state specifies mineral rights, generally either 
exploration or mining licenses, in exchange for 
license holders undertaking exploration or devel-
opment work.
 4. Most exploration licenses for minerals contain 
the presumption that a company finding any-
thing will have the right of first refusal on its 
development.
 5. For mining, unlike for oil or gas, established 
practice includes the offering of exploration on a 
first-come, first-served basis, due to a lack of both 
geological information and investor interest.
 6. However, there is now generally more data avail-
able and hence greater interest in obtaining explo-
ration licenses.
 7. While first-come, first-served will continue to 
be appropriate for areas that are largely unex-
plored, good practice is for a government to 
offer licenses on a competitive bidding basis in 
situations where geological data are available and 
where there are strong indications of multiple 
and competing interest.
 8. Mining agreements should not:
 ■ Include fiscal terms preferential to particular 
investors, most-favored-company provisions, 
or provisions for their own extension to cover 
new areas
 ■ Provide license holders with long-term explo-
ration rights (such as right lasting last longer 
than a decade)
 ■ Allow investor “land-banking”—there should 
be an obligation to conduct substantive work
 ■ Tie up land far larger than the area to be mined 
during the expected life of the mine
 9. Companies should not be made subject to unreason-
able “use it or lose it” provisions, since they need to 
be able to time their investments with regard to the 
price cycle, not just the government’s fiscal needs.
 10. Large numbers of artisanal miners are common in 
the mining sector of several developing countries. 
They are notably present in mining for gold and 
precious stones. Good practice lies in formaliza-
tion and legalization of certain types of artisanal 
and small-scale mining.
3.4 EI SECTOR DYNAMICS
Most accounts of the EI sector emphasize the wide diver-
sity of their structures, noting size and ownership patterns 
and changing trends in them.7 These features continue to 
evolve. Research in recent years has explored the important 
role that national oil companies (NOCs) now play in the 
international oil and gas industry (Tordo, Tracy, and Arfaa 
2011; Victor, Hults, and Thurber 2012; Marcel 2005).8 
Similarly, there has been research into the role of new play-
ers in the global mining industry and into junior compa-
nies and their effectiveness, particularly at the exploration 
stage, where they are assumed to have an advantage and 
where they are increasingly in evidence, especially in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Humphreys 2015).9 Some research 
has been driven by the awareness among policy advisers 
that such companies regularly employ the panoply of inter-
national taxation rules to maximize their advantage, pre-
senting a challenge to governments in states with poorly 
developed fiscal regimes.10
While there is plenty of evidence of the differences 
between mining and hydrocarbons, the dynamic factor 
should be noted here as elsewhere. Trends in both sectors 
seem to be encouraging some convergence. In box 3.4 there 
is a summary of five developments that have, in the view of 
one commentator, the effect of encouraging convergence.
As circumstances change, many investors are accus-
tomed to selling an interest, merging, or making other 
acquisitions in their pursuit of value. Their decisions will 
usually be made within a framework of corporate operations 
that goes well beyond those of a single country, and justified 
to stakeholders who in the vast majority of cases are unlikely 
to reside in the country hosting the investment. These and 
other ways in which EI industries respond to exploration, 
development, and production in their international opera-
tions may be too little understood in host countries, with 
resulting negative effects on the design of public policies.
Buying and selling assets
The typical ways that internationally operating companies 
obtain access to new reserves need to be understood. Explora-
tion activity is only one way for companies to gain access. 
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Companies in the EI sector routinely buy and sell their 
interests through mergers and acquisitions (M&As), usually 
on a friendly rather than a hostile basis. In the hydrocarbons 
sector, it is common for the buyers to be cash-rich NOCs 
from countries with insufficient domestic resource bases, 
such as China and India. Near the peak of the last commod-
ity cycle, in 2011, the disclosed value of exploration and 
production M&A activity increased by almost 70 percent to 
reach US$317 billion (Ernst & Young 2011).11 Cash-rich 
NOCs from China and Korea played an important part in 
that activity. By contrast, in 2015 comparable M&A activity 
in hydrocarbons had fallen to US$71 billion once the giant 
merger between Royal Dutch Shell Group and BG is 
removed from the equation (Ernst & Young 2016, 6); it is 
US$153 billion when this transaction is included. Chinese 
and Asian NOCs were scarcely visible, with total NOC trans-
actions declining to US$6.1 billion in 2015 from almost 
US$122 billion in 2012. The strong correlation between 
M&A and the commodity price environment means that 
with the substantial price fall, M&A activity has been in 
decline for several years (as, for example, equity valuations 
fall and demands grow for returns of capital to shareholders). 
In a downward cycle, companies face limits on their M&A 
aspirations by uncertainty about the prospect of a commod-
ity price recovery and (or alternatively) constraints on their 
balance sheets. Further, cross-border (as distinct from 
domestic) M&A has become increasingly challenged by 
the need for regulatory approvals to meet competition 
concerns by governments and even by what may be called 
cultural differences.
For an international oil company (IOC), this kind of 
sale to an NOC (or other) buyer can be a way to raise funds 
for new projects. It can also be a way to generate a return 
from selling an asset that has been created by identifying 
commercially viable reserves. Its market value is derived 
from its future production potential. As the project 
matures, the share value increases, and a sale follows. This 
kind of IOC has a different business model from that of the 
better-known integrated oil and gas companies. (Exxon 
Mobil and Shell are examples of such companies.) Instead 
of producing oil from a successful exploration and generat-
ing a stream of cash to return to shareholders as dividend 
payments, it sells the asset at an early stage. In this way it 
avoids the complexity of bringing a large find into produc-
tion, which requires significant upfront investment and 
often requires a JV structure to finance the development. 
Other IOCs may choose to produce discovered reserves 
themselves and may acquire other projects in order to gain 
access to the reserves they contain, thereby increasing the 
volume of reserves under their control (with or without 
having discovered them).
A similar trend is evident in the mining sector, where the 
level of spending on M&As tends historically to be greater 
than that on exploration and development. However, here 
too there has been a reaction to the M&A transactions car-
ried out in the years when commodity prices were high, 
with a severe decline in the volume and value of M&A trans-
actions amid large impairment charges or write-downs of 
asset values that have followed these early deals. Separately, 
regulatory hurdles are a challenge for cross-border mining 
transactions, with governments reluctant to allow a transfer 
of ownership of resources to foreign companies, and a 
growing concern about loss of tax revenue that may follow 
from their approval.
When M&A occurs, such activity reflects a transfer of 
ownership of the present stock of mines and associated pro-
cessing facilities. Inevitably, its value is significantly higher 
than the value of annual additions to that stock, which 
derives from exploration and development. Just as in the 
Box 3.4  Convergence of Mining and 
Hydrocarbons?
 ■ Mining companies go to increasingly remote 
places to develop mines, requiring ports, power 
stations, and railway lines, so the upfront costs 
of getting established are rising, in line with oil.
 ■ Mining companies are having larger impacts 
on the local economy. Examples are mining 
projects in Guinea and in Mongolia, increasing 
the size of local GDP hugely.
 ■ Technology advances in oil and gas are making 
them closer to mining in the way they operate 
(shale bringing oil and gas on-land and with 
greater geographical dispersion).
 ■ The recovery process from shale and tar sands 
resembles mining in economics and technolo-
gies more than the traditional extraction from 
deep underground wells; margins look more like 
mining due to higher cost.
 ■ There is increasing similarity in the political 
challenges they face, especially in the impact of 
resource developments. Policy makers see sim-
ilarities, too (as in discussions about Extrac-
tive Industries Transparency Initiative—see 
chapter 8).
Source: Humphreys 2014.
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hydrocarbons sector, junior companies will expect to gain 
their rewards by selling any discoveries to larger mining 
companies for exploitation.
It should already be clear that the business models of 
companies in EI activities are far from uniform and need to 
be understood by governments and their advisers in design-
ing policies for this sector. There are in the EI sector com-
panies that can be classified as large integrated IOCs, junior 
or “independent” IOCs, and NOCs, which can operate 
internationally, regionally, or simply nationally. The com-
pany that is likely to sell its asset in the event of an explora-
tion success is also usually one with a higher than average 
appetite for risk, and that can have advantages to govern-
ments looking for a first-mover to generate interest in their 
territory.
Policy effects
Policy needs to take into account the real differences among 
types of companies and the M&A dynamic arising from the 
maturity of prospects from exploration to extraction. It also 
needs to account for a shift that commonly occurs from 
junior to more major producers. This is particularly evident 
in the petroleum sector, where the investment returns on 
successful projects tend to be higher and payback periods 
tend to be shorter than in mining. Decisions need to be 
made about the kind of companies that a government 
wishes to see as investors within its borders. Many years ago, 
the Norwegian government policy was organized around a 
preference for the larger, integrated companies in its emerg-
ing hydrocarbons sector, while its North Sea neighbor, the 
United Kingdom, favored the entry of a diverse range of 
companies into offshore exploration. These decisions affect 
policy at the beginning of the value chain (the award of 
rights) but also have impacts at later stages, with M&A 
activity being prevalent throughout. This is to some extent 
the lifeblood of a healthy industry, but it is a flow that gov-
ernments should keep a close eye on. In particular, govern-
ments should ensure that the environmental conditions 
associated with the license to operate are carried over to the 
new company.
South-south investment
A significant change in recent years has been the growing 
role of EI companies from the emerging economies, espe-
cially in low-income countries. In this group, Brazil’s, 
China’s, and India’s national or private companies have 
made the most notable impacts on the international EI scene. 
Russia also provides a home to new corporate players, even 
though it is not located in the South. Companies from other 
countries such as Malaysia and Thailand (hydrocarbons), 
Peru (silver), South Africa (platinum), and Botswana 
(diamonds) have made significant impacts on global EI 
markets in recent years. Countries in this group are taking a 
much larger share of global spending on exploration in the 
mining sector, amounting to 60 percent, according to one 
study (Humphreys 2009, 2).
Much of the literature on the development implications 
of EI has focused upon the impacts of foreign direct invest-
ment from OECD or other developed countries, or North-
South flows. However, the rise of players from emerging 
economies, and the so-called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, 
and China) in particular, raises questions about how South-
South flows will affect established patterns. It is still too 
early to answer. As David Humphreys (2009, 21) notes in a 
study of such companies in the mining sector:
[I]nvestors from these countries sometimes bring a 
rather different set of perspectives to their overseas 
investments, emphasizing, on the one hand, raw mate-
rial security of supply considerations along with the 
commercial prospects of a mining project and, on the 
other hand, the beneﬁts of such investments taking 
place within the context of a broader government-to-
government ﬁnancial and cooperation agreement.
Oil and gas dynamics
Large, integrated companies operate internationally at all 
stages of the petroleum cycle: exploration, production, 
transportation, refining, and marketing. These are usually 
known as the IOCs, are privately owned for the most part, 
and are based in the United States and Europe. The six 
 companies commonly attributed to this group are BP, 
ExxonMobil, Shell, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, and Total. 
Sometimes called “super-majors,” these companies account 
for about two-thirds of the world’s exploration and produc-
tion investments, with the balance being made by NOCs. 
They are especially prominent in deepwater exploration and 
development and liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects; their 
size and resources allow them to manage and finance such 
projects more easily than other companies and to face the 
risks that these projects entail.
National oil companies are common among resource-
rich states, with around 90 percent of the world’s oil 
and gas reserves and 75 percent of the production under 
their  control. The largest is Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabia). 
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Some of these NOCs have become increasingly active 
beyond their home base, competing with the IOCs for 
access to new or existing petroleum reserves. Examples of 
companies that have ventured outside their national terri-
tory are China’s CNOOC, CPNC, and Sinopec; India’s 
ONGC; Brazil’s Petrobras; Russia’s Gazprom; and 
Malaysia’s Petronas. NOCs are also used by their home 
states as vehicles to secure much-needed energy resources 
for domestic industries’ needs.
Junior companies, sometimes called independents, do not 
have the high overhead costs of the IOCs. Their size can 
vary considerably, with the smaller ones typically hoping to 
significantly profit from the sale of promising prospects, 
sometimes to other, larger independent companies. They 
are usually prepared to accept high risks at the exploration 
stage, both in terms of the hydrocarbons they target and in 
terms of the countries in which they explore. For this rea-
son, they often dominate in initial exploration, especially in 
frontier settings. They tend to respond quickly to current 
demand and change their exploration focus rapidly. For the 
most part, they operate with funds raised from individual 
investors and equity finance, often in provincial stock mar-
kets such as those in Canada and Australia, making their 
expenditure highly volatile.
Oil service companies are usually confined to the provi-
sion of services and supplies to the operating companies 
that manage exploration and production on behalf of their 
consortium partners. Drilling wells and oilfield manage-
ment are frequently outsourced by operators to special-
ized service providers. The larger service companies, like 
Halliburton or Schlumberger, are capable of becoming 
involved in preexploration, exploration, and production, 
but they may choose not to pit themselves competitively 
against their oil company clients and therefore refrain 
from such activities.
Within the industry, three business stages are commonly 
distinguished: (1) upstream, meaning the exploration, 
development, and production activities; (2) midstream, 
meaning the storage, trading, and transportation of crude 
oil and natural gas; and (3) downstream, meaning refining 
and marketing. Some companies, such as ExxonMobil, 
Shell, and BP, perform activities in each of these segments. 
However, many of the thousands of firms in the oil and gas 
industry are specialists or niche players; further, some carry 
out different activities within one or more of the above seg-
ments. In the EI Value Chain that is used in the Sourcebook, 
the upstream activities fall within the first and fifth chev-
rons, while some of the activities in the midstream and 
downstream segments are treated in the second chevron, 
“sector organization.” The market for crude oil is shaped by 
many players: refiners, speculators, commodities exchanges, 
shipping companies, IOCs, NOCs, independent companies 
and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC). For the most part, the Sourcebook focuses on the 
upstream activities.
Natural gas is commonly found in association with oil. 
The techniques for discovery are the same. Hence, the larger 
oil companies are often also among the largest producers of 
natural gas. Some companies have started out, however, as 
gas companies and moved into oil: Encana (Canada), ENI 
(Italy), BG (UK), and ELF (France) are examples. Gas is 
very much like oil in the upstream segment and very differ-
ent from it in midstream. However, important and distinct 
characteristics of gas differ from those of oil in the upstream 
segment: gas processing and natural gas liquefaction. In the 
midstream segment, transporting natural gas is more com-
plex and much more challenging than transporting crude 
oil, albeit with fewer environmental risks. Constructing and 
operating pipelines to bring natural gas from remote loca-
tions to markets raises complex issues of cross-border regu-
lation (see chapters 5 and 6). However, transportation of 
gas has become significantly easier over the past decade with 
the expansion of the LNG industry, dominated by the larg-
est IOCs. It offers significant opportunities to countries 
along the coast of Africa and the Aceh province of Indonesia, 
where large gas deposits have been found far from the main 
consumer markets. This, of course, comes with infrastruc-
ture implications for emerging gas producers, which the 
Sourcebook takes note of (see chapters 5, 6, and 9).
Mining dynamics
Large, international, multiproduct mining companies are 
relatively few in number. Typical examples would now 
include Anglo American, BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, Vedanta, 
and Glencore. They are involved in every stage of the indus-
try value chain and typically have an interest in several types 
of minerals. The rationale behind this diversification of 
activity and products in the minerals sector is to spread the 
risk of activities and achieve a higher average rate of return 
than would be achieved with a single product such as gold, 
coal, or iron ore. When one commodity is down in price 
another should be up—that is the assumption. Looking at 
the largest companies more closely, many are much less 
diversified than at first appears. If one focuses on the larger 
companies, six have more than 50 percent of their work in 
iron ore, four are copper producers, and three are gold pro-
ducers (Ericsson 2012, 8). The dependence on iron ore is 
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mostly a product of timing; 2011 was the peak of the iron 
ore price cycle. For the most part, then, they are dependent 
on one metal for more than 50 percent of their production. 
These companies tend to be diligent in their approach to 
environmental and social performance standards and social 
investments. They commonly adhere to international stan-
dards and reporting requirements, through, for example, 
the International Council on Mining and Metal’s Sustainable 
Development Principles, and the International Finance 
Corporation’s performance standards.
National resource companies are fewer in number and 
much less influential in mining than their counterparts in 
hydrocarbons. Even so, Burnett and Bret put their number at 
around 80, varying according to size, commodity focus, geo-
graphic reach, and degree of independence from the State 
(Burnett and Bret 2016, 11, 16). Typically, they focus on a 
limited number of minerals and sell them on the international 
market. Early efforts at state ownership and control included 
significant failures in Africa, such as the nationalization of 
copper mines in Zambia, and in the state companies estab-
lished in centrally planned economies, largely in Eastern 
Europe and parts of Asia where, for a long time, it was associ-
ated with a heavy industry development model. The Zambian 
effort was part of a wave of nationalizations of foreign mining 
companies in developing countries in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. During the 1960s there were 32 expropriations of for-
eign mining companies; between 1970 and 1976 the number 
reached 48 (UNCTAD 2007, 108). Governments retreated 
from state control in the 1990s, but the practice remains high 
in many metals, partly due to the growth of state-controlled 
mining in China. Some Chinese companies are becoming 
quite prominent outside China: Chinalco, MMG, China 
Molybdenum, and CNMC, for example. In the diamond 
industry there are examples of successful state holdings in 
Botswana and Namibia, both of which have formed joint 
venture companies with De Beers (RMG 2011, 10). An exam-
ple in copper is Codelco, the Chilean producer. In iron ore 
there is the Indian mining company National Mineral 
Development Corporation. Some of the large “national” min-
ing champions, such as Vale in Brazil or Norilsk Nickel in 
Russia, also enjoy a close relationship to government. In Vale’s 
case, the Brazilian government holds a golden share, which 
could be used to block a foreign takeover.
Junior mining companies are typically medium- or 
small-sized companies focused on exploration activities in 
one country or region or a specific mineral or group of 
minerals. They may be owned by domestic entrepreneurs or 
international firms, sometimes backed by venture capital or 
private equity.12 There are about 1,700 such companies 
(Burnett and Bret 2016) and they make up the majority of 
mining companies in business today. Indeed, many mineral-
rich countries have a group of such companies of differing 
sizes, sometimes each operating in only one mine. Examples, 
can be found in Chile, Mexico, and Peru. They will usually 
have local ownership and staffing. Such companies can 
accept higher risk than the larger ones, both in terms of the 
type of mineral target sought and the countries in which 
they explore. They also “tend to seek the products that are 
presently fashionable, and they can and do change their 
exploration focus quickly” (Crowson 2008, 118). For com-
panies that focus solely on exploration, they are likely to 
recoup their capital not by developing the reserves them-
selves (by which stage their interests are likely to be diluted 
significantly), but by selling most, if not all, of their discov-
eries to larger companies with the technical, financial, and 
marketing skills and access to the capital markets. Sometimes 
the larger companies provide the junior ones with the capi-
tal to support operations and an assurance of a market for 
their discoveries if successful. At the peak of the cycle, in 
2006–8, junior mining companies accounted for over 
50 percent of total mineral exploration, and the majors 
30 percent. Ten years later, those proportions had reversed. 
Juniors are volatile because they generally depend on equity 
markets for their funding, and so are susceptible to cycles. 
The principal markets for risk capital for juniors are largely 
limited to Australia, Canada, and London.
Small-scale miners and artisanal workers play a key role in 
mining, and this has no parallel in the hydrocarbons sector. 
Their work may take on a corporate character, with workers 
employed to mine, but this is generally on a very small scale. 
The subsector is the equivalent of subsistence agriculture and 
is labor intensive, employing on a conservative estimate as 
many as 30 million people around the world. They always 
operate informally and sometimes also illegally.13 These com-
panies and workers usually account for minor shares of global 
mining production. They tend to concentrate on high unit-
value products, such as gold and gemstones, and are widely 
found in developing countries. Health and safety conditions 
among such miners are often poor; these operations tend to 
employ women and children, and they often cause significant 
environmental damage. The benefits to a host country of such 
mining are unlikely to be reflected in any tax returns, and 
mining codes and tax systems are usually not responsive to 
this kind of activity. This sector is on the increase, with 
impacts on the sensitive or protected ecosystems and biodi-
versity and encroachment on World Heritage Sites. (Large-
scale mining also can have such impacts.) It is relatively 
insulated from the rise and fall of commodity prices 
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(in contrast to large-scale mining operations) because the 
economic returns will remain—even in a downturn—
significantly higher than similar artisanal activities, such as 
fisheries and agriculture. A rush of activity can have sudden, 
dramatic impacts: in Madagascar, gemstone rushes have 
attracted as many as 100,000 miners congregated in limited 
areas, with slash-and-burn agriculture used in support of the 
ASM communities.
In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of very large oil com-
panies such as Exxon and Shell moved into the mining sec-
tor to create genuinely EI companies. They assumed that the 
prospects for long-term growth within the oil industry were 
being challenged by the spread of state ownership and 
NOCs and had the cash available from high oil prices to 
fund programs of diversification. Mining and petroleum 
were, they thought, so similar in their characteristics and 
basic requirements that it would be possible to operate 
profitably across both sectors. This proved to be an eco-
nomically unsuccessful series of experiments, underlining 
differences in the respective businesses, and they were soon 
brought to an end. More recently, mining companies have 
been buying into oil (Humphreys 2014).
Unconventional oil and gas dynamics
The leading companies in the development of shale gas and 
oil include super-majors like Shell, Total, and ExxonMobil; 
large IOCs like Anadarko, Pioneer, Encana, Talisman, and 
BHP Billiton; and smaller independent companies that spe-
cialize in shale gas (Cuadrilla in the United Kingdom is an 
example). Most of these operate in the United States and 
Canada, because markets for unconventional oil and gas 
outside of North America are still in their infancy.
3.5 CONCLUSIONS
Investment in the EI sectors (oil, gas, and mining) has fea-
tures that present challenges to policy makers. There are 
significant differences between oil and gas, on the one hand, 
and mining, on the other, and indeed in the mining sector 
itself, although points of convergence have been noted. 
Both sectors are capable of playing a major role in a govern-
ment’s plans for resource-led development.
Effective management in the public interest requires 
recognition of both the common and the unique features of 
EIs in the design of sector policies and institutions. 
However, it will also involve strategic decisions about the 
kind of company or pattern of companies that is best suited 
to achieving the kind of overall policy goal held by a host 
country. More challenging still, it involves a recognition 
that periodically these industries have to transform them-
selves to become more profitable at lower price levels, mak-
ing attraction of investment into any region or country a 
harder task.
Some features of this investor-state relationship are rela-
tively constant over time, while others are quite dynamic, such 
as industry structure, which has shown significant changes 
and greater complexity in recent years, not least due to com-
panies from emerging markets making strategic investments 
aimed at securing future supplies of energy and minerals.
NOTES
 1. In this sense, the “extractives” industries by definition 
stand in contrast to the renewable energy industries, which 
typically rely on natural resources located above the surface 
(wind and solar power, for example).
 2. For large mining projects, this distinction will be less 
apparent.
 3. This clearly does not include artisanal and small-scale 
mining, but it is an integral part of EI generally.
 4. Note, however, that metals can be recycled to reduce the 
demand for virgin sites.
 5. However, “the importance of the finiteness of petroleum 
and mineral deposits to long-term economic  performance 
and commodity price developments is  questionable” (IMF 
2012, 12). Proven oil reserves, for example, have continued to 
rise in spite of increasing consumption levels.
 6. For a comprehensive comparison of oil and gas fiscal 
regimes, see Ernst and Young (2013).
 7. For ownership patterns, see, for example, UNCTAD 
2012 and Crowson 2008. For trends see Ernst & Young 2013 
and Humphreys 2012.
 8. Contrast their more tentative role in the mining sector 
(RMG 2011).
 9. Restructuring during the commodities boom years 
(2003–12) was caused largely by China’s industrialization 
during that period.
 10. See for example, several of the contributions to Keen, 
McPherson, and Daniel 2010.
 11. The previous year’s figures for M&A can be found in 
Fennema 2010.
 12. The medium and junior companies are sometimes sepa-
rated into two categories.
 13. This includes a significant number of child laborers. In 
2011, Human Rights Watch estimated that the number of 
child laborers in artisanal gold mining in a single African 
country, Mali, numbered between 20,000 and 40,000, with 
many of them starting work as young as six years old.
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The Value Chain Approach to Extractives
INTRODUCTION TO PART II
Two key ideas were advanced in Part I of the Sourcebook. 
First, just as more governments face decisions as custodians 
of extractive resources, specialist knowledge about all 
aspects of the extractive industries (EIs) value chain has 
grown and become more readily accessible. This wealth of 
knowledge creates a challenge for states and other stake-
holders who must use it in particular settings. The abun-
dance and diversity of knowledge leaves ample room for 
interpretation of what constitutes “good international 
practice.” It can be difficult to know how the knowledge 
may best operate as a source of standards or quality bench-
marks for policy decisions on legal and regulatory frame-
works, sector organization, fiscal design, and revenue 
management.
The second idea is that, for many and perhaps most gov-
ernments, responsibility for public policy decisions has 
become more sensitive than ever before, for three reasons. 
First, there is greater scrutiny of executive actions by legis-
latures, civil society, and individual citizens keen to ensure 
that decisions to promote resource-led development bring 
benefits to the ultimate owners, the country’s people. 
Second, there is a high level of awareness of negative out-
comes that can result from extractives development at a 
macrolevel (the resource curse) and also of the failures that 
can result from some of the instruments and techniques 
used in development: contract provisions, methods of 
awarding rights, or the design and operation of resource 
funds, for example. Given that extractives are nonrenewable 
resources, wrong policy decisions about their use can be 
particularly damaging to a country. Third, as the links 
between extractives and development policy have become 
established, expectations of potentially wide economic and 
social benefits have grown. This creates new minimum 
requirements for sustainable public policies in the EI sector 
and new sources of strain and instability in relations 
between governments and foreign investors.
Part II of the Sourcebook focuses on areas of EI develop-
ment where decisions involving policy choices are typically 
required and need to be justified by governments to their 
citizens. Through a critical review of the many country and 
regional case studies, elaborations of general principles, 
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published models, and recent research, it presents an 
updated version of internationally accepted “good practice” 
knowledge on four of the five key topics encapsulated by the 
EI Value Chain. The topics or problem complexes addressed 
in Part II are (1) the policy, legal, and contractual frame-
work (chapter 4); sector organization and regulatory insti-
tutions (chapter 5); fiscal design and administration 
(chapter 6); and revenue management and distribution 
(chapter 7). The fifth topic—sustainable development 
implementation—is examined in Part III.
The interests of two broad kinds of state have shaped the 
Sourcebook’s analysis of the body of knowledge: (1) new or 
aspiring extractives producers and (2) existing producers 
engaged in or planning reforms of their oil, gas, or mining 
sectors. In each case, the state will have a keen interest in 
current international good practice in the EI Value Chain. 
The Sourcebook’s operating assumption is that the host state 
has decided to invite participants from the domestic or 
international sector to develop resources on its behalf and 
under its supervision, perhaps with a state company 
involved, rather than to develop the resources entirely by 
itself. For the new and aspiring producing countries the 
benefits of using nonstate parties to develop resources are 
likely to be many. For the second category, the invitation is 
likely to be of a need for specialized, high-tech equipment 
and skills not available in the state sector or for high levels 
of capital investment, or both. For this cooperation to be 
successful, it is necessary for both parties to make credible 
commitments intended to last over time. The establishment 
of a sound and enforceable legal and contractual framework 
is of fundamental importance in this process. This priority 
is reflected in the first two chapters of Part II.
Any modern approach to good practice is influenced by 
the three challenges to effective decision making identified 
in Part I: (1) the need to contextualize and adapt lessons 
from the body of specialist knowledge (good practice has to 
“fit”), the need to counter institutional weaknesses (good 
practice has to be capacity sensitive), and the need for the 
maximum transparency and accountability in governance 
arrangements (good practice has to be credible). Taken 
together, these challenges have contributed to a rethinking 
of good practice knowledge, rebalancing it so that it is much 
less reliant on investor-driven definitions than in the past.
Understanding good practice in this way, informed by 
twenty-first century development needs, should make the 
knowledge presented and analyzed in Part II practical for 
officials in various levels of government and stakeholders 
responsible for the scrutiny of public policy. In our view, 
responsibility in the EI sector should be understood in the 
widest sense, because extractive resources are ultimately 
owned in virtually all parts of the world by the people, not 
by governments.
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Chapter Title 
C H A P T E R  T H R E E
4.1 KNOWLEDGE CORE
A government has to establish principles and instruments 
for building and operating a framework for investment 
decisions before making decisions. These constitute a policy, 
legal, and contractual framework. The framework bundles 
together issues of EI sector policy, legislation, contracts, 
award of contracts and licenses, and regulation of activities. 
Many of the principles and instruments of such frameworks 
are already used widely around the globe, but the way they 
are implemented varies greatly from one country to another 
and over time, as insights and lessons are generated from 
experience. Most of them carry a unique imprint from 
political bargaining in a particular country. With this in 
mind, every attempt to design or reform a framework has to 
consciously anticipate and prepare to resist destructive 
rent-seeking competition among interest groups.1
Much research and experience has already yielded 
insights into the policy priorities that a host state would 
typically expect resource-led development to achieve. 
Abundant discussion has taken place about the pros and 
cons of elements to consider when designing the best and 
most effective arrangements, whether legislative, contrac-
tual, or institutional. Together with a government’s deci-
sions on EI sector organization and fiscal design (chapters 5 
and 6), its decisions on the framework will shape and con-
strain EI sector investments and operations, ensuring (ide-
ally) that they proceed in an orderly fashion and in ways 
that protect the public interest.
The Sourcebook’s focus on the legal and policy frame-
work is sharp because it is done in relative isolation 
from the wider international context in order to capture 
its essential features. The elements of interaction with 
that wider and very important context are considered in 
section 4.11.
Differences between the oil, gas, and mining sectors need 
to be noted. At times they are very significant.
Policy, Lega , and Contractual Framework
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4.2 GETTING STARTED: FACTS OF EI LIFE
The world of legal and contractual relationships in the EIs is 
shaped by two basic facts:
1. Every country, prospective or actual producer, vests 
ownership of oil, gas, and mining resources—when in 
the subsoil—in the state, with very few exceptions, such 
as the United States.
2. Development of oil, gas, and mining resources requires 
translation of this legal fact into a series of coherent 
policy choices, contract forms, and fiscal instruments in 
a distinct structure or framework.
Ownership
The first fact is always a given. Most countries vest the own-
ership of subsoil resources in the state on behalf of the 
people, either in their constitution or in a distinct sector-
specific law: a petroleum law or a minerals law.2 This dec-
laration affects all aspects of the extractives regime and 
makes its operation explicitly a matter of public policy, and 
one that the courts may be empowered to interpret. An 
example of this is the wide-ranging statement of ownership 
that is included in the constitution of Ghana. Its scope is 
wide enough to grasp all the important areas where miner-
als may be found, including offshore waters as well as on, 
and under, land:
Every mineral in its natural state in, under or upon 
any land in Ghana, rivers, streams, water courses 
throughout Ghana, the exclusive economic zone and 
any area covered by the territorial sea or continental 
shelf is the property of the Republic of Ghana and 
shall be vested in the President on behalf of, and in 
trust for the people of Ghana.3
Where a special law is concerned, the declaration of own-
ership might take a different approach. Two examples are:
1. Mineral resources belong to the [Chinese] State. The 
rights of State ownership in mineral resources are exer-
cised by the State Council. State ownership of mineral 
resources, either near the earth’s surface or under-
ground, shall not change with the alteration of owner-
ship or right to the use of the land which the mineral 
resources are attached to.4
2. Title to, and control over, Petroleum in the Territory of 
Somalia are public property and are vested in Somalia, in 
trust for its people.5
An exception to the default rule of state ownership of 
natural resources is the complex mix of private and public 
ownership arrangements used in the United States. A sig-
nificant proportion of lands are in private ownership, and 
the owners are also the owners of the subsoil resources. 
They are entitled to negotiate leases with companies to 
develop mineral resources. Recent discoveries and develop-
ment of shale gas and oil have been made overwhelmingly 
in lands owned by private persons.6 Alongside this, there are 
extensive federal lands and offshore waters where public 
ownership is the norm.
International law provides support for a close linkage 
between state sovereignty and natural resources. The first 
expression of this in modern times was the 1958 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, made as new tech-
nology was becoming available to explore for offshore 
hydrocarbons and eventually other minerals. The idea of a 
“permanent” state sovereignty over natural resources was 
comprehensively elaborated in United Nations (UN) 
Resolution 1803 in 1962 (see box 4.1).7 This had its roots 
in a postcolonial world, where hydrocarbons and other 
mineral resources had initially been developed by foreign 
investors on terms highly unfavorable to the host states. 
The idea of sovereign ownership remains of fundamental 
importance (Schrijver 1997). It is nonetheless qualified by 
a greater appreciation of the need for any central state to 
respect the interests of local communities, particularly in 
areas affected by EI activities; the rights of indigenous 
peoples who may have claims to sovereignty over natural 
resources on their lands; and the obligations of states to 
their neighbors in relation to transboundary environmen-
tal accidents. The latter requires the “polluting” state to 
notify and cooperate with neighboring states to mitigate 
any damage.
International law has also been active in addressing a 
feature of state sovereignty over natural resources that 
assumed importance after UN Resolution 1803: the delimi-
tation of territory, particularly offshore and inland waters, 
for hydrocarbons but also deep-sea ocean spaces for mining 
(see box 4.3). The value of such space has vastly increased 
with the development of technology to explore for oil, gas, 
and other minerals in ever-deeper waters. In a number of 
cases, the inability of states to resolve differences arising 
from boundaries has led them to refer the disputes to inter-
national courts and tribunals for independent resolution. 
Many other disputes remain unresolved and are potential 
sources of tension and conflict.8
Finally, we note the ownership issues that arise from the 
fragmentation or breakup of states, as one part of a state 
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elects to separate itself. South Sudan is a recent example of 
this, and Timor-Leste is another. The emergence of new 
states from the end of the Soviet Union in the 1990s pro-
vides several other examples.
Development of a legal framework
The second basic fact of legal and contractual relation-
ships in the EIs is the need for states to develop a frame-
work for investment and development of the resources. 
Even where public ownership is clearly enshrined in the 
constitution or a special law, there needs to be supple-
mentary guidance on how ownership translates into a 
regime for the award of rights, the terms on which the 
rights are held, and their duration, obligations, the form 
of contract, regulation of operations, institutional coordi-
nation, and the distribution of revenues among the coun-
try’s citizens. This crucial step opens a Pandora’s Box of 
multiple challenges and choices, with the final results—
the framework of policy, law, and contract—being decided 
through political bargaining in the country concerned. 
Government officials will often be faced with a plethora of 
options and advice and recommendations based in “best 
practice.”
An example of the flow in legal arrangements is found in 
Brazil. Article 176 of the constitution provides that “(1) 
mineral deposits, whether exploited or not . . . form prop-
erty separate from the soil, for purposes of exploitation or 
use, and belong to the Union; and (2) unauthorized pros-
pecting or exploitation is prohibited.” Article 177(1) autho-
rizes state-owned or private companies to search for and 
exploit hydrocarbons. Law 9,478/97 provides a licensing 
regime for the hydrocarbons activities, supplemented in 
2010 by a production-sharing agreement (PSA) regime for 
so-called presalt and strategic areas. As knowledge of the 
Brazilian offshore evolved, there was an elaboration of the 
regime for the allocation of rights.
Where ownership of the resource is a highly sensitive 
political issue, great care must be taken by governments in 
proposing or modifying the regime for resource develop-
ment. The legacy of past choices will shape the policy con-
text of the present. In such countries, a key question will be, 
What is to be the role of state enterprises in future explora-
tion and production of the resource? Alternatively, what 
Box 4.1 Sovereignty over Natural Resources
The doctrine of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources was set out in the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 1803 (XVII) in 1962. Approved by capital-
exporting and capital-importing states alike, it states in 
article 1, “The right of peoples and nations to perma-
nent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources 
must be exercised in the interest of their national 
development and of the well-being of the people of the 
State concerned.” The resolution is nonbinding but 
represents good practice.
Resolution 1803 itself was developed at a time when 
discussions about the New International Economic 
Order were robust and postcolonial development issues 
framed the debates. This period came to an abrupt end 
with the 1986 world oil price crisis. This crisis followed 
two oil price shocks in the 1970s, but unlike the sharp 
escalations in prices in 1973 and 1979, the 1986 crisis 
led to a dramatic fall in the price of oil, not unlike the 
price fall in 2015.
An important provision in Resolution 1803 can be 
found in article 3, which expressly recognizes the sanc-
tity of the contract between the foreign investor and the 
state by stating that in cases “where authorization 
[of the investment of foreign capital in the natural 
resources of the host State] is granted, the capital 
imported and the earnings on that capital shall be gov-
erned by the terms thereof, by the national legislation in 
force, and by international law. . . . The profits derived 
must be shared in the proportion freely agreed on, in 
each case, between the investors and the recipient State.”
However, Resolution 1803 does not empower the 
state to make unilateral changes to its laws in order to 
negate the terms of a contract. Article 8 of Resolution 
1803 is clear on this point: “Foreign investment agree-
ments freely entered into by or between sovereign 
States shall be observed in good faith.”
The doctrine of state sovereignty and sovereign 
rights over energy resources also appears in article 18 
of the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty. It has to be exercised 
in accordance with and subject to the rules of interna-
tional law. This doctrine is also an integral component 
of more recent discussions on the rights of indigenous 
peoples to access and control natural resources on 
indigenous lands.
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is the future role for any existing state enterprises if they 
are currently involved in these activities? Are they to be 
instruments of government policy or should they become 
privatized, commercial entities?
The kind of contracts offered, their terms, and the 
method of their award are typically matters of robust 
(but not necessarily informed or systematic) public scru-
tiny. They have to be designed in a manner that ensures 
their long-term legitimacy. Much of the available advice 
about the elements of a framework also caution that any 
choice needs to be supplemented by on-site customiza-
tion: that is, it needs to be adapted to local circumstances 
if it is to work. Moreover, there will be more or less sharp 
differences depending on whether the resources in ques-
tion are oil, gas, or hard minerals. Usually, the legal 
frameworks will be separate to take into account the dif-
ferences between oil and gas, on the one hand, and 
 mining, on the other. In all of this, where does a govern-
ment start?
4.3 EIGHT KEY CHALLENGES
Most attempts to develop a framework for EI policy, law, 
and award of rights will face at least some of eight key 
challenges.
1. Knowledge of the resource. However clear the legal char-
acter of ownership, it will usually be much less clear 
what the host state actually owns. The existence, size, 
and distribution of the resources and their potential 
for extraction are likely to be uncertain in most cases, 
leading to some guesswork in policy design, and for 
companies a hedging of the exploration risk. As knowl-
edge grows, some of the initial assumptions may 
turn out to be way off the mark, leading to policy 
instability.
2. Legacy issues. It is rare for there to be no existing frame-
work in place, or elements of one. Some transitional 
arrangements will need to be established for existing 
rights holders, including state companies, and overlaps 
and inconsistencies between laws need to be identified 
and removed. The challenge may differ in character 
between, for example, a framework for offshore hydro-
carbons and on-land mining operations, which may 
date back a very long time; even so, there may be long-
standing boundary issues to address with neighboring 
states.
3. Sources of volatility. The stability of the policy framework 
will be vulnerable to unknowns in addition to the 
geological ones. These include the expected level and 
trend of future oil, gas, and minerals prices, affecting the 
price at which they will be sold; competition from other 
countries that supply oil, gas, or other minerals; and, for 
the investor, the risk that the country might experience a 
political realignment with impacts on a major EI devel-
opment. Given these unknowns, the policy and legal 
framework must be flexible enough to allow for a man-
aged development of the sector.
4. International competition. Some framework elements are 
influenced by the need to compete with neighboring 
states in attracting foreign investment. It is important to 
find out what the regional and even international going 
rate is that a government in similar circumstances might 
offer.
5. Learning from practice abroad. Knowledge of how 
other countries have fared with certain contract forms, 
fiscal regimes, and techniques can shed light on the 
prospective host country’s efforts. Some form of 
 comparative review should be considered normal 
 practice. The increasing complexity of international 
taxation underlines the importance of knowledge 
exchange.
6. Public expectations. The management of expectations, 
especially among local communities, needs to be 
addressed while the framework is under development; if 
not, there is a risk of serious challenge or worse, under-
mining, at a later stage. In particular, expectations about 
the pace of future EI revenues may be exaggerated by 
civil society in a new EI country when exploration has 
just started.
7. Mining and hydrocarbons. Where both sectors exist, it is 
crucial to appreciate that there are important differences 
between them. In legal regimes these differences are evi-
dent in codes or basic laws, in contract forms and methods 
of award. Designing and operating a framework in one 
sector is unlikely to provide a model for the other.
8. Gas. Within the hydrocarbons sector there are major 
differences between oil and gas, especially evident 
after the initial phase of exploration. The policy and 
legal framework has to be adapted to take into 
account the very different forms of long-term contract 
and infrastructure that are required for natural gas 
development.
Any policy for the extractive sector has to be understood 
as a dynamic construct, not as a set of principles that unfold 
in a straight line. Rather, policy will take a zig-zag route in a 
country and policy makers will need to adapt and adjust 
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their approach as they learn from experience and respond 
to market developments. What worked in the past may fail 
in the future.
4.4 POLICY PRIORITIES
Experience suggests that to be effective, EI sector policies 
should be part of a strategic vision based on consultation 
with a broad base of stakeholders and should provide direc-
tion and clarity on key sector issues (Liebenthal, Michelitsch, 
and Tarazona 2005, 5). The way in which social, economic, 
and political objectives are combined in such a vision will 
inevitably be country specific. The vision may need to be 
revisited and critically reviewed. As the ministry of one of 
the most successful petroleum producers, Norway, has 
noted, “Governments must be willing to consider whether 
established principles and the prevailing policy framework 
create the right incentives for enhanced value creation, and 
possibly adapt policies to ensure that resources are not 
wasted” (NMPE 2002, 19).
Once there is reasonable certainty that resources exist, an 
element of that strategic vision should be the horizon for 
exhaustibility (Daniel et al. 2013, 19–22). If the resource 
horizon is likely to be short, the vision needs to assess how 
government expenditures can be sustained once resource 
revenues end. If it is projected as long, the main challenge is 
likely to be the management of revenue volatility, because 
experience tells us that the price of the resource will cer-
tainly fluctuate.
The resulting policy statements are often stand-alone 
documents, but they may also be found in summary form 
as preambles to sector legislation.9 There are important dif-
ferences among oil, gas, and mining policies that also have 
to be taken into account.
It is perfectly possible for a government to postpone or 
to omit the design of a strategic vision and implementing 
law and to proceed to negotiate a large contract. Some do. 
One compelling reason why this may happen is the time it 
takes to adopt a special law. The risk of this contract-first 
approach is that such an individual contract—which in 
both mining and hydrocarbons can exert an overwhelming 
influence over the economy—will fail to address national 
plans and priorities once these emerge, and that it may be 
viewed by citizens as lacking legitimacy. This lack of a 
“social license to operate” may provoke tensions among the 
communities located in the immediate vicinity of the proj-
ect and may well fuel demands from subsequent govern-
ments for renegotiations. Where several contracts have been 
awarded on this first-come, first-served basis, the result is 
likely to be a patchwork of diverse contract terms that are 
hard to monitor, are of varying quality in terms of their 
benefits to the host government, and are located outside of 
the main legislative framework that the country eventually 
puts in place.
Oil, gas, and mining policies: contrasts
oil. A key element of any oil policy is a decision on the kind 
of partnership envisaged between the host state and foreign 
oil companies. Its shape will depend on the level of knowl-
edge about petroleum resources in the country. If little is 
known about their existence, a priority will be to ensure that 
foreign investors develop an interest and work to create a 
measure of competition. If resources have been found in 
significant quantities, the attraction of capital will usually be 
a much easier task, and the challenge will be to ensure that 
the terms of cooperation reflect the promise.
Estimates of the resource horizon will also play a role. 
A government with substantial reserves relative to the 
population may wish to extend the horizon far into 
the future. For example, in Norway’s case, “Control over 
the tempo of operations has been one of the more central 
and permanent objectives of Norwegian petroleum policy” 
(Al-Kasim 2006, 189). For governments with a shorter 
resource horizon, the priorities are likely to include maxi-
mization of production, including by enhanced recovery 
techniques; attraction of further investment, especially in 
smaller fields; and encouragement of sustainable spin-off 
impacts on local industry and its development on the 
international stage.
The international dimension of oil policy is greater than 
with gas or mining. Markets are international and capital 
flows are highly globalized. This means there is an impact 
on a government’s decisions from both pricing trends and 
the kind of signals to investors given by other states in com-
parable circumstances.
Transparency has increasingly become prominent in oil 
policy, as the 2012 National Petroleum Policy of Liberia 
shows: “The absence of transparency and accountability in 
the petroleum sector would not only result in lack of good 
governance, but would also affect the implementation of 
Liberia’s development agenda negatively.”10 The overlap 
between an oil policy and other policies, particularly envi-
ronmental and social ones, has also become more impor-
tant. Policies have to address the costs of decommissioning 
and of liability for pollution from various oil-related activi-
ties. The Liberian policy is emphatic: “The Government 
may not, by contract or otherwise, bargain away the right of 
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future governments to impose applicable health, safety or 
environmental regulations on licensees or contractors.”11
Gas. In sharp contrast to oil, gas policy has to be compre-
hensive in scope, extending from wellhead to the burner 
tip, if development and production are to be encouraged 
(Le Leuch 2011). Once discovered, even in large quanti-
ties, commercial development of natural gas might not fol-
low, especially in countries where there is insufficient 
domestic gas infrastructure and markets do not exist. The 
reasons may be rooted variously in the assessments of 
“sufficient” reserves; an inability to identify viable long-
term gas markets, locally and/or abroad, if exports meet 
the national interest; or in difficulties in the development 
of construction projects for local processing and transmis-
sion facilities. Governments also need to prioritize among 
the different markets and uses of gas to obtain the highest 
possible added value for both the country and the inves-
tors. Both of these considerations (the potential for export 
projects and the types of domestic gas uses) will depend 
greatly on the estimated amount of available gas reserves 
in the country. A liquefied natural gas (LNG) project is 
likely to be considered only when significantly large 
reserves exist, while local gas-fired power plants need rela-
tively small reserves.
These considerations need a policy that is forward-
looking and one that permits adaptation to the respective 
gas resources potential and expected gas demand of the 
country.
In this context, typical policy objectives are to encourage 
gas exploitation and production under a fair fiscal regime 
and to actively promote domestic use of the produced gas. 
Demand for gas to generate electricity in favor of more pol-
luting alternatives, such as coal, is a strong driver in gas 
development. Domestic gas commercialization also has 
enormous potential for resource-rich countries in terms of 
direct economic benefit, economic diversification, and local 
benefit through power generation and/or industrial con-
sumption (Kellas 2010). A number of African countries, 
such as Mozambique and Ghana, have included this in their 
policy planning (see chapter 5 for discussion of gas master 
plans). This should lead to provisions in the relevant legisla-
tion that
 ■ allow longer periods for appraisal and for production of 
gas discoveries than for oil;
 ■ require mandatory joint development and exploitation 
of gas discoveries between several licensees when 
justified;
 ■ define specific fiscal incentives for promoting gas activi-
ties and principles for gas pricing as well as specific pro-
visions for unconventional gas; and
 ■ state the priorities for gas uses, especially between viable 
domestic and export uses.
Errors in policy making would typically include
 ■ treating gas in the same way as oil in the principal legisla-
tion without providing specific provisions for the 
encouragement of gas activities;
 ■ adopting regulations that do not limit flaring of gas or do 
not impose gas reinjection when such reinjection would 
increase the oil and condensate recovery; and
 ■ giving priority to exports of gas over domestic uses in 
highly populated countries with potentially limited gas 
reserves.
Mining. Policies for mining often include diverse princi-
ples covering (1) technical subjects such as the calculation 
of mineral reserves or conduct of exploration and exploi-
tation; (2) higher level principles such as the need to put in 
place an efficient and effective cadastre system, land ten-
ure, and stable and transparent financial codes and taxa-
tion regimes that are specific to mining; and (3) subjects in 
mining but not unique to it, such as the management of 
social and environmental risks and impacts, maximization 
of social and economic benefits from mining activities, 
and enhancement of development opportunities from 
mining. An example of a policy document that falls into 
the latter category is the Broad-Based Socio-Economic 
Empowerment Charter for the South African Mining 
Industry.12 Similarly, in the 2013 Minerals Strategy of 
Sweden, one of the largest mineral producers in Europe 
strongly emphasizes the harmonious development of min-
ing with the environment, cultural values, and other busi-
ness activities. The 2014 Minerals and Mining Policy of 
Ghana expressly encourages “mining companies to 
develop a participatory and collaborative approach with 
local communities in decision making relating to mine 
planning, development and decommissioning.”13
Consistency between the mining policy and other related, 
existing policies is important to achieve. These will include 
fiscal and environmental policies and policies for other land 
use. Where policies on fiscal, environmental, or social mat-
ters do not exist, an overarching policy on mining could 
include mining-related fiscal, environmental protection, 
and social mitigation policies as well as provision for the 
interaction between mining and other land uses.
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A multilateral initiative on mining and sustainable devel-
opment, the Intergovernmental Forum, has produced a 
mining policy framework. It contains six themes, including 
postmining transition and artisanal and small-scale mining 
(ASM). The aim is to provide developing countries with a 
policy framework or model that incorporates “best practices 
required for good environmental, social and economic gov-
ernance in the mining sector and the generation and equi-
table sharing of benefits in a manner that will contribute to 
sustainable development” (Masanja 2013).
Ten common issues in EI policy making
Some issues are commonly encountered in setting policy 
priorities. Ten of them are reviewed below.14 Each one of 
these issues is discussed in greater detail in this chapter and 
in chapter 5 or 6.
Ownership in practice. The practical consequences of 
sovereign resource ownership depend in large part on the 
policies that a state adopts for the participation of EI sector 
companies, foreign and domestic. Nationalist sentiments 
and concerns for safeguarding sovereignty have made for-
eign private investor participation contentious in many 
resource-rich states (Mann 2002).
Policy statements relating to resource extraction usually 
start by recalling and reaffirming sovereign rights over the 
ownership and development of petroleum or mineral 
resources. Such statements typically call for the EI sectors to 
be developed in a manner consistent with the maximization 
of near-term benefits to, and long-term interests of, the 
state and its development priorities. Increasingly, they are 
accompanied by declarations about the manner in which 
income is to be distributed. In decentralized systems, reve-
nue management is of particularly great importance, so 
much so that some petroleum laws promise a dedicated law 
on revenue management. Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the Somali 
Petroleum Law, for example, state the following:15
Petroleum income will be distributed between central 
federal government, the Regions and Districts of 
Somalia for the beneﬁt of the whole country. [article 4]
The government will create a law to distribute shares 
of petroleum income to the federal central govern-
ment, Regions and Districts of Somalia where the 
petroleum can be found, and that law will be approved 
by the Transitional Federal Parliament in due course. 
[article 5]
The central government shall establish plans for non-
petroleum Regions and secure their shares of petro-
leum income to improve their development. [article 6]
In states that have federal systems of government—such 
as Australia, Canada, Iraq, or Nigeria—different approaches 
to the allocation of sovereign powers over petroleum activi-
ties and revenues have emerged. Here questions arise such 
as, What is to be the division of powers and responsibilities, 
first between the center and other political and administra-
tive subdivisions, and second between ministries, depart-
ments, and agencies of the center and subdivisions, in 
respect of the major areas as they apply to extractive indus-
try activities?
By way of response, some federal systems have chosen to 
devolve significant operational control to subgovernmental 
or private entities, while others have taken a more restrictive 
approach to the devolution of sovereignty authority over 
natural resources.
In a few states, the competent authority is not the 
national government but a subnational entity. In Argentina 
and Canada, provincial authorities award licenses and 
impose taxes on exploration and mining activities.16 At the 
national level, a key question for policy makers relates to the 
manner in which the legal and constitutional frameworks 
constrain the discretion of national authorities in the design 
or allocation of contracts or licenses and their subsequent 
operational control.
Another aspect of ownership may be the need to address 
existing or latent disputes with neighboring states on who 
owns what territory. This commonly affects both inland 
and offshore water spaces and may require intervention by 
international courts or tribunals for independent resolution 
of the state-state dispute. More often than not, this con-
cerns offshore waters (see box 4.2).17 As the technology for 
carrying out EI operations has improved, such areas have 
become accessible for exploration and exploitation. The law 
has evolved considerably over the past few decades, in terms 
of treaty and case law. This applies not only to offshore 
hydrocarbons resources but also to minerals accessible 
through deep-sea mining (see box 4.3).
Sector roles and responsibilities. The roles of the 
 sector ministry, its agencies, and the national resource 
 company (NRC), if there is one, are of the greatest impor-
tance. These institutions are typically mandated to imple-
ment and oversee sector strategy. Other critical entities 
include the ministries of finance (taxation) and environ-
ment (social and environmental protection) and the 
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revenue collection authority. These non-sector-specific 
entities are often tasked with achieving optimal operational 
benefits among the various subgovernmental or sector- 
specific agencies. In practice, this is very difficult to achieve 
and an overlapping competence is often found among state 
entities, creating potential for confusion (see discussion in 
chapter 5).
National resource companies. While not without con-
troversy, NRCs remain popular in most petroleum- 
producing states and also in a growing number of 
mineral-producing states. Their governance and roles, 
which may include both commercial and noncommercial 
objectives, may be the subject of separate legislation, such as 
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Law, or 
emerge from a merger of existing domestic companies, such 
as the one that led to the creation of Pertamina in Indonesia, 
or nationalization, as led to the creation of PDVSA in the 
República Bolivariana de Venezuela. Controversy tends to 
be sharpest in relation to the NRCs’ links to the host state, 
where management and budgetary interference is common 
or when there are different views about the kinds of rela-
tionships that lead to optimal outcomes in a particular 
country context. Where a new NRC is envisaged, capacity 
building is inevitably an important issue. To date, NRCs 
have been more common in the petroleum sector than in 
mining (see chapter 5 and chapter 6).
Private sector participation. Participation of the pri-
vate sector is one of the most important issues to be addressed 
in any sector policy statement. Among resource-rich states, 
such participation is common, with notable exceptions 
being the petroleum sector in Mexico (public for 75 years 
until 2014) and a number of Middle Eastern states.18 For 
policy makers in many former colonial states, the historical 
memory of unhappy private sector involvements—even if 
they occurred decades ago—play a significant role in shap-
ing the legal and contractual frameworks today.
However, few states have found it possible to resist the 
advantages of risk sharing, financing, and technical and 
Box 4.2 Licensing across Shifting International Borders
While award of rights to land areas can generally be 
made on the basis of certainty about boundaries 
between adjacent states, this is not always the case in 
maritime areas. Until the boundaries are clearly estab-
lished under international law, investors will be unable 
to make substantial commitments. One way of address-
ing overlapping claims and providing a temporary 
solution so that hydrocarbons activity can commence 
and revenues shared is for states to agree on a Joint 
Development Zone (JDZ) or Area.
International law allows for states to take provi-
sional arrangements of a practical nature to develop 
the mineral deposit in a defined area under dispute 
without foregoing their territorial sovereignty 
(UNCLOS, articles 74, 83). In practice, with a projected 
life of 30 to 50 years, a JDZ may prove more like a per-
manent solution in place of a delimited boundary. 
There are more than 20 around the world.
There are three ways to establish a JDZ. The first is 
to allow one state with expertise to manage the 
resources on behalf of both states with sharing based 
on a preagreed ratio (for example, the Bahrain–Saudi 
Arabia Agreement, 1958).
The second is for two states to joint venture and each 
state nominates its own contractor which enters into a 
joint venture with the contractor of the other state (for 
example, the Japan–Republic of Korea JDZ). The third 
is the Joint Authority approach, where both states dele-
gate power to a single body, which becomes responsible 
for overall supervision of activities including the award 
of rights in the JDZ (for example, the Nigeria–São Tomé 
and Príncipe JDZ and the Timor Sea JDZ). In Nigeria–
São Tomé and Príncipe’s case, the first round of licens-
ing was held in 2003 and by 2013 US$400 million had 
been spent by contractors under five production- 
sharing contracts (PSCs) awarded in two rounds. Much 
of the government revenue has been in the form of sig-
nature bonuses and concession rentals. Revenues from 
Timor-Leste’s JDZ have proven to be considerable.
The former JDZ contains transparency provisions 
supplemented by the Abuja Joint Declaration on 
Transparency and Governance signed by Heads of State 
and Governments. The Authority is a member of the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. An envi-
ronmental baseline study of the JDZ was undertaken in 
2006 and all activities are regulated according to envi-
ronmental guidelines applicable throughout the JDZ. 
Infrastructure/social projects have been carried out by 
Operators in communities in both countries and local 
content rules applied.
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managerial skills transfer that comes with foreign partici-
pation. Norway, for example, had a very public debate on 
whether or not to open its petroleum sector to foreign 
investors and eventually decided to permit foreign 
involvement for many of the reasons just given (Gylfason 
2004, 26–27).
Exploration. Although the exploration phase generates 
valuable information for the host government and inves-
tors, it remains a financially high-risk undertaking. Thus, 
the question about whether or not the government should 
assume this risk is an important policy issue. Faced with the 
risks, governments have four basic options: they can (1) 
develop the resources themselves, (2) contract private petro-
leum and mining companies to develop the resources 
for fees, (3) auction the right to develop the resources to a 
private company, or (4) adopt a combination of any of 
the aforementioned alternatives. More often than not, 
governments enter into agreements with private companies 
to explore and develop the resources at their own costs and 
risks. This option is particularly attractive where a govern-
ment or its NRC does not possess the essential technical 
know-how and skills to develop the resources themselves 
(Tordo 2007, 5–6).
Local benefit. Policy statements increasingly outline 
expectations with respect to local benefit as governments 
seek to maximize impacts from resource development in the 
wider economy. Local benefit requirements seek links 
between core sector investments and operations, on the one 
hand, and local employment and economic activities, on the 
other. Policy makers are likely to experience strong pres-
sures from local business or communities to promote such 
content. However, such pressures can present issues for 
both host governments and foreign investors, as the neces-
sary skills for some petroleum and mining operations may 
Box 4.3 Deep-Sea Mining
Technological advances are yielding access to mineral 
deposits in the deep waters of the oceans. This frontier 
for mining exploration involves licensing in waters 
subject to national jurisdiction (exclusive economic 
zones or EEZs) and in international waters. The envi-
ronmental and social impacts of such activities are not 
yet fully understood and a cautious approach is encour-
aged for such development.
In international waters, applications for rights are 
granted by the International Sea-bed Authority (ISA) 
under the UN Law of the Sea Convention, which estab-
lishes and governs the “area” beyond jurisdiction of 
coastal states for “the common heritage of mankind.” 
The ISA has established a mining code and issued sev-
eral sets of regulations on minerals. The code requires 
information on the proposed plan of work in a license 
application, to include a preliminary assessment of the 
possible impact of the proposed activities on the 
marine environment; a description of the proposed 
measures for prevention, reduction, and control of pol-
lution and other hazards, as well as possible impacts on 
the marine environment; and a description of environ-
mental baseline studies and rules relating to possible 
environmental impact. Companies must enter into a 
contract with the ISA before receiving an exclusive 
right to explore for or exploit the mineral resources of 
the deep seabed.
Developing states have preferential access to the area 
if they identify banked sites with known prospectivity. 
Exploration licenses from the reserved banked sites 
have been granted to commercial companies spon-
sored by Nauru (2011), Tonga (2011), and Kiribati 
(2012). State sponsorship entails responsibility to 
monitor and control the operations. Apart from the 
economic rent, the expected advantage is knowledge 
transfer. Already more than two dozen licenses have 
been granted to countries such as Brazil, China, India, 
Japan, and the Russian Federation.
A number of countries are also seeking to derive 
benefits from deep-sea mining in their EEZ as well as 
in international waters. Papua New Guinea became the 
first state to award a seabed mining license in its 
national waters. Fiji is among the growing number of 
Pacific Islands countries engaged in licensing, adopting 
a law to promote investment in this area: International 
Seabed Minerals Management Decree 2013. The United 
Kingdom passed its Deep-Sea Mining Act in 2014. For 
the ISA National Legislation Database, see http://www 
.isa.org.jm/en/mcode/NatLeg.
The marine mining industry has produced a volun-
tary code to address environmental protection issues—
the International Marine Minerals Society’s Code for 
Environmental Management of Marine Mining, http://
www.immsoc.org/IMMS_code.htm.
66 OIL, GAS, AND MINING
not be available in the state concerned (see boxes 4.5 and 4.6 
and chapters 2 and 10).
Fiscal objectives. Fiscal objectives are normally the 
focus of intense attention at the detailed implementation 
level, but at the policy level they typically emphasize both 
revenue sharing and safeguarding of incentives for effi-
ciency and investment. These dual objectives are often 
simultaneously pursued and must be balanced against each 
other for optimal results. However, such a balance will be 
affected by global or regional market conditions and by 
perceptions about the going rate in similar country con-
texts (see chapter 6).
Revenue and expenditure management. There is a 
growing recognition of the particular challenges resource 
wealth can present to macroeconomic management. As a 
result, many policy statements issued by governments spell 
out intentions with respect to the saving and investment of 
resource revenues (including the possibility of resource 
funds) and to their expenditure. Examples of states that 
have developed policy statements in this regard include 
Chile, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kuwait, Norway, Papua 
New Guinea, and Timor-Leste. Some of these policies are 
summarized in chapter 7.
Social and environmental concerns. Strategies for 
protection of the social and physical environment usually 
feature prominently in EI sector policy pronouncements. 
Their focus often goes beyond measures aimed at the miti-
gation of adverse consequences and extends to the kind of 
resource-led development measures discussed elsewhere 
(see chapters 2 and 9). These include the promotion of net 
benefits and the distribution of those benefits between the 
poor and the elite, between men and women, and among 
other disadvantaged groups such as the elderly and children 
(see chapter 9). The challenge here is to ensure that these 
policies are joined to the policies specifically aimed at EI sec-
tor development and that implementing agencies coordi-
nate. Often they do not.
Local context and commitments to investors and 
civil society. The overall regime for the EI sector must, or 
should be, sensitive to investors’ concerns about long-term 
investment security. Where the context is one of past nation-
alization or frequent unilateral changes to contracts, inves-
tors will usually expect the policy and related legal framework 
to signal a changed investment climate. Similarly, there 
needs to be a proactive communications approach to civil 
society to ensure that there is an accurate understanding of 
the government policy for the EI sector (particularly impor-
tant for the mining sector). This can correct misinformation 
and fill information gaps.
Investors will be sensitive to a general problem that is 
sometimes referred to as the “obsolescing bargain.”19 Once 
a large-scale investment is made in largely immovable 
assets, the investor faces a risk that the government may 
unilaterally change the terms of the investment regarding 
shareholder agreements, taxes and tax rates (increasing 
project-specific or sector-specific taxes), or, in the most 
extreme case, nationalizing a project. The risks are typically 
larger in states with small economies and only one large 
minerals or petroleum operation.
These risks can often be reduced by increased transpar-
ency and accountability related to a combination of national 
legislation and contracts that are binding under interna-
tional law and arbitration. The obsolescing bargain problem 
can also be reduced by such actions as shared commitments 
to private-public partnerships for major infrastructure that 
supports the minerals and hydrocarbons operation. inter-
national financial institution (IFI) funding of the project or 
its infrastructure can also reduce risk, because there would 
be IFI sanctions on governments that do not keep their 
obligations under legal agreements to which IFI’s are signa-
tories (see chapter 9).
Once the major policy decisions have been made, gov-
ernmental authorities need to agree on exactly what is to be 
awarded, to what end, and the manner of award. Typically, 
rights will be awarded on the basis of procedures in laws or 
regulations rather than being negotiated in agreements or 
contracts. This promotes transparency about the licensing 
process, gives some protection against corrupt practices in 
which rights might be obtained by bribes, and mitigates the 
asymmetry of information and capability that can arise 
between inexperienced officials in small governments and 
highly experienced and skilled company negotiators. The 
following section addresses laws for oil, gas, and mining 
activities.
4.5 HYDROCARBONS AND MINING LAWS
Key ideas
1. The building blocks of a legal framework for oil, gas, or 
mining are laws, contracts (often model form con-
tracts), and implementing regulations. Often the laws 
are sector-specific, treating hydrocarbons and mining 
separately, but intermeshing with other domestic laws 
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dealing with tax, investment, and environment matters, 
for example, and also any bilateral and multilateral trea-
ties to which the state is party. It is crucial for all parties 
(and not only investors) that these legal instruments 
function as a coherent framework, with links where 
appropriate to other parts of the country’s legal system 
and its enforcement agencies and taking into account all 
federal and provincial levels of government. The 
Sourcebook online version includes many examples of 
these instruments.
2. The host state for EI investment may and often will play 
not one or even two but three roles: owner of the 
resource, regulator of operations, and operator by means 
of an NRC. These roles will often overlap and may con-
flict. In the event of disputes, the host state may also be 
the primary forum for hearing and adjudicating the 
issues.
3. Capacity will play a crucial role in the operation of a 
regime. If little is available, the resulting constraints can 
be anticipated in the framework, at least in its early stages 
of operation. Legal frameworks can include “nondiscre-
tion” provisions that specify that the government “shall” 
issue a license provided that the specified procedures are 
followed and criteria are met as defined in the law and 
regulations (these are the procedures and a criterion that 
generally relate to legal entity status, good standing, and 
financial and technical capacity). Such provisions help 
limit the need for discretion by a government minister or 
other authority in granting licenses, thereby promoting 
certainty and countering possible corruption. However, 
a sound framework will be effective only if there are well-
functioning, accountable institutions with adequate 
resources to implement them.
4. Any legal framework for hydrocarbons or mining will 
operate within a wider legal system in the host state that 
is shaped by civil law, common law, Islamic law, or a 
hybrid.
5. The legal framework for hydrocarbons or mining has to 
be consistent with the country’s constitutional frame-
work. Constitutions differ to the extent that they recog-
nize and guarantee private property rights or prohibit 
private parties or foreigners from acquiring property 
rights in general and rights over extractives in particular. 
They will often differ in their approach to vesting 
authority to regulate specific matters in special agencies 
(for example, environmental protection) or in the execu-
tive (for example, taxation and foreign exchange) or the 
judiciary (review of government decisions and settle-
ment of disputes). They may also differ in the way and 
the extent to which they vest authority to grant rights in 
particular levels of government rather than the central 
authorities. The interpreter of constitutional require-
ments may be a special court and not the executive. If so, 
the court’s interpretation can sweep away entire hydro-
carbons and mining laws if they conflict with the consti-
tution. For example, the Indonesian constitutional court 
declared the entire Hydrocarbons Law void in 2012, 
ruling that the independent regulatory agency interfered 
with the state’s direct control over national resources as 
required by the constitution.
6. The legal framework has to be consistent with the coun-
try’s international obligations. A wide variety of interna-
tional hard and soft law, rules, and principles will have 
an impact on the domestic laws of most EI-producing 
countries. These range from the obligations on trade 
from membership of the World Trade Organization and 
various free-trade agreements, investment treaties, and 
double taxation treaties to soft law principles such as 
those concerning transparency (for example, the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative) and sus-
tainable investment (such as the Equator Principles). 
This can impact on the design of local benefit provisions, 
health, safety, insurance, and environmental standards 
to be followed by investors in the host country.
7. Often there are separate laws for petroleum or hydrocar-
bons on the exploration and production activities, on the 
one hand, and the transportation and refining provisions, 
on the other: between “upstream” and “downstream.”
Issues to be addressed
Typically, there is a wide range of issues addressed in the 
legal framework, whether it applies to hydrocarbons or 
mining. The same issues need to be addressed by the pack-
age of legislation and licenses or contracts. Differences 
between the two EI sectors tend to lie in the level of detail or 
comprehensiveness adopted in each legal instrument. As 
ideas about good practice develop, a mechanism needs to be 
in place to ensure that these rules can be adapted and 
updated. The principal issues that need to be addressed are 
the following:
 ■ Ownership of the natural resource
 ■ Authority to allocate rights for the development of natu-
ral resources
 ■ Establishment of a clear framework for the role of the 
competent bodies of government, for companies, and for 
civil society and local communities
68 OIL, GAS, AND MINING
 ■ Identification of the authorities and procedures by which 
the government allocates mineral or petroleum rights 
along with the rights and obligations of both the license 
holder and the government
 ■ Clear, transparent, competitive, and nondiscretionary 
procedures for issuing exploration and production 
rights, including those issued by contracts, along with 
the technical and financial qualifications needed to hold 
a mineral or petroleum right
 ■ Permissible contract types
 ■ Assurance to a prospective license holder or contract 
signatory of security of tenure, which includes issues 
relating to development rights, assignment rights, and 
retention rights
 ■ Listing of the obligations of the mineral or petroleum 
right holder to explore, invest, and produce the mineral 
or petroleum or else relinquish the right so that it can be 
made available or assigned to another party ready to take 
on those obligations
 ■ Reporting requirements of the license or right holder
 ■ Conditions for voluntary relinquishment and termina-
tion for cause of the license or right
 ■ Health, safety, and environment (HSE) requirements 
related to the license or right
 ■ Procedures for management of possible land-use con-
flicts between different claimants or users
 ■ Dispute resolution procedures
 ■ Establishment and implementation of an effective com-
munications strategy
 ■ Definition of the mandate and role of state-owned NRCs 
and minority state equity in mining, oil, and gas compa-
nies (NRCs are addressed further in chapter 5)
 ■ Granting of the right to construct and own infrastructure 
specific to petroleum or mining operations (for example, 
pipelines or rail routes)
 ■ The main principles of the fiscal regime
Operation of the rules
The basic principle underlying any EI sector-specific legisla-
tion is that the government provides the investor with min-
eral or petroleum rights in exchange for the investor’s 
undertaking exploration or development work. The laws 
and regulations need to specify the authorities and proce-
dures by which a government allocates mineral or petro-
leum rights along with the rights and obligations of the 
license holder. A well-designed licensing system (see section 
4.6) will provide a licensee with assurance that whatever is 
found can be developed by the licensee and that what the 
licensee develops can be retained with an equitable sharing 
of both risks and benefits with the host government.
The legal regime will also provide the government with 
assurance that licensees or contractors will undertake explo-
ration or development work in a timely, technically compe-
tent, environmentally responsible, and socially acceptable 
manner or be obliged to relinquish the mineral or petro-
leum right so that the land can be made available to another 
party. Thus, the laws will need to clearly specify the man-
date, authority, and responsibility of different agencies and 
ensure that overlaps and inconsistencies are avoided 
between different laws, particularly between EI sector laws 
and HSE regulations.
Most laws require a measure of interpretation for them 
to work that requires an understanding of what a rule 
means and what it was intended to achieve. A lack of trained 
staff to interpret laws will create uncertainty, confusion, and 
poor decision making.
In the event that omissions or ambiguities arise, one way 
to resolve them may be through supplementary agreements 
with individual operators or investors until the needed 
amendments can be made to the laws or regulations. In 
countries like Norway and the United Kingdom, govern-
ments issue guidance notes on a regular basis to provide 
clarity on the operation of the laws. In the case of overlap-
ping regulations between EI sector laws and environmental 
laws, for example, different departments of government 
may decide by written memorandum of understanding 
which regulation will be applied and by whom until the 
regulations or legislation are clarified. Such a procedure can 
give clarity in the interim and allow activities to proceed. 
However, this is unlikely to meet with success unless there 
is extensive consultation with the local communities and 
any local nongovernmental organizations.
Some extractives sectors have peculiarities. For that rea-
son, laws governing oil, gas, and mining are treated sepa-
rately in the following material. Taxation issues are treated 
in chapter 6, but it should be noted that in most countries a 
separate hydrocarbons or mining taxation law supplement-
ing and consistent with the general tax code is adopted as 
the normal practice. Alternatively, a set of special provisions 
related to oil and gas and mining issues is inserted in the 
country’s general tax code.
Petroleum
Three distinct approaches to the design of hydrocarbons 
legislation can be identified:20 (1) a comprehensive, highly 
detailed approach, (2) reliance on individually legislated 
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contracts or agreements, and (3) a hybrid approach, which 
combines less comprehensive, or framework, legislation 
with detailed regulations and flexible contract or agreement 
specificity.21 Usually, laws relating to petroleum will be 
adopted separately from laws that address mining of other 
minerals. This can lead to the perception that there are sig-
nificant differences between mining and hydrocarbon legis-
lation. However, the similarities between the two sectors 
often outnumber the differences.
Each of the three approaches that follow have one fea-
ture in common: they will normally provide for upstream 
(exploration and production) activities only, leaving 
downstream activities to be covered in a separate law. 
This could be a gas law (addressing phases of gas develop-
ment after production, such as processing, transporta-
tion, storage, and trading) or an energy law (addressing 
either or both gas phases postproduction and/or electric-
ity and other forms of energy). An exception to this (for 
oil and gas) is the Indonesian Law 22 of 2001 Concerning 
Oil and Gas, which covers oil and gas upstream and 
downstream activities but in distinct chapters of the law 
and in separate regulations. This topic is discussed further 
in chapter 5.
Design option 1: Detailed Content Approach. This 
approach fixes, in a particular law and enabling regulations, 
all or most of the provisions that are required for the con-
duct of petroleum operations. These detailed instruments, 
enacted by the legislature, mandate standard content for 
licenses and contracts usually in the regulations, which can 
be easily and, if necessary, often amended, although some 
specific terms may be left for negotiation or competitive 
tenders. This codified approach is often supplemented by 
highly detailed guidance notes that provide an official inter-
pretation of key provisions and issues. It is the preferred 
approach in almost all Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) states, from 
Canada and Australia to Norway and the United States, 
many of which have extensive legislative experience of these 
regimes.
There are also a number of Latin American states that 
have adopted this approach. Its supporters claim it has sev-
eral advantages: it (1) ensures equal treatment for all 
EI-sector participants or licensees, (2) focuses negotiations 
on a few key variables and limits opportunities for arbitrary 
or discretionary behavior, (3) ensures full knowledge and 
transparency regarding the licensing regime, (4) enhances 
protection against corrupt practices whereby resource rights 
are obtained for bribes, (5) mitigates the disadvantages of 
asymmetry of information and capability between often 
inexperienced officials of small governments and highly 
experienced and skilled resource company negotiators, and 
(6) also avoids scarce government capacity being tied up in 
intensive negotiations on individual projects.
The main disadvantage of this approach lies in its inflex-
ibility. Any adjustments require changes to primary legisla-
tion, which may be difficult, or at least slow, to achieve 
(Date-Bah and Rahim 1987, 94). Nonetheless, there appears 
to be a preference for states to adopt this detailed legislative 
approach in the mining sector (Williams 2005), while the 
petroleum sector tends to adopt a framework approach to 
legislation, albeit with a higher degree of reliance on a 
model contract to supplement the legislative framework 
(Onorato 1995).
Design option 2: individually legislated agreements. 
Under this approach, the most important terms are con-
tained in individually negotiated agreements between the 
state or its agent and investors. These are given the force of 
law by legislative ratification. This has been the approach 
taken in developing states where the existing law was too 
general or when there was no overall petroleum code in 
place and when waiting for the preparation and passage of 
comprehensive legislation is deemed to be costly in terms of 
delayed investment and development. A model agreement 
may still be used to facilitate negotiations. Since such an 
agreement is consensual in character, is subject to negotia-
tion, and has the force of law, it reduces the chances of uni-
lateral intervention by the state and can create a stable and 
predictable framework for the private party.
This approach also gives maximum flexibility to govern-
ment authorities to negotiate terms with investors. This is 
perceived by some as an advantage but by others as a serious 
drawback. At its worst, it may facilitate corruption. At a 
minimum, it can complicate sector management by creat-
ing a patchwork or multiplicity of legal regimes. This is due 
to the fact that once terms have been agreed on and legis-
lated they become fixed, subject to any provisions they may 
contain regarding stability of terms.
Design option 3: Hybrid Approach. Under a hybrid 
approach, which is now common in states with sectors to 
develop, legislation typically takes the form of a relatively 
brief enabling law, sometimes called a framework law. It is 
used to confirm policy choices and covers key concepts and 
topics but refrains from going into detail and leaves room 
for further definition by governmental authorities through 
secondary regulations and individual contracts. States as 
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diverse as Côte d’Ivoire, Namibia, and Timor-Leste have 
preferred systems where the government has the power to 
enact detailed rules and regulations but also has sufficient 
discretion to make adjustments of some terms on an indi-
vidual basis. The less detailed legislative content under this 
option is designed to minimize the need for later amend-
ments in the primary law. While this benefit is often con-
sidered to be a significant factor in states where the 
legislative process is typically lengthy, or where such legis-
lation represents a delicate compromise of diverse inter-
ests, it can also prove challenging to reconstitute in an 
amendment process.
Negotiating discretion under this hybrid approach can 
be, and usually is, limited by the issuance of model licenses 
or contracts. This can be important in reducing the burden 
on government bodies with limited resources at their dis-
posal. At the same time, the enabling legislation allows 
governmental authorities to respond quickly to new needs 
as they arise by adjusting model contracts for new awards 
and amending regulations: a process that will be carried out 
primarily at the ministerial level rather than by legislative 
action. The main advantage of this approach is that “it pre-
determines in a legislative form all those issues in respect of 
which the government requires a minimum standard or 
which can be realistically, as it were, prenegotiated” (Date-
Bah and Rahim 1987, 96).
Assessment of options. The choice of approach to legisla-
tive design will depend on state context and take into 
account legal, cultural, political, social, and economic fac-
tors as well as the level of investor interest in development of 
the sector. At greater or lesser levels of detail, all three of the 
approaches will seek to reflect the overarching policies noted 
in section 4.4 and in particular will include reference to the 
topics listed in that section. Effectiveness will depend very 
much on the fit with context rather than any formal advan-
tage one approach may have over another.
In all cases, a key consideration is that sector legislation 
is harmonized with other relevant legislation, including not 
only fiscal and environmental legislation but also other legal 
texts applicable to economic activity, such as foreign invest-
ment laws, labor laws, and the general tax code.
Gas
A gas law usually refers to legislation that covers the activi-
ties beyond the field delivery point along the gas supply 
chain, such as transmission pipeline networks, distribution, 
and supply to end-consumers. It is very unusual to adopt 
a law specifically for gas exploration and production. The 
reasons for this are explained by Le Leuch (2012):
[B]oth oil and/or natural gas may be discovered from 
exploration activities and therefore the rights granted 
to the state and the explorers concern both products. 
Oil and natural gas consist respectively in the liquid 
and gaseous forms of petroleum or hydrocarbons 
generated in underground formations. Moreover, the 
search for and exploitation of oil and gas require tech-
niques and methods relatively similar.22
Example. The scope of the Cameroon Gas Code 2002 pro-
vides an illustration of the objectives and content of a gas 
law in a developing country designed to encourage the 
growth of the domestic gas industry. Section 1 states the 
following:
This law . . . shall govern the downstream gas sector 
comprising transportation, distribution, processing, 
storage, import, export, and marketing of natural gas 
within the national territory.
Except as otherwise provided, this law shall exclude 
the following:
Prospecting, exploration, exploitation, transportation, 
storage and processing activities of liquid or  gaseous 
hydrocarbons as governed by Law no. 99/13 of 22 
December 1999 to institute the Petroleum Code . . .
Under section 2 it states the following:
The purport of this law is to promote the develop-
ment of the downstream gas sector in Cameroon. As 
such, it is aimed at:
 – Putting in place a legal framework conducive to the 
development of gas resources;
 – Setting up an attractive environment for private 
national and foreign investors in the gas sector;
 – Laying down principles governing regulation of the 
sector.
There are other reasons it is hard to specify precise rules 
for gas in the way that is typically done for oil.
 ■ First, there is a need to identify a specific market for the 
gas discovery in order to decide how commercial it is. 
Usually, such markets will be regional; for example, 
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an obvious market for the sale of gas from fields in either 
Mozambique or Namibia would be South Africa.
 ■ Second, in the absence of an international dollar-denom-
inated price as in oil, gas has to be priced according to a 
basket of alternatives that reflect the market it is to be 
sold into. The resulting formula is usually complex and 
needs to be negotiated in each case.
 ■ Third, the cost of infrastructure for gas commercializa-
tion is very high, whether in terms of transportation and 
distribution pipeline networks or installations for its 
liquefaction and specialized tankers for its transport. 
Finance for such long-term fixed investments on a large 
scale is unlikely to be forthcoming from lenders, unless 
there is an assurance of long-term markets and contracts. 
This has implications for the kind of gas sales contract 
that is adopted by the parties.
 ■ Finally, the lead time for development of a gas field is 
usually quite long. The contract provisions (or the petro-
leum law or both) will normally allow for a much longer 
period to discuss commercialization of a gas deposit than 
oil; they usually require the parties to discuss how to 
proceed and give them a generous amount of time to 
conclude their discussions on the technical and financial 
aspects of the discovery.
Given these conditions, the common practice is to 
have provisions inserted into a hydrocarbons law that 
address specific features of natural gas development 
and extraction. Suboptimal practice would be to treat gas 
as oil and omit specific provisions encouraging gas activi-
ties. In particular, customized provisions should provide 
for incentives to encourage the development of new 
 projects and uses and to compensate for the higher 
cost and lower value of natural gas relative to oil. As 
Onorato (1995) notes in a policy research paper on legal 
frameworks:
Enlightened modern Petroleum Laws have specially tai-
lored gas development and commercialization provisions to 
encourage positive action on gas discoveries.
These special provisions will typically be variants of the 
following:
 ■ Ownership of gas in the ground belongs to the state, as 
with oil.
 ■ Associated gas will be distinguished from nonassociated 
gas.23
 ■ Licensing procedures are adapted so as to permit longer 
times for appraisal and for production than for oil, with 
the right to authorize a specific retention license for 
assessing the viability of a gas discovery and finding buy-
ers for the gas.
 ■ Joint development and production of gas discoveries is 
mandatory between several licensees when such an 
approach makes viable gas projects that would otherwise 
be noncommercial.
 ■ Gas flaring or venting is prohibited except in strictly 
defined circumstances.
 ■ There is a statement of the priorities for gas uses: 
between domestic and export uses and for gas reinjection 
in oil reservoirs; establishment of national gas reserves if 
required and conditions for gas exports.
 ■ Specific fiscal incentives for gas promotion need to be 
defined as well as the principles for gas pricing, including 
the entry point into the mid-/downstream facilities and 
the valuation point for tax purposes.
 ■ Specific provisions are made for unconventional gas.
 ■ Transparency issues, such as publishing government 
revenues and related agreements on oil and gas, are 
addressed.
 ■ If gas export revenues are expected to be large, the law 
may provide for the establishment of a sovereign wealth 
fund (see chapter 7).
Examples. Australia was one of the first countries to use the 
concept of a retention lease to allow the holder of rights to a 
gas discovery to benefit from a longer exploration and 
appraisal phase. Vietnam allows a retention period of up to 
seven years. Australia also encourages the joint development 
of gas projects combining the resources and infrastructure of 
third parties so as to jointly develop or complete an access 
agreement for the use of facilities or technology to provide 
an acceptable rate of return. Angola forbids gas flaring except 
for short periods when this is required for testing purposes 
and other operating reasons. Indonesia’s Oil and Gas Law of 
2001 sets out a priority for domestic gas uses over gas exports 
and introduced a domestic market supply obligation.
Suboptimal practice would include absence of regula-
tions to limit flaring of gas or giving a priority to gas exports 
in highly populated countries with potentially limited gas 
resources.
Petroleum and gas conclusion. It is unusual for a 
petroleum law to include the activities of transportation, 
commercialization, and utilization. This is typically pro-
vided for in a separate law, discussed in chapter 5. Indonesia 
is one of the very few countries to adopt a law that covers 
both upstream and downstream sets of activities in a single 
law, the Oil and Gas Law of 2001.
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Mining
At the most basic level, a mining law or code should be 
simple and clear to understand. The challenge for many 
countries is that existing laws may date from a premodern 
period, because mining is often an old activity, perhaps with 
a history of hundreds of years, as in many Latin American 
countries. In Africa, the laws might date from colonial 
times. It was only in the 1990s that many Latin American 
countries undertook major reforms of their old mining 
laws. Many African countries trod the same path in the early 
21st  century. This need to grapple with a historical legacy of 
mining is in contrast to the hydrocarbons industry in many 
parts of the world, which tends to have a more recent 
 history, not least due to its shift into offshore areas.
The kinds of benefits that investors look for in a mining 
law include clear and transparent processes, security of ten-
ure, the freedom to transfer their rights, and freedom to 
operate and market their output on commercial terms. The 
laws are usually complemented by provisions in investment 
or tax legislation that “provide reasonable freedom to dis-
pose of foreign exchange earnings, primarily profit-based 
taxation on internationally competitive terms, and stability 
of those terms by contract for a reasonable period of time” 
(Naito, Remy, and Williams 2001, iii). Of all of these, secu-
rity of tenure—the guaranteed right of an exploration right 
holder to mine the ore that the holder has discovered—is 
particularly important. If the exploration license holder 
needs to obtain governmental approval of its feasibility 
study and mine development plan as a condition for the 
grant of a mining right, it is at risk of not obtaining a right 
to mine an ore that it has discovered. This acts as a strong 
disincentive to investment.24
If the law takes a framework character rather than being 
highly detailed, it can permit flexibility in project-specific or 
site-specific agreements. These can include agreements for 
community programs, targets for local employment, or 
agreements on value-added or government equity in a spe-
cific project.
Lessons for the successful reform of mining laws were 
generated by several Latin American countries in the 
1990s. Among the key principles of mining law reform 
identified from that period were (1) ease of access to areas 
on a first-come, first-served or some other nondiscretion-
ary basis (but with a review of the applicant’s financial and 
technical qualifications), (2) an open mining cadastre and 
title registry, (3) free transferability of mining titles, (4) 
simple financial maintenance requirements, and (5) mini-
mal royalty obligations. These were found to be essential 
elements for attracting foreign investment. However, 
learning from the experience of others can be hampered 
by not knowing how to apply new knowledge in a particu-
lar setting. Attempts at regional and bilateral harmoniza-
tion of mining regulatory regimes have developed to 
compensate for this. Examples of regional attempts 
include the African Mining Legislation Atlas, an online 
platform about legislation in Africa’s mining sector, and 
the directive adopted by the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) in 2009, setting out the 
issues that a national mining law should address.25 The 
directive’s impact is likely to be limited by the diversity of 
circumstances that it encounters among the 15 member 
states. An example of a bilateral attempt is the mining and 
geology cooperation agreement between Angola and the 
Republic of Congo of 2013, which promotes the exchange 
of geological data and the harmonization of tax frame-
works in areas such as diamond mining and establishes 
training and assistance programs.
Environmental aspects of mining laws are particularly 
important, so it is necessary to identify whether environ-
mental regulations are integrated into the mining law and 
whether they are attached to the title of mineral rights or are 
imposed as conditions of operation. The provisions where 
such considerations are particularly important are those 
relating to environmental and social impacts as well as mine 
closure and land reclamation. A key principle is pollution 
prevention rather than just control and mitigation of impacts. 
Provisions on community consultation, publication of 
information, and community development could also be 
enshrined in the law and developed in detail in regulations, 
noting the role of international standards in guiding the lat-
ter and filling in any gaps.
In this vein, the intrusive character of mining may 
require provisions in the law expressly limiting its scope. 
The kind of areas that may be excluded include national and 
local parks, nature reserves, and areas close to communities. 
In the Philippines Mining Law of 1995, for example, ances-
tral lands are excluded unless consent is obtained from the 
local cultural community. Military or government reserves, 
cemeteries, infrastructure, and public or private buildings 
are also excluded. Such exclusions should be made explicit 
before any rights are awarded so that they do not affect any 
preexisting title. In Ghana, the mining law permits the min-
ister of lands and natural resources to reserve land that is 
not “subject of a mineral right.”26 If rights have already been 
rewarded, it is still possible to grandfather them in and 
allow such mining to continue.
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Unconventional oil and gas
Very few laws on oil and gas make distinctions between 
conventional and unconventional sources (including shale 
gas or oil, tight gas or oil, and coal-bed methane). However, 
the economics and the extraction techniques used are differ-
ent. The growing interest of governments and private inves-
tors in awarding and acquiring exclusive rights to explore 
for and produce unconventional sources of gas and oil has 
begun to change this and to encourage provisions that deal 
with each category of unconventional gas and oil relative to 
their conventional counterparts.27 In Argentina an amend-
ment was made to the Federal Hydrocarbons Law in 2014, 
introducing a new type of concession contract for uncon-
ventional exploitation, with a 35-year term and unlimited 
10-year extensions. In the United Kingdom, the existing 
regime for licensing has been adapted to include certain new 
conditions, but in terms of structure it remains the same as 
for conventional sources. Since operations are mostly 
located on land, important environmental and social con-
siderations need to be assessed prior to the development of 
policies and legal frameworks. Indeed, comparisons may be 
made with the challenges typically arising in the mining 
rather than the conventional hydrocarbons industry. In all 
cases, transparency is of particular importance in order to 
promote a positive community response to a new (and con-
troversial) industry, as well as to attract foreign investment.
Any policy and legal framework must take into account 
several specific features of unconventional gas and oil, such 
as the following:
 ■ Operational considerations. Higher density of wells and 
on-land base for exploration, appraisal, development, 
and production operations leads to a greater demand for 
land access authorizations and operational permits. A 
well for shale gas will typically run vertically down to the 
shale layer for a about a mile and then extend horizon-
tally, possibly for as much as two miles, potentially going 
under the land of many owners.
 ■ Environment and social regulation. The potential impact 
and perceived risks on the surface land, air quality, and 
underground water resources mean that regulation is 
required. In practice, the risks of groundwater contami-
nation from the fracking process itself are likely to be less 
common than those arising from improperly managed 
sludge and fracking pits and improperly disposed frack-
ing fluids. Such fluids typically contain methane, ethane, 
and volatile organic compounds, which may be hazard-
ous to health if not contained and disposed of during 
fracking operations. Air pollution may also arise from 
inadvertent venting of substances into the atmosphere 
and affecting the quality of air in the surrounding area.
 ■ Fiscal incentives. These are required when the cost of 
unconventional operations is substantially higher than 
for conventional ones. This could mean reduced royalty 
rates, a tax credit or more favorable schemes for cost 
recovery, and a profit gas split. This approach is less jus-
tified if there is an additional profits tax or a profit-
sharing scheme in place, because in that event the 
economic criterion on which it is typically based will 
allow for an automatic integration of the economic dif-
ferences between conventional and unconventional gas.
 ■ Licensing systems. Adjustments would be needed to pro-
visions on exploration and appraisal periods, work com-
mitments, the definition of an unconventional gas field, 
and submission of development plans. Where rights 
have already been awarded specifically for conventional 
petroleum or coal exploration and production in a given 
area, new rules may allow the award of separate rights for 
unconventional resources. In Indonesia, for example, 
regulations give a priority access to holders of existing 
rights if they wish to seek rights over unconventional 
resources. The production-sharing contract (PSC) for 
coal bed methane has a term of 30 years, including an 
initial exploration term of 6 years, which may be extended 
by 4 years for assessing the viability of a commercial coal-
bed methane project.
4.6 CONTRACTS AND LICENSES
Contrasts between hydrocarbons and mining
The host government–investor agreements typically used 
in the petroleum industry have limited relevance to those 
commonly found in the mining industry. Agreements, con-
tracts, and sometimes licenses are the favored terms in the 
hydrocarbons sector, while licenses are typically favored in 
mining, with permits and concessions sometimes used. 
Similarities between the sectors’ usage do exist, but the 
considerable differences between the two industries are 
reflected in their contractual preferences and, indeed, in 
the existence of separate regimes for hydrocarbons and 
mining regulation in most countries. Some of the differ-
ences are as follows:
1. Some of the main differences arise from considerations 
of geology and exploration, production processes, mar-
ket economics, and environmental and social impacts.28
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2. These differences go a long way to explaining why agree-
ments are more widely used in the petroleum industry 
than in mining. The production-sharing form of agree-
ment, for example, which is so widespread in the petro-
leum sector, is largely absent in mining.
3. The scope of most petroleum agreements is also wider, 
extending over more phases of the industry’s activity 
(exploration, appraisal, production, and sale) than min-
ing agreements typically do (Land 1994, 187).29
4. The degree of government involvement and control is 
usually greater in petroleum agreements than mining 
agreements (Land 1994, 187–88).
As one observer notes: “Where petroleum agreements do 
have some relevance for mining agreements is in areas not 
directly related to the particular production, for example, 
similarities in local content, dispute resolution, stabilization 
etc.” (Southalan 2012).
The importance of negotiation. In both industries, 
the formal characteristics of contracts and licenses matter, 
but the ways in which particular clauses reflect the risks 
and benefits of the areas that a government can offer are of 
crucial importance. Differences among agreements are 
stronger to the extent that EI sector laws give broad powers 
to governments to negotiate agreements with potential 
investors. Negotiators are allowed to develop terms to 
attract investment in a competitive market, with an eye on 
the going rate for the acreage they have on offer. The terms 
can be adapted to take account of specific risks in new or 
higher risk areas and adapt any standard terms to other 
circumstances. However, the scope for abuse of this discre-
tionary power is such that recent trends confer less discre-
tion, encouraging greater standardization in the terms of 
agreements and licenses.
Transparency. In both hydrocarbons and mining, argu-
ments have been advanced for the publication of contracts 
between host governments and investors, sometimes called 
“primary contracts.” (Rosenblum and Maples 2009). A 
recurring theme in such arguments is that publication will 
facilitate scrutiny and counter corruption. This is not a new 
argument, but it has acquired greater force in recent times. 
Many contracts have highly standardized forms, and indeed 
a significant number of them are available on various 
Internet websites, including the EI Sourcebook’s site. The 
counterargument—usually based on a need to respect com-
mercial confidentiality—has been significantly weakened by 
the reality of increased access to contracts. Maintaining the 
commercial confidentiality of some contract terms for a 
period of, for example, two years might be one way to 
assuage this concern.
Does a model help?
Standardization is also encouraged by the use of a model 
contract or license for the basic relationship between the 
host state and foreign investors. Examples of this practice 
are found in South Africa in mining licenses and in the 
United Kingdom in hydrocarbons licenses. Essentially, this 
use of a model involves creating model clauses in legislation 
and then inserting them in the license. They are regulatory 
in character and are not actually negotiated. The model 
clauses are likely to change only slightly over time and will 
usually include extensive regulatory controls.
A more common approach is for governments to issue 
models as a basis for negotiation with interested parties. Not 
only governments do this. The larger international EI com-
panies usually maintain their own databases of model con-
tracts and may well use an in-house model as a starting 
point in negotiations with a government. There is, however, 
no industry-wide recognized model of a host-government 
agreement. If a host government wants to avoid being dis-
advantaged in contract negotiations, it would be well 
advised to have its own model prepared before it com-
mences discussions with foreign investors or launches a 
licensing round. It can then set the framework for the offers 
and negotiations. The use of model contracts to standardize 
provisions also has the advantage of reducing the impact of 
a capacity shortage and inexperience that is often felt on the 
government side. Further, it can increase transparency, not 
least by giving a prospective investor an idea of what the 
government’s intentions are. Such models are commonly 
used by governments in international publicity exercises or 
road shows in Houston or London, for example. On the 
downside, even a good model may require negotiations 
about matters of detail in specific cases, and it can also act 
as a straightjacket for government officials if it is treated too 
rigidly. As the name implies, a model contract is intended as 
a guide with general application in a particular EI regime.
The responsibility that government negotiators bear is 
considerable. Sadly, faced with an experienced and highly 
professional team from the foreign investor, they will, in 
many cases, have challenges from a lack of sufficient capac-
ity on their side to negotiate a contract and in monitoring 
an operation. This capacity issue is one reason some advis-
ers may argue for a rigid, highly standardized form of model 
contract, to be presented to prospective foreign investors on 
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a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The terms and conditions may be 
developed with assistance from international experts, but 
once the model contract has been agreed on by the host 
government, its terms and conditions will function as being 
effectively set in stone for government officials and prospec-
tive investors alike. For countries facing a serious shortage 
of qualified staff, this rather extreme approach may be 
thought necessary to safeguard against the conclusion of a 
bad deal and/or against the risk of corruption. A variant of 
this approach would be to incorporate most of the key 
terms in legislation, such as a hydrocarbons law, rather than 
to place them in a model contract, with the same outcome 
that little would be left to be negotiated with the prospective 
investor in the individual contract.
These remarks on models apply to host government–
investor agreements. There is no internationally recognized 
model for agreements on production sharing or conces-
sions. Models vary widely in structure, level of detail, and 
links to existing legislation and economic circumstances. 
Where the domestic legal system is weak or poorly devel-
oped for EI purposes, contracts may be especially detailed to 
compensate for these shortcomings. Routinely, govern-
ments design agreements for their own use, drawing on the 
various models or actual agreements from other jurisdic-
tions. Models are not, however, universal practice. In some 
cases, standard terms may be set down by the government 
but not in the form of a model agreement. For many years 
the United Kingdom has published regulations (a form of 
secondary legislation, which can be amended with relative 
ease from time to time) containing model clauses for inclu-
sion in its petroleum production licenses. These are updated 
and reissued from time to time. For each license granted 
these regulations are incorporated, apparently with few 
amendments. The set of model clauses that apply is the one 
applicable at the time the license is issued, with any subse-
quent changes in the model clauses applying only to later 
licenses.
Models are used extensively in the EI industries; they 
provide the legal foundations for many activities in which 
the parties seek to cooperate.30 They cover various kinds of 
activity such as exploration, development, and mine opera-
tions and confidentiality and nondisclosure. (See, for exam-
ple, the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation’s forms 
and model contracts.)31 Among models designed by the 
Association of International Petroleum Negotiators (AIPN), 
there are several kinds of model agreements for joint opera-
tions involving several companies.32 There are also models 
for unit development of a field that crosses several contract 
areas; assignment of interests in a concession; the sale and 
purchase of natural gas or LNG; confidentiality issues; pro-
vision of services or goods to the operating company; dis-
pute settlement; and bidding for blocks.
With thousands of oil, gas, and mining transactions con-
cluded every day around the world, the advantages of stan-
dardization lie in savings of time and effort by using 
boilerplate text that can be applied to many contracts. Some 
industry associations have encouraged their development 
and use. Their length and content varies considerably, with 
detailed guidance notes added in many cases. Although the 
emphasis in such agreements tends to be more on their 
relevance for industry, their content can be very useful for 
host governments, not least if they have a national company 
that is a party to the resource operations (Martin and Park 
2010).
Oil and gas contracts
The main types of contract in the international oil and gas 
industry relevant to the framework chevron of the EI Value 
Chain are those that establish a cooperative relationship 
between the host state and the investor or consortium and 
those that establish forms of cooperation among the con-
sortium partners, where often a state company can be 
involved.
Common agreements between governments and 
investors. Three common forms of agreement govern the 
relationship between government and investors in upstream 
oil and gas operations: (1) licenses or concession agreement 
(a tax and royalty system); (2) PSAs; and (3) risk-service 
agreements (RSAs). Typically, only concession agreements 
are found in the mining sector, while the licenses found 
in hydrocarbons activities have a contractual character and 
so differ from a simple administrative permission. An 
important consideration is that each of these legal forms 
may be modified so that it has an economic outcome that 
is broadly similar to the others. The choice of contract 
or license form ultimately tends to be determined more 
by the overall objectives of EI sector policy or by the coun-
try’s administrative capacity than by economic or fiscal 
considerations.
An effect of resource nationalism in the oil sector in the 
1970s was that the PSA emerged as a most effective way of 
addressing host-government demands to retain owner-
ship of the resources even when foreign or domestic inves-
tors were involved in petroleum operations. PSAs do not 
confer rights of ownership of the petroleum on the com-
pany or consortium that concludes the agreement. Instead, 
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the company receives a share of the overall production 
(and a percentage of the costs). So throughout most of the 
operations it, or the joint venture, provides technical 
expertise and capital (exploration and production ser-
vices) and assumes project risk in return for exclusive 
rights to explore for and produce oil and/or gas from the 
contract area. In contrast to the concession or license 
form, the PSA does not confer a right to own the petro-
leum at the wellhead. Indeed, if the state owns the pipe-
line, it may not take ownership of its share until it has 
reached the port of loading. For a country that is sensitive 
about ownership of its resources by foreigners, this 
arrangement has many attractions.
The license or concession. The modern petroleum 
license is rooted in the old concession idea and is the oldest 
of the three forms of agreement in common use from the 
North Sea to parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. However, as the 
international petroleum and mining industries have evolved, 
the past 100 years have seen major adjustments of the con-
cession form in favor of host states (Moran 1972, 216–19). 
The modern concession provides host states with active 
roles in the management of their natural resources. This 
often occurs through the direct participation of NRCs in the 
development of a host state’s EI sector (Nahkle 2010).
Under a license, the investor or group of investors holds 
rights to extract and own 100 percent of the produced 
resource—but not the resource in the ground. This is par-
ticularly appealing to petroleum sector investors because it 
allows the investor to book all the corresponding oil and 
gas reserves for financial reporting purposes.33 The licensee 
bears all risks and funds all operations. Host-state revenues 
under licenses generally consist of a royalty and an income 
tax, possibly including additional income taxes on the inves-
tor’s excess or windfall profits. As a result of these fiscal 
 features (see chapter 6), the license is often referred to as a 
“tax and royalty agreement.” It is found in all the OECD 
countries in one form or another and also in many Asian 
and other countries. In the Russian Federation and 
Kazakhstan, attempts to the use the PSA have given way to a 
preference for concessions.
State equity participation in petroleum licenses usually 
occurs through the state’s NRC, where such participation is 
perceived as a means of increasing revenues and boosting 
control over operations (see chapter 5).34 In the mining sec-
tor, it is equally—if not more—common to find the state 
holding a direct minority equity stake through the mining 
or finance ministry rather than through an NRC. In spite of 
its negative historical connotations for many countries, the 
modern petroleum license continues to be used widely 
throughout the world.
A recent example is the concession contract for prospecting 
and production under the Mozambique Petroleum Law of 
2014. This grants the exclusive right to carry out exploration 
and production as well as a nonexclusive right to construct and 
operate oil pipelines or gas pipeline systems for the transporta-
tion of crude oil or natural gas or infrastructure for liquefaction 
of gas produced from the concession contract area, except 
where access to an existing oil pipeline or gas pipeline system or 
existing infrastructure is available on “reasonable commercial 
terms.”35 However, the fiscal regime of this so-called conces-
sion contract is designed with production-sharing mechanisms 
in terms of cost recovery and production sharing.
Production-sharing agreements. PSAs were introduced 
by Indonesia in the 1960s. Since that time, PSAs have 
become an increasingly popular means for petroleum con-
tracting, especially among developing states. These include 
the Arab Republic of Egypt, Gabon, Peru, and Trinidad and 
Tobago. Under a production-sharing model, an agency 
appointed by the state—typically its NRC—is the conces-
sionaire, and the investor is a contractor to the concession-
aire; the concessionaire (the state) holds the mining rights, 
not the investor. The investor, however, as under concession 
agreements, bears all risks and funds all operations (unless 
there is state equity participation).
Revenue sharing between the host-state government and 
the investor is determined by arrangements for sharing 
petroleum production volumes between the two, as spelled 
out in the PSA. The investor does not own total production 
but only its entitlement under the PSA. As a result of these 
legal structures, the investor can book only a share of the 
total reserves.36 The PSA contractor is normally required to 
pay income taxes on income derived from the PSA, which 
complicates administration (see chapter 6 for a detailed 
description of PSA fiscal provisions, especially figure 6.4).
Under PSAs, the state agency or national oil company 
(NOC) is directly involved in operational decisions either in its 
capacity as concessionaire or in its participation as a member 
of a management committee (similar to a joint operating com-
mittee) with the investor. These committees are common in 
PSAs but rare in concessions. In a number of states, the NOC 
will participate in the project with an equity stake in the PSA.
The advantages of the PSA include the following:
 ■ The investment risks are borne by the petroleum compa-
nies while the host state shares any profits arising from 
the project without sharing the risks.
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 ■ From the perspective of the investor, if the PSA is 
enacted into law, it provides legal security for petroleum 
companies even though it limits the parties’ ability to 
modify the agreement without parliamentary approval.
 ■ It ensures a “more direct government control and par-
ticipation” (Tordo 2007, 10).
On the other hand, the main disadvantage of the PSA is 
that the host-state government may find its profit interests 
in conflict with its regulatory role when its own regulations 
raise the costs of a project under a PSA. Furthermore, the 
host-state government will tend to become legally respon-
sible for decommissioning if it acquires title to installations 
and structures through the PSA—although often the parties 
will tend to agree otherwise in the PSA (Tordo 2007, 10).
Licenses (especially modern tax and royalty systems) and 
PSAs differ in legal structure, ownership (and marketing) of 
production, and related reserve booking possibilities but 
otherwise share many key attributes.
Risk service agreements. RSAs, like PSAs, tend to be a 
phenomenon limited to the petroleum sector and almost 
never apply to the mining sector. RSAs go beyond PSAs in 
asserting host-state control. The state or NOC hires an 
investor as a contractor. The investor assumes all risks and 
costs and is reimbursed for its costs. The investor is also 
remunerated for the service it provides in accordance with a 
mutually agreed formula so long as commercial production 
targets are met.
The investor never obtains rights to the petroleum, 
 however. Even produced petroleum when brought to 
the surface continues to belong entirely to the state. 
Reimbursement and remuneration are normally in cash, 
although in some states the cash payment may be converted 
to an equivalent amount of petroleum by right.37 The inves-
tor cannot book reserves if it is paid only in cash but is 
entitled to do so for payments in petroleum.
Most RSAs provide for a transfer of operatorship from 
the investor to the NOC at a given date prior to expiration 
of the contract. For states where host-state sovereignty 
issues are emphasized, the RSA is a popular contractual 
choice.38 Investors, on the other hand, tend to resist RSAs 
when possible, because they restrict access to petroleum 
ownership rights and also limit the economic upside poten-
tial available under typical remuneration formulas.
From the investor’s perspective, the main advantage of 
the RSAs is often thought to be that it enables the investor 
to gain access to produced petroleum on preferential terms. 
In states with large reserves, but where license or PSA 
arrangements are unavailable, investors will still often agree 
to RSA arrangements in the hope of developing a lucrative 
long-term relationship. However, for states with unex-
plored frontier areas the RSAs may be less attractive to 
potential investors because they tend to offer relatively too 
little return to the investor (Nahkle 2010, 104; Date-Bah 
and Rahim 1987, 99–100).
RSAs have been used in Middle Eastern countries such as 
the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq and in Latin America by 
Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, and the República 
Bolivariana de Venezuela. In Mexico the state oil company, 
Pemex, was authorized to enter into multiple service contracts 
in 2004. The contractor is remunerated in the form of a ser-
vice fee in cash for the work and services it has carried out. In 
the contract this fee is expressed as a list of specific unit prices 
for each type of work and service that the contractor delivers.
Licenses are perhaps slightly more favored in industrial-
ized states, in the legal form of administrative licenses or 
leases, while PSAs tend to be more popular in developing 
states. RSAs, the least common of the three contractual 
agreements, tend to be found in those states with strong 
nationalistic leanings or a limited need for foreign expertise. 
In a number of states, hybrid approaches to contracting 
have been adopted. Trinidad and Tobago has experimented 
with all three forms of contract.
Contract provisions. Contract names—such as licenses, 
PSAs, or RSAs—are conventions only and their use by states 
can vary, as the Mozambique example described earlier 
shows us. Their economic content is far more important. 
Apart from the distinguishing characteristics described in 
the previous section, all three contract forms share many of 
the same basic provisions. They are common to most min-
ing agreements as well.39
The following short sections explain what some of the 
key contractual provisions are for the conduct of operations 
and handling of administrative and commercial issues in 
exploration and production activities in the hydrocarbons 
sector. Fiscal provisions and instruments as well as valua-
tion issues are addressed in chapter 6. Social and environ-
mental provisions are addressed in chapter 9. It is important 
to note that for many of these provisions the content is 
largely settled and noncontroversial. Only a few are subject 
to changes in thinking about what is good practice, and 
these are highlighted below.
Parties to the Contract. Normally, contracts are entered 
into by the state or the NRC (representing the state) 
and the private investor (or investors). In the highly 
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international economy for oil and gas, the investor will 
commonly use a subsidiary company based in a location 
that offers it both maximum tax advantages and opportu-
nities for future dispute resolution (for example, in a coun-
try that has a bilateral investment treaty). It is therefore a 
matter of great importance to the host state to ensure that 
it has examined closely the prospective investor(s) and 
assured itself that an agreement with it does nothing to 
jeopardize its power to levy taxes, to regulate, or to defend 
itself robustly in a future dispute.
Exploration. Petroleum contracts specify an exploration 
term (six to eight years is typical) divided into phases with 
associated obligatory work programs and budgets and lim-
ited requirements to surrender areas at intervals. Given the 
complexity of exploration and the characteristic paucity of 
technical data on deposition, exploration terms for mining 
are typically less demanding than for petroleum.
Petroleum contracts invariably provide the investor with 
both a right to explore and—in the event of successful 
appraisal of a commercial discovery—develop, produce, 
and benefit economically from it. In contrast, mining con-
tracts often separate out the two activities, with success in 
exploration not necessarily guaranteeing rights to commer-
cial development (Stanley and Mikhaylova 2011, 6–7). 
However, there may be a presumption of continuation 
dependent on demonstration of technical and financial 
capacity and an acceptable mine development plan.
Development. The right to development is usually condi-
tioned on approval by government authorities of a compre-
hensive development and production plan. Such plans will 
normally include annual work programs and budgets and 
provisions for abandonment or decommissioning of mining 
or petroleum projects at the end of the project’s life cycle 
(see chapter 9).
Contracts can, and often do, provide for a development 
and production phase ranging from 30 to 40 years. Detailed 
provisions are often made for the right to build, possibly 
own, and operate essential infrastructure.40 The issues relat-
ing to public infrastructure used in the mining sector are the 
subject of a good practice note and brief available on the 
Sourcebook website.41
Normally, the investor is required to conduct the explo-
ration and development expeditiously and in accordance 
with stipulated work obligations; otherwise, the investor 
will surrender the rights to the host-state government 
so that the rights can be awarded to another potential 
investor. The host-state government may also require 
guarantees to ensure that the work obligations are fulfilled 
and that the resources are exploited in a sustainable man-
ner (Duval et al. 2009).
Conduct of Operations. This contractual provision obliges 
the investor to conduct all operations in accordance with 
good practices as generally applied in the EI sector. 
Petroleum contracts often make reference to “good oil field 
practice,” which is a widely recognized term, connoting, 
inter alia, the use of sound international practices with due 
attention to conservation of the resource, safety, and protec-
tion of the environment.
Force Majeure. Contracts excuse an investor from perfor-
mance obligations under the conditions of force majeure 
(Onorato 1995, 32). A contract clause defines force 
majeure—typically, events beyond the investor’s control 
that make it impossible or at least very difficult to perform. 
The clause may list qualifying events that, in addition to 
natural events, may include unwarranted government inter-
ference or changes in law adversely affecting the investor.
Control and Inspection. Control over investor operations 
may be exercised by the relevant EI sector ministry, its tech-
nical agency, or possibly, although not ideally, the NRC 
(see chapter 5). The contract normally requires host-state 
government approvals of exploration and appraisal pro-
grams and budgets, the development and production plan, 
and annual work programs and budgets.
Submission of Information. Provisions related to the sup-
ply of information to the host-state government have 
become increasingly important, given government inter-
est in being more directly involved in EI sector operations. 
The investor is typically required to submit—on a timely 
basis—all information and data generated by, prepared 
for, or obtained in the conduct of operations. This is criti-
cal not only to supervision of the investor’s contrac-
tual obligations but also to the host state’s understanding 
of its existing and potential petroleum or mineral resource 
base.
Data Ownership and Confidentiality. This is an extremely 
contentious area. Investors consider both the ownership 
and confidentiality of the data they generate or acquire as 
vital to their commercial interests. Host states, on the 
other hand, see ownership as critical to building a national 
data repository to inform their decisions on EI sector 
issues. The government’s interest includes the right to 
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release data as essential to the promotion of exploration 
and development interests. Contractual provisions, out-
side of a few industrialized states, now assign ownership to 
the host state while allowing the investor to retain copies 
of paper or electronic data and samples of physical data, 
subject to confidentiality requirements (Rosenblum and 
Maples 2009, 23–25).
Often, contracts will impose time limits on confidential-
ity. In these cases, confidentiality requirements are nor-
mally stipulated to terminate when the relevant contract 
ends, when an investor relinquishes its rights under the 
contract, or for some shorter specified period, such as five 
years (Rosenblum and Maples 2009, 23–25).
In terms of confidentiality, technical data is of enormous 
commercial and strategic importance. However, beyond 
technical and physical data, confidentiality may extend to 
financial data and other information generated under the 
contract and even to the contract itself (see chapter 8).
Ownership of Assets. Treatment of the ownership of assets 
in petroleum contracts varies depending on the contract 
type. Under concession agreements, the investor usually 
retains ownership at least until the end of the  concession, at 
which point it may be transferred to the host-state govern-
ment for its eventual decommissioning (Cotula 2010, 24; 
Kaplan et al. 2012, 28).
Under PSAs, the transfer of asset ownership from the 
investor to the host-state government usually occurs earlier 
than under a concession agreement, ranging from the time 
when the assets are installed to the time when the investor 
has recovered its costs. The operative provision under both 
types of agreement is that the investor retains the use of the 
assets, without charge, during the life of the contract, along 
with all the obligations in the contract such as those related 
to the decommissioning and abandonment of the assets.
Assignment. Given the frequency with which hydrocarbons 
companies are likely to sell or buy interests in contracts or 
licenses, it is normal practice for a host government to offer 
the possibility of assignment, sale, or transfer of contract 
interests. Provisions on assignment, direct or indirect, are 
standard in both model and actual agreements and in petro-
leum and mining legislation. For example, principles relat-
ing to transfer of the parties’ rights and obligations under 
joint operating agreements (JOAs) are set out in the widely 
used AIPN International Joint Operating Agreement.42 
Governments have an interest in ensuring they are aware of 
a proposed transfer, to whom and under what conditions. 
Increasingly, they require information about beneficial 
ownership, both as an anticorruption measure and as a way 
of ensuring that tax obligations are met if there are offshore 
and domestic gains.
Small pioneering oil companies are likely to want to 
monetize their interest at an early stage or bring in a larger 
company to participate in carrying out the petroleum 
operations. So, the more restrictions on the right to sell or 
assign that are imposed by a state, the less the potential 
value of the interest to a first mover company.
There are a number of principles that apply to these 
transactions that are well settled and generally understood. 
At a minimum, the host state will require prior approval of 
the proposed transaction by the relevant government author-
ity.43 The purpose of such approval or consent is to ensure 
that any assignee meets the government’s expectations for 
financial capability and technical competence in the project 
(the raison d’eˆtre for inviting the foreign company in at the 
outset) and can therefore discharge its obligations under the 
petroleum agreement. If there is a doubt about the assignee’s 
capacity to perform its financial obligations, the assignor 
may be asked to provide the NOC with a guarantee of per-
formance of the potential assignee for a certain amount of 
time (as has happened in Vietnam and Angola).
Without notification of a prospective change, the govern-
ment will not be aware that a change of contractor and/or 
operator has taken place and will have no opportunity to 
ensure that the necessary checks are carried out to verify the 
new assignee’s capabilities. The most common form of state 
approval is by written letter before the transfer of interest 
takes effect, rather than an ex post facto endorsement. To 
avoid arbitrariness on the part of the governmental authori-
ties, assignment clauses often stipulate that approval will not 
be “unreasonably withheld” or “unreasonably delayed.”44 In 
Liberia, for example, if consent has not been given within 30 
days, it is deemed to have been given (although this is too 
short a time frame to be treated as a guide).
A contemporary example from the Middle East may be 
found in the 2007 Jordan Model Production Sharing 
Agreement. This model contract reflects the industry prin-
ciples just described in that it establishes the general princi-
ple that the state’s prior written consent is required for any 
assignment or other disposal of “all or any portion of [the 
contractor’s] duties and obligations” under the contract, 
subject to a limited, defined exception concerning affiliates:
Article 31—Assignment
(a)(1) CONTRACTOR shall not assign or otherwise 
dispose to a non-Afﬁliate person, partnership, 
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corporation or other entity all or any portion of its 
duties or obligations hereunder, without the prior 
written consent of [Natural Resources Authority of 
Jordan] whose approval shall not be unreasonably 
withheld.45
Tax implications relating to the assignment of contrac-
tual rights may also have to be assessed (see chapter 6). In 
particular, there is the question of capital gains tax (CGT) 
being imposed on the proceeds of a sale. After several cases 
in which governments have sought to do this in the face of 
expectations to the contrary, it is likely to be a consider-
ation for international oil companies in their assessment of 
and negotiation of contracts. The issue of tax being levied 
on sums made at the time of exit appears for many years 
not to have been an area of controversy in petroleum 
investment practice. What has changed the situation in 
recent years is the size of the amounts involved in exit 
transactions. This is the origin of recent increased interest 
by governments in such transactions and in the possibility 
of taxing them. In Central and East Africa alone, at least 
five governments have been reviewing their CGT rules 
(the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, and Uganda) and another (South Africa) has 
been called on to do so by an influential policy institute 
within the governing party.46 Previously, there was no 
practice of levying tax on such transactions. The shift in 
policy preference has therefore encountered an absence of 
legal power in some existing arrangements.
Foreign Exchange. These provisions cover investor rights 
and obligations with respect to recording foreign exchange 
transactions and to retaining foreign exchange earnings out-
side the host state. The foreign investor seeks to ensure that 
funds earned within the host state are convertible at a non-
discriminatory market rate of exchange.
Foreign exchange provisions also seek to ensure that 
funds are remittable at the foreign investor’s discretion to 
the overseas parent company or its shareholders. Such 
provisions also seek to ensure that the remittance is gov-
erned by rules that both parties will adhere to for the 
duration of the contract. Most developing states provide 
full foreign exchange remittance guarantees. The host 
government will nevertheless be keen to ensure that for-
eign exchange transactions do not have an impact on 
macroeconomic management, a possibility because the 
hydrocarbons sector may well be large in relation to the 
rest of the economy.
Auditing and Accounting. These contractual provisions 
mandate that the investor maintain books and accounts in 
conformity with national or international norms and grants 
the host-state government the right to conduct audits. In the 
absence of internationally agreed accounting standards, care 
needs to be taken about the way in which expenses are to be 
calculated and about transfer pricing (see chapter 6).
Qualification of Contractor. Some petroleum contracts 
require the investor to conduct business through a locally 
incorporated company for tax purposes and other legal 
reasons. This is an area of key concern to a host state, 
because internationally operating companies are usually 
highly sophisticated in ensuring that their operations are 
structured so as to minimize their tax liability (Cotula 
2010, 26).
Health, Safety, and Environment. This provision requires the 
contractor to conduct operations in conformity with the 
host state’s HSE laws and regulations (see chapter 9). This 
may be supplemented by reference to industry best practice 
or international environmental standards.
Reclamation and Decommissioning. Some petroleum 
 contracts vest responsibility for reclamation, repairing, 
and/or decommissioning of sites in the contractor. Other 
types of contractual provisions require that funds be 
deposited in a dedicated account each year to cover the 
reclamation, decommissioning, and abandonment costs 
(see chapter 9). As more and more countries face the pros-
pect of  decommissioning, this is likely to be an area of 
evolving practice.
Local Goods and Services. Most petroleum contracts require 
the investor to purchase their goods and services from 
within the host state, provided both quality and price are 
competitive and subject to availability (Tordo et al. 2013). 
The reasoning behind local benefit provisions is to promote 
linkages between the EI sector and the local economy (see 
box 4.4 and box 4.5 and chapter 9). It is particularly chal-
lenging in new provinces where there is no infrastructure 
and no government knowledge of the sector.
Training and Local Employment. Most petroleum contracts 
require the foreign investor to give preference to nationals 
who have the requisite skills for employment in the EI sec-
tor. These provisions normally also require that the investor 
conducts training programs with a view to promote local 
employment (see box 4.4).
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Box 4.4 Local Benefit
Most petroleum and mining laws require that foreign 
companies adopt some measure of preference for local 
goods and services. In addition to the direct benefits to 
stakeholders (such as local businesses, entrepreneurs, 
and communities) through market diversification, 
productivity, and access to business opportunities, 
capital, and technology, there are wider benefits typi-
cally sought by such requirements: (1) increased 
employment and skills, (2) increased domestic and 
foreign investment, (3) technology and knowledge 
transfer from international resource companies, 
(4) exports and foreign exchange, and (5) increased 
government revenues.
The definition of local benefit (often called local 
content in the literature) is very important. Some states 
consider “local” companies to be those that are regis-
tered nationally rather than fully taking into account 
the degree of added value that these companies create 
for participation by local individuals. Ideally, prefer-
ence should be given to companies that are involved in 
actual manufacturing activity as well as those with 
significant ownership, management, and employment 
of local citizens. Companies within the “region” should 
also be treated as local.
For companies as well as states this is a matter of 
some sensitivity. Internationally operating compa-
nies prefer to work with contractors they are familiar 
with and to use their standard company procedures 
for holding tenders and procuring goods, services, 
and other work. Local companies will be unfamiliar, 
at least initially, with such procedures. For certain 
kinds of activity, expertise is unlikely to be available 
among domestic companies. Tensions can therefore 
be expected in the development of a local benefit 
policy.
Problems should be anticipated in the following 
four areas:
1. Where certain goods and services are lacking in the 
host country
2. Where there is poor quality of domestic goods and 
noncompliance with international standards and 
safety requirements (as stated by foreign investors, 
for example)
3. Where there is a practice of using local mediators as 
suppliers of goods, services, and other works instead 
of domestic manufacturers
4. Where there is a lack of employees with the appro-
priate qualiﬁcations
The design of a local benefit policy can also create 
problems in implementation. Take, for example, the 
following provision mandated in Chad: licensees must 
“give priority to those goods and services available in 
Chad insofar as their prices, qualities, quantities, deliv-
ery terms and sales conditions compare to goods and 
services available abroad and do not require the 
licensee to bear any kind of extra economic burden” 
(Tordo et al. 2013, 51).
Provisions such as these are often insufficiently dis-
seminated, monitored, and enforced. Moreover, it may 
be difficult or impossible to compare factors such as the 
reliability or performance quality of a local supplier of 
goods and services in relation to competing suppliers.
Nonetheless, contracts may include fairly elaborate 
provisions on local benefit requirements that specify 
criteria, including certification, to identify when mate-
rials are not available locally or at reasonably compa-
rable quality standards. They may also involve a 
monitoring system through the NRC or a specialized 
government agency or procurement office.
Stabilization. Stabilization clauses are offered as an invest-
ment promotion device, often because they are given by other 
states in the region also competing for investment capital. 
The guarantees they provide protect the investor’s contrac-
tual rights against adverse interference by the state through 
legislative measures. Although such provisions may not stop 
the government from exercising its legislative powers, stabili-
zation clauses can mandate that a court or arbitration tribu-
nal compensate the investor for any damage suffered. Aside 
from a strictly legal assessment of their value in formal pro-
ceedings, stabilization clauses may enhance the ability of an 
investor to negotiate a more favorable settlement in a dispute 
with a host state that seeks to revise the terms of the original 
agreement (see section 4.9 and chapter 6). Therefore, any sta-
bilization clause has to be well balanced and properly drafted 
to protect the state’s interests in an appropriate manner.
Termination. The contract normally stipulates the circum-
stances that permit either party to terminate the agreement 
(for example, when there is breach of a fundamental term by 
the other party). These can include a failure to carry out a 
work program or a breach of environmental obligations.
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Natural gas
Agreements for the exploration and production of petro-
leum typically cover both oil and gas. They usually contain 
clauses dealing with the peculiarities of the gas industry: 
longer lead times to identify viable markets if gas is found 
and to reach agreement with buyers for long-term sales 
contracts. Longer times are also needed for securing the 
high levels of investment for field development, processing, 
and transportation. (See pages 70–71 and 107–08 in this 
chapter.)47 The fiscal terms applicable to gas production 
have to be more attractive to investors than those for oil, 
because the selling price is lower than its oil equivalent (and 
hence offers lower profitability), transportation costs are 
higher, and the production profile is longer and flatter. The 
duration of the project and the long payback period mean 
that investors will tend to pay extra attention to the guaran-
tees provided by stabilization clauses.
To anticipate the complexities of contracting, a govern-
ment may provide a special legal instrument for the interim 
negotiating period. For example, Vietnam’s amended 
Petroleum Law (2000) states the following:
If discovering gas with commercial value, while lack-
ing the consumption market as well as conditions on 
pipelines and suitable treatment facilities, contractors 
may retain the areas where gas is found. The duration 
of retention of such an area shall not exceed ﬁve 
(5) years and may, in special cases, be extended for two 
(2) more years. Pending the consumption market and 
the conditions on pipelines and suitable treatment 
facilities, the contractors shall have to proceed with 
the work already committed in the petroleum con-
tracts (Le Leuch 2011, at 8.6.2).
The concept of a specific retention lease was first devel-
oped in Australia. Its objective is to encourage the explora-
tion of gas and the identification of commercial gas markets 
by granting the contractor enough time to assess the 
Box 4.5 Local Benefit: The Kazakhstani Experience
As Kazakhstan moves toward the status of a major oil 
and gas producer, it has developed a policy on sourcing 
hydrocarbons-related work to Kazakhstani firms. Legal 
mechanisms have been put in place to require oil and 
gas companies (or “subsoil users”) to use local goods, 
works, and services in their operations and to increase 
the proportion of Kazakhstani employees in their staff 
and in the staff of their contractors. The policy was first 
introduced into hydrocarbons legislation in 2004 with 
the terms Kazakh manufacturer and Kazakh origin 
applicable to goods, works, and services. It had little 
practical impact. The Kazakh Content Law of 2009 
took a more robust approach to implementation and 
has proved effective. Virtually all of these provisions 
migrated into a new Law on the Subsoil and Subsoil 
Use (2010).
Why was this change necessary? When goods, 
works, and services were purchased from a foreign 
supplier, the funds benefited non-Kazakhstani econo-
mies, often the same country of origin as the subsoil 
user. All such expenses were treated as contributions to 
the annual minimum level of investments that were 
required under contracts between subsoil users and 
the state. Failure to meet this target could lead to uni-
lateral termination by the state. Finally, once produc-
tion was started, the subsoil users had the opportunity 
to avoid paying higher taxes for the investments, giving 
them an incentive to overstate their costs at the explo-
ration stage.
In response, Kazakhstani content on goods is 
defined as a percentage share of the cost of Kazakh-
origin materials and the producer’s expenses for goods 
processed in Kazakhstan. For services, Kazakhstani 
content is defined as an aggregate cumulative share 
based on the cost of goods used for the performance of 
works, as well as the agreement value and/or payments 
to Kazakhstani employees. It also takes into account the 
salary fund of the entity performing works or provid-
ing services. Among the key elements in the Kazakhstani 
regime is an online registry of goods, services, and 
work in subsoil operations that allows the authorities 
to monitor the operation of the procurement rules, 
according to the 2010 law. Quarterly reports by subsoil 
users ensure that this mechanism allows the authorities 
to monitor fulfillment of obligations on content. 
Calculation of the local benefit percentage is done by 
means of a uniform method. Certification of local ben-
efit is also used. There is also a long-term plan with 
targets for local benefit set in percentage terms.
Violations of procurement rules are treated as a 
breach of the subsoil contract and the penalties may 
include termination of that contract.
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viability of the discovery and its potential for marketability. 
In the Offshore Petroleum Act of 2006 a five-year retention 
lease is provided for. The criteria for granting it are (1) that 
the block contains petroleum and (2) that the recovery of 
such petroleum is not currently commercially viable but is 
likely to become so within 15 years. Guidelines have been 
issued to define what “likely to become commercially via-
ble” means. The Australian legislation anticipates a further 
complication for gas development:
Where commercial viability is dependent on combin-
ing a development with other potential third party 
developments or access to third party facilities or 
technology, the petroleum will not be considered 
commercially viable if the titleholder is unable to 
complete an agreement to jointly develop or complete 
an access agreement for use of facilities or technology 
which provides an acceptable rate of return. . . . The 
Joint Authority may declare an offshore pipeline to be 
subject to common carriage (Le Leuch 2011, 8.6.4).
In a spirit of realism, the Australian authorities also note 
in their Guideline for Grant and Administration of 
Retention Lease that success is not guaranteed even if a 
period of extra time is granted:
[I]t is recognized that the market for natural gas is 
often characterized by large, long-term contracts, at 
speciﬁed rates over speciﬁed periods, and speciﬁc 
quality. Therefore, in some circumstances, the Joint 
Authority may agree that an otherwise commercially 
viable gas project (assuming current prices) is not 
commercially viable and may not proceed due to an 
inability to obtain a contract at prevailing market 
terms and conditions, which would support devel-
opment. Alternatively, the Joint Authority may 
accept that the level of resources, while substantial 
may be insufﬁcient to meet any currently available 
market opportunity (e.g. an LNG project) (Le Leuch 
2011, 8.6.4).
In approaching the design of specific contract clauses on 
this subject, it should be noted that there has been a shift in 
recent years to include incentives for foreign investors to 
develop any gas reserves found. Typically, the PSA contractor 
would be granted more attractive fiscal and contractual terms 
for gas projects. Years ago, a different approach was adopted 
in many countries: there would be an automatic transfer of a 
gas discovery to the state or its national oil company.
An example of this regime in a modern contract is found 
in Angola (Le Leuch 2011, 8.7.3). Where nonassociated gas 
is discovered, the rights for its appraisal and exploitation are 
automatically transferred to the state company without any 
compensation to the contractor, unless the state company 
invites it to participate in the development of the gas field 
on terms that the parties agree on. Until the 1980s Egypt 
had a similar approach, with the result that gas exploration 
was neglected. This approach is nowadays the exception 
rather than the rule. Egypt modified its PSAs to give the 
company the right to develop and produce gas under cer-
tain economic provisions included in the PSA which are 
more favorable than those for oil. The result was a signifi-
cant growth in gas production, domestic gas utilization, and 
exports in subsequent years. The Angolan example high-
lights what may happen if no provision is included on the 
consequences of a gas discovery for the right holder or 
investor. Without some prior right to develop the resource, 
it would be obliged to negotiate with the government in 
competition with other companies or it may find that its 
discovery is handed over to a state company to develop with 
or without foreign partners.
Box 4.6 outlines the main provisions in petroleum con-
tracts signed with the host government that relate particu-
larly to natural gas. Chapter 5 reviews the main characteristics 
of gas industry contracts, such as agreements between buy-
ers and sellers, pricing arrangements, and an overview of 
how the downstream sector is organized for natural gas and 
LNG operations.
There is one kind of contract that is designed to address 
a specific set of circumstances: a gas deposit has been dis-
covered but the investor was not interested in developing it 
and surrendered its rights. Several years, perhaps decades, 
later, the deposit appears highly commercial and invest-
ment in development is possible. In such circumstances, a 
government may offer to a new investor a development and 
production-sharing agreement (DPSA) or an appraisal/
development and production agreement. Appraisal of the 
existing discovery would confirm whether the gas resources 
within the block are sufficient to justify a final decision to 
invest. The agreement with the new investor would include 
a field development obligation but no exploration rights. 
Qatar, one of the world’s most successful gas-exporting 
countries, has adopted this approach. The various DPSAs 
were concluded between the national petroleum company 
and foreign investors to develop nonassociated gas from the 
giant North Field.
The consequences of a failure to develop a gas policy that 
leads to a monetization of the country’s gas resources are 
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evident in Nigeria’s case. A large proportion of its associated 
gas is still flared, with significant environmental and social 
costs. The reasons are rooted in the absence of appropriate 
infrastructure for processing, transporting, or distributing 
gas or for generating electricity.
Mining
Types of licenses and application procedures. The 
vehicle used to transfer a right to a company or other legal 
entity to explore for and extract minerals is usually called 
a license. The name can vary, however, with convention 
being common in civil law countries and development 
agreement sometime used in others. The idea is the same: 
it is a legal instrument that sets out rights and obligations 
of the investor and host state that are additional to the leg-
islation relevant to mining activities. Sometimes the con-
tent is in a standard form, sometimes it is individually 
negotiated, and sometimes it is partly standardized and 
partly negotiated.
More often than not there are between two and three 
kinds of licenses covering prospecting, exploration, and 
exploitation (the mining regimes of Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Tunisia, Turkey, and the Republic of Yemen are examples). 
Box 4.6 Contractual Provisions for Natural Gas
Petroleum exploration and production contracts 
signed with governments will typically include some or 
all of the following specific gas-related provisions:
1. Deﬁnitional provisions. Natural gas operations 
typically are highly integrated but contain distinct 
segments: upstream, midstream, and downstream, 
each subject to a speciﬁc ﬁscal regime. Deﬁnitions 
are required to clarify the phase of operations to 
which the contract applies, the point of delivery, and 
the point of valuation, distinguishing upstream 
facilities from transportation pipelines and down-
stream facilities. Deﬁnitions will cover associated 
and nonassociated gas, condensate, and natural gas 
liquids.
2. Appraisal of discovery provisions. Relative to oil, a 
longer period is generally allowed for appraisal of a 
natural gas discovery. Assessment of commercial 
potential generally takes more time given limited 
domestic markets, the absence of competitive inter-
national markets, and the need to establish long-
term sales agreements (based on a sufﬁcient 
aggregation of gas reserves, before ﬁnal commit-
ments to development are made). A retention period 
mechanism may be included in the contract.
3. Joint development provisions. Contracts may 
include obligations for joint development of gas dis-
coveries and for the use of common infrastructure 
where stand-alone development would be noncom-
mercial. It is similar to schemes designed to develop 
a project as a single unit where the resource crosses a 
boundary.
4. Associated gas provisions. Natural gas is often found 
together with oil. The priority use of associated gas is 
generally in support of oil operations to increase oil 
recovery through reinjection into the oil reservoir. 
Disposal of associated gas provisions may (1) pro-
hibit or heavily ﬁne gas ﬂaring on environmental 
grounds, (2) allow the investor the right to commer-
cialize associated gas if possible, or (3) set terms for 
the sale or delivery of associated gas to the state if so 
requested by government.
5. Gas market provisions. Contract provisions may 
require priority allocation of gas to the domestic 
market and/or set conditions for the authorization 
of export sales.
6. Gas pricing provisions. The typical absence of a 
competitive upstream market for price reference 
purposes and the integrated character of gas oper-
ations necessitate that contracts contain a detailed 
gas valuation clause (in addition to the oil valua-
tion clause) setting out how wellhead prices are to 
be determined for sale of the gas. Often govern-
ment approval of gas sales contracts, including 
pricing, is required; there can be tensions as a 
result between the imposition of a low price for 
domestic consumption and a price based on fair 
market value, with damaging effects on long-term 
investment.
7. Fiscal provisions. Gas operations are typically less 
proﬁtable than oil operations. Fiscal terms in con-
tracts are typically adjusted to reﬂect this distinction 
unless the ﬁscal regime is based on achieved proﬁt-
ability (in which case no adjustments are required). 
The past practice of leaving the negotiation of ﬁscal 
terms until discovery or setting ﬁscal terms for gas 
equivalent to those for oil has largely been aban-
doned (see chapter 6).
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Some countries offer a special license to artisanal or small-
scale miners. Algeria, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, and 
Nigeria, for example, have such a license, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Zambia have a license for each). 
Some such licenses for local citizens only (Namibia, 
Tanzania, and Zambia, for example). In some cases, the 
words permit, lease, or concession are used. There may also 
be significant legal implications following from the terms 
used between civil and common law countries.
According to the vehicle chosen, the mineral right is 
transferred by the government authority in exchange for a 
commitment to carry out mineral exploration, develop-
ment, or production. The manner of transfer and the rights 
and obligations of the licensee are usually set out in laws 
and regulations (see 4.7, “The Award of Contracts and 
Licenses”). Most countries with mining operations offer 
two main types of license for commercial-scale activities: a 
license to explore and a license to mine. A small number of 
states, especially in Latin America, where Chile is the most 
important example, grant a simple mining concession—
which is a right to produce—through an application to a 
judicial proceeding. The application must show technical 
and financial capacity. In addition, these states will probably 
also offer some type of artisanal and small-scale mining 
license or registration.
A prerequisite of the law and regulations is to stipulate 
clearly the procedures for submitting license applications 
and the process by which mining rights will be issued and 
approved. Any qualifications, such as technical and finan-
cial capacity requirements, also need to be set out in rela-
tion to the kind of license, the obligations imposed, work 
commitments, and the size of land being licensed. 
Normally, the time will be stipulated within which a 
license will either be issued to an applicant or in which the 
applicant will be informed of the reasons as to why it has 
been denied. The manner of award of rights is discussed in 
section 4.7.
Investors expect any license conditions offered to pro-
vide successful applicants with strong security and continu-
ity of tenure for the term of the license. As long as the 
licensee is fulfilling its obligations, it should be clear that 
this title will not be taken away arbitrarily and will be 
renewed if requested by the licensee. Moreover, it should be 
equally clear that if the holder of an exploration license 
wishes to be granted a mining license for a discovery it seeks 
to develop, there is a provision in the law for this to happen. 
Without these provisions on security of title, usually 
regarded as good practice, companies might not apply for 
licenses (Onorato et al. 1998, 31).
An illustration is found in chapter 4 of the Swedish 
Minerals Act Minerals Ordinance (2007, section 3):
If several persons have applied for a concession for the 
same area and more than one person can be consid-
ered, . . . the applicant holding an exploration permit 
within the area for any mineral covered by his applica-
tion for a concession shall have precedence. If none of 
the applicants holds an exploration permit, the appli-
cant who has undertaken appropriate exploration 
work within the area shall have precedence.
This security includes exclusivity and a prohibition on 
unlicensed activity in the area. However, some countries 
allow licenses to be awarded to different licensees for differ-
ent minerals on the same areas. The 2006 Ghana Minerals 
Act, section 34(1), for example, states the following:
The Minister may, on an application duly made by a 
qualiﬁed person and on the recommendation of the 
Commission, grant a prospecting license in respect of 
all or any of the minerals speciﬁed in the application.
Linked to this provision on security of tenure is the pro-
vision of rights to assign license interests to other parties. 
Usually, any such transfers would be permitted subject to 
the consent of the relevant government body, with consent 
largely triggered when the application meets financial and 
technical capacity criteria. Such transferability tends to be 
particularly important to junior mining companies that are 
the driving force behind high-risk, grassroots exploration. 
The Ghana Minerals Act, section 14(5), addresses this in the 
following terms:
Subject to the other provisions of this section, an 
undivided proportionate part of a mineral right or 
application for a mineral right may be transferred, 
assigned, mortgaged or otherwise encumbered or 
dealt with. 
The Minister must approve such a transaction and his 
approval shall not be “unreasonably withheld or given sub-
ject to unreasonable conditions” (section 14(1)).
To limit speculation, the authorities in Western Australia 
do not allow a transfer of an exploration license to take place 
during the first year in which the license has been held.
Other provisions typically included in licenses (or in the 
provisions of the mineral law or regulations relating to 
licenses) are ones that identify the competent government 
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authorities and their responsibilities, a matter that limits the 
risk of duplication or overlapping jurisdiction. They set 
forth rules for relinquishment, whether voluntarily after 
disappointing exploration, a failure to perform work obliga-
tions, or as part of an agreed scheme to return acreage in 
stages to the public authorities. They also set forth consid-
erations for dispute settlement by a third-party authority 
(see section 4.11, “Disputes: Anticipating and Managing 
Them”).
Licenses: Exploration. Most exploration licenses have a 
short term relative to a mining license: an initial period in 
the range of two to four years may well be followed by sub-
sequent (“repeat”) extension periods of two to four years, 
giving the licensee a total period in the range of 10 to 
12 years. This amount of time is generally considered neces-
sary or reasonable to allow for the identification and subse-
quent proof of an economic deposit that is viable for 
development. Some states grant exclusive licenses that will 
cover any and all minerals discovered.48 Other states grant 
licenses only for prespecified minerals. In these cases, differ-
ent companies may have licenses for different minerals on 
the same tract of land. However, the latter approach can 
result in conflicts of interest as different license holders may 
be permitted to explore on the same land area.
A fundamental goal of an exploration license is to ensure 
that exploration does in fact take place and, further, that a 
flow of information is delivered to the granting authority, 
the state. License holders are therefore given the right to 
search for, or exploit, minerals on the basis of use. Typically, 
a license holder will lose provisions and rights under the 
license if the area is not developed. This is to ensure that 
mineral rights holders do not simply obtain the rights and 
then hold them for speculative purposes. ‘A “use it or lose 
it” approach can be implemented through a variety of 
mechanisms such as work requirements and obligations, 
time-based mandatory relinquishment of a portion of the 
license area, or annual rental payments for holding a license 
area that progressively increase over time.
The need to promote exploration activity can enter into 
the way other provisions are drafted in the exploration 
license. It may be necessary to define the content of a work 
program in a flexible manner, because the licensees will 
seek to do more work in areas that have proven to be prom-
ising and less in areas that have been found to be less pro-
spective. There are, however, limits to the flexibility a 
government will typically offer. Minimum expenditures 
should, for example, be nonnegotiable. Exploration expen-
ditures should be primarily for substantive and verifiable 
exploration work, rather than for large overheads or indi-
rect cost allocations. Alternatively, a government could 
impose progressively increasing land rental or holding fees, 
which raise the cost of holding the license area each year. 
Licensees will retain land they consider highly prospective 
but will relinquish less promising land.
Another key principle is that exploration license holders 
should contribute to a flow of data to the state on the prog-
ress of their geological activities. They may be required to 
provide an annual summary report of their findings for land 
that they continue to hold. They may also be required to 
provide full details of their exploration work and findings 
and their interpretation of the exploration data for land that 
is handed back from the license area. Such information 
received by the government is usually kept confidential 
until the license is surrendered. Then it can be made public. 
Termination provisions should apply in the event that com-
panies fail to meet minimum expenditure requirements or 
to provide required exploration information.
In addition, license holders are normally required to 
restore any land that is disturbed during exploration. 
Penalties or sanctions typically apply to companies that fail 
to comply. In cases where the license is surrendered or ter-
minated, an in-migration management plan and a resettle-
ment and compensation plan is also mandated; these 
stipulations are particularly important in the mining sector. 
A full-fledged environmental impact assessment (EIA) is 
not generally required for exploration activities, but govern-
ments may require that a scoping study of an EIA be pre-
pared.49 In most of these factors just described, there are 
strong parallels with the practices found in the petroleum 
sector.
Licenses: Exploitation. Before any mining license is 
issued to an applicant company, there needs to be a bank-
able feasibility study,50 along with the necessary environ-
mental and social assessments and management and 
mitigation plans. There also needs to be a mine financing 
plan to demonstrate that the mine can be financed. In prac-
tice, there may be variations in approach. In small states 
where licenses for large-scale mines may be issued only once 
every few years, the government may require that a bankable 
feasibility study be completed and submitted with the license 
application. However, states with very large mining sectors 
and many mining license applications each year may issue 
the mining license on the basis of an application process that 
takes into account the technical and financial capacity of the 
applicant without formally requiring the submission of a 
bankable feasibility study.
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Exploration license holders usually expect an exclusive 
right to apply for a mining exploitation license for an area 
where they have discovered minerals, and to convert that 
exploration license to a mining license subject to fulfilment 
of specific criteria required by the relevant laws and regula-
tions. Without this, they will probably not wish to take on 
the exploration risk: in the event of success, they may after 
all fail to be granted a right to develop the deposit. In any 
two-stage system, this is a source of risk, but many countries 
have taken steps to strengthen the linkage between explora-
tion and mining rights in their laws. In Chile, Argentina, 
Mexico, Mongolia and Madagascar it comes close to being 
automatic access to a mining right for the licensee in its 
exploration area. Demonstration of the existence of a com-
mercial deposit or of technical and financial capability to 
develop it become of little or no importance as criteria for 
granting a mining license.
The initial term for exploitation licenses is generally 
10–30 years for large to very large deposits—shorter if the 
deposit will be mined out in a shorter period—with one or 
possibly two extensions depending on the size of the 
ore body (Martin and Park 2010). In the Centre for 
Sustainability in Mining and Industry study (CSMI 2010) 
for the Sourcebook,51 the sample of countries using mining 
licenses found that periods varied between 25 and 40 years, 
with an option to renew. These periods could be negotiated 
depending on the estimated life of the mine. Licenses are 
generally exclusive and specify the main mineral products 
that will be or may be produced. The license will usually also 
give the license holder the exclusive right to exploit other 
minerals that may be found in the mining license area fol-
lowing approval and permits for such development.
Investors generally expect to be granted the right for the 
license holder to assign the license to another party with the 
consent of the government. Where given, this consent 
should be conditional on the new license holder meeting 
certain financial and technical capacity criteria. The govern-
ment may also make the transfer conditional on payment of 
a tax on any capital gain made from the transfer. Policy on 
this subject has been rapidly evolving, particularly in Africa. 
Mozambique provides an example. In a takeover by Rio 
Tinto of a mining project no CGT was paid. This triggered 
significant popular unrest, and as a result the law was 
changed, but not retrospectively, and was enforced in rela-
tion to similar changes in the hydrocarbons sector.52
The mining license will typically contain reporting require-
ments on a variety of matters. Licensees have to report on and 
be in compliance with the prevailing health, safety, environ-
mental, and social laws and regulations in the country. 
Similarly, license holders are expected to provide reports at 
regular intervals (monthly, quarterly, and annually) on pro-
duction, employment, sales, stockpiles, earth moving, tail-
ings, health, and safety performance. Reporting requirements 
will generally also include specifications on development and 
exploration activities as well as capital investment programs. 
If the license or contract contains provisions on reporting of 
payments made, it is important that such provisions are clear 
about when, where, and how such payments are to be made, 
as well as how much, and about the content and timing of the 
required reports. The government may also seek the power to 
require the data underlying the payment calculations or any 
operating reports the licensee is required to provide.
Termination provisions set out the circumstances under 
which the license can be terminated. Typically, this will 
include failure to construct and operate the mine as 
approved and/or frequent, repeated, uncorrected, and sub-
stantial HSE violations. There are normally provisions 
requiring the defaulting party to be notified of the breach 
and giving it an opportunity to rectify it. Termination of a 
license by a government is usually considered a last resort 
and is always open to legal challenge. For this reason, the 
termination must be material to the mining license or 
development agreement. If voluntary termination by the 
company is provided for, this provision needs to ensure that 
the circumstances are clear and that any required payments 
are set out. Closure of the mine is a stage that requires care-
ful monitoring to ensure that obligations on rehabilitation 
and reclamation have been carried out (see chapter 9).
Operating permits. In addition to the mining license 
requirement, construction and operation of a mining proj-
ect will be subject to environmental, water use, and land use 
permits (related to zoning and/or conversion from other 
uses such as forestry and agriculture) and approval for the 
commencement of production. It is likely that a bankable 
feasibility study will be required for environmental permit-
ting.53 An approved preliminary mine closure plan, which 
includes financial assurance provisions, will usually be 
required.
Mining agreements. While there are many types of legal 
agreement used in the mining industry, a mining develop-
ment agreement is commonly used to attract investment and 
develop mining projects. Usually, such agreements are pro-
vided for in a mining law and so are negotiated within the 
parameters set by such a law.54 An example is section 10 of 
the 2010 Tanzania Mining Act, which allows the minister of 
energy and minerals to enter into a development agreement 
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with the holder of a mining right, with a view to granting the 
government a free carried interest and state participation 
and financing of mining operations. The level of carried 
interest is subject to negotiation and the agreement itself is 
subject to review by the parties every five years. This is car-
ried out on the basis of a standard model provided in a set of 
the Mining (Mineral Rights) Regulations 2010. The agree-
ment may contain provisions that guarantee the fiscal stabil-
ity of the long-term mining project.
Mining development agreements may be useful in the 
case of large-scale projects, where the mining company may 
have to set up appropriate infrastructure that might attend 
not only to the needs of the mining project itself but also 
those of the local community or of other economic sectors 
(collateral use of the infrastructure by third parties with 
nondiscriminatory tariffs and creation of development cor-
ridors). On a broader view, mining development agree-
ments may ensure more flexibility to deal with specific 
projects. If the adoption of mining development agree-
ments is intended, it is recommended that in drafting them 
they take into account the model text prepared by the 
International Bar Association (IBA 2011), the Model Mining 
Development Agreement (MMDA) (see box 4.7).
Mining agreements can be controversial where the law 
is characterized by elements that are no longer regarded as 
good practice. An example is the Malawi Mines and 
Minerals Act of 1981, which authorized the responsible 
minister on behalf of the government to enter into mining 
agreements. Extensive discretionary power was vested in 
the minister, such as the power to waive or vary many of 
the provisions of the act as he or she saw fit or to have the 
final say in matters in dispute without further appeal. The 
minister was not required to act on or seek advice and did 
not have to set forth grounds on which decisions should 
be made. It was therefore possible for almost all impor-
tant matters to be regulated, including elements of the 
fiscal regime to be addressed in a mining agreement, 
through a special regime created for a particular project. 
This approach would now be unusual, because modern 
mining laws tend to limit the scope of discretionary pow-
ers and—where discretion is required—make their exer-
cise subject to clear criteria and frequently to advice from 
a statutory body such as a mining advisory council. 
Discretion is typically time bound and decisions are open 
to review by an aggrieved party through independent 
review procedures.
The era of ad hoc mining agreements negotiated between 
individual mining companies and a (capacity-challenged) 
state has been replaced by one in which generally applicable 
provisions of laws are the dominant rule-setting mecha-
nism. In many cases, mining laws are still complemented by 
different kinds of mining contracts, but these tend to be 
standardized and nonnegotiable. They can, for example, 
provide the investor with stabilization of the fiscal and legal 
regime.
The adoption of a mining development agreement may 
not be required. The mining law could well stipulate that 
local benefit, procurement, infrastructure, and other con-
cerns of the government be attached to the mining license 
itself. In South Africa, the mining licenses set out detailed 
requirements that would make a separate development 
agreement of doubtful relevance. However, South Africa is 
Box 4.7 Model Mining and Development Agreement
In an interesting experiment, a group of mining law-
yers analyzed about 60 mining agreements and pro-
duced a model mining development agreement, or 
MMDA. This project identified clauses that were 
clearly written and that reflected a reasonable mea-
sure of balance between the interests of the host state 
and the interests of investors. The aim of the project 
was to identify clauses that constitute a form of inter-
national best practice in regard to mining agreements. 
The MMDA project sought to provide solutions for 
states with gaps in their mining codes; clauses from 
the MMDA could be included in supplementary pri-
vate agreements on an ad hoc basis. The result is a 
collection of clauses that are representative of the kind 
of matters that would typically need to be addressed 
in an agreement for a mining project. The MMDA 
aims to provide a guide for drafters covering such 
 matters as fiscal terms, tenure, rights and obligations, 
and community and sustainable development. The 
MMDA envisages a series of options that will assist 
the parties in a negotiation to identify the options that 
are best for them.
The final text and explanatory materials are available 
at the Sourcebook website: http://www.eisourcebook 
. org/2425 _TheIBAModelMiningDevelopmentAgreement 
 MMDA Project.html.
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an established mining country, and a different approach 
may suit a country establishing a mining regime for a new 
industry. If they are required, or thought valuable in lessen-
ing political risk or financial risk for the investor or to 
address site specific issues, the following guidelines may be 
noted.55
Filling Gaps and Making Clarifications. Well-designed min-
ing agreements can (in situations where the laws and regula-
tions are incomplete or poorly drafted) be used to fill gaps, 
clarify ambiguities and uncertainties, or resolve differing 
interpretations. However, where there is a satisfactory mod-
ern legal and fiscal regime, agreements should not be used to 
define licensing conditions, environmental and social pro-
tection requirements, or fiscal terms—these should all be set 
by the law. Five practices that should be avoided in design-
ing a mining development agreement are identified and 
briefly discussed in box 4.8.
Contentious Issues. While laws and regulations may specify 
regulatory requirements, the procedures by which they are 
applied can also be very important. Mining agreements 
can also be used to spell out the details of procedures 
regarding actions that have potentially significant finan-
cial implications or risks for both the investor (such as 
expropriation and cancellation or suspension of a license) 
and the government (such as abandonment, closure, 
and reclamation). In this vein, agreements can also spell 
out more detail on force majeure and dispute resolution 
procedures.
Benefit Sharing. The management and mitigation of envi-
ronmental and social risks should be a matter of regulatory 
compliance and enforcement. In contrast, site-specific 
issues related to how a mining operation can support 
national and local economic development involve develop-
ing a shared understanding among government, the mining 
operator, and (for local impacts) the community regarding 
matters such as targets for or minimum levels of (1) employ-
ment and procurement for the economy as a whole and (2) 
employment and training for the local community, com-
munity programs, community infrastructure, and social 
capital development. A mining agreement can be used for 
the investor to provide and government and the community 
to receive commitments in this regard and might also cover 
the use of foundations funded by the company.
Government Commitments. A mining agreement can also 
provide site-specific commitments by the government to 
the investor and/or community of actions that the govern-
ment will take. This could include benefit-sharing actions 
(for example government support for mine-related voca-
tional training programs or small business training pro-
grams) or assurances for investors that are not in the 
law—such as tax stabilization clauses if the government is 
prepared to make such a concession.
Box 4.8 Practices to Avoid
At least five practices should be avoided, and if they are 
present in mining development agreements they 
should be treated as a source of significant concern.
1. Fiscal terms: Mining agreements that include ﬁscal 
terms that are more favorable to the investor than 
the ﬁscal terms in the law
2. “Most-favored investor” provision: Mining agree-
ments that include a “most-favored investor” provision, 
entitling the company to any beneﬁts subsequently 
granted to another investor
3. Extension to other areas: Mining agreements that 
contain provisions for their own extension to cover 
new areas, a particularly bad practice when the 
terms are potentially unfavorable to government 
(Sierra Leone had a bad example of this.)
4. Long-lived exploration rights: Mining agree-
ments that provide license holders with long-lived 
exploration rights (such as rights lasting longer 
than a decade) and that do not require substantial 
work activity or costs for holding land—so that the 
license holder can “bank the land” for its own ben-
eﬁt, thereby denying the possibility of mineral 
development that could beneﬁt the nation as a 
whole
5. Land banking: Mining agreements that tie up very 
large amounts of land relative to the size of 
the area to be mined during the expected life of the 
mine—which again has the effect of enabling 
the license holder to bank the land for its own 
beneﬁt
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Infrastructure. An important role for mining agreements can 
be to address site-specific infrastructure issues such as power 
supply and the provision and operation of roads, railways, 
and ports for transport of mining inputs and products. The 
approach used may vary according to circumstances, so this 
is a matter for negotiation between the government and the 
investor leading to an agreement on key issues such as who 
pays for constructing the infrastructure (mining investor or 
government) and whether it is dedicated to the mine or if it 
will support broader economic development—and if the 
latter how it will be operated and managed and how user 
charges will be determined.
Other Matters Requiring Consensus. Beyond infrastructure, 
mining agreements can address other site-specific matters 
requiring consensus between government and company 
such as
 ■ information sharing by the mining company beyond 
reporting requirements in the law and regulations (for 
example projections of expected tax payments; and
 ■ accounting rules to be used for taxation purposes.
Shareholder Agreements. In situations where the state has a 
share in an otherwise privately owned mining company, 
good practice is for a shareholder agreement to be used 
to spell out arrangements, obligations, and authorities of 
the different shareholders and management. Special 
care in drafting such agreements is of paramount impor-
tance so as to clearly protect the state participating 
interests.
4.7 THE AWARD OF CONTRACTS AND 
LICENSES
Objectives, constraints, and context
Typically, awards are made by a government authority on 
behalf of the state for the exclusive right to explore and, if 
certain conditions are satisfied, to exploit any commercial 
discovery. The objectives in designing the award process are 
to find the best candidate (for example, the most efficient 
explorer and developer); to maximize the potential reve-
nues as a result of the award; and to avoid any distortion of 
incentives to perform.
Contract or license award decisions should logically 
emerge from the overarching EI sector policy objectives 
listed in section 4.4. As a priority, the following policy 
determinations should be made: (1) whether or not to 
explore and develop the EI sector, (2) at what pace the EI 
sector should be developed (if the answer to the first ques-
tion is an affirmative), and (3) whether or not the private 
sector should participate. Very few states choose not to 
explore, given their development needs and the revenue 
potential of the petroleum or mining sector in the event of 
success.56 States, however, may be concerned about the 
pace of exploration and development activity because of 
their capacity to absorb the revenues (see the discussion in 
chapter 7), infrastructure constraints, or social and envi-
ronmental risks.
In designing and/or conducting a licensing round, sev-
eral government authorities are likely to be involved, with 
one designated as the lead authority. It will face a number of 
constraints, both external and internal. Geology and price 
expectations, each critical to investor interest, tend to fall 
into the first category; there is not a great deal that the 
authorities can do about them. Some actions are possible, 
however. If uncertainty about geology is a factor, a govern-
ment can prepare comprehensive information packages 
based on existing data and the possible acquisition of lim-
ited new data along with their interpretation. Good practice 
encourages this.
New data, such as seismic or aeromagnetic data (see 
box 4.9), might be acquired at the government’s expense, 
through donor support, or on a speculative basis by private 
investors or seismic contractors acting on the government’s 
behalf and reimbursed through data sales. Depending on its 
nature and value, the data might be made freely available to 
potential investors, sold to interested parties, or its purchase 
may in some cases be made mandatory as a condition for 
participation in the licensing round.
With respect to price expectations, governments may, if 
circumstances allow flexibility on timing, choose periods of 
rising resource prices to launch a licensing round. Such 
periods are, however, likely to be periods of maximum 
competition among states for investor interest.
Internal constraints (matters over which the govern-
ment might be expected to have control) will also have a 
major bearing on licensing prospects and include issues of 
macroeconomic and political stability as well as the types of 
legal, contractual, regulatory, institutional, and fiscal 
regimes a government chooses to adopt (see chapter 6 and 
chapter 9).
Conditions for success
Turning from contextual considerations to the licensing pro-
cess itself, a number of conditions have been demonstrated 
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as critical to success. The first is an environment where there 
is competition among potential investors. If this can be 
achieved, it can potentially result in the best outcome for 
the state.
Competition among potential investors can also help 
offset some of the asymmetry regarding access to informa-
tion that tends to disadvantage governments in licensing. 
Investors are often better informed about a state’s geologi-
cal prospects than their government counterparts. This is 
particularly true in the early stages of EI sector develop-
ment when data-sharing requirements have yet to be 
established. While problematic in the case of one-on-one 
bilateral negotiations over contract awards, this informa-
tional disadvantage is largely nullified when informed 
investors are made to compete against each other (Cotula 
2010, 18).
The second condition critical to success is institutional 
capacity. Properly preparing a licensing round and evaluat-
ing potential investors and their contract proposals requires 
sophisticated professional technical, legal, and commercial 
skills. These skills need to be acquired by host-government 
authorities responsible for the contract award process. 
Pending their development, the authorities are generally 
encouraged to engage support from outside experts.
Award procedures
Transparency is at the core of good practice when it comes 
to award procedures. Whether acting individually or as par-
ticipants in a competitive bidding round, license applicants—
on a nondiscriminatory basis—should be made fully aware 
at the right time of the procedures to be followed. They 
should also be provided access to all available data, whether 
on a free or purchase basis, and be informed of all applicable 
legal and fiscal regimes (including model contracts). 
Documentation should also provide assurances that areas 
offered for license are currently unlicensed and that proper 
authority exists for their licensing.57 With the possible 
exception of specific technical data, this information should 
be available in the public domain. All of this reduces the risk 
that one investor or consortium may be unfairly favored 
over another.
Box 4.9 Geodata
“Effective acquisition, maintenance and dissemination 
of geodata can act as a magnet to investment and can 
enable governments to understand better their natural 
resources in order to manage them most effectively” 
(BGS International 2102).
The successful discovery of natural resources 
requires significant effort at the exploration stage. It 
also requires the application of sophisticated explora-
tion and exploitation technology. To attract foreign 
investment, a host government should try to limit 
information uncertainties and asymmetries associated 
with its resource endowments.
Many developing states lack the geosciences infor-
mation (geodata) necessary to undertake detailed land-
use planning. Because governments are faced with 
budget constraints and pressures to provide critical 
services to their citizens, geodata is poorly maintained 
and hard to access. Many governments find it difficult 
to justify the collection of geodata when the payoffs are 
generally long-term in comparison with the country’s 
immediate spending needs.
Geoscience information can be collected on an ad 
hoc basis, resulting from a “lucky” discovery by arti-
sanal miners or from more systematic, complex, and 
large-scale efforts. The quantity of this information 
(whether it is produced by a state or private investor) 
depends ultimately on the benefits and costs perceived 
by either party.
If all of the benefits are not internalized by the gov-
ernment, or if the returns associated with the collection 
of geoscientific data are prohibitively difficult to calcu-
late (due to perceived high levels of political, technical, 
or security risks), a state may be left with less geoscien-
tific information than it needs for efficient develop-
ment. A state should identify those policies required to 
ensure that a sufficient amount of geosciences infor-
mation is produced.
A sufficient quantity and quality of geodata are 
needed to ensure that a host state earns an equitable 
portion of its natural resource wealth and to enable 
private investors to assess the geological prospects of a 
license area. In these situations, the state does not need 
expertise in assessing the value of the license area, 
because the competitive tension created by a properly 
managed auction process should ensure that the license 
is fairly valued. For example, the government of Papua 
New Guinea has been skilled at utilizing such data col-
lection to promote investment in its EI sector.
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It is desirable, and now increasingly common practice, 
that applications for awards should be prequalified to 
ensure that bidders have the financial and technical capacity 
to undertake a substantial exploration or mine development 
program. This also allows the government to eliminate bid-
ders who are not serious and to safeguard any special inter-
ests it might have, perhaps to reserve a proportion of the 
areas on offer to local oil and gas companies. Where geo-
logical information is limited, or not immediately encour-
aging, governments may decide to adopt an open door, 
first-come, first-served licensing procedure or direct nego-
tiation with a limited number of prequalified companies. 
Where significant geological data is available and investor 
interest is high, competitive auction is generally considered 
the best option.
Criteria for award
Once the credentials of potential investors have been estab-
lished, good practice favors setting a limited number of 
clearly specified criteria for the award of a license. Arguably, 
the most important of these is the investor’s work commit-
ment, which should be specified in both physical terms and 
financial (minimum) expenditure terms.
In petroleum contract awards, the work program is 
generally considered to be controlling and it must be per-
formed even if resultant expenditures exceed the mini-
mum.58 In mining contracts awards, it is not always 
possible to be very specific about the work to be per-
formed, and therefore giving priority to work programs 
may not be appropriate. In most petroleum licensing 
procedures, the work program and expenditure commit-
ments are combined with financial and fiscal variables 
(such as bonuses, royalties, or production shares). For 
reasons discussed in chapter 6, the last of these is probably 
preferable on efficiency grounds.
Sometimes a third variable may be added, but where 
awards are based on more than one variable, applicants or 
bidders need to be told the relative weights the authorities 
have assigned to each variable for selection purposes. 
Ideally, the variables selected should be relatively easily 
assessed not only by the authorities but also by observers of 
the award process. Adding variables related to contributions 
to local infrastructure and or local benefit—whether by 
direct participation in the award or through commitments 
to local suppliers—can make bid evaluation difficult even if 
the potential political and developmental appeal of such 
variables is strong.
Oil and gas
Method of award. In designing a method of award of 
rights, several overall objectives are likely to predominate: 
the method needs to be consistent with the government’s 
overall policy for the hydrocarbons sector; it needs to 
encourage participation by both foreign and, ideally, 
domestic participants; it should favor selection of the com-
pany or consortium best able to do the job; it needs to deter 
collusion among bidders who might otherwise try to keep 
their bids low; and it needs to provide some deterrence 
against political and lobbying pressures that might work to 
distort allocation by favoring some over others (Tordo, 
Johnston, and Johnston 2010, 34–37). The method also 
needs to take into account the available technical and 
administrative capacity in the host state and adapt the 
design accordingly.
There is no standard method of allocation of rights that 
could be applied by any government in any circumstance. 
However, there are two principal methods used by govern-
ments to allocate rights to explore for and exploit oil and 
gas: (1) the open-door method, by which rights are 
awarded at any time in a contractual form as a result of 
negotiations between the government and interested inves-
tors, following solicited or unsolicited expressions of inter-
est in specified areas, and (2) rounds of award. The latter 
method can be subdivided into two categories: administra-
tive procedure and auction. Under administrative award, 
rights are allocated according to a process of administra-
tive discretion on the basis of a set of criteria defined by the 
government. Under the auction method, rights are allo-
cated to the highest bidder. In practice, most countries use 
a combination of these systems, since country-specific 
objectives and constraints will change over time, as will 
exogenous factors such as the level and trend of oil and gas 
prices. Moreover, the areas over which rights are granted 
will have diverse characteristics, including mature, fron-
tier, or deepwater areas, requiring more flexible allocation 
policies.
Open door. The open-door method presents transparency 
risks. Criteria for award are often not predefined or known 
to market participants. The acreage on offer may be com-
pletely unexplored or frontier in character, meaning that 
little or no information is available to the parties, creating 
the risk of major errors of judgment. The government usu-
ally retains significant discretionary power and flexibility 
over the manner in which it awards rights. There is less com-
petition than in awards made following a competitive 
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round. Corruption is very possible. However, Tordo, 
Johnston, and Johnston (2010) argue that such systems can 
“be made more transparent through the definition of clear 
award criteria, the publication of negotiation results and the 
use of external oversight bodies.”
In the distant past, the award of rights by direct negotia-
tions was common, but the trend among host states has 
long since favored some form of competitive bidding 
(Duval et al. 2009, 37).
Competitive bidding. The award of rights in a round of 
competitive bidding has a greater potential for transpar-
ency. Unlike auctions, allocation in rounds does not divert 
significant sums of money away from exploration work. 
However, when administrative procedures are dominant, 
award criteria can be vaguely stated or not published at all. 
To counter this, the United Kingdom makes public its 
award criteria and more recently has published informa-
tion on the scoring that is attached to each criterion. The 
United Kingdom also awards rights on the basis of work 
programs proposed by the bidders and publishes those of 
successful applicants. Unsuccessful applicants can request 
detailed feedback on the evaluation of their applications. 
Where discretion is involved, it requires a level of techni-
cal capacity and resources among government officials if 
they are to evaluate the proposals properly. Where there 
are capacity constraints this is not likely to be an attractive 
option.
By contrast, the use of auctions can ensure that rights are 
awarded to the highest bidder. Auctions offer the advantage 
of conveying information about the value given to blocks by 
bidders and which bidder values them most. For areas that 
are underexplored or frontier in character, or where infor-
mation if very limited, this can be a significant benefit.
Elements that can be bid on include signature bonus 
payments, work programs, royalties and various forms of 
profit sharing, “infrastructure-linked,” or a combination of 
some of these.
 ■ If a signature bonus is the parameter, then the investor 
that offers the highest up-front cash payment is most 
likely to be granted rights to the area on offer. Whether 
or not hydrocarbons are discovered, this offers a conve-
nient source of early revenue to the government. It is 
unusual for a government to depend solely on a single 
parameter such as this when it may be combined with 
royalties and corporate income tax to capture the eco-
nomic rent.
 ■ If bidding is based on work programs, it will be focused 
on exploration activity, and the investor will bid to carry 
out a specific set of activities within a specified time. 
Like bonus bidding, it represents a cash outflow for the 
investor prior to a discovery, but by contrast exploration 
costs are usually recoverable and tax deductible. The 
program would normally contain some flexibility to 
allow for new information that results from performance 
of the work commitments.
 ■ If royalty is taken as the main parameter, the investor 
that offers the highest rate will receive the rights to 
explore for and develop the resource in the area on offer. 
Such payments are conditional on future production 
and therefore on a commercially viable discovery. Since 
no large up-front payment is required, this method of 
bidding is more attractive to smaller investors than cash 
bidding.
 ■ If bidding is based on profit sharing, the investor who 
offers to pay the highest share of potential future profits 
is granted the rights for the area on offer. Like royalty 
bidding, this is an offer to pay that is conditional on dis-
covery, development, and production of hydrocarbons, 
and also requires no up-front payment.
 ■ Linkage of access to resources with infrastructure invest-
ment has become more popular in recent years: so-called 
bundled bidding. For emerging petroleum countries, 
including many in Africa, that have significant infra-
structure needs and limited public expenditure capacity, 
the bidding parameters could include the improvement 
of local infrastructure related to the area where the proj-
ect will be developed. However, this approach does pres-
ent the risk of not selecting the most appropriate investor 
qualified for the effective exploration of the area to be 
awarded.
The literature on methods of award of rights tends to 
dwell on the element of discretion and its potential for cre-
ating uncertainty. This wariness may be exaggerated. 
Typically, a state will make a standard offer to all comers but 
in some cases it will be possible to negotiate or bid on quite 
crucial elements of the bargain. In practice, this use of dis-
cretion in making the final award can be valuable for the 
host state, because it may allow the state to choose an inves-
tor that is more likely to fit the government’s social, indus-
trial, or environmental policies. Tordo, Johnston, and 
Johnston (2010, 16) recognize too that “the award of future 
licenses may be a powerful way for a government to influ-
ence the behavior of existing investors.” Discretionary 
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power in this respect has the potential to act as a carrot or 
incentive to existing investors to cooperate with other poli-
cies that may be quite distinct from allocation ones (and 
without which the state’s ability to persuade a reluctant 
investor may well be much less).
In a comparative study of discretion in oil and gas 
regimes, Terence Daintith (2006, 2) notes, “Discretion 
appears most significantly as a way of relaxing rules which 
might lead to the loss of title in the absence of development 
or production,” pointing to the examples of Australia and 
the United States. Rules and standards for government 
behavior can become too strict in some regimes, and discre-
tion can act as a way of addressing the resulting rigidity. 
However, in countries where there are few checks and bal-
ances, such as through legislatures, courts, and civil society 
groups, the arguments for reducing the scope of discretion 
in the award of rights are much stronger.
A different set of issues arises with respect to the award 
of rights to companies for the acquisition of data (see 
“Objectives, Constraints, and Context” under section 4.7). 
Many governments seek to reduce geological risk and 
increase competition among potential investors by allocat-
ing these limited rights to a single company for a very lim-
ited period. Such technical information is expensive to 
obtain and has commercial value. Governments therefore 
typically allow the company to sell it in packages to poten-
tial investors as a way of recovering costs and making a 
profit. Access to the data is, of course, shared with the 
government.
Joint bidding. In the oil and gas industry, irrespective 
of the kind of contract that a host state intends to offer, it 
is very common for companies intending to submit a bid 
to join in a consortium. This is a helpful way of securing 
the participation of smaller companies, as has been 
found in Australia, Brazil, and the United Kingdom. By 
making a joint application the parties seek to reduce 
their individual risk, to share the application costs, and to 
set down the principles on which they plan to work 
together. The joint venture allows them to pool diverse 
strengths such as financial, technical, and commercial 
capability as well as good connections with the host gov-
ernment and a track record in the country or region. This 
joint approach leads to the conclusion of an agree-
ment governing the relationship during the application 
period: a joint bidding agreement. If the bid is successful, 
this early form of joint venture agreement will be the pre-
cursor to the joint operating agreement (discussed in 
chapter 5.3).
The mechanics of such agreements are described in the 
following material. However, some governments take the 
view that joint bidding should be discouraged and even 
prohibited, because it reduces the number of competitors 
and may encourage collusion. Angola, the United States, 
and the República Bolivariana de Venezuela have taken this 
approach, as had Norway until a few years ago.
If investors are to conclude a joint bidding agreement, 
the parties need to disclose and discuss what each can offer 
the joint venture. Exchange of information can be a sensi-
tive matter, because it may be that one party owns technical 
data likely to give the group a competitive edge in a bid. 
The parties, therefore, will require a confidentiality agree-
ment within which to have these discussions. If the bid does 
not go ahead, this can assist in dealing with the return of 
information and obligations about nondisclosure. Another 
document that the parties may consider necessary is an 
agreement that establishes an area of mutual interest. The 
agreement predates a joint bidding agreement and is a 
statement that the parties’ interests are in alignment and 
that they intend to work together to pursue joint develop-
ment opportunities if the area becomes available for 
development.
The joint bidding agreement establishes the terms on 
which the parties will make their bid. It sets out the area 
and the kind of rights that are being applied for, as well as 
a timetable, steps to be taken to prepare and submit the 
bid, and agreement on how the costs are to be allocated 
among the parties. It may well prohibit any party from 
submitting a bid for hydrocarbon rights in the area sepa-
rately from the group. It also sets out the basic terms on 
which a JOA will be entered into if hydrocarbon rights are 
eventually awarded to the joint venture. It can be more or 
less detailed and cover, in outline at least, many or only a 
few of the topics that a JOA would normally cover (voting 
and withdrawal mechanisms, for example). Given the 
time it takes for a JOA to be fully negotiated and con-
cluded, the joint bidding agreement may, if the bid is suc-
cessful, prove to be the basis for the parties’ initial 
operations covering several years. It is, nevertheless, an 
agreement concluded with a view to securing, rather than 
managing, the contract rights and so is likely to have an 
interim character.
In principle, it would not be impossible for the parties to 
proceed with their bid application without such a joint 
agreement. However, the investment of some extra time 
and money over that required to make the bid itself is usu-
ally thought worthwhile in defining in detail the terms that 
will govern the new relationship.
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Mining
Method of award. The procedure for allocation of min-
eral rights is typically based either on a noncompetitive 
process (sometimes called “first come, first served” or 
“free entry”) or a competitive (“tender”) process. Both are 
commonly found within a single state but not used 
simultaneously.
In the noncompetitive method, the party that first 
applies for rights in a particular area has a priority position 
to be granted rights to explore, provided it satisfies some 
administrative requirements. This has typically been com-
mon for exploration licenses due to a lack of geological 
information and correspondingly higher risk and lower 
investor interest. Even where information is available, the 
likelihood of a large discovery may be small. This approach 
has the advantage of being simple to administer with online 
applications being possible.
The second method is often used when a government 
invites bids for areas it has offered already and on which it 
provides more assured information about potential. The 
risk is therefore lower than for greenfield acreage and allows 
investors to make more informed decisions. It tends to be 
used in situations where geological data is available from 
exploration programs and where there are strong indica-
tions of interest from more than one potential applicant. 
This may occur if licenses are released by state companies 
(in connection with a divestment program, for example) or 
where mineral rights have been relinquished or revoked. It 
is harder to apply to greenfield sites about which there is 
little information or where such information needs to be 
reviewed and confirmed. The main difference between the 
two methods lies in the application process rather than in 
the eligibility criteria used or the terms and conditions. It 
lies in “the route followed to acquire the mineral right” 
(CMSI 2010, 4). Any method of allocation of mineral rights 
should be subject to continuous review and assessment, 
because lessons are learned from experience and incorpo-
rated into future practice.
There is a body of literature that argues for competitive 
bidding in preference to the first-come, first-served method 
(for example, Collier 2010, chap. 5). It usually notes that 
this method is very common when awarding rights for oil 
and gas activity but less so in the mining sector. Yet in both 
cases the value of natural resources could be captured for 
society by encouraging competitive bidding. A UN study 
notes, “Transparent and competitive concessioning of 
known mineral assets can help” in setting a fair mar-
ket value on the resource (UN 2011, 95). Others argue, 
“The technical nature and risks of finding resources in the 
two industries and in the different economic and risk pro-
files” between hard-rock mining and hydrocarbons provide 
a justification for favoring the first-come, first-served 
approach in awarding mining rights (Haddow 2014).
In some cases, a government may elect to grant exemp-
tions from either of these methods or to give a community 
a preferential right to mineral rights in its area. It may also 
decide to make an award of rights on a direct basis with an 
investor in exchange for infrastructure. This kind of bun-
dled deal offers potential for a wider development in the 
country concerned and beyond. This is addressed in chapter 
9, and for a further discussion see Stanley and Mikhaylova 
(2011).
A delicate feature in any regime for allocating rights is 
the amount of discretion reserved to a government in rela-
tion to an award. If this is not narrowly drawn, there is 
potential for an abuse of power, and this will certainly be 
treated as a significant risk factor by potential investors. 
Appeal to judicial review is less likely when provisions for 
actions by government officials are couched in discretionary 
terms, rather than, say, as duties imposed on such officials. 
In the Ghana Minerals and Mining Act of 2006 (section 
5(3)) a provision was introduced that required the minister 
for lands and natural resources to provide written reasons 
when an application is not granted or the application is 
granted over only a part of the land applied for. This was 
designed to ensure transparent use of discretion and to give 
comfort to applicants for mineral rights.
Nondiscrimination is an important principle in making 
any award of rights. It is important in countering any 
attempt to favor domestic mining companies or state-
owned mining enterprises. In Western Australia, the min-
ing regulations address this by a common device. Section 
57(4) of the Mining Act 1978 states the following:
[T]he Minister, may on the application of any person, 
after receiving a recommendation of the warden . . . 
grant to that person a license to be known as an explo-
ration license.
Usually an application for an exploration right is accom-
panied by a program of work. Over time a new program will 
be required as progress is made and greater knowledge 
acquired. Performance of the program will normally be a 
condition for renewal of the license. In Chile, a failure to 
establish this condition of a work program has meant 
that little greenfield exploration has been carried out. 
Relinquishment is also included as a condition.
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It should also be noted that in states where minerals 
belong to the landowner, negotiation of payment of royal-
ties will be the typical means by which an investor will 
acquire mineral rights. Where the land cadastre is in tradi-
tional ownership, even though the mining cadastre (the 
subsurface rights) is usually owned by the state, it will be 
essential for the investor to develop a constructive working 
relationship with the local community through its leaders. 
About 80 percent of the surface land in Ghana, for example, 
is in traditional ownership.
In the CSMI (2010) study on allocation of mineral rights, 
the authors identified eight suboptimal practices:
 ■ Discriminatory practices and overuse of discretion by 
government and officials
 ■ Lack of clarity and transparency in the processes and 
procedures for acquiring mining rights
 ■ Absence of consistency in the terms and conditions 
applied to mining rights
 ■ Disregard for the rule of law by both government and 
investors
 ■ Poor governance with regard to rights and obligations of 
mining right holders
 ■ Inadequate institutional frameworks for management of 
the mining sector
 ■ No provision for social and environmental impacts of 
mining
 ■ Inequitable distribution of benefits from mining
To counter these, five principles of good practice ought 
to be applied to both the competitive and noncompetitive 
application/administrative processes, in their view. The 
first of these, equality before the law, requires a framework 
that ensures nondiscrimination to all applicants, whether 
local or foreign, based on predefined eligibility criteria; 
compliance requirements and titleholder obligation; pub-
lic disclosure of application (and related consultation with 
landowners and affected communities); standard terms 
and conditions (covering duration, transferability, and 
discouragement of hoarding, for example); a transparent 
fiscal and royalty regime; and equal application of the law 
in the acquisition of mineral rights. The second overarch-
ing principle is good governance, which implies that the 
rule of law should apply to both the government and the 
investor with respect to administrative justice and proce-
dural fairness, consistency in the application of the law, 
clarity of administrative procedures, guided discretionary 
powers, security of tenure, access to courts, and compli-
ance with the law.
Three further principles were social and environmental 
protection (reflected in the compilation of environmental 
and social impact assessments and implementation of good 
labor practice and observance of health and safety laws); 
equitable distribution of benefits (including charters to 
ensure benefits filter through to society as a whole); and 
institutional framework for implementation (well-defined 
responsibilities and capacity for effective management sys-
tems, including targets, performance measuring tools, and a 
computerized cadastre system).
First come, first served. The traditional approach to the 
allocation of mineral rights—whether licenses or contracts— 
was the first-come, first-served approach. The availability of 
this method was thought to incentivize companies to make 
an application for mining activity, and it was not necessarily 
biased in favor of any party. Examples include Australia, the 
United States, and some Latin American and many African 
countries. However, over time a number of states have 
adopted the competitive bidding approach. Examples of this 
shift are Algeria and Tanzania.
The changing trend is generally due to more geological 
data becoming available and an increasing interest among 
companies in obtaining exploration rights than in past 
decades. Thus, the noncompetitive approach has come 
under review in a number of states, particularly where more 
than one company is applying for a license for the same 
tract of land.59
As always, the key issue is not whether a country should 
become part of a trend or not but whether its own circum-
stances merit this approach or the alternative or some 
hybrid. In China, a mixed approach is adopted: auctions are 
allowed for areas previously explored but first come, first 
served is adopted for unexplored areas. If the state’s capacity 
to process applications is low, it may find that the first-
come, first-served approach results in a very large number 
of applications (several thousand in Mongolia, for exam-
ple), with the effect of choking its ability to assess them 
properly. Some applications may also be purely speculative, 
and the government may decide that they are not to be 
encouraged. Mongolia provides plenty of examples of this, 
given that its Minerals Law of 1997 did not include a review 
of the applicant’s technical and financial qualifications. 
Again, China provides a contrast: its version of the first-
come, first-served approach included a requirement of 
proof of technical qualifications, a technical exploration 
plan, and proof of funding.60
The noncompetitive approach will continue to be appro-
priate for areas that are largely unexplored. However, in 
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areas where good geological data is available and where 
there are strong indications of interest from more than one 
potential applicant, governments are more likely to offer 
licenses on a competitive bidding basis. The key is to ensure 
that rights are offered on a fair, transparent, and timely 
basis. It should also allow for dispute settlement processes 
in the event that disputes arise.
In the face of allegations that this method leads to a 
hoarding of rights, some have proposed the adoption of a 
“use-it-or-lose-it” regime, whereby the licensee has to 
explore, mine, or relinquish its rights.
Competitive bidding for mineral rights. Where depos-
its have been previously explored and new development and 
production rights are being offered, competitive bidding 
should be used. Governments are encouraged to develop in 
detail their strategies for mining activity prior to bidding, 
which is in itself a positive development. There are success-
ful examples in Peru and Afghanistan.
Two examples of new development and production 
rights being offered are, first, when land is released by an 
NRC back to the government for licensing to private inves-
tors, and second, when a license holder hands back land for 
which more detailed geological data has been provided to 
the government. In both cases there may be several inves-
tors competing for the same license; in these cases only 
competitive bidding should be used (Global Witness 2008, 
11, 20). In the case that land is offered for competitive bids 
and there is only one qualified bid, that bid would, of 
course, be the winner.
Competitive tenders also become appropriate in post-
conflict and fragile states where mineral assets, including 
past operating mines, have become separated from the 
holder of prior rights. As governments strengthen their 
regulatory control and improve their knowledge of the 
resource base, the need for a competitive award of mineral 
exploration and exploitation rights grows. The Aynak cop-
per deposit in Afghanistan is an example (Stanley and 
Mikhaylova 2011, 7), and other examples can be found in 
many African postconflict countries, such as Liberia, 
Mozambique, and Sierra Leone. The existing body of geo-
logical interpretation may, however, prove to be of limited 
use for mining company applicants.
Tendering requires some upfront costs from the bidders, 
and if there is an element of administrative or political 
uncertainty, or a lack of transparency, it may fail to attract 
investors. In some countries of the former Soviet Union, the 
process has been adopted and proved time consuming and 
expensive for investors (Clark et al. 2003). Payments have 
been required, as well as higher taxes and royalties than in 
neighboring countries.
Good practice calls for a transparent competitive bidding 
process that can be accomplished by ensuring access to all 
qualified bidders and having standardized bidding docu-
ments that include (1) all available geological information, 
(2) confirmation that the land is unlicensed, (3) details of 
the applicable legal regime and procedures, and (4) full 
details of the rights that will be granted to the winning 
bidder.
Mining bidding criteria. Single bidding criteria (usually 
an upfront cash premium with staged payments) are sim-
pler to apply than multiple bidding criteria. A single bidding 
criterion can be either (1) an upfront premium or (2) the 
value of the work program to be undertaken. In either case, 
the winning bidder should submit a bankable feasibility 
study within a given time or risk forfeiting the license.
If a set of multiple bidding criteria are used, factors such 
as upfront cash payment, conditional payment, and/or 
minimum exploration expenditure can be combined. This 
can be achieved through an equation that creates a numeri-
cal value. However, any combination that includes a work 
program evaluation will involve subjective judgments on 
the part of a committee evaluating the work program. In the 
case that mining exploration is being competitively bid, it is 
quite rare that an upfront cash premium or a future pay-
ment is used, because mining companies do not see suffi-
cient value to bid such a payment. Typically, however, an 
exploration work commitment will be competitively bid. 
Relevant considerations include the following:
1. Cash bonus bidding, which is generally considered to be 
less efficient in frontier areas
2. Use of area-wide licensing, in which the government 
takes into consideration the bidders’ expressions of 
interest in other areas
3. Market segmentation, which takes into consideration the 
bidders’ technical and financial ability to pursue differ-
ent types of exploration activities (Tordo 2007)
4.8 WHY REGULATIONS ARE NECESSARY
While matters of fundamental principle will typically be 
settled in a law and be authorized by the legislature, some 
rules need to be made that build on these principles and can 
be periodically adjusted without having to go through the 
normally long process of adopting a new law. This is the 
basis for the adoption of secondary rules, called regulations.
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Regulations complement laws and contracts, filling in 
the details essential to their implementation. Typically, leg-
islation should authorize the competent authority to make 
regulations from time to time, providing the detail and 
procedures by which to implement the policy objectives for 
the EI sector and by reference to specific enabling provi-
sions of the legislation. Regulations are subsidiary instru-
ments of the EI sector legislation and should never be 
inconsistent with it.
Regulations should focus primarily on technical and 
operational matters (such as licensing procedures; contract 
area; monitoring, inspection, and control of operations; 
reports on operations; and operational standards) but may 
also include fiscal elements (such as royalty definitions, 
surface rental, fees, and fines), cost and volume audits, and/
or social and environmental requirements. In some cases, 
regulations may even specify the competent authority or 
authorities in the EI sector.61 In the area of local benefit, one 
can expect the general principles to be set out in a basic law, 
but the detail is better suited to regulations, involving spe-
cific mechanisms to achieve the law’s general objectives. 
The Mozambique Petroleum Law of 2014 and the regula-
tions it envisages illustrate this.
A failure to understand the different roles of primary and 
secondary legislation means that matters of detail may be 
dealt with in the main law—whether petroleum, mining, or 
in some countries, like Kazakhstan, in both. As knowledge 
of the EI sector grows, there will be pressure to amend the 
rules accordingly. If all matters, including essentially techni-
cal ones, are covered in a comprehensive law, the tendency 
will be to require amendments to the primary law. It will 
quickly become an unwieldy, complicated instrument, 
largely impenetrable to investors and citizens alike. A 
response to this problem is to issue guidance notes as aids 
to interpretation.
In the early stages of EI sector development, regulations 
may focus on main principles rather than detailed rules, 
leaving details to be elaborated at a later date based on 
growing EI sector experience and understanding. There are, 
however, a number of critical provisions related to resource 
management that should be recognized at the outset, 
including the right to receive all relevant information, the 
right to inspect, and the right to issue more specific rules as 
the EI sector develops.
A general trend has been for regulation to become more 
performance based under a goal-setting approach as 
opposed to prescriptive in character. The latter approach is 
reliant on the application of a rigid framework in which 
step-by-step compliance is required and inspections and 
audits are common. The former sets outcomes to be 
achieved and is more flexible about how the company meets 
the outcomes that the government is seeking. In the EI sec-
tor such an approach is becoming much more common. It 
is standard in environmental practice. It does mean that 
government needs to be clear about what outcomes it is 
seeking and how it will assess and monitor the companies. 
At its best, it can encourage companies to innovate and 
lower the cost of reaching specific outcomes by applying 
new technologies which improve performance.
Regulations in the EI sector typically fall into two major 
categories: (1) resource management and (2) health, safety, 
and environment matters.
Resource management
Regulations directed at resource management are now com-
mon practice and are vital to effective EI sector oversight 
and control. This is an area in which good practice may not 
be a sufficiently high standard to recommend, irrespective 
of the context. Rather, the best available practice may well be 
essential. These regulations generally focus on the follow-
ing: (1) regular and comprehensive reporting; (2) transfer 
of all significant data, analyses, and samples obtained in 
operations; and (3) consultation, consent, and approval 
requirements at critical stages of operations.
Typically, requirements are numerous. They include 
reporting and, where appropriate, consent or approval by 
the governmental authorities at each of the following junc-
tures in the implementation of the EI Value Chain: 
(1) reconnaissance, (2) exploration work program imple-
mentation, (3) drilling, (4) discovery, (5) appraisal, 
(6) commerciality, (7) development plan and any revisions 
thereto, (8) reservoir management and production, (9) late 
field or mine life plans, and (10) decommissioning plans.
Beyond their immediate relevance in ensuring adherence 
to good oil field practice, one can expect these regulations 
to provide vital inputs to broader policy decisions on licens-
ing, the pace of sector development, state participation, 
social and environmental safeguards, and macroeconomic 
planning.
Health, safety, and environment requirements
Regulations dealing with social and environmental concerns 
have become critically important in the management of the 
EI sector and are dealt with in more detail in chapter 9.
However, at the basic level, there exists a well-developed 
international practice on HSE standards.62 These standards 
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are reflected in state legislation or regulations and are avail-
able for adoption by newcomers to the EI sector of a par-
ticular state. As the EI sector develops, HSE regulations tend 
to become more detailed and highly prescriptive.
The current trend, however, is to move away from overly 
detailed requirements and to develop goal-setting regula-
tions. These are normally backed up by nonmandatory 
guidance notes (Miller 1991). The regulations set out the 
objectives that must be achieved, but they allow flexibility in 
the methods or equipment that companies may use to meet 
their obligations. Instead of putting all the burden on the 
regulator to decide ex ante what would count as safe and 
what would not, increasing responsibility is put on the com-
pany to convince the regulator that its plans are reasonable 
and responsible.
This goal-setting approach is also sometimes referred to 
as the internal control principle. The perceived advantages of 
the approach are that (1) it avoids the problems that inevi-
tably arise when prescriptive regulations become outdated 
because of rapidly changing and increasingly complex oper-
ating conditions and procedures, and (2) it puts responsi-
bility where action can be taken: at the company or operator 
level.63
4.9 INVESTMENT GUARANTEES: STABILIZATION
A challenge to the design of any legal and fiscal regime for 
oil, gas, or mining is created by the combination of unknowns 
at the time the contract is signed and the volatility of markets 
for resources once extracted. “Changed circumstances” is a 
familiar doctrine in international law (rebus sic stantibus), 
but it has greater than usual force in the EI sector when 
prices may rise or fall with precipitous speed, magnitude, 
and duration, with disruptive consequences for all parties. 
Governments have the legal capacity to introduce new laws 
or revise the terms of existing contracts in response to these 
and other changed circumstances. Their sovereign power to 
do so is not in question. Once an investor has taken the ini-
tial risk and proved that a commercial deposit exists, the 
allocation of risks in the original bargain shifts from the 
capital-hungry state to the investor. The resulting political 
risk of unilateral alteration of acquired rights has encouraged 
the industry practice of using stabilization instruments such 
as clauses in contracts with host governments or separate 
stability agreements.
Stabilization instruments take many forms, but the idea is 
often criticized because it appears to invite states receiving 
investment to constrain key sovereign rights. The MMDA 
section 13.2, Tax Stabilization Clause, cautions the following: 
“Stabilization Clauses are very controversial, even within the 
MMDA Working Group. Neither this generic clause nor the 
example clauses provided reflect the opinions of the Working 
Group” (IBA 2011, 89). Their target is not to stabilize mar-
kets but to limit the consequences of a political response to 
market changes (such as a very large rise in prices) or legisla-
tive actions due to other circumstances (such as a realign-
ment of domestic politics affecting foreign investment). The 
principal beneficiary of stabilization is the foreign investor, 
but the state too can benefit by acquiring a competitive 
advantage over a neighbor by including such an incentive in 
a bid to attract capital from investors that typically have a 
number of options in their portfolios.
Forms of stabilization
The majority of stabilization instruments take a contractual 
form. The practice of including clauses in mining and 
hydrocarbons agreements with host states is widespread but 
not universal. The four main kinds of stabilization clause 
are described in box 4.10.64 It is important to note that 
hybrids are common and that more than one form of stabi-
lization clause may exist in a single contract, representing a 
kind of “belt-and-braces” approach on the part of the inves-
tor. In practice, the names of particular types of clause may 
well vary from one actual contract to another, underlining 
that any classification is for guidance purposes only. 
However, the essential idea is the same: the parties to the 
agreement seek to provide contractual assurance that the 
investment terms at its core will remain the same over the 
life of the agreement.
Carve-outs. It is common for a state to insist on a narrow-
ing of the scope of a stabilization clause, so that, for exam-
ple, matters of health, safety, and environmental protection 
are sometimes expressly excluded from its scope.
Stability agreements. Some countries offer distinct stabil-
ity agreements. Chile, for example, enters into such agree-
ments for mining investments made under a concession. 
Taxes specified in the agreement, applicable to the invest-
ment, as well as customs and foreign exchange provisions for 
the payment of costs and the repatriation of profits and capi-
tal, are frozen for terms of up to 20 years. The agency is the 
Foreign Investment Committee. Ghana is another example. 
Under its Minerals and Mining Act 2006, section 48, a stabil-
ity agreement may be granted for the mining lease holder’s 
interest. This has a term of 15 years and protects the holder of 
a lease from being adversely affected by future changes in 
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Box 4.10 The Four Main Forms of Stabilization Clause
Freezing
In its strictest form, a freezing clause prohibits the host 
state from changing its laws and handcuffs the state so 
that it cannot exercise its sovereign rights to change its 
law with respect to the particular contract containing 
the stabilization clause. It may also incorporate the 
country’s laws in their entirety at the time the contract 
was signed into the particular contract creating a spe-
cial governing law.
Example: “The Government hereby undertakes 
and affirms that at no time shall the rights (and 
the full and peaceful enjoyment thereof) granted 
by it under Article [X] (Income Taxation), 
Article [X] (Royalty), and Article [X] (Other 
Payments to the Government) of this Agreement 
be derogated from or otherwise prejudiced by 
any Law or the action or inaction of the 
Government, or any official thereof, or any other 
Person whose actions or inactions are subject to 
the control of the Government. To the extent 
there is inconsistency between the [Tax Law] as 
defined in Article [X] (Taxation), the Agreement 
shall govern” (MMDA sect. 13.2 in IBA 2011).
Intangibility
This attempts to freeze the contract rather than the 
law. It prohibits unilateral changes to the investment 
agreement and requires the consent of both parties 
before any changes may be made.
Example: “The government will not without the 
agreement of the contractor exercise its legislative 
authority to amend or modify the provisions of 
this Agreement and will not take or permit any of 
its political subdivisions, agencies and instrumen-
talities to take any administrative or other action 
to prevent or hinder the Contractor from enjoy-
ing the rights accorded to it hereunder” (Model 
PSC, Mozambique 2001, art. 30.7(d) and (e)).
Rebalancing
These clauses require a renegotiation of contract terms 
in the event of specified circumstances occurring. If the 
host state adopts a measure subsequent to the conclu-
sion of the contract (a triggering event) that is likely to 
have damaging consequences to the economic benefits 
of the original bargain for one or both of the parties, a 
rebalancing has to take place. Petroleum contracts dif-
fer in their treatment of how that balancing will be 
effected. These clauses do not seek to prevent a change 
in the law applicable to the contract by the host state. 
Rather, they seek to address the economic impact of 
such a change in the original bargain and establish a 
framework to renegotiate or rebalance that bargain.
Example: “(a) In the event of changes in any Law, 
the provisions of which are more favorable to the 
Company, then such provisions shall apply to 
the Company if Company so requests.
(b) In the event there occurs any change in the 
legislation of the Government or local legislation 
(including provisions relating to imposts, duties, 
fees, charges, penalties, and tax related legisla-
tion) after the date of this Agreement, and if in 
the Company’s sole and good faith opinion such 
change would have the effect of divesting, 
decreasing, or in any way limiting any rights or 
benefits accruing to the Company under this 
Agreement or under current legislation, then the 
Parties shall, in good faith, negotiate to modify 
this Agreement so as to restore the Company’s 
economic rights and benefits to a level equivalent 
to what they would have been if such change had 
not occurred” (MMDA sect. 13.2 in IBA 2011).
Allocation of Burden
The burden arising from a change in laws applicable to 
the contract is shifted by means of this clause from the 
investor to the state company. No balancing is implied 
and no amendment of the contract is required. It is the 
national company that is required to take remedial 
action under the contract, such as paying an additional 
tax or royalty.
Example: “The GOVERNMENT shall indemnify 
each CONTRACTOR entity on demand against 
any liability to pay any taxes, duties, levies, charges, 
impositions or withholdings assessed or imposed 
on such entity which relate to any of the exemp-
tions granted by the GOVERNMENT under this 
Article 31.1” (Model PSC, Kurdistan 2007) (see 
Cameron 2010, 80).
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laws that result in heavier financial burdens. It has to be rati-
fied by the parliament. If a development agreement is entered 
into, under section 49 of the same act, it may contain stability 
terms. This kind of agreement is also subject to ratification by 
parliament. In the hydrocarbons sector, both Timor-Leste 
and Nigeria have provided dedicated instruments for stabili-
zation prior to investments being made, mostly in the natural 
gas sector. Some Latin American countries have provided for 
stabilization agreements that cover various kinds of invest-
ment including mining, oil and gas investments.
Asymmetry. A dimension of these clauses that govern-
ments may want to consider carefully before agreeing to 
them is their occasional asymmetry.
The ﬁscal stability clauses in many mining and petro-
leum agreements are asymmetric: protecting the con-
tractor from adverse changes to the ﬁscal terms but 
passing on beneﬁts of reductions in tax rates or other 
changes beneﬁcial to the contractor, such as more liberal 
rules for cost recovery (Daniel and Sunley 2010, 417).
For Daniel and Sunley the asymmetry is a “one-way bet” 
that offers both protection and benefits to the investor. They 
provide an illustration of how this stability would operate by 
reference to the Kurdistan Model Production Sharing 
Contract of 2007. In addition to a right to negotiate an off-
setting change if a package of government-initiated changes 
leaves the investor in an adverse economic position, this 
“would allow the contractor to request the benefit of any 
future changes. In effect the contractor could cherry pick a 
balanced tax reform package combining, say, lower tax rates 
with less favorable capital recovery rules” (Daniel and Sunley 
2010, 422–23.) In other words, a fiscal stability clause can 
provide both a positive and a negative form of protection 
with respect to future state actions, with the positive element 
working to ensure that any available benefits occurring after 
the original agreement are brought into that contract to 
benefit the investor. This contrasts with the kind of fiscal 
stability offered by Timor-Leste in its tax stability agreement 
which, Daniel and Sunley (418) note, is an example of a 
“two-way bet”: it “fixes tax parameters in both directions—
the contractor does not benefit from tax reductions.”
4.10 CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS
As section 4.6 “Contracts and Licenses” suggests, contracts 
and licenses are diverse and sometimes complex. As a result, 
their negotiation, probably on the basis of a model, will 
require considerable expertise across disciplines, involving 
law, geology, engineering, and economics skills. Before any 
negotiations start, the government needs to give some 
thought to at least four features of EI contract negotiations 
in a modern setting:
1. Legacy matters. Negotiations rarely take place in a context 
that lacks a history of interactions with international 
companies. The country’s history of dealing with inves-
tors, and investors’ track record in dealing with the coun-
try, including any deals struck that appear in retrospect to 
have been made on bad terms for the state, influence any 
subsequent negotiation.
2. Extractives differ. Negotiations on oil exploration or min-
ing exploration and their possible development will dif-
fer, sometimes involving complex issues of infrastructure 
development. If gas development is envisaged, it requires 
special knowledge of gas pricing, transportation, and 
marketing.
3. Capacity limits can be managed. In the face of capacity 
shortages, a government usually has no difficulty obtain-
ing offers of outside help. The challenge is to identify 
offers that come from the best source. Best means the 
ideal fit with the government’s objectives and needs, 
rather than a rapid response.
4. Technology helps. The idea that negotiations always 
require face-to-face meetings does not fit the context of 
computers, Internet connections, and video conferenc-
ing. This influences the tasks of preparation, research, 
and reduces the number of on-site meetings of all of the 
parties.
In general, negotiating procedures tend to be complex 
and lengthy, covering potential investments for long-term 
projects in conditions of considerable uncertainty. 
Negotiations have different phases, from formulating stra-
tegic policies and regulatory frameworks to preparing for 
and carrying out negotiations for particular projects and 
monitoring and enforcing contracts. They typically address 
the sharing of economic rent between the investor and the 
host government and have significant economic develop-
ment, environmental and social impacts. The government 
must carry out due diligence on its potential partners in 
what may be a long-term relationship.
Negotiations require special skills, particularly a grasp of 
both legal and economic issues, such as fiscal modeling, to 
explore the impacts of various fiscal options prior to mak-
ing a choice. A major problem for most countries is the lack 
of capacity (specialized know-how, technical expertise, and 
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negotiating experience) to negotiate the necessary agree-
ments with well-resourced and experienced foreign inves-
tors, suppliers, and contractors. This is often due partly to 
difficulties in attracting or retaining qualified and experi-
enced staff as a result of salary differentials with the private 
sector and a high staff turnover. As more countries make 
commercially viable discoveries, the demand for negotiat-
ing capacity (and support from third parties outside the 
country) increases. The abundance of suppliers of such 
skills among development organizations goes some way 
toward mitigating this problem.65
Given the complexity of the issues involved and their 
consequences in terms of revenue and other benefits, gov-
ernments should place a premium on the development of 
internal negotiation capacity and access to knowledgeable 
external expertise. This is especially important given the 
considerable information, skills, and resources generally 
available to those on the other side of the negotiating table.
Two helpful tools are the availability of model contracts 
to the government side (see section 4.6) and the potential 
role of a state resource company. Such companies can “sus-
tain a cadre of trained personnel with skills that can be 
deployed effectively in negotiations. By comparison, sector 
ministries are often ill-equipped to contend with the chal-
lenges of contract negotiations” (Land 2009, 170).
Governance issues can play a role in negotiations. In some 
cases, governments reject or not seek support in negotiations 
despite internal capacity shortcomings. The reasons may be 
a lack of coordination, a lack of resources, distrust, internal 
disagreements, or corruption. One study of ministry behav-
ior noted, “Some ministries may want ownership over par-
ticular deals, and may therefore be reluctant to coordinate 
and collaborate with other ministries” (CCSI 2012, 9). 
Alternatively, the authority of a particular ministry within 
government or of a state resources company to manage the 
negotiations and approve the final terms may well be uncer-
tain. Government officials may also seek quick, short-term 
solutions for political reasons. Where corruption is preva-
lent, officials prefer to retain maximum discretionary author-
ity throughout the decision-making process. In such contexts, 
it is useful for the other organs of government such as parlia-
ment (and also civil society) to be aware of contract negotia-
tion issues to function more effectively as a source of checks 
and balances in the domestic system. Governments may then 
be held accountable for the deals they have negotiated.
Renegotiation is a highly sensitive topic. Gas sales con-
tracts typically contain price review clauses, but it is rare for a 
hydrocarbons or mining contract to envisage a renegotiation 
of the basic terms in a comparable way.
Inevitably, in a long-term relationship one of the parties 
may come to view the terms of the original contract as 
unfair, poorly drafted, or inappropriate to changed circum-
stances. For the government, an insistence on renegotiation 
(however justified it may see this action) will usually carry a 
high reputational cost and risk triggering international arbi-
tration. Irrespective of any short-term benefits in a particu-
lar case, the impact on future investment may be negative, 
and if formal arbitration has resulted, the outcome in terms 
of legal costs, time spent, and reputational damage can be 
significant. A much more common approach in such cir-
cumstances is to seek discussions on an amicable basis with 
the investors, seeking a resolution away from the glare of 
publicity and minimizing its adversarial character. The 
investor too may seek to revisit its contractual obligations, 
perhaps seeking to reduce its work program in the light of 
unfavorable early results.
Sometimes it has been claimed that renegotiations have 
taken place under duress.66 The expression forced renegoti-
ations has been used in media descriptions of investor-state 
negotiations in Latin America and some other regions. 
It underlines the importance of following good practice in 
any such negotiations. If duress has occurred, the outcomes 
are likely to be deemed null and void.
In the Aminoil case,67 the investor argued that it was 
threatened with a shutdown of its operations if it failed to 
agree to new terms offered by the Kuwaiti government after 
a significant oil price increase. The investor also argued 
that obtaining its consent in such circumstances rendered 
any decision invalid because it was obtained under duress. 
The presiding tribunal did not accept this claim.68 It set out 
four principles that should be followed if the negotiations 
were to be deemed fair: they had to be conducted in good 
faith and there had to be sustained negotiations over a 
period appropriate to the circumstances, an awareness of 
the interests of the other party, and a persevering quest for 
an acceptable compromise.69 If the investor was under 
financial pressure, this did not necessarily mean that an 
agreement reached between the parties was made under 
duress. There had to be some evidence of abuse by the 
other contracting party.
4.11 DISPUTES: ANTICIPATING AND 
MANAGING THEM
The likelihood of a dispute emerging at some point in a 
long-term EI project is high, and can even occur prior to 
any production of the deposit. With respect to oil and gas, 
a dispute may arise between the host government and/or its 
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state resources company and the investor, among the par-
ties to a joint venture, or between the host state and a neigh-
boring state over a range of issues, such as ownership of 
land or seabed or the use of infrastructure such as pipelines. 
In the mining sector, it typically arises between the state and 
the title holder or applicant, between competing miners, or 
between a title holder or applicant and noncompeting par-
ties. The range of issues may include revocation or suspen-
sion of a license, perhaps due to alleged lack of compliance 
with performance obligations; a dispute over environmen-
tal or social obligations during the development phase; or 
interpretation of issues relating to mine closure. For a for-
eign investor, a key question is whether such disputes are to 
be referred to the country’s normal courts and tribunals or 
a separate nondomestic agency such as an international 
tribunal.
Anticipation of this possibility of a dispute is essential. 
The appropriate time to prepare for it is during initial con-
tract negotiations, prior to the commencement of EI opera-
tions. Every investor is aware of this need for preparation, 
partly because disputes can arise not only with the host state 
but also among the investors themselves, such as between 
parties to joint venture contracts as much as between the 
parties to a host-government agreement. It is important 
that the host state understands this risk too and identifies 
the responses it would be most comfortable with, not least 
because of the high public profile likely to attend on any 
such dispute with investors.
Prevention is the best cure. The downsides of a formal 
dispute (in terms of cost, time, reputation, and potential 
damage to the project) are usually greater than any benefits 
to the parties. Management of differences is therefore a 
highly desirable goal, and procedures should be put in place 
to try to resolve disputes at an early stage. Although precise 
evidence is lacking, due to confidentiality, it appears that 
many disagreements in oil, gas, and mining are settled prior 
to the triggering of formal legal processes, or if that occurs, 
they may be settled before they reach the stage of an arbitral 
award. This reflects the importance of both commercial 
realities and the need to preserve the long-term relation-
ships between investors and host states.
There are commonly used ways for parties to settle their 
differences amicably and speedily (such as mediation, con-
ciliation, or cooling-off periods). They can also include the 
use of stepped or multitiered approaches in the contract 
itself. In this way, parties are required to submit disputes to 
an increasingly rigorous and formal series of dispute resolu-
tion methods. This allows the parties to encourage and 
allow opportunities for an agreed settlement, either through 
mediation or (in the AIPN models) negotiation by senior 
executives on each side. It means that the parties retain 
control over their own destinies in the initial stages and also 
ensures that if these relatively informal efforts at a settle-
ment fail, the next step will be one that allows a third party 
to render a binding decision. If a stepped approach is 
adopted, it is important that the transition from one step to 
another is made clear (to avoid challenges by one of the par-
ties). The increasingly wide adoption of multitiered dispute 
resolution procedures makes them part of good practice in 
contract design.70
Failing these dispute prevention methods, one or both 
parties may choose to pursue formal and binding legal pro-
ceedings. This may require the dispute to be heard by the 
local courts, but often in the EI sector the parties will have 
agreed that in the event of a dispute they will submit their 
disputes to international arbitration: a form of private jus-
tice.71 Many governments would prefer to see their domes-
tic courts settle disputes, but international arbitration will 
be keenly sought by most foreign investors to limit actual or 
perceived risk from local court processes; it is a concession 
many states have been prepared to make. The possibility of 
lengthy delays, open-ended proceedings, corruption, or lack 
of due process in local courts comprise some of the per-
ceived risks by investors. Arbitration is unlikely to be quick, 
but once a decision is made, it provides finality about the 
dispute. Appeal is possible only in very limited circum-
stances and not on errors of law or fact.
Apart from international arbitration, there is another 
dispute settlement route for issues that have a technical, 
scientific, or accounting character: expert determination. 
The central idea is that a third-party expert should be 
appointed to evaluate the dispute. For example, a dispute 
concerning the specifications of a particular product used 
during operations could be resolved by an expert determi-
nation without having to commence arbitral proceedings.
There are important differences between determination 
by an expert and arbitration: there are usually no statutory 
provisions governing the former in contrast to the latter, 
and the legal requirements of an arbitration may be absent, 
with the parties not necessarily being required to present 
their case or to submit evidence. Whereas the courts may be 
used to assist in an arbitral process, by appointing arbitra-
tors if necessary, by granting interim injunctions, and above 
all by enforcing awards (that is, like a court judgment) of 
the tribunal, there is no comparable role for the courts in 
the process of expert determination. Enforcement of the 
expert’s determination is a matter left to the contract itself, 
if it is enforceable at all. On the international level, this is 
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even more problematic; since it is not an arbitral award, it 
cannot be enforced under the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(New York Convention).72 Challenges to an expert’s role 
may be made on limited grounds such as fraud or collusion 
or that the expert had departed to a material extent from the 
instructions given.
Whatever method is used, the dispute settlement mecha-
nisms will be set out in the contract and will constitute a 
very important assurance to the investor that the bargain 
struck in the contract will be secure over time. A well-
drafted dispute resolution clause will, in the event of breach, 
provide a means for seeking compensation through an arbi-
tral award enforceable against the state hosting the invest-
ment. Under the New York Convention, an arbitral award 
is enforceable through the local courts of 146 states.
Investment treaties
In making preparations for potential disputes, it is crucial to 
note that investors may bring a legal claim for damages 
against a state based on a legal instrument existing outside 
of the contract: a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) or a mul-
tilateral investment agreement (MIA), of which there are 
now more than 3,000 in existence. These treaties are con-
cluded between states for the reciprocal protection and 
promotion of investment by investors from either state in 
the territory of the other state; they are part of international 
law. Among the rights they confer is the right to initiate 
arbitration if the host state or its agencies have taken mea-
sures alleged to be inconsistent with the treaty obligations. 
The treaties generally cover access to arbitration, the rules 
applicable to the arbitration, and the enforcement of arbi-
tral awards.
BITs and more recently free trade agreements have 
become very popular as a means of promoting and protect-
ing foreign direct investment in the globalized economy 
(Sornarajah 2010). The typical content comprises substan-
tive provisions (see the list in box 4.11) and mechanisms for 
dispute settlement. All of these treaties will contain a provi-
sion that protects foreign investors from expropriations 
without compensation. To date, tribunals have held, for 
example, that a government expropriated an investor’s 
property when it revoked its license to operate, and that it 
Box 4.11 Claims under Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)
The substantive rights protected under a BIT usually 
include the following:
 ■ Fair and equitable treatment
 ■ National treatment
 ■ Most favored nation treatment
 ■ Full protection and security
 ■ Protection from expropriation
 ■ Umbrella clauses
Many claims have included a reference to the fair and 
equitable treatment standard. Some of these concern 
the review of administrative decisions and the weight 
given to legitimate expectations and due process. In 
Occidental v. Ecuador (2004) the tribunal held that the 
stability of the legal and business framework is an 
essential element of fair and equitable treatment; this 
view was also supported in the CME v. Argentina case 
(2005). Other cases support the view that in certain 
circumstances the standard has limited application 
only. There are other cases concerning the application 
of this standard that involve the treatment of investors 
by the courts of the host state (denial of justice, for 
example).
The requirement of national treatment is a different 
substantive right and aims to provide a level playing 
field for foreign investors at least after the investment 
has been made. Typically, the foreign investor is given 
treatment that is no less favorable than that accorded 
by the host state to its own investors.
Another requirement commonly found in BITs is 
that investments of nationals of either contracting 
party shall enjoy full protection and security in the ter-
ritory of the other contracting party. This is typically 
concerned with failures of the state to protect the inves-
tor’s property from actual damage caused by state 
officials or by the actions of others, where the state has 
failed to carry out due diligence.
An umbrella clause is a catch-all provision to cover 
every kind of investment obligation of the host state. 
The clause brings obligations or commitments that the 
host state has entered into in relation to foreign invest-
ment under the protective umbrella of the BIT, and can 
elevate contract claims to treaty claims.
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violated its “full protection and security” obligation because 
it failed to protect the investment from losses and disrup-
tions caused by local citizens. Clearly, such treaties limit 
sovereignty; a question commonly raised is whether the 
system of justice based on these treaties and resulting 
awards is as fair to sovereign states as it appears to be to 
investors.73 Whatever the merits of the arguments for and 
against them, it cannot be overstressed that a host govern-
ment must enter into these commitments only after serious 
and considered assessment of their potential benefits and 
risks.
The role of MIAs. The best known of these are the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT), and the ASEAN Investment 
Agreement. In each case, investment disputes have arisen 
under their provisions. NAFTA is concerned with trade 
generally, and the ASEAN Agreement is concerned with 
any legal disputes that may arise directly out of an invest-
ment. By contrast, the ECT is concerned with energy only. 
It was opened for signature in December 1994 and was rati-
fied in 1998. Its aim is to establish “a legal framework in 
order to promote long-term co-operation in the energy 
field” (article 2). The definition of “investment” is compre-
hensive and lists specific asset types.
In recent years, the number of claims arising under the 
ECT has overtaken those registered under NAFTA. This is 
largely due to claims against European governments for 
changes made to their subsidy regimes for renewable energy 
resources. For EI matters, the ECT has been used for dis-
putes mainly involving East European and Central Asian 
states. Its provisions on the settlement of any investment 
disputes that may arise provide for the use of compulsory 
arbitration against governments at the option of foreign 
investors for alleged breaches of the investment agreements, 
without the need to first exhaust local remedies. Moreover, 
binding state-to-state arbitration is provided for in article 
27. This involves the use of an ad hoc tribunal for disputes 
between states concerning the application or interpretation 
of the treaty. It is not restricted to the resolution of disputes 
arising from investment issues. The dispute settlement pro-
cedures may in fact be diverse, including international arbi-
tration, and provide for final and binding solutions to many 
disputes. The rules and procedures governing transit dis-
putes in particular have been enhanced since ratification to 
minimize disruption when a dispute is taking place. A key 
provision lies in article 26, which provides various options 
to investors to take host governments to international arbi-
tration in the event of an alleged breach of the treaty’s 
investment provisions.74 Each state that is party to the ECT 
is obliged to provide for effective enforcement of arbitral 
awards in its country. There are three ways of bringing an 
action:
1. The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID),
2. A sole arbitrator or an ad hoc tribunal established under 
the UN Commission on International Trade Law, or
3. An application to the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce.
Arbitration
Arbitral proceedings are often complex and have become an 
increasingly common forum for resolving disputes in the 
petroleum and mining industries throughout the world. 
Since arbitration is a private mode of dispute settlement in 
international commerce, in which the rules are agreed by 
the parties themselves, it is often assumed that it exists inde-
pendently of the national courts. In fact, there is a global 
adjudication system in which international investment and 
other commercial disputes are “resolved by binding and 
final arbitration, as regulated, however, by national legisla-
tion and judiciaries” (Brower, Brower, and Sharpe 2003, 
415). It is crucial at all stages (design, proceedings, and set-
tlement) to be aware of this fact of enforcement and the role 
played by the New York Convention in making awards 
enforceable through the local courts. The amounts awarded 
by tribunals can be very large, amounting in some cases to 
billions of dollars. An investor can try to enforce a ruling in 
the national courts of a third state where the host state has 
assets and have them seized or have bank accounts frozen.
If arbitration becomes a reality, it is essential to review 
the law governing the dispute and the method of arbitration 
chosen in the contract.
The arbitration agreement. The defining feature of arbi-
tration is that it is a form of justice based on the parties’ 
agreement. The fundamental document for the jurisdiction 
of the tribunal is the arbitration agreement, usually the arbi-
tration or dispute settlement clause in the hydrocarbons or 
mining license or contract. This will set forth a description of 
the disputes that will be subject to arbitration, the scope of a 
tribunal’s authority, applicable law, language, and location of 
the arbitration, whether it will be administered by an institu-
tion such as ICSID or the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC), and may include rules and procedures to 
be followed.
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The lex arbitri or law of the place where the arbitration is 
held (sometime called the seat) will govern the procedures 
of the arbitration. This includes the admissibility of evi-
dence, security for costs, judgment and confidentiality 
orders, appeal ability, and the enforceability of an award 
against assets in New York Convention countries. From a 
practical point of view, it is best to choose the governing law 
of a country in which there is a probability that the legal 
profession and judges have some knowledge of the law 
relating to oil, gas, and mining.
Institutional or ad hoc arbitration? The parties 
may choose to have the arbitration conducted through an 
international arbitral institution or on an ad hoc basis. 
These are sometimes called administered and nonadminis-
tered arbitration, respectively. An institutional form of 
arbitration sets timetables and procedures to be followed 
when establishing the arbitral tribunal for the conduct of 
the arbitration. An ad hoc arbitration is conducted under 
rules agreed by the parties or set by the arbitration tribunal. 
There are a growing number of options in institutional 
arbitration. The most popular forums for arbitral disputes 
are institutions such as the ICSID, the ICC, and the London 
Court of International Arbitration (Brower, Brower, and 
Sharpe 2003; Paulsson 1995). There are also a number of 
regional arbitration centers that are available to assist in 
resolving disputes, such as the Singapore International 
Arbitration Centre and the Arbitration Centre of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.
The advantages of an institutional approach are usually 
thought to include the following: it provides a wealth of 
arbitral experience, including that of the arbitrators them-
selves; it ensures that the arbitral tribunal is appointed and 
deals with any challenges to arbitrators; it has rules that are 
a known quantity; it sometimes has sufficient prestige to 
persuade a reluctant party to arbitrate and comply with the 
award; and it can be particularly useful when parties have 
different levels of sophistication or different languages and 
cultures. In an ad hoc arbitration, parties may designate the 
rules in their contract or they may adopt a preexisting set of 
rules, such as the rules of the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).75 They are 
designed to provide a comprehensive set of procedural rules 
on which the parties may agree for the conduct of arbitra-
tions arising out of their commercial relationships. This 
freedom of the parties to customize the arbitration is 
thought to be the main advantage of the ad hoc approach, 
inviting comparisons between a tailor-made suit and one 
bought off the rack.
4.12 SUMMARY
The first chevron in the EI Value Chain contains two key 
elements that shape the subject matter of chapter 4: prop-
erty rights and the contract. In almost all countries, extrac-
tive resources when in the ground are owned by the state, 
and exploration and development of those resources is car-
ried out under contract or license by corporate entities, 
usually foreign ones, often with the state as a partner. 
Decisions on the award of rights follow from the kind of 
property rights and contract/license regime they establish. 
Together with the fiscal terms, discussed in chapter 6, they 
establish what we may call a first pillar of governance for the 
extractives sector. It plays a crucial role in conferring legiti-
macy on the terms and conditions on which investments are 
made. If flawed, the long-term stability of these arrange-
ments is unlikely to prove enduring.
Finding 1: Knowledge of the fundamentals of extractive 
industry legal and regulatory frameworks is readily available. 
Supply is abundant. Much of it has been assembled in the 
Sourcebook. Understanding the form and content of basic 
oil, gas, and mining laws, contracts and licenses, regulations, 
and methods of award is facilitated by the large number of 
well-established model forms available to governments, 
legislatures, and civil society.
Finding 2: Application of this knowledge is difficult because 
of four distinct sources of dynamism.
1. First, and most obviously, every country context is unique. 
Each contains specific features of a social, cultural, politi-
cal, geological, and economic nature that require some 
adaptation of this body of knowledge before it can become 
operational. As a result, there can be no such thing as a 
“model” for a government to follow, lifted from another 
country context. However, this chapter shows that there 
are different ways of combining established legal forms 
and instruments. The question for the country becomes, 
What is the right combination of established instruments for 
our particular context at this time?
2. Second, legacy matters. Only in very rare cases will an 
extractives policy be developed from a blank slate. For oil 
and mining (rather than gas), it will have to absorb or 
build on a legacy of policy, laws, and contracts, usually 
developed when less knowledge was available and in less 
propitious circumstances. In East Africa, for example, the 
legislation developed when there was little oil or gas dis-
covered has been found to be incomplete when address-
ing the complexities of hydrocarbon production from 
very large discoveries. The question becomes, Given this 
CHAPTER 4: POLICY, LEGAL, AND CONTRACTUAL FRAMEWORK 107
living legacy, how do new proposals manage such con-
straints and limit their impact?
3. Third, adaptation will be required. This is true even when 
a new, cutting-edge regime is in place. As knowledge of 
the links between the extractives and wider economic and 
social transformation grow, the blend of different laws, 
contracts, other instruments, as well as some of their 
contents, has to be modified to reflect this. A failure to do 
so carries the risk that the overall regime will lose its 
legitimacy and long-term credibility. Currently, local 
benefit, change of control or transfer of interests, and 
infrastructure linkages are areas where established 
approaches are being modified to better achieve develop-
ment goals. Are formal mechanisms in place to allow future 
administrations to make adaptations smoothly and quickly, 
and is the capacity there to achieve this?
4. Fourth, looking ahead, any choice made with respect to 
a combination of legal and regulatory instruments will 
need to be adjusted as knowledge grows and capacity 
increases. The initial choice has to be made with this 
flexibility in mind, or it must include ways to adapt to a 
variety of future circumstances. What mechanisms can 
we put in place to allow for flexibility without creating 
uncertainty for future investment flows?
Finding 3: Policies are becoming increasingly differentiated 
among the segments of the extractives sector. They recognize 
the distinct challenges in each segment. This is evident in 
the use of gas policies or master plans, greater appreciation 
of the different approaches to the award of rights that are 
common in the mining and hydrocarbons industries, and 
the need to provide overarching justifications for develop-
ment policies within the extractives sector. An element that 
affects the legal and regulatory framework in all extractives 
sectors is the need to sharpen instruments aimed at secur-
ing benefits from wider developmental impacts on their 
economies, such as local benefit. Publication of policy 
documents online as in the Sourcebook can accelerate this 
process.
Finding 4: Countries have progressively better defined the 
nature of subsoil rights granted and the scope of each stage of 
the entire upstream process, especially in hydrocarbons. The 
aim has been to facilitate the administration of subsoil 
rights, to limit interpretation problems and possible areas of 
dispute, and to integrate the experience the countries have 
accumulated from implementing previous licenses or con-
tracts. The increasing transparency of contracts in oil, gas, 
and mining sectors is probably contributing to this process 
of improvement in the detail of contract design.
4.13 TAKING ACTION: RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND TOOLS
Legal and regulatory framework
In designing its legal and regulatory framework, each coun-
try should take into account general factors such as the min-
eral or crude oil price; the existence of small, medium, and 
large deposits or fields; whether they are on-land or offshore 
or both; whether they are mature and/or frontier areas; and 
whether they are of a conventional or unconventional 
nature, for example. Then, if it seeks to achieve an appropri-
ate level of hydrocarbons activity in each of these categories, 
it will have to develop the conditions that fit its unique com-
bination of circumstances. If a country has only one set of 
rules for all categories, it will probably succeed in developing 
only one category of resources or none at all.
Method of award
Any policy on allocation of rights has to be flexible and able 
to respond to changing geological conditions and to chang-
ing global market conditions, especially the expected level 
and trend of future oil, gas, and mineral prices. These 
 factors are beyond the control of governments and will play 
a crucial role in determining investors’ strategies and risk 
assessments. Selection of a method has to reflect these wider 
contextual variables.
There is an element of discretion in most methods of 
allocation of rights to extractives. Its scope has to be consid-
ered in relation to both the need for (and benefits of) trans-
parency and its value in a government’s local benefit policy 
or the promotion of environmental and strategic objectives. 
These play a key role in conferring legitimacy on the overall 
regime among the wider public. For an award of rights to 
have long-term stability there has to be a perception that the 
award has the potential to benefit the public welfare.
Gas extraction
Any petroleum policy has to contain specific provisions on 
gas, distinguishing between associated and nonassociated 
sources. This should also address unconventional gas if 
prospective resources may exist in the country. The policy 
should include incentives to the private sector to develop 
gas fields, taking into account the higher costs of doing so, 
the longer time required to assess its economic viability, and 
the varying sizes of fields.
An upstream policy for gas is insufficient to promote gas 
resources. It has to be complemented by a downstream gas 
policy consistent with the goals given to the upstream policy.
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Policy has to be tailored to the respective gas resource 
potential and the expected gas demand of the country, with 
the aim of fostering gas investments. As a result, the legal 
framework should state the priorities for gas uses between 
domestic and export uses and include incentives such as 
longer appraisal periods and production periods than for 
oil; special fiscal incentives must be included for promoting 
gas activities and principles for gas pricing; mandatory joint 
development of gas discoveries between several licensee 
companies must be addressed; and provisions for uncon-
ventional gas must be included.
Knowledge tools
The kind of technical support available to governments for 
planning, negotiating, implementing, and monitoring 
investments in the extractives sector is being enhanced by 
the use of Internet-based tools such as the Negotiation 
Support Portal, designed by Columbia Center on Sustainable 
Investment (CCSI) and aimed at host  governments (www 
.NegotiationSupport.org). This sort of tool is likely to 
evolve into an invaluable source of data, tools, and resources 
to tackle many of the problems discussed in this chapter. 
Further, for examples of petroleum and mineral contracts 
available in the public domain, there is Resourcecontracts.
org, a repository developed by CCSI, the Natural Resource 
Governance Institute (NRGI), and the World Bank. It also 
provides annotations of the contracts’ environmental, fiscal, 
operational, and social provisions to facilitate comprehen-
sion of what are often lengthy and complex documents. 
There are well over 1,000 contracts from around 90 coun-
tries available. In spite of these excellent initiatives, the 
crucial bottleneck for most governments will probably 
remain one of securing access to the right combination of 
information, expertise, and skills.
NOTES
 1. Rent seeking can take many forms: offers or solicitations 
of bribes and illicit payments to or by government officials, 
fraudulent declarations to the tax authorities, embezzlement 
of state funds, conflicts of interest of officials who have an 
ownership stake in companies doing business with the gov-
ernment, inappropriate use of position to influence govern-
ment decisions, and others. A World Bank (2008, 2) report on 
the Democratic Republic of Congo noted how, for historical 
reasons, a culture of rent seeking had developed in the DRC.
 2. Of course, they may also do both, with the sector law 
repeating the more authoritative statement contained in the 
constitutional document. For comparative studies of 
approaches adopted in mining, see Bastida, Warden-
Fernandez, and Waelde 2005. For a comparable multi-author 
study on petroleum law, see Duval et al. 2009.
 3. Article 268 of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of 
Ghana. http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/republic 
/constitution.php.
 4. Mineral Resources Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
1986, amended 1996, art. 3, para. 1.
 5. Transitional Government of Somalia, Petroleum Law 
2007, art. 5.1.
 6. Such leases will typically not contain an arbitration 
clause for the settlement of disputes, in contrast to the petro-
leum and minerals agreements between investors and states 
found outside the United States (Hood 2012).
 7. 1962 General Assembly Resolution 1803 on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources: GA res. 1803 (XVII), 17 
UN GAOR Supp. (no. 17), UN Doc. A/5217 (1962), p. 15. This 
has been supported by later judgments of the International 
Court of Justice.
 8. For an overview of the literature on maritime delimitation 
disputes, see Cameron 2006.
 9. The Memorandum to the Ghana Minerals and Mining 
Bill of 2006 provides an explanation of the changing policy 
priorities that made necessary certain provisions in the new 
law. The Mozambique Petroleum Law of 2001 states that its 
adoption is to ensure “greater competitiveness in the petro-
leum sector and guarantees the protection of rights and 
assets of participants in Petroleum Operations.” Petroleum 
Law No.3/2001 of 21 February 2001, Preamble. http://www 
. e i s o u rce b o o k . o r g / c m s / f i l e s / a t t a ch m e n t s / o t h e r 
/Mozambique %20Petrol%20Law,%202001.pdf.
 10. Republic of Liberia, National Petroleum Policy November 
2012, 7, http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/January%202016 
/Liberia%20National%20Petroleum%20Policy%202012.pdf.
 11. Liberian National Petroleum Policy, 19.
 12. Department of Mineral Resources, Pretoria, South 
Africa, 2010, https://www.westerncape.gov.za/Text/2004/5 
/ theminingcharter . pdf. See also Department of Mineral 
Resources’ 2015 Assessment of the Broad-Based Socio-Economic 
Empowerment for the South African Mining Industry, http://
www.dmr.gov .za/mining-charter-assessment-report.html.
 13. See the National Minerals and Mining Policy of Ghana, 
Accra, November 2014, principle 18, 22.
 14. This list is not exhaustive. Detailed intentions under each 
of these, and other possible policy headings, would normally 
be provided by implementing legislation, model contracts, 
contract award procedures, regulation, and fiscal regimes.
 15. Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, Petroleum 
Law of Somalia, Law No XGB/712/08 dated 06/08/2008; and 
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President’s Office Ref JS/XM/182/06/2008, August 7, 2008. 
Sourcebook reference, http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms 
/Jan%202014/Somalia%20Petroleum%20Law%202007.pdf.
 16. In Canada, the federal government retains authority over 
income taxation while royalties are a provincial responsibility.
 17. For an overview of the literature on maritime delimitation 
disputes, see Cameron 2006.
 18. Even in the Middle East, several companies have engaged 
private sector participants: for example, in Persian Gulf states 
such as the United Arab Emirates or Qatar. The rationale for 
such participation is access to cutting-edge technology and a 
sharing of technical and financial risks.
 19. Economists also refer to the obsolescing bargain as the 
“time inconsistency problem.”
 20. This section follows closely the scheme set out in chapter 3 
of Duval et al. (2009, 28–29), International Petroleum Exploration 
and Exploitation Agreements: Legal, Economic, and Policy Aspects 
This study provides an excellent survey of key issues under these 
headings. The terms used by Duval et al. are, however, slightly 
different: fixed content, agreement, and flexible systems are the 
three categories used there.
 21. It should be noted that rules contained in a basic con-
stitution are likely to override any of the above in the event 
of conflict.
 22. The list of special provisions for gas in a petroleum law 
is based on Le Leuch (2012), and much of this text follows 
the content of his paper.
 23. Associated gas will usually mean gas that is produced in 
association with oil but in a project that is primarily focused 
on oil production. Nonassociated gas usually refers to gas in 
fields or reservoirs that contain mostly gas reserves, even if 
associated liquids such as condensate are present as well.
 24. This was evident among the “transition” countries exam-
ined in the World Bank Group Mining Department report 
The Potential for Mining Investment in Transition Economy 
Countries of East and Central Asia (Clark et al. 2003).
 25. The ECOWAS Directive on the Harmonization of 
Guiding Principles and Policies in the Mining Sector. 2009. 
Abuja, Nigeria. ECOWAS is a group of 15 West African 
states. http://documentation.ecowas.int/download/en 
/publications/Ecowas%20Directive%20and%20 policies%20
in%20the%20minning%20sector.pdf.
 26. Minerals and Mining Act 2006 Act no. 703, section 4(1).
 27. For an overview of the early years of the industry in its 
U.S. setting, see Sakmar 2011.
 28. In terms of geology and exploration, hard rock mining, 
unlike energy resources (coal and petroleum) extraction, 
cannot be adequately located through basic geological data; 
much time and drilling over large areas of land is necessary 
to find feasible mineral deposits. Petroleum exploration is 
considerably more expensive and risky than mineral explo-
ration, particularly when deposits are in offshore waters 
(Land 1994, 22–23, 99–100). Smaller operations are possible 
in mining, whereas petroleum production typically requires 
huge mechanization and capital. The physical properties of 
petroleum, and the frequent need to divide production in 
large oil fields, has resulted in more standardized arrange-
ments than compared to mining (Land 1994, 25–32, 102). 
Regarding economics, petroleum obtains faster and larger 
returns than minerals, and so the industry is less risk averse 
than compared with investment in mineral production. The 
petroleum industry has also been far more profitable than 
mining (Land 1994, 140–141, 258–264). In petroleum, the 
government can normally sell the product relatively easily 
directly to markets, which has traditionally not been the case 
with minerals (Smith and Wells 1975, 588). The environ-
mental impact of removing the resource is much greater in 
mining than it is in petroleum (Land 1994, 35). Where petro-
leum is extracted from the sea, which is often the case, it 
presents different environmental and social issues than occur 
with land-based mining. For all of these points, and particu-
larly the impact of technology and recent developments, see 
the discussion of petroleum and mining in chapter 3 of the 
Sourcebook.
 29. And some governments may have contracts with separate 
companies for the different stages (Barberis 1998, 56).
 30. Use of model agreements by educators is common, such 
as in courses offered by Sourcebook partners the Centre for 
Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy and the 
Columbia Centre for Sustainable Investment.
 31. Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, “Forms and 
Model Contracts,” Westminster, CO, https://www.rmmlf 
.org/~/link.aspx?_id=69EB538B7FD34BB38F7B7E545A864
37F&_z=z or the models developed by the Association of 
International Petroleum Negotiators, http://www.aipn.org.
 32. AIPN model agreements are available only to its members, 
but are extensively used in contract negotiations by company 
negotiators and law firms. More information is available at the 
website, http://www.aipn.com.
 33. Booking of reserves refers to adding proven reserves of oil 
and gas to the balance sheet of the company. The reporting 
could possibly be net of any royalty paid in kind.
 34. In the petroleum sector, with few exceptions, the NRC 
participates in an unincorporated joint venture. In the min-
ing sector, the NRC participates through share ownership in 
a jointly owned corporation. The unincorporated joint ven-
ture is prevalent in petroleum for operational reasons 
(it offers greater flexibility with respect to transfers of own-
ership and conduct of operations on an individual or sole-
risk basis) and because multiple investor interests are 
common. Mining operations, in contrast, may involve only 
one or two investors, which favors an incorporated approach.
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 35. Law No. 21/2014 entered into force on August 18, 2014.
 36. This is called the investor’s production entitlement share.
 37. Iranian RSAs provide for this under the so-called buy-
back clause (Nahkle 2010). There are also pure service con-
tracts, which are no longer widely used but under which the 
contractor is paid a fee (usually tied to production) for his 
services. No element of exploration risk is involved in such 
agreements.
 38. This includes countries such as Mexico and selected 
countries in the Middle East.
 39. For a comprehensive review of the subject in this section, 
see Duval et al. 2009. The contract variations that can be 
found between oil and gas, on the one hand, and mining, on 
the other, are very minor and not important for the level of 
discussion in this section.
 40. Essential infrastructure facilities in the EI sector typically 
include pipelines, terminals, roads, railways, and/or processing 
or smelting facilities.
 41. Both the good practice note and brief are available at CSMI 
(2010). http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/files/Good%20
Practice %20Note%20for%20Granting%20Mineral%20
Rights%20%20-%202012%20Oct%209%20v2.pdf.
 42. There are several versions of this model JOA, the most 
recent dating back to 2012. Its predecessor, the 2002 AIPN 
Model JOA, was arguably the most influential of all versions 
elaborated by the AIPN to date, but the 2012 version is likely 
to gain more significance in the future as the users become 
familiar with it and use it over a longer period.
 43. In the words of a leading textbook on the subject, “Any 
sale, transfer, or assignment of any interest in an [interna-
tional petroleum agreement], including to an affiliate, is 
subject to the prior approval of the [host country]” (Duval 
et al. 2009, 161).
 44. For example, in Kenya the model PSA 2015 provides for 
assignments to third parties as follows: “The Contractor may 
assign to a person other than an affiliate part or all of its 
rights and obligations under this contract with the consent 
of the Minister, which shall not be unreasonably withheld 
and which shall be granted or refused within thirty (30) days 
of receipt by the Minister of the notice from the Contractor 
that it intends to make such an assignment but the Minister 
may require such an assignee to provide a guarantee for the 
performance of the obligations of the Contractor” (article 
35(2)). https://www.nationaloil.co.ke/pdf/Model_PSC_2015 
_-_210115.pdf. An earlier version of this model PSA was 
used in 2011 when Kenya consented to the purchase by Total 
E&P of participating interests in five offshore blocks.
 45. 2007 Jordan Model Production Sharing Agreement, at 
art. 31, Barrows Middle East Supplement 176, attachment II, 
at 61. See also 2005 Afghanistan Model Production Sharing 
Agreement for Hydrocarbons Exploration, Development 
and Production, January 3, 2005, Barrows Middle East 
Supplement 171, attachment VIII, article XXIX, at 48: “29.1 
The Contractor may sell, assign, transfer, convey or other-
wise dispose of any part or all of its rights or interests 
under this Agreement to an Affiliated Entity without 
Government consent, or to any other entity with the prior 
written consent of the Government, which consent shall 
not be unreasonably withheld.”
 46. There are numerous other examples. The Democratic 
Republic of Congo introduced a hydrocarbons law in 2015 
that imposes a 35–45 percent CGT. Kenya issued guidelines 
for its EI sector in 2015 through its Revenue Authority, 
imposing a rate of 30 percent for resident firms and 37.5 
percent for nonresident firms. Tanzania will levy a CGT of 
at least $258 million on the $1.3 billion asset sale of Ophir 
Energy’s natural gas fields to a unit of Singapore’s Temasek 
Holdings, and a further large sum from Shell’s acquisition 
of BG Group with which Ophir had partnered in exploring 
the country’s gas reserves. Finally, in South Africa a report 
by the ANC Policy Institute (2012, 34) stated, “In order to 
discourage mineral right speculators we must introduce an 
exploration (prospecting) right transfer capital gains tax of 
50%, payable if the right is on-sold or the company changes 
hands before mining commences. This will encourage 
genuine mineral property developers rather than specula-
tors (‘flippers’).”
 47. Le Leuch (2011) identifies present and desired good or 
best practice with respect to natural gas exploration and 
upstream development activities. It pays particular atten-
tion to upstream gas policies, licensing, legal, contractual, 
regulatory oversight requirements, and fiscal regimes.
 48. An exclusive license by definition means that no other 
exploration or exploitation licenses will be granted on the 
same piece of land.
 49. A scoping study is generally an assessment of environmen-
tal impact requiring less comprehensiveness than a full EIA.
 50. A bankable feasibility study is the final study prior to 
launching the mining project and is generally subjected to a 
fully independent audit.
 51. The study contains a comprehensive appendix with spe-
cific country regulations and reports that permit comparisons 
to be made.
 52. The independent Columbia Center on Sustainable 
Investment described the pattern of events as follows: “Rio 
Tinto purchased all of the shares in Riversdale Mining 
Limited (an Australian company) on the Australian Stock 
Exchange, for around US$4 billion. Riversdale Mining 
Limited had a subsidiary, Riversdale Energy (Mauritius) 
Limited (a company registered in Mauritius), which owned 
the local company, Riversdale Mozambique Limitada (RML). 
RML held the rights to the coal projects in Mozambique. 
Through its takeover, Rio Tinto indirectly acquired the rights 
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to the Mozambique coal projects. The value of Riversdale 
Mining Limited was due to its rights in the Mozambique 
coal projects. Mozambique is in the process of amending its 
laws so as to capture transactions such as this in the future” 
(Mandelbaum and Toledano 2013, scenario 1).
 53. These studies generally include an environmental and 
social impact assessment, an environmental and social 
management and mitigation plan, and a preliminary mine 
closure plan that includes financial assurance provisions.
 54. For a detailed study of mining agreements, with case 
studies of Australia, Chile, Indonesia, and Papua New 
Guinea, see Barberis 1998.
 55. The guidelines draw on the World Bank Mining Toolkit 
(Strongman 2010), an internal World Bank document.
 56. Deliberations on the island state of Palau were interest-
ing in this respect. Palau had a dependable source of income 
based on its unique marine ecology and fully recognized 
that an invitation to explore for petroleum could threaten 
this source. In the end, exploration went ahead but not 
without considerable debate and introduction of appropri-
ate safeguards. Costa Rica is another example of a state that 
hesitated to develop its hydrocarbons reserves. In August 
2011 Presidenta Laura Chinchilla issued a three-year mora-
torium on exploration and exploitation, although this was 
suspended by the Constitutional Court in early 2012.
 57. Overlapping or multiple licensing has been a problem in 
mining. This problem is largely attributable to the absence of 
a professionally maintained mining cadastre. In both mining 
and petroleum, confirmation of licensing authority has been 
a problem, especially in federal states where subnational 
authorities have sought to issue licenses where authority to 
do so resides at the federal level.
 58. Setting only expenditure obligations may result in situa-
tions where cost overruns satisfy the investor’s obligations, 
but where work—on which exploration success depends—is 
shortchanged.
 59. States that have permitted access to subsoil rights with-
out a competitive bidding process in the past appear to be 
shifting practice toward a more competitive process.
 60. PRC Decree No. 240, art. 6 and 8.
 61. Generally, however, competent authorities are detailed 
in the relevant legislation.
 62. See, for example, ISO 2004.
 63. Goal-setting regulations were developed in the United 
Kingdom and Norway in response to a string of high-profile 
offshore oil drilling accidents. This approach has been rec-
ommended recently as one of several proposed regulatory 
reform responses to the 2010 Macondo well disaster in the 
Gulf of Mexico.
 64. The content on stabilization in this section is drawn from 
Cameron 2010.
 65. A very useful start in this process is the website resource 
organized by the Columbia Center for Sustainable Investment, 
http://www.negotiationsupport.org/matrix/columbia 
-center-sustainable-investment.
 66. Some early examples are recounted by Waelde and Kolo 
(2000, 14–18).
 67. The Government of the State of Kuwait v. American 
Independent Oil Co. (Aminoil), Award, 21 ILM 976 (1982) 
(“Aminoil”).
 68. Aminoil, para. 40 et seq.
 69. Aminoil 1014; but see also Berger’s (2003, 1365–66) list 
of 19 requirements that should govern the parties’ conduct 
during a contract renegotiation.
 70. Their main aims are to minimize or contain the escala-
tion of disputes that arise between the parties; to preserve the 
parties’ long-term relationship; to maximize cost efficiency; 
to ensure that the parties can agree on mechanisms for main-
taining the performance of ongoing obligations under the 
contract, pending resolution of their dispute; and to ensure 
that there is a notification procedure in place, which allows 
the parties to be fully aware of the timing of each stage in the 
dispute process and the transition, or escalation, of the dis-
pute from one stage to the next. Without such a notification 
procedure, this approach would fail to achieve its function of 
streamlining and setting the pace to the parties’ dispute.
 71. This subject is examined in detail in a number of texts. 
For example, see Cameron (2010) and Duval et al. (2009, 
chap. 19).
 72. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), 330 UNTS 
38; 21 UST 2517; 7 ILM 1046 (1968).
 73. South Africa became embroiled in an investor-state dis-
pute and as a result it carried out a review to assess the value 
of BITs for investment in the country. A review of this process 
can be found in Carim (2013).
 74. Rules Concerning the Adoption of Transit Disputes 
(‘Rules’), adopted December 1998.
 75. “UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules” may be found at http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration 
/1976Arbitration_rules.html.
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Chapter Title 
C H A P T E R  T H R E E
5.1 KNOWLEDGE CORE
The second chevron in the EI Value Chain, sector organization 
and regulatory institutions, addresses institutional structures 
and instruments that enable the transformation of natural 
resources into wealth. It covers the state’s roles as supervisory 
authority, enforcer, and, in many countries, participant in 
extractive activities. To those classic roles should be added a 
new one: the state as facilitator of wide, sustainable develop-
ment beyond the extractives sector. What are the best roles and 
responsibilities of government agencies for policy, legislation, 
and practice to ensure that extractives are developed in the 
public interest? The involvement of large amounts of private, 
often foreign capital in oil, gas, and mining activities means 
that structures and instruments should promote cooperation 
but also permit understanding by government of the range of 
relationships between private and state-owned entities.
In recent years, widespread stakeholder discussion about 
institutional reform, both in countries with mature extractive 
sectors and in those with emerging extractive activities, 
emphasizes that any design requires periodic review consider-
ing experience gained and changing circumstances. Yesterday’s 
success can become tomorrow’s failure.
Legacies from the past often complicate policy design. 
Only a very few countries will ever start development from 
a blank slate; most will inherit structures created earlier and 
designed with different priorities. As a result, institutional 
redundancy, overlapping institutional mandates, and poor 
coordination are common challenges. Some reform, reorga-
nization, or restructuring is almost always required, as is 
developing a cadre of personnel with specialist skills. 
Sometimes this transformation leads to dramatic plans to 
modify existing structures of governance, as has occurred in 
Brazil and Mexico. Sometimes it involves more modest and 
focused programs of reform aimed at adapting existing 
institutions to a more mature stage of resource develop-
ment, as in Norway and the United Kingdom. Often it is a 
response to new knowledge and practices, such as those 
concerning the environment, safety, and transparency.
Sector Organization and Regulatory 
Institutions
5
Transparency and Accountability
Fiscal Design
and
Administration
Revenue
Management and
Distribution
Sustainable
Development
Implementation
Policy, Legal,
and Contractual
Framework
Sector Organization
and Regulatory
Institutions
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Specific issues arise in the organization of oil, gas, and 
mining activities that require special attention. On the basis 
of the agreements between states and investors (discussed in 
chapter 4), many other agreements are concluded, covering, 
for example, joint ventures and subcontracting for services 
and supplies, for gas sales, and for transportation. The range 
of agreements goes well beyond the scope of the Sourcebook. 
However, the kind of governance that they establish is often 
investor led or driven by “industry best practices” devel-
oped over time and through experience in many different 
countries. An example is the widespread use of joint operat-
ing agreements in the hydrocarbons sector. Increasingly, the 
focus of governments on securing wide benefits from oil, 
gas, and mining makes it necessary for them to understand 
better these second order agreements and the investor-led 
governance they establish. Some of the common topics will 
be examined in the second part of this chapter.
5.2 ORGANIZATION IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The challenges of building government institutions are well 
known. A central theme in much of the literature on devel-
opment is the importance of capacity building, particularly 
to equip countries new to oil, gas, or mining development 
for the specialized tasks of oversight. A wide variety of edu-
cational programs has sprung up in centers around the 
world to meet the need for specialists. Yet if the goal is 
extractives-led, nationwide development, the kind of knowl-
edge needed by states goes beyond technical information; 
they need an understanding of the kinds of organizational 
structures that are typical in the oil, gas, and mining indus-
tries and the challenges that such structures present for 
oversight and partnership. Without sound knowledge of 
standard approaches to EI governance, and how government 
interventions can fit into or modify them, government-
driven efforts to make the sector work properly to achieve 
overall social and economic benefits may have limited and 
disappointing outcomes.
Responding to the challenges of sector organization ben-
efits from knowledge of the ways other governments have 
designed their sectors for oil, gas, and mining activities. In 
the hydrocarbons sector, the Norwegian approach has had 
a strong influence on current thinking.1 One of its key fea-
tures is the separation of regulatory and commercial func-
tions. Instead of entrusting both to a state company, this 
approach places them in separate institutions (table 5.1). 
A recent example of this from an African country can be 
found in the regulatory scheme for petroleum activities in 
Uganda (see table 5.2).
In practice, the Norwegian approach has not proved an 
easy one for many countries to adopt. It argues against a 
consolidation of domestic sector capacity. That is less 
attractive when there is a lack of skilled personnel and 
institutional capacity. (In practice this is a common prob-
lem). Where those conditions apply, a consolidated 
approach may be better able to deliver near-term results. 
Consolidation may even be a step toward a later separation 
of functions, although once established a consolidated 
approach will of course create vested interests that make 
a later separation difficult. In mining, Botswana and 
Chile have enjoyed success similar to Norway’s in the 
Table 5.1 The Norwegian Approach: Dividing 
Institutional Governance Tasks and Responsibilities 
Task Responsibility
Policy making Ministry/parliament
Legal framework Ministry/parliament
Ownership to resources Ministry/regulator
Collector of tax or share of 
production
Ministry/tax regulator/
state-owned company
Regulatory work Independent regulator or 
government directorate
Commercial activities State-owned or private, 
national companies or 
international oil companies
Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate.
Table 5.2 Ugandan Regulatory and Institutional 
Framework
Directorate of Petroleum in 
Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Development
Supports policy formulation 
and licensing of acreage
Petroleum Authority of 
Uganda
Regulates and monitors 
compliance of petroleum 
operations
Uganda National Oil 
Company Ltd.
Moves the country’s 
commercial interest in 
production-sharing 
agreements forward
Creates joint ventures 
across the petroleum value 
chain
Source: Petroleum Authority of Uganda
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development of extractive resources. For reasons that will 
be discussed, they may offer lessons for optimizing sector 
organization, but these are well short of a prescriptive tem-
plate or model for others to follow.
Governance: Who does what?
The roles and responsibilities of different ministries and 
agencies need to be clearly defined and enforced. This helps 
to avoid overlapping or conflicting competencies and roles in 
policy making, rulemaking, and monitoring. At the same 
time, it prevents gaps in regulatory responsibility. Moreover, 
if the overall policy objective is to utilize the extractives sector 
for wider economic development and benefits, it is impor-
tant to ensure that institutions and agencies are working to 
this end and not discouraging such development by their 
actions.
Typically, there are 10 key institutions that share respon-
sibilities in the management of oil, gas, and mining:
 1. Executive bodies
 2. Legislative bodies
 3. Sector ministries
 4. Regulatory agencies
 5. National resource companies
 6. Finance ministry
 7. Taxation authority
 8. Central bank
 9. Economic planning ministry
 10. Environment ministry
Close coordination among these, while admittedly diffi-
cult to achieve, is essential to effective extractives sector 
management. An illustration of how some of the above 
institutions are organized in an interrelated and successful 
way in Norway is provided in figure 5.1. In addition to the 
entities in the figure, Norway also has two state-owned bod-
ies, Gassco and Petoro, which report to the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy. Gassco has an “architect role” with 
authority over the further development of the gas infra-
structure. Petoro is a 100 percent state-owned enterprise 
that handles the state’s direct financial interest.
Cohesiveness is highly important since conflicts among 
the various roles are potentially damaging, both to the 
achievement of the state’s goals and to the scale and tempo 
of investment. The challenge of coordination can be par-
ticularly daunting in states with federal or decentralized 
structures. Addressing these challenges effectively requires a 
high level of capacity in the institutions charged with sector 
management and regulation.
Each of these institutions needs to have sufficient 
resources and staff to fulfil its mandate, commensurate with 
Figure 5.1 State Organization of the Norwegian Petroleum Sector
Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate.
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the technical complexities of oil, gas, and mining sectors. 
More often than not, requisite capacity is lacking. Technical 
assistance and the engagement of professional advisers can 
make an important contribution to capacity building. 
However, capacity requirements will change if activity 
moves beyond exploration to development and production. 
A dynamic, evolving approach to the various tasks of gov-
ernment is essential.
Executive bodies. The executive, which typically includes 
the presidency and executive cabinet, often reserves for itself 
the final decision on critical EI sector issues such as licensing 
rounds, state participation, and the establishment of extrac-
tives-sector-related funds.
Legislative bodies. Often overlooked and handicapped 
by weak institutional capacity and more powerful execu-
tive bodies, legislatures have the potential to play a major 
role in effective management of the oil, gas, and mining sec-
tors. Through their core law-making function, legislatures 
are responsible for reviewing bills and enacting legislation 
needed to support any sector.
Legislatures also serve an oversight function that allows 
them, and particularly their committees, to (1) inject 
accountability through investigation of oil, gas, and min-
ing sector issues and (2) scrutinize government activities 
and the allocation of funds. The latter function can extend 
to the scrutiny of national resource companies, perhaps 
through a requirement to submit annual reports and 
audited financial statements. Under Norway’s Petroleum 
Act, the state petroleum company, Statoil, is obliged to 
report to the legislature on any projects it undertakes that 
have significant economic and social impacts or costs 
reaching more than US$840 million.
Finally, in their representative role, legislatures can 
ensure public participation in the political process as it 
relates to these sectors.
Sector ministries. At the center of the network of govern-
ment agencies involved in extractives sector management 
is the sector ministry itself (box 5.1). This ministry typically 
has overall responsibility for the sector, but sometimes its 
scope is limited to only hydrocarbons or mining. This man-
date requires the ministry to oversee sector operations and to 
set policy and strategic direction of the sector. The ministry’s 
role is usually defined in sector legislation.
Tasks falling within the ministry’s mandate and guided 
by legislation commonly include (1) sector policies and 
Box 5.1 Institutional Structure: The Ministry and the Regulatory Agency
The sector ministry and the regulatory agency bear 
most of the overall responsibility for management of 
the extractives sector.
A well-designed sector ministry comprises the following:
1. A unit responsible for issuing and overseeing 
licenses, enforcing license conditions, and maintain-
ing an up-to-date public register of exploration and 
production licenses that is easily accessible by all 
interested parties
2. For mining, an artisanal and small-scale mining 
(ASM) unit (in states with large ASM activity)
3. An inspectorate with a strong presence at sector 
sites (This office inspects activities to assess compli-
ance with licensing conditions and health, safety, 
and environmental regulations and performs pro-
duction and technical audits.)
4. An environmental and social unit that collaborates 
with and provides support to the environmental 
and social authorities that oversee the sector
5. An economics unit that analyzes the economics of 
petroleum and mining companies operating in the 
sector
6. A unit that promotes the sector at national and 
international events
7. Highly experienced and skilled staff to oversee large 
petroleum and mining projects and to put the gov-
ernment on an equal footing with the management 
and specialist staff of international companies and 
large investors
8. Employment conditions and salaries sufficient to 
prevent the most highly skilled and experienced 
staff from being hired away by international 
companies
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planning, including proposed legislation; (2) negotiation 
and award of contacts or licenses; (3) calculation and collec-
tion of royalties; (4) promotion of local benefits; (5) prepa-
ration of regulations; (6) oversight and regulatory functions, 
with authority to delegate this responsibility; (7) coordina-
tion with other ministries, especially the ministries of 
finance and economic planning; (8) governance of national 
resource companies (NRCs), sometimes in collaboration 
with the finance ministry; and (9) promotion of the sector 
at national and international events.
For countries that discover petroleum deposits for the first 
time, there is likely to be a provisional approach to the design 
of a ministry’s role, relying on an existing ministry until it is 
clearer what the size of the deposits is likely to be and there-
fore what sort of organizational commitments are required.
Although environmental and sustainable development 
issues are usually the responsibility of other ministries, 
small units charged with coordination of the sector and 
environmental or social ministries are often found within 
the extractives sector ministry.
Mining Specifics. The sector ministry will typically include 
four units that play important roles in mining. The first of 
these is the Mining Cadastre Office, which is responsible for 
issuing and overseeing licenses, enforcing license conditions, 
and suspending, terminating for cause, or accepting relin-
quishment of licenses. It is also responsible for maintaining 
an up-to-date and public register of exploration and mining 
licenses, to which any interested parties may have access. The 
second is the Mining Inspectorate Office, which is typically 
charged with ensuring compliance with licensing conditions 
and health and safety regulations. It also carries out produc-
tion and technical audits, which require a strong presence at 
commercial and artisanal mining sites. Third, also likely to 
play an important role is the Environmental and Social Unit, 
which provides support to the environmental and social 
authorities responsible for the sector; it also takes charge of 
outreach to local communities and mining companies. This 
unit can help improve the benefits of mining activities and 
mitigate the impacts, which often are felt most directly at the 
community level. Finally, within the sector ministry there 
may be a unit dedicated to engagement with artisanal and 
small-scale mining (ASM). This is likely to provide training 
to assist ASM productivity and health, safety, and environ-
mental performance.
Requirements for Effective Performance. If the sector ministry 
is to work effectively with other ministries and agencies, there 
will have to be an alignment of shared objectives; clarification 
of mandates, competencies, and responsibilities; sharing of 
knowledge; and a willingness to use memoranda of under-
standing or similar mechanisms to formalize working rela-
tionships and to clarify potentially overlapping mandates, 
competencies, and responsibilities.
Effective performance in the ministry is likely to be 
enhanced by attention to five areas: (1) avoiding discretionary 
Box 5.1 Institutional Structure: The Ministry and the Regulatory Agency (continued)
A well-designed sector regulatory agency is responsible 
for the following:
1. Topographical mapping, regional geological map-
ping, and related work
2. Geological data collection, dissemination, and pub-
lication (including the digitization of paper files and 
records)
3. Setting consultation, consent, and approval require-
ments at critical stages of operations, including the 
following:
■ Reconnaissance
■ Exploration work program implementation
■ Drilling
■ Discovery
■ Appraisal
■ Commerciality
■ Development planning and any revisions to plans
■ Reservoir management and production
■ Late field or mine life plans
 ■ Decommissioning plans
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or arbitrary use of power, so that investors have confidence 
that issues will be addressed in a predictable, transparent, and 
orderly manner; (2) securing adequate and competent special-
ist capacity required for monitoring, oversight, and enforce-
ment of regulatory requirements and license and/or contract 
conditions; (3) securing highly competent, professional, and 
noncorrupt staff to oversee large hydrocarbon or mining proj-
ects, with the capacity to deal with the management of interna-
tional companies and large investors; (4) offering employment 
conditions and salaries that prevent the most highly skilled and 
experienced staff from being hired away by international oil, 
gas, and mining companies; and (5) using effective, third-party 
dispute resolution and appeals mechanisms.
Regulatory agencies. The EI sector ministry should 
be empowered and expected to delegate regulatory func-
tions to a subordinate and quasi-independent agency. This 
agency would normally report to the EI sector ministry and 
have oversight functions for (1) the development of techni-
cal specifications and standards; (2) technical supervision of 
EI sector operations; (3) supervision of company operations 
in accordance with contracts and legislation; (4) metering 
and monitoring of production, technical data analysis, and 
storage; (5) recording of licenses and ownership interests; 
(6) contributions to economic planning; and (7) protection 
of social and environmental priorities in coordination with 
relevant authorities.
Oversight and enforcement of health, safety, and envi-
ronmental (HSE) requirements is commonly assigned to a 
regulatory agency. The agency typically has reporting obli-
gations to the EI sector ministry and one or more other 
ministries or agencies involved in HSE issues. This, however, 
is not always the case. In Norway, for example, safety mat-
ters are vested in a distinct petroleum safety authority within 
the regulatory agency. This Norwegian approach appears to 
highlight the importance given to safety considerations; it 
also provides some autonomy within the regulatory agency 
itself.
The collection, storage, and analysis of EI sector data and 
samples, and the preparation and maintenance of records 
on petroleum and mining rights and agreements, have 
become critical mandates for regulatory agencies. Good 
practice provides for an arms-length relationship between 
the regulatory agency and its ministry in order to safeguard 
the regulatory agency’s objectivity. In a number of states, EI 
sector regulatory functions, either formally or in practice, 
have been allocated to the NRC rather than to an indepen-
dent agency. This choice appears to have been based pri-
marily on the perceived superiority of expertise within the 
NRC—but it is a practice that seriously compromises the 
impartiality of regulation. (See “The State as Participant” in 
this chapter).
Mining Specifics. For mining, a distinct body usually has 
important functions covering geological data collection, 
management, and dissemination. It works closely with the 
sector ministry and may well be a part of it. The work of a 
geological survey unit is not likely to be primarily (or at all) 
regulatory in character, but its work will contribute to the 
efforts of the main regulatory bodies. 
The unit’s work includes high-level regional geographi-
cal surveying to provide data from which parties can select 
exploration targets. It entails topographical mapping, 
which is important for many purposes, including mineral 
exploration. The collection and management of data 
includes maintaining all historical data files and maps, 
including both the unit’s own data and those received from 
license holders carrying out exploration work, and it 
encompasses the digitalization of paper files and maps. 
Exportation files have to be kept confidential, but data 
from them are integrated into the overall database and 
made publicly available once a license is relinquished. 
Finally, the geological survey unit is responsible for data 
publication and dissemination. Interested parties must be 
provided physical or virtual access to hard copy and digital 
reports and files. Topographical and geological maps and 
reports and data must be published at an affordable cost 
and in suitable map and other formats, ideally including 
digital formats.
National resource companies. NRCs play a power-
ful, and often controversial, role in EI sector management. 
Normally, NRCs are responsible for commercial operations 
and the development of a shared national capacity in the EI 
sector. Sharing competencies, goals, and planning between 
public and private stakeholders, NRCs often have difficulty 
in separating their obligations. Since NRCs are charged 
with responsibilities going far beyond commercial opera-
tions and may capture local managerial and technical sector 
expertise, they often bypass the EI sector ministry to which 
they usually nominally report.
The importance of NRCs varies greatly between the 
petroleum and the mining industries. Few countries with 
petroleum production actually or in prospect would fail to 
introduce and build an NRC. In the mining sector this is far 
less common. Largely due to their prominence in the petro-
leum sector, NRCs are discussed at some length in this 
chapter’s “The State as Participant.”
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Finance ministry. In almost all states there are certain 
tasks that fall exclusively within the traditional competence 
of a ministry of finance. These usually include (1) tax policy 
and the proposal of tax legislation, (2) resource revenue 
forecasting, (3) revenue management, and (4) expendi-
tures (budget allocations). In a number of states, mining 
and petroleum royalties are assessed and collected by the EI 
sector ministry, especially where there are issues of quan-
tity measurements or price verifications that require specific 
technical expertise.
All of these functions, however, depend on an accurate 
understanding of the EI sector and require close coordina-
tion among the finance and EI sector ministries and NRCs. 
Unfortunately, this coordination is typically weak or entirely 
lacking (Rosenblum and Maples 2009, 26). Good practice 
would recommend establishment of a small professional 
unit within the finance ministry that is well grounded or 
trained in sector economics and operations and able to deal 
with EI sector agencies on an equal footing and, therefore, 
ensure coordination.
Taxation authority. In most states, there is a revenue 
authority responsible for assessing and collecting taxes and 
undertaking tax audits. Likewise, most states have a customs 
authority responsible for import duties. The finance minis-
try is responsible for tax policy and proposing tax legislation 
for the mining and petroleum sectors. All EI sector minis-
tries and authorities must have strong EI sector knowledge 
to do their work efficiently and effectively.
In many states, EI sector tax authorities are part of a larger 
taxpayer unit within the tax authority. Some states may even 
have a dedicated mining tax unit. For states where petroleum 
or minerals make up a significant portion of tax revenues, it 
is important to have high-level systems and capabilities and 
highly skilled and experienced staff to work on a small num-
ber of large EI sector projects. This approach contrasts with 
tax agency authorities that may be dealing with tens of thou-
sands, or possibly hundreds of thousands, of small retail or 
other businesses. This may have important implications for 
staffing and employment policies as well as the provision of 
fully adequate computer and other systems for the sections 
of the tax agency that deal with the EI sector.
Central bank. While not expected to play a proactive role 
in EI sector management, the central bank of a resource-
rich state does play a pivotal role in the tracking, reporting, 
and reconciling of fiscal and financial flows in the EI sector. 
Central banks in these states also likely play a large role in 
setting monetary and exchange rate policies. However, in 
resource-rich states the central bank’s major role relates to 
requirements for repatriation of funds by EI sector investors. 
The central bank will often set policy concerning the share 
of export revenues that must be brought onshore and the 
share that may remain offshore.
Economic planning ministry. In states where economic 
dependence on the EI sectors is high, the performance of the 
sectors is closely tied to overall macroeconomic planning. 
The ministry charged with economic planning, like the 
finance ministry, should have a very close relationship with, 
and a good understanding of, the various EI sector agencies.
Environment ministry. Petroleum and, especially, min-
ing activities are often associated with significant environ-
mental and social footprints. Addressing the issues arising 
from those footprints may be the responsibility of the EI 
sector ministry, but good practice recommends that respon-
sibility go to specialized ministries such as the environment 
ministry and ministries dealing with labor and local com-
munity matters. Good practice also recommends that a 
small unit be established within the EI sector ministry to 
coordinate with the specialized environmental and social 
issue ministries.
Other agencies. There are a number of other state agen-
cies relevant to the EI sector. These include the health 
ministry; labor ministry; ministry of foreign affairs; min-
istry of national parks, wildlife, and tourism; ministry for 
infrastructure; and the customs and excise tax authority, for 
imports and exports (Bunter 2002; Duval et al. 2009, ch. 20).
The state as participant
Governments have adopted state participation in many 
countries and in a variety of forms, according to their aims, 
their circumstances, and the issues they face. The most 
common vehicle for participation has been the NRC, but 
participation can still be effective without it.
On the face of it, NRCs would seem an ideal instrument 
to tackle the problem of asymmetry of information between 
governments and foreign investors. They seem to be an 
obvious vehicle for ensuring and promoting national con-
trol over the development of the oil, gas, and mining sec-
tors, although they feature far more prominently in the 
development of oil and gas than in the mining sector. NRCs 
are now a typical feature in most if not all petroleum 
regimes around the world, particularly outside of the coun-
tries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
122 OIL, GAS, AND MINING
Development (OECD). They control about 90 percent of 
the world’s oil reserves and 75 percent of production, with 
similar shares for natural gas, and many of the world’s 
major oil and gas infrastructure systems.
The role of NRCs in the mining sector has been less per-
vasive but significant nonetheless. The largest producer of 
copper in the world is Codelco (Chile); the leading pro-
ducer of diamonds is Botswana’s partly state-owned 
Debswana; and OCP (Morocco) is the leading producer of 
phosphate in the world. This imbalance is reflected in the 
state of the research, where significant studies have been 
carried out into the role of NRCs in the hydrocarbons but 
fewer in their role in mining.2 In a comprehensive study of 
NRCs, the practice in 45 countries was examined, but only 
11 of these 45 countries had an NRC in mining (NRGI 
2013). Nonetheless, state participation in the mining sector, 
in any one of a diverse array of forms, is not unusual, even 
if far from being as common as in the hydrocarbons sector, 
where Charles McPherson’s observation rings true: 
“Through outright ownership or share participation, either 
on a mandatory basis or through the exercise of option 
rights, [it] remains common practice” (McPherson 2010).
Enthusiasm for NRCs has waxed and waned over the years, 
as experience with them has varied greatly. However, they 
have proved a durable phenomenon, particularly in resource-
rich developing states. They are usually a powerful influence 
on policy making in developing countries. Some countries 
have more than one: the Russian Federation has Rosneft (oil) 
and Gazprom (gas); China has the national oil companies, the 
China National Petroleum Corporation, and the China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC); and Trinidad 
and Tobago has distinct national gas and oil companies.
Often referred to as “national champions,” NRCs have 
been established with a wide range of both commercial 
and noncommercial objectives. The latter have included, 
in countries like Nigeria and Angola, the tasks of award of 
rights, revenue collection, and public expenditures. Their 
performance in pursuing all these objectives has provoked 
debate and prompted responses aligned with what is now 
considered good practice (Marcel 2006; McPherson 2003). 
Initially, there was a tendency to evaluate them in relation to 
the kind of objectives that international resource companies 
(IRCs) set themselves and identify ways in which they could 
be more effective in value creation (Tordo, Tracy, and Arfaa 
2011). More recently, appraisals of their performance have 
focused on their governance, since often they operate with 
low levels of oversight and accountability (Heller, Mahdavi, 
and Schreuder 2014). Indeed, recent research has indicated 
that no less than 18 out of 45 NRCs are not under any legal 
obligation to report information about their operations and 
28 fail to provide comprehensive reports on their activities 
and finances. However, where existing NRCs have accepted 
remedial reform measures, there is good evidence of their 
achieving enhanced levels of performance.
The international reach of NRCs has grown in recent 
years. A number of NRCs have adopted a strategy of diversi-
fying internationally into upstream investments abroad. 
Examples of companies pursuing this strategy are Petrobras 
in Brazil; the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation and 
Sinopec in China; Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited 
in India; Gazprom, LukOil, and Rosneft in Russia; and 
Petronas in Malaysia. For the Chinese and Indian compa-
nies, one of the drivers behind such expansion has been to 
gain access to energy production that can meet the home 
state’s economic demands (Jiang and Sinton 2011). However, 
NRCs have over time enjoyed diverse results in their interna-
tionalization strategies.
Commercial objectives. Most NRCs have objectives that 
include a requirement to act in a commercial manner, even 
if the way in which that is defined and its relationship to 
other goals vary considerably from one case to the next. In a 
small number of cases in the past, NRCs in the petroleum 
industry have been expected to emulate, and have been suc-
cessful in emulating, their privately owned counterparts in 
terms of commercial efficiency and the generation of profits. 
These NRCs have been successful in operating as a coun-
terbalance to the traditional influence of IRCs. In a limited 
number of cases, these NRCs have been able to replace IRCs 
completely (Stockman 2011).
Noncommercial objectives. The more common expe-
rience is that NRCs have tended to be the focal point for 
accomplishing a broad range of national, economic, social, 
and political objectives. This focus is based on their access to 
funds and to a lesser extent on perceptions that their technical 
and managerial skills are superior to local firms. Objectives 
coming under this heading comprise the following: (1) job 
creation, (2) development of local capacity, and (3) provision 
of social and physical infrastructure.
Petroleum NRCs have also had a key role in income redis-
tribution through the supply of products at subsidized prices 
for domestic consumption. It is important to note that these 
may not cover the NRC’s operating costs. If the NRC toler-
ates an accrual of arrears by consumers, the de facto subsidies 
can be even higher.3 As noted, NRCs also act as the petroleum 
sector regulator and, in the case of petroleum projects under 
a production-sharing agreement (PSA), the NRCs act as a 
CHAPTER 5: SECTOR ORGANIZATION AND REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS 123
fiscal or commercial agent selling the government’s share of 
petroleum on the government’s behalf.
Examples of these noncommercial roles allocated to an 
NRC are many. In Angola, Sonangol, the national oil com-
pany, has the duty to use its revenues to manage and service 
Angola’s sovereign debt. In Mexico, PEMEX, the state 
petroleum company, has directed a program called Gifts 
and Donations, which aims to promote social development 
by providing small-scale infrastructure, in-kind goods, and 
cash transfers. This noncommercial role was one of the 
company’s activities that were targeted by the government 
for reform in 2013.
It may be argued that the NRC is better suited to provide 
services to remote communities than the central govern-
ment: this was an argument made in Angola with respect to 
Sonangol (IMF 2007, 29n50). The transparency of any such 
activities would need to be clear however, with reporting 
requirements put in place. Often they are not.
Issues relating to NRC performance. There have been 
problems and controversy with respect to both assigned 
functions and the NRCs’ performance in carrying out these 
functions. Meeting commercial objectives has proved diffi-
cult; in fact, with few exceptions, NRCs have scored poorly in 
this area (Tordo, Tracy, and Arfaa 2011). This is attributable 
to a number of factors, including a lack of competition and 
weakness in capacity. Funding equity participation in the EI 
sector has also proved a problem for NRCs. In states where 
there are urgent competing priorities for the use of public 
funds, choices not to contribute NRC equity participation 
in EI sector projects can hold back performance and devel-
opment of capacity. Other causes have been attributable to 
political interference (using the NRC as a cash cow, for exam-
ple, or changing the directors or management arbitrarily) 
and requirements to carry out noncommercial activities.
By assigning noncommercial objectives to NRCs (some-
times called “nonfiscal goals”), most of which would usually 
be seen as falling within the proper province of government, 
the NRCs have the potential to undermine not only their 
own commercial effectiveness but also the effectiveness of 
governmental macroeconomic management. In granting 
these noncommercial functions to NRCs, governments can 
unnecessarily complicate macroeconomic management and 
diminish transparency and accountability. An NRC assump-
tion of the role of sector regulator while simultaneously 
pursuing commercial objectives creates serious conflict of 
interest issues (Tordo, Tracy, and Arfaa 2011).
Along with the assignment of noncommercial objectives, 
the other main impediment to commercial performance 
relates to a lack of good governance. Primarily, this issue 
relates to the problem of NRCs becoming captured by a 
small number of privileged elites who then use the NRC for 
their own gain rather than for the national interest and 
poverty alleviation (Tordo, Tracy, and Arfaa 2011). With 
access to significant financial flows and the ability to exer-
cise considerable influence over economic activity both 
inside and outside the resource sectors, the NRCs have been 
natural targets for control by elites interested in pursuing 
their own political and personal agendas. These elites have 
an interest in promoting a lack of clarity with respect to 
NRC operations, in politicizing management, and in ensur-
ing dependency of the NRCs on the elites for funding and 
other operational prerequisites.
Responses and good practice. The debate over NRC 
 performance in the past has prompted a number of positive 
responses. Commercial performance has been enhanced by 
the introduction of competition (by partnering with IRCs) 
and by privatization in varying degrees (by partial listing 
on stock exchanges). Funding issues have been addressed 
by adopting flexible contractual formulas (such as carried 
interests or production sharing) with the private sector, 
which defers or cancels funding obligations. Efficient mod-
ern EI sector tax systems can be relied on to generate rev-
enues for the state comparable to those obtained through 
equity participation without risking public funds.
As reflected in a number of states, most reform recom-
mendations include the transfer (with suitable transition 
arrangements) of noncommercial functions to government, 
leaving the NRC to focus primarily on commercial activi-
ties. Most states have avoided giving regulatory roles to 
NRCs in the mining sector, but in the petroleum sector it is 
quite common for NRCs to have considerable regulatory 
obligations in addition to commercial functions. This is 
usually attributable to capacity issues or overriding political 
considerations.
A measure of pragmatism is required in addressing the 
presence of noncommercial functions, however. Probably the 
only NRC that has eliminated all of these functions from its 
portfolio is the Norwegian NRC, Statoil. The challenges to 
exporting the Norwegian model to other countries are signifi-
cant in this and in most other areas (Thurber, Hults, and 
Heller 2011). Context is crucial here. For small states that are 
commencing extractives development, a strict separation of 
functions may not yet be attainable or even desirable. For states 
with limited capacity or political constraints, it may also not be 
feasible, at least in the near term. Indeed, some countries, such 
as Brazil, Colombia, India, and Indonesia have temporarily 
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assigned regulatory responsibilities to an NRC during an initial 
phase of development, only to take them away at a later, more 
mature phase of operations when commercial behavior 
appears feasible and when conflicts of interest may create per-
formance costs (Heller, Mahdavi, and Schreuder 2014, 8).
If regulatory functions cannot be separated from the 
NRC, they can be ring-fenced within it for operational and 
accounting purposes, and reported in the national budget 
and accounts. Transfer of regulatory functions out of the 
NRC is high on all EI sector reform agendas, but internal 
ring-fencing may be preferable until credible capacity and 
assurances of good governance can be established in an 
external agency. Serious commitment to eventual NRC 
commercialization is also essential.
Without resources, the path to eventual commercializa-
tion will prove elusive. If revenue cannot be retained by the 
NRC, or if flows from the finance ministry cannot be guar-
anteed, the results are likely to be negative. PEMEX, Petronas, 
and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 
have incurred significant losses because revenue flows have 
proved inadequate to cover operational costs on a regular 
basis. The experience of Angola’s Sonangol illustrates that 
the opposite: too much autonomy can have damaging effects 
on revenue flows to central governmental institutions.
Within the NRC, transparency should be accepted as a criti-
cal ingredient to good governance. This starts with properly 
prepared, externally audited, and public accounts. Disclosure 
of such key data on company finances and activities on a regu-
lar basis is critical. One of the ways in which this can be 
achieved is to partly privatize the NRC, as with Petrochina, 
Gazprom, Petrobras, KazmunaiGaz E&P (Kazakhstan), and 
Statoil. This requires the NRCs to demonstrate to prospective 
investors that they have good commercial prospects, 
transparent decision making, and accounts that are clear and 
meet set objectives. Adherence to the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative standard of 2016 would require the 
publication of information on the in-kind sales of oil, gas, and 
minerals managed by NRCs; on NRC transfers to and from the 
state finance ministry; on the overall revenues earned by the 
NRC; and on basic information about quasi-fiscal expendi-
tures on infrastructure, subsidies, and debt relief. Behind this 
emphasis on transparency is the familiar concern with effective 
performance rather than transparency as an end in itself. It can 
play a key contributory role in transforming economic success 
in oil, gas, and mineral activities into sustainable advances in 
development.
Mining NRCs. The establishment of NRCs in the mining 
sector has become more popular in recent years following 
a period of relatively poor performance. Some of the NRCs 
in the mining industry had their roots in nationalizations 
of mining operations, primarily in the 1960s and 1970s, 
following the independence of many states. Their perfor-
mance, especially those in Africa and Asia, was hampered by 
a variety of factors, including mismanagement, poor access 
to resources, a lack of cost discipline, political intervention, 
and corruption. Only a few, for example in Zambia, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ghana, reversed their 
nationalization of the mining sector, however. For the most 
part, state participation remained in one form or another.
When mineral prices began to rise significantly, there was a 
revival of interest, with plans to establish new mining compa-
nies announced (Hall 2013; Bryson 2011). Participation in 
private sector mining activities could be arranged through 
shareholder agreements (see box 5.2). Several of the top inter-
national mining companies are now to some extent in state 
Box 5.2 Mining Participation
Well-designed arrangements for a government to take 
a minority equity role in private sector mining invest-
ments will be based on a shareholder agreement that 
addresses the following:
1. How the equity is funded (free equity, carried 
equity, or paid-in equity) for both initial capital 
expenditures and any subsequent needs (including 
covering cash flow shortages or funding sustaining 
capital expenditures or production expansions)
2. The decision-making powers of different share-
holders regarding issues such as dividend deci-
sions, budget approvals, senior management 
appointments and remuneration, investment 
 programs, and raising new capital (including new 
debt)
3. Conditions under which ownership may change
4. Shareholder responsibilities and obligations at the 
time of mine closure
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hands (see chapter 3). Mining companies with links to the state 
have emerged as international investors too (see “Mining 
Dynamics” under section 3.4). A new set of issues is emerging 
related to Chinese NRCs becoming investors around the world 
and offering turnkey infrastructure and other investments as 
part of an overall mining investment package, usually brokered 
by the respective governments (ECLAC 2010; Davies 2010). 
Legal standing. NRCs should ideally be established as dis-
tinct legal entities under the state’s corporate laws and not 
as units within governmental departments. This legal sepa-
ration assists in providing a clear profit motive and avoids 
productive enterprises being used for predominantly social 
or political purposes. Corporatization can help to avoid 
operational subsidies being subsumed in the budgets of 
government departments. It can also help incorporate fiscal 
discipline principles from the corporate world in terms of 
capital raising and corporate decision making. Beyond cor-
poratization, a partial stock listing (where the state main-
tains majority control) can bring the added discipline of 
meeting stock market listing and reporting requirements.
Market discipline. The most efficient NRCs are those that 
have been subject to full market competition, that is, NRCs 
that gain no advantageous treatment from their own govern-
ments compared with privately owned companies. This means 
that NRCs should whenever possible be subject to the same 
fiscal regimes, tax assessments, auditing procedures, and tax 
payments of a privately held company. The NRC should apply 
for, and obtain, licenses in the same manner as other compa-
nies and should be subject to the same licensing conditions as 
private companies, with all regulatory activities being under-
taken by government regulatory offices.
Like a private company, the NRC should be subject to 
strong market discipline (Tordo, Tracy, and Arfaa 2011). 
This means that the NRC should raise capital in the private 
market place and should set up and maintain a strong bal-
ance sheet with debt obligations that do not create any undue 
pressure or risk for the shareholder. Any debt obligations 
should be insignificant in terms of their impact on national 
accounts, sovereign debt, and any debt service of the state.
Good governance. Good governance of NRCs requires 
attention to the role of EI sector or finance ministries in 
exercising the shareholder role on behalf of the state. Com-
mercially based shareholder roles can lead to companies 
that compete strongly in the international market place. 
Examples of companies with a strong commercially based 
shareholder role include Codelco in Chile, Petronas in 
Malaysia, and Vale and Petrobras in Brazil. Codelco and 
Statoil (Norway) are often cited as examples of NRC success 
stories (see box 5.3).
Box 5.3 NRC Success Stories
Some prominent examples of generally well-managed 
and highly profitable and competitive NRCs include, 
in mining, Chile’s Codelco and, in petroleum, Norway’s 
Statoil.
Codelco was formed in 1976 to take charge of the 
state’s mining interests. It is 100 percent state owned, 
with a board appointed by the president of Chile. 
It accounts for 5 percent of gross domestic product, 
25 percent of exports, and 17 percent of the budget. 
There is limited governmental interference and a high 
degree of transparency. In spite of its incorporation of 
several elements of good governance, Codelco has 
little control over its revenues, and there are tensions 
between commercial and social functions, leading to 
inefficiencies.
Norway’s state petroleum company, Statoil, was cre-
ated in 1972. It was granted preferential status in the 
licenses awarded to international oil companies, 
involving a license share for Statoil that was carried 
through the exploration phase by the oil company 
partners, and in the event of a commercial discovery 
the share rose to 51 percent of the license. It helped 
Statoil to develop rapidly as a commercial enterprise. 
The primary goal from the outset was commercial effi-
ciency, and present and future role of Statoil to incom-
ing investors was clear. Extended public discussion of 
both structure and policies took place. The company’s 
portfolio was later split in two, and all remaining ele-
ments of preferential treatment were removed. In 2001 
Statoil was partly privatized. The state had no board 
participation and the state’s direct participation in 
licenses was held by a separate entity, the State Direct 
Financial Interest, in turn managed by another state 
entity operating on a nonprofit basis. The trend has 
been for state participation to become much lower to 
around 20 percent.
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Likewise, a misguided or even corrupt shareholder role 
that is combined with inadequate or corrupt management 
and large noncommercial roles can lead to the kind of 
companies that are now producing only a small fraction of 
their peak production. Examples of companies in the min-
ing sector that have experienced these types of problems 
in the past include Gecamines in Democratic Republic of 
Congo, ZCCM Investment Holdings in Zambia, and 
Comibol in Bolivia. Examples from the petroleum sector 
might include NNPC in Nigeria and Pertamina in 
Indonesia, both of which have incurred huge financial 
losses in the past.
While the management of state-owned enterprises may 
make recommendations and proposals regarding annual 
budgets, investments, and raising debt and dividends, good 
practice is for an NRC to be required to have polices and 
decisions regarding such matters taken by its board of 
directors, giving due consideration to the owners’ interests, 
guidance, and instructions.
At the highest level, there are six main aspects related to 
a strong commercial shareholder role:
1. Shareholding needs to be held in the name of one or 
more government officials (such as EI sector or finance 
ministries), which will appoint the board of directors, 
who act as the shareholders’ representatives governing 
the NRC. The directors should be selected and appointed 
based on their knowledge about the business and avail-
ability to become informed about the company’s activi-
ties in order to ensure that the shareholders’ interests are 
well served. The directors should be fully independent of 
management and management influence.
2. The appointment of management should be based on 
professional qualifications and experience, not political 
or family affiliations.
3. The board of directors should provide management with a 
clearly stated mission related to resource development 
(including mineral or petroleum processing and marketing 
as appropriate).
4. The board of directors should ensure that management 
focuses on its core business and does not expand its 
activities into other noncore business areas. In this 
regard, the board of directors should approve only those 
company business and investment plans that are consis-
tent with shareholder objectives. A very important aspect 
is the scope and focus of the core business and any ancil-
lary business activities. Another important aspect is the 
employment policy of the company regarding workforce 
productivity and remuneration.
5. Oversight of the sources and uses of funds with regard 
to the NRC should be done to raise commercial borrow-
ing of needed debt, meeting the listing requirements of 
stock markets and the shareholder; that is, the manage-
ment should not make decisions with regard to cash 
flow distribution, dividend, and retention for the com-
pany. Instead, this should be based on a management 
recommendation.
6. The NRC, its managers, and directors should be excluded 
from any regulatory roles or activities.
State equity. It is not uncommon for legislation to provide 
government with the right to take a minority equity holding 
in a private sector EI operation (see “State Participation” 
under section 6.4 “Fiscal Instruments” and box 6.1). Such 
equity can be held directly in the name of the government or 
it can be held by a government entity that is established as a 
vehicle to hold equity in other companies.
Minority equity participation can have the advantages of 
enabling a government to invest in a potentially profitable 
EI project, while avoiding the costs and risks associated with 
exploration or other preparatory work (which may not 
eventually result in a viable investment opportunity). It also 
gives the government access to information that may not 
otherwise be available about the project and the partnering 
private shareholder company. Moreover, it gives govern-
ment a share in the dividends of the company—although 
these are generally unpredictable and may take many years 
to appear, especially if the company is not very profitable or 
if all the profits should be reinvested.
There are also potential risks and disadvantages to minor-
ity equity participation. The government may have a limited 
decision-making role as a minority shareholder when all 
major decisions are made by the majority shareholder. If the 
company plans a major new investment or expansion that 
requires additional equity from its shareholders, the govern-
ment may be faced with a dilemma of having to put in addi-
tional equity or see its ownership diluted.
In the worst case, if the company is losing money, it may 
require additional shareholder funds to remain in business. 
The government may be required to put in new cash to keep 
the company operating. There can also be a potential or real 
conflict of interest if a regulator is also given a position on 
the company’s board of directors as one of the government 
shareholder representatives.
It is important that there is full disclosure of the forms 
of payment involved for participation shares and the own-
ership arrangements involved. In some countries, a work-
ing interest share may be granted to the “government” but 
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in fact is held by a group of individuals associated with the 
government. If this delegation is transparent, its rationale 
should be fully disclosed (IMF 2007, 25n39).
Equity funding. There are two main ways to fund an equity 
stake: by means of paid-in capital or a carried interest (see 
section 6.3 and box 6.2). A third but less common approach 
is to acquire the equity for free. The method of paid-in capi-
tal means that the government pays for its equity in cash so 
that it has the same standing as other shareholders. In this 
case, the government should make its decision as part of its 
overall process for determining both the uses and sources 
of its funds to help ensure that it makes rational decisions 
regarding any use of its funds for an equity investment.
Carried interests are frequently used for minority gov-
ernment equity participation in EI sector projects. The 
advantage for the government is that it does not have to 
provide cash. The disadvantage for the company, and the 
other shareholders, is that carried interests have the effect of 
diluting the equity base of the company, which must then 
raise the cash to cover the government’s participation 
(Kemp 1987, 103). Thus, carried interests are essentially a 
loan from the company, or the majority shareholder, to the 
government.
There are instances when governments insist on a 
minority free equity in a new EI sector project. Free equity 
is tantamount to taxing the project but is a very different 
instrument from a tax. An equity holding gives a govern-
ment the many rights and benefits but also the many obliga-
tions and risks of a shareholder. A tax requirement simply 
gives the government the right to collect a tax payment by 
the company and the obligation to assess and collect taxes 
according to the prevailing taxation rules (Sunley, 
Baunsgaard, and Simard 2003, 164). A mandatory require-
ment for free equity runs the risk of creating a climate of 
resentment and distrust. This can result in the private 
shareholder(s) looking for ways to recoup their investment 
without using dividends to which all shareholders are 
entitled.
Key institutional issues
Building capacity. Large-scale EI sector developments 
can involve very substantial investments relative to many 
small economies and can require much more technical 
expertise than other sectors in the domestic economy. They 
can also involve very experienced and serious international 
investors, on the one hand, and speculators seeking a short-
term advantage from a state’s resources, on the other.
Experienced investors can put government officials at a 
disadvantage when negotiating private participation in 
a state’s EI sector (Cotula 2010, 131). It may be necessary, 
therefore, to adjust employment and other policies, so that 
the EI sector agencies can attract and retain competent, non-
corrupt, well-qualified, and experienced professional staff in 
sufficient numbers to administer the EI sector effectively and 
represent the state interest. It may also be necessary to ensure 
that the EI sector ministries and agencies, and their counter-
parts in the tax and finance ministries, have adequate bud-
gets and technical capacity, given the high financial stakes 
involved for a state with large-scale EI sector operations.
The development of institutional capacity is crucial. 
Appropriate institutional capacity at each stage in the EI 
Value Chain is critical to overall EI sector management suc-
cess. Targeted skills, training, adequate resources and com-
pensation, and insulation from political interference are 
essential. Resource-rich developing states whose institu-
tional capacity is weak can seek support by directly engaging 
external expertise or benefiting from donor or international 
finance institution technical assistance programs. External 
assistance can be doubly valuable in providing essential 
training while at the same time addressing current issues on 
behalf of the state. Good practice would call for this assis-
tance to be discussed and carefully planned with the 
expected beneficiaries. The petroleum sector technical assis-
tance program, designed jointly by the governments of 
Norway and South Sudan and the World Bank, provides an 
excellent example of good practice (see box 5.4).
Interagency coordination. Perhaps the biggest issue 
in the development of appropriate institutional capacity 
relates to interagency coordination. Several different gov-
ernment entities engage with EI sector investors. The key 
government agencies include (1) the EI sector ministry or 
government department on exploration and production, 
(2) the ministry responsible for geological data, (3) the 
ministry responsible for the environment, (4) the ministry 
responsible for local community and social issues, (5) the 
finance ministry, (6) the ministry or administration respon-
sible for taxation, (7) the ministry responsible for economic 
planning, and (8) the ministry or ministries responsible for 
rural and small business development. There are also spe-
cialist regulatory agencies that have a role from time to time.
As will be noted in the discussion of fiscal administration 
in chapter 6, all too often expertise regarding EI sector 
exploration and operation is to be found only in the EI sec-
tor ministry. If this expertise is not made available to, or not 
accepted by, other arms of government, the result can be 
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that those other agencies will be seriously disadvantaged in 
their engagement on EI sector issues.
It is not unusual to find that some ministries or agencies are 
actively encouraging new investment while, at the same time, 
others are in effect creating barriers (for example, in their 
approach to environmental permitting procedures). This can 
obviously create additional risks for investors and fewer ben-
efits for government. As a practical matter, this can cause 
problems with issuing visas and work permits and providing 
customs clearances and releases for goods and equipment. 
Thus, there is great value in developing well-organized and 
coordinated EI sector knowledge-sharing and information 
flows. In particular, it is important that the EI sector ministry 
coordinates well with other government departments in order 
to achieve effective oversight, regulation, and risk sharing 
between government and investors (Alba 2009, 9).
Efforts at institutional reform
An increasing number of countries have engaged in major 
reforms of their institutional structures responsible for oil, 
gas, and mining. From Indonesia and Mexico to Nigeria and 
Algeria, there are examples of countries that have found their 
institutions inadequate to handle evolving national circum-
stances, changing resource horizons, or market conditions. 
As a result, they have initiated, at a minimum, reviews of 
existing arrangements, and more ambitiously, programs of 
sweeping institutional change. Some of these have  succeeded, 
at least in part, and others have stalled or failed.
These experiences have generated a growing body of litera-
ture, which has relied heavily on case study analysis, sometimes 
using political economy theory as a tool for analysis (Victor, 
Hults, and Thurber 2012). Heller and Marcel (2012) have 
rightly observed that much of the literature on the hydrocar-
bons sector is heavily biased toward the experiences of large, 
well-established oil producers, which have geological prospects 
and institutional capacity levels that are very different from the 
context of administrative, human, and oil sector capacity con-
straints that typically characterize the new entrants. To build 
capacity quickly, the governments concerned face the choice of 
concentrating resources and responsibilities in a single institu-
tion, such as an NRC or sector ministry, or to separate the 
functions and lay the foundations for good governance.
Hydrocarbons. Much of the reform effort in the hydrocar-
bons sector has been influenced by the Norwegian “separation 
of functions” approach, whereby the commercial, regulatory, 
and policy functions of government are kept institutionally 
distinct. Specialist institutions are created for each of these 
functions and given a limited mandate so that intragovern-
mental roles are clear. Such an approach appears to have had 
much success in Norway in resource management, but this 
provides no guarantee that it can be replicated in countries 
with very different political systems, population sizes, and 
institutional structures. A major constraint is often a lack of 
human capital, but so is a lack of institutional development, 
such as one might expect to find in a postconflict society. For 
example, in a study of several oil-producing countries and 
Box 5.4 Petroleum Technical Assistance to South Sudan
South Sudan was officially recognized as an inde-
pendent state in July 2011. Since then, it has become 
the most petroleum revenue-dependent country in 
the world (with dependence at 98 percent of its 
budget).
A grant of US$ 3.3 million was prepared by the 
World Bank, working closely with the South Sudanese 
government and other key donors, such as Norway, 
to address South Sudan’s urgent petroleum sector pri-
orities in three key areas. The grant would do the 
following:
1. Assist the Ministry of Energy and Mining 
and Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
(MoFEP) in assuming certain core functions related 
to EI sector management and revenue management
2. Assist MoFEP in establishing a macroeconomic and 
fiscal policy framework that takes into account the 
challenges of extreme petroleum dependence
3. Assist relevant committees of the South Sudan 
Legislative Assembly to begin to carry out their account-
ability function for the use of petroleum revenues
In all cases, appropriate external expertise has been 
carefully identified and will be twinned with selected 
South Sudanese expertise for training and capacity 
building purposes.
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their oil governance regimes, a Stanford University research 
team noted that efforts to establish independent regulatory 
agencies in Algeria and Nigeria had not only failed but had 
not even helped to promote the idea that regulatory reform 
could bring valuable benefits (Thurber, Hults, and Heller 
2011). If the wider environment is not conducive to reform, 
or the political will is lacking, or both, the chances of such 
a structure being successfully transplanted and leading to 
greater accountability are very small. São Tomé and Prín-
cipe is another example of a country in which the establish-
ment of a tripartite structure has failed to generate significant 
improvements in accountability (Heller and Marcel 2012, 31).
The Stanford University team also noted the existence of 
a group of countries that had never seriously attempted to 
separate commercial from regulatory and policy functions 
but which had nevertheless had oil sectors that appeared to 
run “reasonably well” (Thurber, Hults, and Heller 2011, 14). 
Angola is one such example where there is no independent 
regulatory institution and where in practice the national oil 
company is sector manager, regulator, and operator all 
rolled into one. From a transparency point of view this is far 
from optimal, but it has led to a productive and stable petro-
leum sector in a country that had the destabilizing effects of 
a civil war from 1975 to 2002. If a conclusion may be drawn 
it is that the political economy of the country concerned is of 
paramount importance to the establishment of a successful 
regime of governance and that reform plans need to take this 
into account if they are to be effective.
In recent years, Latin America has taken a number of 
different approaches to reform in both hydrocarbons and 
mining (Zamora 2014). In hydrocarbons, Colombia is a 
leading example (see box 5.5), following on from earlier 
Box 5.5 Petroleum Reform in Colombia
After 30 years of resource administration by the 
Colombian National Oil Company, Ecopetrol, which 
had been created in 1951 to operate the assets of the De 
Mares concession after its contractual ending, an insti-
tutional reform was adopted by the government using 
special powers granted by congress in 2003.
Similar to Brazil, the reform separated the adminis-
tration of the petroleum resources from Ecopetrol and 
created the National Hydrocarbons Agency (ANH) to 
undertake this role. The ANH was given sufficient 
powers to design the most appropriate contractual 
vehicle(s) to allow the operations of Ecopetrol or any 
other qualified third parties in exploration and pro-
duction under equal access.
In December of 2006, Ecopetrol was further trans-
formed into a publicly owned and listed corporation 
with direct participation of financial investors in its 
ownership and decision making, with a limit of 20 
percent of its shares.
The scope of the resource administration of the 
ANH is limited to the upstream end of the value chain. 
The midstream activities continue to be regulated by 
the Ministry of Mines and Energy, while, since December 
2012, the regulation of downstream activities passed 
from the ministry to the already existing independent 
regulatory commission for electricity and gas.
The ANH adopted a new contractual vehicle in 
2014. It can be described in modern terms as a tax and 
royalty license with additional state participations at 
variable shares of production. The royalty established 
by the law is variable (5–25 percent) on a sliding scale 
according to average monthly production volumes by 
field. The additional contract-based shares of produc-
tion are two tiered: one that is based on a sliding-scale 
function of international prices (calculated as a 30–50 
percent share of excess price over a base price) and 
another that is established as a bidding parameter in 
competitive bidding rounds (x factor) as a percentage 
of the net production of the operator after royalties 
and price-based production shares.
The new contract could be described as a hybrid 
between concession and production sharing. Such a 
design allows for a variable capture of economic rent, 
as is the case with PSAs but without the complications 
of a joint administration. The state owns the resource 
in the ground and transfers title of the operator’s share 
at the wellhead, while retaining the state’s share 
through to the point of sale, which can be anywhere 
from the wellhead onward.
While reaffirming the sovereignty of the state over 
its resources, the contract allows for a flexible and pro-
gressive capture of rent and a clean and simple admin-
istration that avoids potential conflicts of interpretation 
or cumbersome administrative procedures.
Ecopetrol, on the other hand, operates as a fully 
integrated petroleum company, listed in the Bogotá, 
New York, and Toronto stock exchanges, with strict 
and transparent governance and reporting systems.
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reforms in Brazil (see box 5.6), with Mexico embarking 
on an ambitious long-term restructuring starting in 
2013. In their approach to the assignment of powers to 
regulate and oversee the sector, Brazil, Colombia, and 
Peru have put in place systems with an independent, 
professional, and transparent administration of the 
resource and a separate NRC. Mexico is a transitional 
case but has already separated the resource administra-
tion and licensing responsibilities from the NRC into the 
Ministry of Energy and the National Hydrocarbons 
Commission.
Mining. Efforts at institutional reform in the mining 
 sector have taken a slightly different direction from those 
in hydrocarbons, with a strong emphasis on the kinds of 
reform required to attract inward investment, coupled 
with measures designed to enable institutions to respond 
better to the social and environmental footprint of the 
mining industry (Bastida 2008). However, to achieve 
these objectives there has been a similar focus on iden-
tification and differentiation of roles among government 
institutions, even if much less on the role of state compa-
nies than in the hydrocarbons sector. In many countries, 
a significant challenge derives from the age of the  mining 
sector. Oftentimes it has a much longer history than 
hydrocarbons: the institutional and legal  frameworks can 
readily date from decades earlier and reflect thinking that 
has long since been superseded. Reform has also had to 
take into account the differences in scale that are common 
among mining projects, with small-scale and artisanal 
miners playing a role that has no parallel in the hydrocar-
bons sector.
Several examples of mining reform illustrate the 
 special challenges facing reformers in the mining sector. 
In Argentina in the 1990s, reform targeted legal and 
policy frameworks that had been established in the 
19th century and required the establishment of coordi-
nation among the 23 provinces, which owned the min-
eral resources, and the federal government. The initial 
emphasis was on licensing and geological survey activi-
ties, but this shifted to environmental aspects and social 
impacts.
Institutionally, the biggest challenge is often what Gary 
McMahon has called the “Catch 22 of mining sector 
reform” (McMahon 2010). If reform is successful at 
attracting investment, “the public institutions cannot hire 
more staff or even keep their own people due to the large 
demand from much higher paying private companies.” 
This problem appeared in other countries such as Mali 
and Papua New Guinea, which addressed it by earmarking 
part of the mining revenues for the responsible sector 
ministries.
Box 5.6 Petroleum Sector Reform in Brazil
Brazil’s organizational reform of its petroleum sector 
(1997 onward) has provided clarity on roles and respon-
sibilities and enhanced transparency and accountability. 
The roles for Petrobras (Brazil’s NRC for petroleum 
exploitation) are divided among the following entities:
 ■ President: Approves fiscal targets for Petrobras
 ■ Congress: Approves the investment budget for Petrobras
 ■ Ministry of Mines and Energy: Develops EI sector 
policy and the Petrobras budget
 ■ Agencia Nacional do Petroleo (ANP): Independent 
regulatory agency that provides regulatory oversight 
and royalty administration
 ■ Ministry of Finance: Develops EI sector tax design and 
administration and proposes fiscal targets for Petrobras
– Petrobras: Responsible for commercial petroleum 
operations
 ■ It is 51 percent state owned with the remaining 
shares listed on the stock exchange and subject to 
exchange requirements on transparency. Petro-
bras provides full disclosure of expenditures and 
revenues that are held in public, audited accounts. 
It coexists with more than 70 other upstream oper-
ating companies.
 ■ Private sector: Authorized to act alone or in joint 
ventures with Petrobras
Since the large “presalt” discoveries in 2007, a different 
approach has been adopted. Production-sharing con-
tracts instead of concessions were required for the 
presalt areas, and Petrobras was made the exclusive 
operator with a minimum of 30 percent stake in any 
consortium. Governance indicators for Brazil have 
deteriorated since.
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In Papua New Guinea, the sector reforms were triggered 
by the clear need to rebalance sector organization in favor 
of community rights, in the face of a perception among the 
Bouganville islanders that they bore all of the environmen-
tal and social costs but saw few of the economic benefits 
(McMahon 2010, 16–17). Changes were made in the draft 
standard mining contract to address this, and institutional 
capacity was expanded. Spinoff businesses and joint ven-
tures between local and foreign companies resulted, formal-
ized in memoranda signed by mining companies and their 
host communities. Further, both government and mining 
companies supported the establishment of specific action 
plans to support women in mining, with a gender desk set 
up for each large mine. This gender focus led to women 
playing important roles in the renegotiation of community 
benefits in memoranda of agreement for two of the most 
important mining areas, Ok Tedi and Lihir.
Separately, a new mining authority was established in 
2006: the Mineral Resource Authority, charged with admin-
istering the sector. It raises its own funding from sector 
levies and fees and is not subject to the kind of funding 
shortages and staff constraints as its predecessor. Another 
agency was established to maintain the regulatory frame-
work with substantial institutional capacity.
Another example of mining reform is the program 
that commenced in Madagascar in the late 1990s 
(McMahon 2010, 22–23). The two key planks of the policy 
were a decentralized administration and a close involvement 
of affected communities. Programs of capacity building were 
introduced for local and regional mining administrations. 
A separate initiative was to establish an institute for the study 
of gems, since the country has around 500,000 artisanal and 
small-scale miners. 
Box 5.7 summarizes key points about mining sector reform 
in several other countries.
5.3 SPECIAL ISSUES
Because a growing number of governments desire to secure 
wide benefits from oil, gas, and mining activities, they have 
developed an interest in better understanding the kind of sec-
tor organization typically required after the grant of rights by 
the host government agreement to the investor(s). Many sec-
ond order agreements are concluded by investors on this cru-
cial foundation and often establish a kind of investor-led 
governance, relying on decades of evolving industry practices.
In this operational phase of extractives’ activities, the 
host state still has an important monitoring role and will 
often be present as a participant. Typically, it will either 
become a party to arrangements such as a joint venture or it 
will need to understand them in order to perform its over-
sight role. Of course, it can do both.
Box 5.7 Mining Sector Reforms
Botswana, Brazil, Chile, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and Zambia provide different models for both 
sustained success and reform.
Botswana has a 50/50 ownership of the highly prof-
itable Debswana diamond operation with De Beers and 
has played an active, commercial shareholder role 
while leaving management in the hands of De Beers. In 
addition to its dividends as shareholder, the govern-
ment has also received substantial tax payments.
CVRD (now called Vale) has been a well-governed 
and well-managed iron ore mining company in Brazil. 
It was taken to the stock market by the government and 
remains one of the world’s largest and most profitable 
iron ore exporters.
Chile has retained control and operation of much of 
its copper resources through the 100 percent state-owned 
Codelco. A strong shareholder role, undertaken in large 
part by the technically competent and well-experienced 
Chilean Copper Commission (Cochilco), has enabled 
Codelco to remain one of the most highly profitable and 
lowest cost mining companies in the world over many 
decades.
In the mid-1970s, Gecamines in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and ZCCM in Zambia were two of 
the largest and most profitable copper producers in the 
world; both were state-controlled. However, a combi-
nation of noncommercial roles, mismanagement, and 
corruption led them to become noncompetitive in 
their copper and cobalt mining production. Today, 
they produce one-fifth of their peak production of the 
1970s. Both have now been restructured and reformed 
and have divested much of their noncommercial roles 
to other government agencies. Most of their mineral 
reserves have been auctioned to private investors who 
are now assisting in the rebuilding of the mining sector 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia.
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This level of sector organization is relevant to questions 
about how a domestic industry might be stimulated by oil, 
gas, or mining projects that have a finite life. Domestic com-
panies may eventually be able to supply goods, works, and 
services to the operators of extractives activities and related 
infrastructure projects. Such operators could, of course, be 
NRCs, like Kazmunaigaz in Kazakhstan or Petrobras in 
Brazil. Governance of this “service” sector has typically been 
left largely to the operator, but the growth of local benefit 
policies has brought it increasingly under the scrutiny of 
government bodies. In the near term, they could generate a 
significant boost to employment, and in the long term spi-
noff activity offers potential for creating new industries with 
local, perhaps regional, and even international standing. 
This is the part of the context in which debates about local 
benefit take place (see chapters 4 and 10).
Four of the more common areas in which governments 
might benefit from a deep understanding of governance 
arrangements in oil, gas, and mining sector organization are 
examined in this section: joint ventures, transportation, 
natural gas, and mining agreements.
Hydrocarbons: The joint venture approach
Many EI projects are carried out within the framework of a 
joint venture structure. This can spread risks in high-cost pro-
jects and may be attractive for a variety of reasons, not least if 
there is an exploration risk amid uncertain geology. Irrespective 
of the form of the host government agreement (HGA), there is 
likely to be a joint venture structure underlying it. It is common 
for the state or its agent to be a party to such arrangements, 
often as a sleeping partner in the initial stages. For govern-
ments, this can provide a useful source of information about 
the progress of a project in addition to any reporting require-
ments that are based on the contract between the host govern-
ment and the foreign investors. It can also function as a way of 
building specialist capacity within the state sector. Indeed, in 
some cases the contract may be made by the foreign investors 
and a state company, acting on the government’s behalf.
Commercial structures tend to have some differences 
between the petroleum and mining sectors. Unincorporated 
joint ventures have been more common in oil and gas pro-
jects for reasons rooted in tax, financing, and technology, 
with capital separately provided by the partners and produc-
tion shared. These structures have been much less common 
in mining, with major companies preferring to own majority 
stakes in locally incorporated vehicles.
The principal mechanism for the management of joint 
operations in the petroleum industry is the joint operating 
agreement (JOA). The JOA is the typical legal mechanism by 
which several parties pool their resources to engage in a 
petroleum project. It assumes an agreement between the 
parties and the host state such as a PSA, or concession, and 
cannot exist without such an agreement. Whereas that agree-
ment will set out the rights and obligations of the parties 
vis-à-vis the host government, the JOA will set out the rights 
and obligations of the parties among themselves. It will not 
establish a partnership in the legal sense—it is an unincorpo-
rated joint venture structure. An early draft version of it is 
often seen as a joint bidding agreement (see chapter 4).
The importance of the JOA also lies in its being a starting 
point for further essential agreements concerning the busi-
ness of oil and gas production, processing, sales, and trans-
portation and for other agreements that may be concluded 
among the parties concerning assignment, unit development, 
and decommissioning. If, for example, one or more of the 
parties elects to transfer part of its interest in the licence or 
contract a separate agreement, called a farm-out agreement, 
will normally be used. Its key element is the taking on of an 
obligation to carry out or to fund the carrying out of works. 
If, for example, Party A owns 30 percent of the joint venture, 
it may agree to transfer 15 percent to Party B in return for 
Party B agreeing to fund Party A’s entire 30 percent share of 
the cost of drilling a well. Such transactions to transfer assets 
(and also to sell them through a sale and purchase agree-
ment) are very common in the international oil and gas 
industry. Similarly, the cooperation among parties to a joint 
venture may be developed further if petroleum deposits are 
found that appear to extend from one contract area to 
another. This will normally require the conclusion of a unit-
ization agreement. The latter is briefly examined in the fol-
lowing material. Another important form of agreement that 
is commonly used in current industry practice concerns 
decommissioning (see the discussion in chapter 9).
The joint operating agreement. The union of diverse 
parties that a JOA entails is analogous to the kind of alli-
ance formed by a marriage, although their number may 
well be significantly more than two.4 They come together 
by mutual consent and bind themselves legally for richer, 
for poorer and for better or for worse.5 The JOA is designed 
to last for the life of the project, which may be as much as 30 
years, and the parties will remain together unless termina-
tion, withdrawal, assignment, or default occur. Unlike most 
marriages, the parties write down the rules of conduct that 
they will be subject to. Therefore, the JOA will provide the 
framework and the detailed rules on which the joint venture 
will operate throughout its lifetime. It will be in constant use 
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by the parties during the operations, including their techni-
cal, financial, legal, and operational teams, so it needs to be 
carefully negotiated at the outset. It will usually apply only 
to a single government concession or contract. Given the 
JOA’s key role and the overall asymmetry of information 
between host government and foreign or nonstate compa-
nies, the absence of the government or its state company 
from a JOA means it will be at a serious disadvantage in the 
flow of day-to-day information about a field.
Relationship to the Host Government Agreement. The conces-
sion or contract sets out the vertical relationship between the 
government and the consortium of investors. In a produc-
tion-sharing contract (PSC), the investors are usually 
referred to simply as “contractor.” The JOA itself sets out the 
horizontal relationship among the parties’ consortium in 
which they lay out the rights and liabilities arising under the 
HGA. The two agreements are inseparable. Four features of 
the JOA are particularly relevant to the host government:
1. The work obligations in the HGA relating to exploration 
and appraisal wells to be drilled need to be carried out by 
the joint venture parties and the JOA has to reflect this 
paramount consideration. Further work, such as devel-
opment and production activities, will usually require 
government consent.
2. The operator of the JOA will become the spokesman of 
the consortium and main point of contact with the gov-
ernment. It needs to be comfortable with this and confi-
dent that the choice is compatible with performance of 
the work under the HGA.
3. The physical area set out in the HGA will set limits on the 
scope of the JOA and the rights the parties enjoy over it.
4. The duration of the HGA will set limits on the JOA not 
least if it makes distinctions between specific phases of 
activity or requires more than one form of authorization 
for a defined series of activities.
The HGA will typically provide that the parties in the 
consortium are jointly and severally liable to the govern-
ment for performance of the terms of the HGA. A failure by 
one or more of the parties to fulfill its responsibilities under 
the HGA could result in the government enforcing the 
terms of the HGA against the other parties.
Contents of a JOA. The JOA will not constrain the government 
but as a matter of priority it will be designed to reallocate among 
the parties the joint and several liabilities imposed in the HGA 
so that their liability is shared according to the predetermined 
interests of each of the parties. This will determine each party’s 
ownership interest and benefits and its liability to costs, 
expenses, and risk, as well as its right to vote in relation to the 
management of the joint operations. The sharing of liabilities 
works between the parties and not against the host government 
in the grant of rights made through the HGA (although some-
times the government may insist on approval of the JOA). It 
will be supported by indemnities that will ensure the parties 
undertake to indemnify and hold harmless each other for 
claims, liabilities, and so on, up to their percentage share.
In the interest of efficiency, the parties will appoint an 
operator to run the joint venture on their behalf, with three 
main tasks: to carry out the joint operations, to represent 
the joint venture to the host government and third parties, 
and to manage the group’s internal affairs, such as chairing 
meetings and providing accounts. The operator does this on 
a no-loss, no-gain basis. As the agent for the other parties, 
the operator is normally regarded as having a fiduciary duty 
toward them. What that means and what happens if it is 
breached are guided by the notion of what a “reasonable 
and prudent operator” would do in similar circumstances, 
a standard that is provided in the JOA.
Control over the operations (and the operator) is exercised 
by means of an operating committee in which each of the par-
ties is represented and which controls the direction of opera-
tions by means of passmark voting (the aggregate percentage 
interest required to agree a proposal). These passmarks will 
differ according to the phase of operations, and voting prac-
tices are likely to vary from one JOA to another.
A decision such as the relinquishment of an HGA or 
dismissal of the operator would normally require a higher 
passmark than many other decisions. Another way the JOA 
can control operations is to impose controls on expendi-
ture: all joint operations are funded from a joint account 
(with its workings set out in an accounting procedure that 
forms part of the JOA) into which the parties are liable to 
pay their respective percentage interest share. Procedures 
are established to agree on programs and budgets, and this 
is a key area of importance to the parties for control of 
operations (and the operator) and their exposure to costs. 
The operating committee has the right to make authoriza-
tions for expenditure within the budget over a certain 
amount. The operator’s requirement to keep the operating 
committee fully informed underlines the value to the host 
government of a state body presence on this committee. 
There are also procedures for contracting for certain types 
of work (competitive tendering requirements, restrictions 
on use of operator’s affiliates, and so on) that are relevant to 
a local benefit policy, if one exists.
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Other provisions protect the parties’ interests by provid-
ing for insurance, such as is required by law and as desired 
by the parties; litigation; and sole risk, which allows some 
parties to proceed with a proposal (drilling, appraisal, or 
development) that does not meet with majority approval. 
The JOA does not usually address joint sales of production, 
which is left to individual participants to arrange, nor will it 
address any use of infrastructure facilities such as terminals. 
However, the right to lift a share of production is also 
matched with an obligation to do so, since the commercial, 
financial, and technical aspects of a failure to do so would 
seriously affect the other parties to the JOA. There are also 
provisions in the JOA on access to, and sharing of, data 
gathered in JOA operations and on force majeure.
The JOA does not usually contain more than an outline 
reference to decommissioning (see chapter 9). Its main goal 
is to assert that the parties remain responsible for their per-
centage interest share of decommissioning costs.
Over time the standard approach to even these typical 
JOA clauses will be modified to take into account new 
developments. An example is the Gulf of Mexico oil spill 
disaster and subsequent litigation, which is likely to have an 
impact on clauses dealing with the allocation of liability and 
insurance. In particular, this will involve a review of the 
common use of “willful misconduct” in a JOA to apply to 
intentional or reckless acts and the degree of foresight it 
requires, and the inclusion of “gross negligence.” Other 
clauses may be adapted if the oil and gas subject matter is 
unconventional (for example, shale oil or gas). The possible 
spread of shale gas operations outside the United States 
should lead to such adaptations.
Ending the JOA Relationship. The JOA parties may separate in 
one of three ways: (1) due to fault or default; (2) by mutual 
consent; or (3) a party’s decision to transfer its interest. Default 
may arise as a result of a failure by a party to pay its percentage 
interest share of cash calls within the time set for payment. 
Parties in default normally lose their rights under the JOA and 
ultimately may lose their interest; nondefaulting parties will 
have to pay pro rata the amounts that are outstanding and 
may ultimately acquire the defaulting party’s interest. Defaults 
could arise in connection with decommissioning obligations 
if a party sought to escape this liability, and the JOA should 
provide for this. It may also arise in connection with liability 
for significant environmental damage.
If a party wishes to leave the JOA by transferring its inter-
ests by a sale, a swap, or some other mechanism, consent by 
the host government is normal practice but, in addition, the 
JOA includes provisions on rights to, and limitations on, 
assignment. The other parties’ consent is required before a 
transfer can take place, although this must be “reasonable” 
and may well not apply if the transfer is to an affiliate; and 
the other parties may limit transfers of interests in the JOA 
by including rights of preemption, such as a right of first 
refusal.
Model JOAs. The origins of the JOA lie in practices of an oddly 
named body, the American Association of Petroleum 
Landmen (AAPL). The rather simple approach they adopted 
within the United States was not appropriate to the challenges 
of international petroleum operations, and more complex 
JOAs emerged. Attempts to develop a model JOA for interna-
tional practice have emerged from the Association of 
International Petroleum Negotiators (AIPN), which has pro-
duced successive models, the most recent being in 2012. The 
aim of these models is to reduce the time spent in drafting a 
JOA and in negotiating its content. In practice, there is still 
plenty of scope for negotiation, even if the parties are able to 
commence with one of these industry-accepted models or a 
hybrid approach that combines provisions from more than 
one model of JOA. Any such model will have to be adapted 
to fit the terms of the HGA in a particular case, as well as 
the circumstances of the JOA parties and the project itself. 
Other examples of model JOAs are those provided by Oil & 
Gas UK, which was intended to reflect common U.K. indus-
try  practice at the time (for offshore areas); the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate (available in Norwegian only); the 
Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation; the Canadian 
Association of Petroleum Landmen; and the AAPL. While 
there have been others, those issued by these bodies are the 
models that have been updated from time to time.
A recent development is the model unconventional 
resources operating agreement (UROA) developed by the 
AIPN.6 This is the first operating agreement to cover joint 
operations in shale oil and gas, tight oil and gas, coal-bed 
methane, and other unconventional production methodol-
ogies involving wellbore operations. It is based on an exist-
ing model for conventional resources but considers evolving 
industry practices and issues that are unique to unconven-
tional resources. These unique issues include pilot projects; 
subarea, multipad drilling and production; and other aspects 
of horizontal drilling. As an alternative to using an entirely 
new operating agreement, the UROA includes provisions 
that would allow an adaptation of existing operating agree-
ments to address the new issues arising from unconven-
tional resources. They affect the standard provisions on the 
operating committee, work programs and budget, exclusive 
operations, and disposition of production.
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Unitization agreements. A subagreement that is very 
similar to a JOA is called the unitization agreement. It arises 
from special circumstances. Where hydrocarbon resources 
are found to cross a boundary established by a contract or 
license, the response is typically to require the parties to 
develop the resource jointly as a single unit. Unitization is a 
response to this problem and the potential waste of hydrocar-
bon resources that unregulated development threatens. It is 
a program for the development and production of petroleum 
from a deposit or deposits that aggregates several concession 
areas (or parts of them) into a single unit, in which all of the 
parties will take a percentage interest. It is commonly thought 
to be a more efficient way of developing the deposit, preserv-
ing its unity, and limiting damage to the geological struc-
ture, which may otherwise reduce the recoverable reserves of 
petroleum.
The various companies holding rights granted by the gov-
ernment will negotiate a unitization or unit operating agree-
ment. It will aggregate the management of the various JOAs 
and appoint a unit operator to act on behalf of all of the par-
ties in the unitized area. These two elements of the agreement 
(the combining of various interests in a unit and the opera-
tion of that unit) are distinct but normally managed within 
the framework of a single agreement. Given the time it usu-
ally takes to negotiate a unitization agreement, the parties 
sometimes agree to a preunitization agreement to allow initial 
evaluation work to commence. What the parties discover 
during this process (such as geological and reservoir engi-
neering studies) may lead to a different allocation of interests 
in the final agreement. The effect of this agreement will be to 
overlie, but not to replace, the various JOAs; they will remain 
in operation. However, in its content it will resemble a JOA. 
The provisions on calculation and sharing of the reserves 
between the contract holders to the various blocks in a site are 
found in a unitization agreement but are not present in a 
typical JOA.
A legal requirement to conclude a unitization agreement 
in certain circumstances will usually be found in the petro-
leum law, but also in regulations and in the petroleum 
agreement itself. Examples follow:
Angola (Production Sharing Agreement, 1997). Art. 27(1): 
“In the event of there being petroleum deposits, capable of 
commercially viable development which extends beyond 
the contract area, and where other entities have agreements 
for the exploration and production of petroleum with a sim-
ilar unitization provision, SONANGOL may . . . require that 
the petroleum in those deposits should be developed and 
produced in mutual co-operation.”
Somalia (Petroleum Law, 2008, Providing for the Unitization 
Agreement). Art 32.1: “If and when a Reservoir is discovered 
to lie partly within a Contract Area, and partly in another 
Contract Area:
32.1.1.1 the SPA (Somali Petroleum Authority) 
may require by written notice the Contractors 
to enter into a unitization agreement with each 
other for the purpose of securing the more 
effective and optimized production of Petroleum 
from the Reservoir, and
32.1.1.2 If no agreement has been reached 
within a period of eighteen (18) months from 
receipt of written notice as required in 
Section 32.1.1.1, the SPA shall decide on the 
unitization agreement.
32.1.2 If and when a Reservoir is discovered to lie 
partly within a Contract Area and partly in an area 
that is not the subject of a Petroleum Agreement:
32.1.2.1 The SPA may require by written notice 
the Contractor to enter into a unitization agree-
ment with the SPA of the purpose of securing 
the more effective and optimized production of 
Petroleum from the Reservoir; and
32.1.2.2 If no agreement has been reached 
within a period of eighteen (18) months from 
receipt of written notice as required in Section 
32.1.2.1, the PSA shall decide on the unitization 
agreement, unless otherwise provided in the 
Production Sharing Agreement.
32.2 Without limiting the matters to be dealt with, the unit-
ization agreement shall define the amount of Petroleum in 
each area covered by the unitization agreement, and shall 
appoint the operator responsible for production of the 
Petroleum covered by the unitization agreement.”
Models. The various terms of a unitization agreement are 
the subject of a model form published by the AIPN (www 
.aipn.org), based on two PSCs. Other models have been 
published by the Petroleum Joint Venture Association of 
Canada (www.pjva.com), the American Petroleum Institute 
(www.api.org), and the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law 
Foundation (www.rmmlf.org).
Cross-Border Units. Unitizations can cross international 
boundaries. In such cases, where boundaries are already 
established, the first step to securing investment in 
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petroleum activity is the conclusion of a bilateral treaty 
between the relevant states, such as those between the 
United States and Mexico, the República Bolivariana de 
Venezuela, and Trinidad and Tobago, and the United 
Kingdom and Norway.7 On this basis, unitizations can be 
organized across borders by the relevant companies with 
mechanisms for sharing the revenues among the parties.8 
A source of uncertainty arises where the deposit lies in off-
shore waters and crosses national boundaries. Recognizing 
and agreeing to these boundaries is a matter for negotia-
tion between the states. Where they are in dispute, states 
have options nonetheless for peaceful development of the 
resources concerned (see box 5.8). 
Hydrocarbons: Transportation
Oil and gas pipeline networks have been described as “the 
arteries that bring energy supplies from wellhead to market” 
(Energy Charter Secretariat 2007, 5). They raise important 
issues of regulation for governments, which can only be 
touched upon here. Oil and gas networks have significant 
differences, and the following section highlights some of the 
special features of gas transportation.
For landlocked countries, an export pipeline to a seaport 
is likely to be crucial to the monetization of its produced 
resources. For all countries, interruptions to flows of oil and 
gas can quickly cause disruption along the energy chain. 
Box 5.8 Unitization in Maritime Waters
Innovation in technique and growing knowledge of EI 
potential have increased interest in maritime areas. 
Beyond national land and territorial sea areas, interna-
tional law plays the key role. The UN Law of the Sea 
Convention (UNCLOS) confers sovereign rights on 
coastal states “for the purpose of exploring and exploit-
ing, conserving and managing the natural resources.” A 
coastal state’s sovereign rights to explore the seabed 
and exploit its natural resources are treated as both 
inherent and exclusive in the continental shelf regime. 
This is stated clearly in article 77(1) and (2) of UNCLOS. 
No one may undertake activities of exploration or 
exploitation without the express consent of the coastal 
state. The exclusive nature of these rights prevents 
them from being lost to another state in the absence of 
any express agreement to the contrary. Their exclusive 
character is reaffirmed by article 81 UNCLOS, which 
grants the coastal state the exclusive rights to authorize 
and regulate drilling on the continental shelf for all 
purposes. They do not, therefore, depend on occupa-
tion, either express or notional, or on any express proc-
lamation by the coastal state. The rights cannot be lost 
through neglect.
Unitization can follow the conclusion of a bilateral 
treaty between the relevant states. Such treaties fre-
quently include a mineral deposit clause such as the 
following:
If any single geological structure or petroleum 
field . . . extends across the delimitation line and 
the part of such structure or field which is situated 
on one side of the delimitation line is exploitable, 
wholly or in part, from the other side of the said 
line, the Contracting Parties shall, after holding 
consultations, seek to reach agreement as to the 
manner in which the structure or field shall be 
most effectively exploited and the manner in 
which the costs and benefits arising from such 
exploitation shall be apportioned (UK-Norway 
Boundary Treaty 1965, art 4).
These treaty arrangements are much easier to conclude 
if there is agreement between the states on the bound-
ary between them. In many maritime areas, however, 
this is not the case. There are more than 200 maritime 
disputes ongoing around the world and more bound-
ary disputes on land, creating significant disincentives 
to investment in prospective oil and gas deposits. As a 
result, there have been efforts to develop joint develop-
ment arrangements that are provisional with respect to 
the boundary dispute but that allow hydrocarbon 
activities to proceed. Examples of this are in the Joint 
Development Zone (JDZ) of Timor-Leste and Australia, 
and that between Nigeria and São Tomé and Príncipe. 
The governance structure of JDZs differs from that of a 
unitized development usually in the following manner: 
in the JDZ, a code is likely to be used with a separate 
hierarchy and a dedicated administration; in unitized 
development, there is likely to be a joint operating 
agreement, with allocation of jurisdiction to existing 
institutions, and material and procedural rules will 
govern supervised conduct.
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Since such networks often cross multiple national borders 
and jurisdictions, the legal and diplomatic complexities can 
be significant, involving international treaties, national laws 
and regulations, and a barrage of commercial contracts.
A very large quantity of oil and natural gas is transported 
every day across international borders. For oil, this amounts 
to around 65 percent of production, usually by ship but also 
by pipeline, and by rail and road truck if volumes are small. 
For gas, it amounts to around 31 percent of production, 
mainly by pipeline but also by liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
ship. For a number of countries that have recently discovered 
extractive resources, the issues of transportation and transit 
have a special significance—they involve the transportation 
of the resource from a landlocked state and emerging hydro-
carbons producer, such as Uganda, to another (Tanzania) 
with port facilities and LNG terminals.9
In terms of sector organization, there are differences 
between oil and gas pipeline networks, between on-land 
and offshore pipeline networks, and between main pipelines 
and gathering pipelines (which gather the crude oil from 
multiple wells in a production field before initial processing 
and shipping), and between these and transit pipelines. The 
states involved can be suppliers, consumer states, or transit 
states. Apart from operational aspects, oil and gas pipelines 
“look essentially the same, perform the same service, and 
obey the same laws of physics. They are installed in largely 
the same manner and face the same regulatory and social 
dilemmas” (Miesner and Leffler 2006, 1). However, this 
does not mean that the terminology governing oil and gas 
pipelines is the same. It is not. There are also important dif-
ferences, for example, between crude oil pipelines and 
refined products pipelines.
Oil and gas pipelines. While natural gas transmission 
companies have the same customers as oil companies, they 
have—instead of refiners—local distribution companies 
and large volume customers. The former usually enjoy an 
exclusive right to serve a particular area. In contrast to natu-
ral gas, oil does not reach the end user in the same form: it is 
transformed in refineries before it is suitable for consump-
tion by its various customers.
Continental pipeline networks. Some countries have 
land mass that has permitted or necessitated the construc-
tion of continental pipeline networks for oil and/or gas. 
Examples are Canada, Russia, and the United States. The 
United States has more than 2.43 million miles of pipelines 
carrying natural gas and hazardous liquids such as crude oil 
and refined products (Inkpen and Moffett 2011, 403–4). 
They are used for almost 70 percent of the crude oil and 
refined products that are transported in the United States. 
Of these networks the pipelines that transport gas make up 
the largest part, connecting cities to neighborhoods, and 
addressing the geographic imbalance between producers 
and consumers.
There are also pipelines that cross continents, such as the 
Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline. This kind of project can be 
motivated by the goals of diversifying clients and minimiz-
ing transport costs. In the case of the Maghreb-Europe 
pipeline project, a complex corporate structure was estab-
lished for the construction and operation of the pipeline. 
Legal title over the pipeline was vested in a company owned 
by the Moroccan state.
Financing. Organizationally, pipelines are constructed using 
debt financing, often on the basis of a consortium using proj-
ect financing. The consortia of organizations usually include 
government bodies and development banks, such as the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank, or 
a regional bank such as the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (EBRD). These bodies may provide 
various kinds of support such as ensuring access to land or 
capital. An example of this is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) 
pipeline for crude oil transport from Azerbaijan to Tur-
key across Georgia. The pipeline was financed using a very 
high level of debt via project financing, and the consortium 
included the IFC and the EBRD.
Pipeline agreements. The contractual and commercial 
character of pipeline agreements is driven by some com-
mon principles. The pipeline networks are to be organized 
as low risk and low or moderate profit entities (with most 
of the profits to be generated at the field) with a regulated 
rate of return based on cost sharing. The positions of ship-
pers and owners in the transportation system are to be 
balanced so as to reduce the conflict of interest between 
the parties involved. Within a single country the owner-
ship models that result are essentially twofold. The first is 
a joint venture model, which has traditionally been pre-
ferred among international oil companies. The second is 
a joint stock company model (private, state owned, or a 
mixture). In this model, the rights and obligations of the 
parties involved will be formalized through a participants’ 
agreement. As far as operation is concerned, this will usu-
ally be undertaken by the participants’ own organization 
or contracted to third parties under an operating or service 
agreement. In the BTC case, it is undertaken by one of the 
shareholders in the pipeline itself.
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For transportation, a commercial tariff will be set for the 
service rendered. This is distinct from a transit fee, which 
is a charge assessed by a sovereign state. Typically, one of 
three transportation tariff models will be adopted for cost 
recovery:
 ■ A throughput-based tariff (The unit tariff will vary 
according to the throughput, so that a low throughput 
would lead to a high tariff and vice versa.)
 ■ A fixed-unit tariff (where the unit tariff is independent of 
the actual throughput)
 ■ A combination of the above (The capital element of the 
tariff is fixed but the operating element will vary accord-
ing to throughput; a rebate may be available if more 
volume is committed.)
Transportation agreements are required to establish the 
rights and obligations of owners of a transportation system 
(the transporter) and owners of the product to be trans-
ported (the shippers). It will normally contain three kinds of 
clauses: technical, commercial, and financial and legal. Only 
a few items in the second category are of importance.10
In one of the leading works on oil and gas agreements, 
the writers of the chapter on transportation agreements, 
Brian Cassidy et al. (2008, 204), state that the provisions 
dealing with transportation charges or the tariff “are of 
central importance in a transportation agreement.” Under 
the subhead “What Would a Transporter Be Expected to 
Recover?” they state the following:
 ■ The main elements that the transporter would expect to 
recover through the tariff can be summarized as 
follows:
– The pipeline capital costs (e.g., construction related) 
incurred mostly prior to the start date;
– The pipeline operating costs (and other variable costs, 
for example spares), incurred during the life of the 
transportation agreement; and
– An element of profit. This assumes that the transpor-
tation activity is a profit generating unit of its own, 
separate from the other segments of a particular 
project.
The actual tariff structure adopted in a transportation 
agreement, however, may take several forms, according to 
the authors. If, for example, it is a cost recovery structure, 
the charges will be related to the actual costs and in particu-
lar the variable ones “incurred by the transporter during the 
term of the transportation agreement. . . . The purpose of 
this structure is to pass through the risk of changes in these 
costs to the shipper. . . . Most importantly, the tariff should 
reflect the commercial arrangement reached between the 
parties.”
These remarks apply to pipeline transportation of oil 
and/or gas both within national frontiers and across bor-
ders. However, the commercial principles are likely to be 
the same for both. The survey by Cassidy et al. (2008) cov-
ers “the issues that need to be dealt with in a typical gas 
transportation agreement (GTA) or crude oil transporta-
tion agreement (COTA)” (150). It is perhaps revealing that 
when referring to both of these agreements they use the 
common term transportation agreement, suggesting that 
the commercial arrangements contain many more similari-
ties than differences.
Crossing borders, transit, and landlocked states. 
There is no single legal model for pipeline ownership when 
more than one country is involved. The two most common 
models are for each state to own each section of the pipeline 
that is placed within its national frontiers: the connected 
national pipelines model. Alternatively, a pipeline project 
may be developed as a single unit: the integrated pipeline 
model. An example of the former is evident in the agree-
ment between Turkey and Iraq on oil transportation:
Each of the two States guarantees to operate, main-
tain, manage, and finance, and to provide all require-
ments for the part of the system located within its 
own territory to transport Crude Oil through the 
pipeline across Iraqi and Turkish territories and to 
deliver into Ceyhan terminal on the Mediterranean 
shore.11
The integrated pipeline model requires an intergovern-
mental treaty and agreements between the individual 
states and the pipeline company. The result is a mixture of 
international law, commercial contracts, and domestic 
laws. The BTC pipeline is an example of this.
When a pipeline takes a commodity from country A to 
country B, but transits country C in the process, it is to be 
expected that country C may levy a fee on the carriage, either 
as compensation for providing a right-of-way or for services 
rendered, such as protection or safety. There are no standard 
rules applicable to transit fees and they tend to be based on 
negotiation, once the principle of levying a fee has been 
accepted. Fees are usually the subject of pipeline agreements 
entered into between the countries concerned and the owners 
of the pipelines (which may involve the respective states or 
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their enterprises) or in an intergovernmental treaty. 
International law plays no role in setting transit fees.
As cross-border pipelines become increasingly impor-
tant for international trade, public international law is likely 
to play a growing role in constructing more harmonized 
and coherent legal regimes for construction and operation 
(Vinogradov and Mete 2013). The kind of international 
treaties and conventions that are potentially relevant to a 
discussion of transit include the Energy Charter Treaty 
(particularly article 7 on transit), General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs 1947, World Trade Agreement 1994, New 
York Convention on Transit Trade of Land-Locked States, 
and UN Law of the Sea Convention, which contains provi-
sions for landlocked states in articles 124–25, 127, and 129. 
Model agreements for cross-border pipelines have been 
developed to assist governments in their organization of 
frameworks for cross-border trade in oil and gas.12 
Important principles that emerge from these treaties are 
freedom of transit, nondiscrimination, noninterference for 
political or economic reasons, noninterruption, fair and 
reasonable tariffs, notification in the event of emergencies, 
and mutual assistance.
The experience with international transit pipelines for 
oil and gas has not usually been positive. They have a very 
checkered history, with frequent disruptions due to govern-
ment-to-government disputes. This has been very evident 
in the Middle East and the countries of the former Soviet 
Union; the acrimonious results have been documented in 
some detail (Pirani, Stern, and Yafimava 2009; Stevens 
2009). In part the source of dispute lies in the various kinds 
of transit systems that a regulatory regime has to apply to. 
The kind of transit system that is purest, with no connection 
to the gas supply system in the transit country, is rare. More 
likely, the transit pipeline will also be used to supply gas of 
the same origin to the transit country itself. It may even be 
integrated into the domestic supply system and owned and 
operated by the main national transmission operator.13
Environmental and Human Rights Issues. Long-distance, 
cross-border pipelines usually involve significant environmen-
tal and social impacts, whether they are on land or underwater. 
Proposals may well involve plans to construct pipelines near or 
through sensitive areas such as rain forest, protected habitats, 
or the Arctic. This has led to a growing role for international 
regulation, both global and regional, in addition to the relevant 
national environmental legal frameworks. These norms can 
be legally binding but also can take the form of soft law obli-
gations developed by industry associations and international 
financial institutions. They may impose restrictions on the 
choice of route or pipeline design. Among the many interna-
tional conventions is the Espoo Convention on Environmental 
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, which pro-
vides for extensive consultation procedures prior to the con-
struction of large-diameter transmission pipelines, both on 
land and offshore.
Pipelines have become significantly safer as well as more 
efficient as a means of transporting oil and gas over long 
distances, crossing mountains, valleys, and rivers or going 
undersea. However, spills and leaks do still occur, and much 
more commonly than is socially acceptable. Major efforts 
therefore go into the design and execution of environmental 
and social impact assessments. Recent debates about the 
construction of a new North American pipeline, Keystone 
XL, from Canada to Nebraska in the United States, and 
about Arctic drilling and related pipeline infrastructure, 
have underlined the continuing sensitivity of this subject 
(see chapter 9).
Pipelines can also raise human rights issues, as has been 
evident in the large cross-border projects, the Chad-
Cameroon Pipeline and the BTC Pipeline.14 To mitigate 
this, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights set out an expectation that pipeline companies shall 
adopt policies that demonstrate respect for human rights.15 
They are also expected to carry out a due diligence process 
and ensure that processes are in place to enable remediation 
of adverse impacts. These principles are to be applied even 
when the domestic law of a jurisdiction in which the pipe-
line company operates is silent on international require-
ments, has not enforced them, or is in conflict with them 
(United Nations 2011, principles 23–24).
Organizing a natural gas sector
Sector organization for gas development presents a govern-
ment with very different challenges from oil. Natural gas is 
distinct from oil in terms of transportation, regulation, and 
commercial arrangements. This is particularly striking in 
the kind of agreements typically used in the sector.
The two segments, upstream and downstream, are inter-
connected, creating a chain of discrete links (often referred 
to as the “gas chain”) with gas required to be present in 
sufficient quantities at each link of the chain. For a gas dis-
covery to be commercial, the gas needs to be sold at a fair 
market price. Yet each of these two segments is, as Le Leuch 
notes, “covered by specific legal, regulatory, fiscal and con-
tractual regimes as the costs, risks, economics and business 
models of each . . . are not comparable” (Le Leuch 2011, 13). 
Once a government has awarded rights to explore for and 
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exploit gas, it needs to consider the framework for activities 
beyond the field delivery point. These activities—which fol-
low from production and include transportation, storage, 
and distribution up to the end user—are essential for the 
monetization of gas resources. As the Sourcebook has 
emphasized, the close links between upstream and down-
stream mean that gas activities, in contrast to oil, require 
significant planning before investment can be made in the 
development of a gas industry, whether for domestic con-
sumption or for export. Not only that, but the investment is 
very large and requires coordination among several inves-
tors. This means that a gas policy faces a challenge in 
encouraging timely investments in each segment of the sup-
ply chain, from the wellhead to the projects on transmission 
and distribution.
In these circumstances, a government with significant 
proven gas deposits may decide to supplement its petroleum 
law with a dedicated gas law based on a distinct policy for the 
gas sector. Its focus is likely to be on encouraging the most 
efficient and economic utilization of the produced gas. The 
local context is decisive here, because the policy has to estab-
lish priorities between the various possible commercial uses 
of the gas in conjunction with stakeholders such as upstream 
investors. These could be first the development of domestic 
gas demand, providing for exports, and establishing a regu-
latory framework for gas, including a gas regulator. The 
choice will be strongly influenced by whether the country is 
limited by its reserves or by its market for gas use. In Egypt, 
for example, priority was given to the domestic uses of gas 
and the establishment of a national reserve to secure a long-
term supply for local gas requirements, with additional 
sources of gas available for export if the reserves are identi-
fied. A similar approach was adopted in Canada and the 
United States, with a license requirement for gas export and 
delivery limited to circumstances in which it can be shown 
that sufficient gas resources exist to adequately cover the 
local demand in the long term. Even a country with 
medium-sized gas reserves, like Côte d’Ivoire, decided to 
promote development to supply only the local markets, 
mainly for power generation.16 By contrast, Qatar has a lim-
ited domestic market for its very considerable reserves of gas 
and priority was therefore set for exports after the supply of 
the country’s limited needs.
Establishing these policy priorities will assist in organiz-
ing the timely construction of the necessary processing, 
transmission, and distribution infrastructure facilities. 
However, even if a gas law is adopted as a result, most of the 
connections between upstream and downstream will be 
established by contract law rather than by statute.
Gas master plan. Given the potential for using the discovery 
of large gas deposits as a vehicle for wider economic devel-
opment, more and more governments see it as a worthwhile 
exercise to develop and publish a distinct gas sector policy 
(or at the very least a petroleum policy that includes gas sector 
issues). In 2014 Mozambique approved just such a natural gas 
master plan, including a proposal to construct a pipeline from 
the location of the gas deposits to the capital, Maputo, which 
is the main center of population. (For background on the 
plan, see ICF International 2013.) A year earlier, its neighbor, 
Tanzania, published a natural gas  policy.17 The overall aim of 
these East African initiatives is to maximize industrial benefits 
from the development of gas rather than to rely on benefits 
from export revenues alone. To ensure that gas develop-
ment achieves improvements in the quality of life for citizens 
while at the same time minimizing social and environmental 
impacts, the Mozambican Plan set five priorities:
1. Growth in domestic public and private sector institu-
tional competencies
2. Growth in domestic industry and businesses, especially 
small- and medium-scale industries
3. Increased employment throughout the country, especially 
in the less-developed provinces
4. Infrastructure to support expanded economic activities 
(port and rail infrastructure, for example), especially in 
the less-developed provinces
5. Expanded access to training and education
Given the complexity of gas market development and the 
ambition of a growing number of gas-producing countries 
for domestic benefits from resource development in addi-
tion to revenues, the experience of Mozambique with the gas 
master plan (GMP) instrument may be instructive. Among 
the lessons early experience has yielded are the following 
(Huurdeman, Chikkatur, and Crook 2014):
 ■ A GMP needs to focus on a strategic analysis of policies, 
institutions, and regulations in the gas sector, rather than 
just technical details and specific build-out plans.
 ■ GMP recommendations should contain a hierarchy of 
decisions so that the government can take specific deci-
sions immediately and then carry out additional analyses 
over time to inform future decisions. The goal of a GMP 
should not be to define all decisions about the emerging 
gas sector, and the GMP should evolve over time according 
to actual circumstances.
 ■ Government needs to actively plan for implementation of 
GMP decisions, early on in the planning process. It may 
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need to seek additional resources for more detailed studies 
and to plan for policy and regulatory changes, which 
require legislative measures.
 ■ The development of a GMP needs to include and have 
the active participation of key government ministries.
 ■ Broader stakeholder groups need to be involved in the 
GMP development process to foster a consensus-building 
context.
Legal and regulatory framework. Many countries in 
the developed and developing world have adopted gas laws. 
Examples include the Gas Code of 30 December 2002 in 
Cameroon; the Law on Electricity and Gas of 21 May of 1999 
in Georgia; and in Latin America the Law on Gas of Brazil 
supplemented by its decree on application of 2010. Often 
there is an influence of U.S. and U.K. gas laws, particularly 
on subjects such as the role of a gas regulator; the regula-
tory framework for construction and use of transmission 
pipelines; storage facilities; distribution networks; supply 
and marketing activities; imports and exports of gas; and gas 
pricing. There is therefore plenty of scope for drawing on the 
experience and approaches of other countries in designing a 
legal framework. However, the scope of a particular gas law 
will depend very much on a country’s specific circumstances, 
including known gas deposits and policies. In particular, it 
will be influenced by the priority given to the development of 
a domestic gas market and to domestic supply over exports.
In establishing an agency for the gas sector, some coun-
tries experience capacity constraints. The solution to this is in 
most cases readily available. If there is an existing petroleum 
regulatory agency for upstream activities, its role can be 
expanded to include gas operations downstream. This was 
the solution adopted by Brazil pursuant to its 2009 gas law. 
The petroleum agency, Agencia Nacional do Petroleo (ANP), 
was charged with promoting gas activities along the entire gas 
supply chain by targeted actions. In particular, this involved 
the promotion of new gas projects, facilitating third-party 
access to existing gas infrastructure at fair tariffs, and intro-
ducing a greater degree of transparency over domestic gas 
markets and use of infrastructure. To achieve the latter goal, 
ANP created a dedicated public web-based gas portal.
Example: In the Cameroon Gas Code of 2002, the down-
stream gas sector is regulated by the minister responsible for 
petroleum with the option of establishing a regulatory 
agency in future. Gas transmission and distribution are 
subject to the grant of a concession awarded for a renewable 
period of 25 years on the conditions stated in a concession 
contract defining the rights and obligations of the trans-
porter or distributor. The principles of pricing of services 
and gas provide for a cost of service plus reasonable return 
on equity approach. For activities such as processing, 
import, export and storage, a license is required rather than 
a concession.
The main gas agreements. Long-term contracts play a 
crucial role in providing the foundations for the sector after 
commercial deposits of gas have been found. These are not 
the only kinds of contract in use: shorter term contracts or 
spot sales are also in use, particularly in well-established 
regional markets such as Europe and the United States. 
While these have grown in recent years, long-term gas sales 
commitments remain fundamental and are likely to remain 
so until regional and global gas markets become so fully 
liquid that long-term pricing mechanisms are no longer 
needed.
Generally, there are three main kinds of contract used in 
the international gas industry: (1) gas sales agreements 
(GSAs); (2) gas transportation contracts and (3) gas balanc-
ing contracts, used to allocate under-lifted gas among pro-
ducers (Le Leuch 2012, app. 8).
Gas Sales Agreements. GSAs are signed between producers 
(sellers) of gas and buyers. Often known as gas sales and 
purchase agreements, they provide for the long-term sale of 
certain quantities of gas by the producer at a base gas price 
on a given date and delivered at a given point of the gas sup-
ply chain. They have a duration of between 15 and 25 years, 
especially when they are related to the sale of LNG or to 
exports of pipeline gas using a specially built pipeline. With 
the impact of market liberalization, and unconventional gas 
supplies, the duration can now be much shorter. The base 
price is subject to a specific revision formula containing a 
list of agreed indices such as the quoted prices for a set of 
crude oils and/or competing fuels to gas as well as indices 
representative of costs, inflation, and sometimes currency 
exchange rates. For the Sourcebook focus on the extractive 
phase, this kind of contract is particularly important. 
Without it being put in place, extraction of the gas deposit 
will almost certainly not commence. It is also the kind of 
contractual arrangement that most developing countries 
prefer, given the absence of high-cost gas infrastructure.
There are two main kinds of GSA, depending on whether 
or not the future gas production in the agreement is dedi-
cated by the seller to be produced from specific gas/oil res-
ervoirs or fields and supplied at the delivery point. If it is, 
the agreement provides for a detailed mechanism to adjust 
the daily and annual quantities to be supplied and pur-
chased relative to the dedicated gas reserves, as they are 
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periodically reestimated under procedures set out in the 
GSA. This kind of agreement is often found in developing 
countries for new projects when the investor seeks to obtain 
project financing for monetizing the discovered gas 
resources.
The other type of GSA is a pure supply agreement under 
which the seller is free to select the source of the gas to be 
supplied at the delivery point to the buyer. This means that 
the quantities of gas to be supplied and purchased are equal 
to the quantities stipulated in the initial agreement without 
any adjustment on reserves.
The provisions in each type of GSA will number around 
30, covering legal, contractual, operational, economic, and 
fiscal matters. They will typically include provisions on 
price determination and possibly a price review, contract 
quantities and gas quality, and a take-or-pay obligation for 
the buyer to accept on an annual basis the minimum quan-
tities specified in the GSA. In the event of a failure to do so 
(and it may amount to up to 80 percent of the total 
amount), the buyer will compensate the seller by paying for 
the gas not taken up to a certain agreed amount. These are 
high-value contracts that tend to have complex dispute 
resolution procedures to cope with any disagreements. 
Examples of model text are available in the Model Form for 
Gas Sales Agreement developed by the AIPN, along with 
guidance notes.
It should be emphasized that price is a crucial variable. 
Without a price, there will not be a contract. The price is 
also determined on principles quite different from those 
governing the sale of oil in international markets. Gas prices 
will depend on its uses and will differ between different 
regional markets. This means that a gas valuation clause has 
to be inserted in the contract to ensure the gas is sold at a 
fair market value. This will hold for the price of sales to 
third parties as well as sales to domestic users and for 
export. It is often the case that the gas sales contracts must 
be approved by the government, including approval of the 
gas pricing clause. It may be noted that some governments 
impose a gas price that is lower than the fair market value in 
order to support domestic consumption. This is likely to 
have negative effects on the economics of gas projects and 
the long-term interests of the country.
The contract gas price typically consists of a base price 
that is adjusted from time to time according to several indi-
ces, each one having a specific percentage weight in the price 
adjustment formula. Most of the gas traded in Europe and 
Asia has prices linked to oil through a formula. The index 
will set a floor price and a ceiling price to limit the range of 
gas price variations over a given period. This protects the 
seller for its investment in the upstream project and the 
buyer by ensuring that the purchased gas does not become 
noncompetitive with alternative sources of energy or feed-
stock. A price review or reopener clause is often included to 
allow a revision of the price in certain defined circum-
stances. It will typically identify a trigger event that permits 
the review procedure to be invoked immediately or at some 
date; a procedure for negotiation and dispute resolution and 
some criteria against which possible revisions to the price 
formula can be assessed; and provision for accounting 
adjustments once the new price has been determined 
(Mildon 2012).
Gas Transportation Agreements. These agreements deal with 
the use of existing pipelines, usually treated as distinct proj-
ects from the upstream activities, owned and operated by a 
separate legal entity. Long-term gas transportation agree-
ments are concluded between the company owning the 
pipeline and each of the users of the pipeline (the shippers), 
the shareholders of the pipeline company, and/or third 
parties.
They provide for the annual contractual quantities to be 
transported, quality of gas, the capacity reservation, and the 
determination of the tariffs along with a ship-or-pay obliga-
tion for the shippers. Model gas transportation agreements 
have been produced by the AIPN with guidance notes.
Gas Balancing Contracts. These serve to allocate the balance 
between gas taken up and not taken (lifted) by the producers 
of a gas field in circumstances where joint selling is not pos-
sible or desirable for commercial or legal reasons (it might 
breach antitrust law).
When a pipeline route is designed to cross borders 
between two or more countries, the contract structure will 
require a treaty to be put in place between the countries 
concerned. There are many examples of such treaties, from 
the North Sea to east-west pipeline routes into Europe.
Liquefied natural gas. An LNG project will usually be 
considered as part of the downstream (or midstream) sector 
or as a distinct sector in its own right. There are 17 coun-
tries around the world with more than 30 such projects (Le 
Leuch 2012, 53).18 Of these, no less than 14 are from outside 
the OECD area. Developing countries have 92 percent of 
the LNG capacity already built. In Africa, these are Algeria, 
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, and Nigeria. In Latin America, 
there is Trinidad and Tobago, while in the Middle East there 
are Abu Dhabi, Oman, and Qatar. In Asia and the Com-
monwealth of Independent States are Brunei, Indonesia, 
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Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, and Russia. The only OECD 
countries on the list are Australia and Norway, with the 
United States a long way behind them.
The transportation solution LNG offers to countries 
seeking to export gas is the reason why there is such a pre-
ponderance of developing countries in the LNG business. 
It suits those countries facing a distance between the pro-
ducing fields and the consuming markets, sometimes a dis-
tance of, say, over 4,000 kilometers. As Le Leuch (2012, 53) 
notes, “LNG represents for developing countries a cost-
benefit solution to unlock stranded gas resources and mon-
etize them when the local gas demand is insufficient.” Papua 
New Guinea illustrates this point. For decades, several large 
and medium-sized gas and condensate discoveries were 
stranded for economic reasons due to the difficulties in find-
ing domestic and international markets for them. Eventually, 
a project was developed to export LNG and liquid petro-
leum gas under long-term purchase contracts to three Asian 
countries: China, Japan, and Taiwan, China.
The fiscal regime is usually distinct from that which 
applies to the upstream sector. An LNG plant may have a 
fiscal regime that is more favorable to the investor than the 
upstream fiscal one, including, for example, temporary tax 
holidays. The kind of legal, contractual, and fiscal frame-
work that is applied to LNG plants can be classified into one 
of three types. In the first two nonintegrated models the gas 
production and the LNG plant have different stakeholders. 
This is not surprising since the length of time required to 
develop an LNG project after a discovery of a gas field can be 
very long. Another reason is that governments and national 
oil and gas companies usually have a stake in the upstream 
activity but will have to collaborate with international inves-
tors to establish a joint venture to secure access to the tech-
nology, finance, and marketing that is required when 
developing an LNG project.
Mining agreements
Sector organization by contract in the mining sector bears 
many similarities to the hydrocarbons sector. Common 
industry agreements in mining are preliminary agreements 
such as exclusivity or confidentiality agreements at the bid-
ding stage; project evaluation and development agreements; 
joint operating agreements; supply agreements; acquisition 
agreements; financing agreements; consulting service agree-
ments; community agreements; marketing and sales agree-
ments; and reclamation.
However, commercial structures between the sectors 
show some differences. For example, unincorporated joint 
ventures have been more common in oil and gas projects. 
The reasons for this popularity are rooted in tax, financing, 
and technology, with capital separately provided by the 
partners and production shared. In the mining sector, these 
structures have been much less common, with major com-
panies owning majority stakes in locally incorporated vehi-
cles. Where joint ventures are formed, they also present a 
contrast in tending to be formed after the discovery and 
appraisal of a mineral deposit to facilitate commercial 
development.
Models are available for some of the agreements. For 
example, the Australian Mineral Law Association (AMPLA) has 
a Model Exploration Joint Venture Agreement (Minerals).19 
The U.S. Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation (RMMLF) 
has standard forms called Forms 5, 5A, and 5A LLC, and 
Canadian forms of agreement also exist. Given that the coun-
try of origin of many internationally operating companies is 
one of the above countries, the models are worthy of note.
The AMPLA Model Exploration JVA (Minerals) has sep-
arate versions for two-party and three-party ventures. They 
cover only the exploration phase, through the preparation of 
a bankable feasibility study, and use an unincorporated 
entity. These are designed for noncomplex projects. Only a 
majority vote is required to proceed to development. If a 
venture declines to participate in approved development, its 
ownership interest is subject to a forced sale at fair value.
The RMMLF Form 5 creates a common law joint venture, 
while Form 5A is a model for establishing an operating agree-
ment (no legal entity) and Form 5A LLC creates a Delaware-
based limited liability company. It is important to understand 
that these documents are useful mainly as a checklist and not 
to be used as off-the-shelf forms of agreement. Form 5 was 
published in 1984 and is widely used in the United States and 
Canada for exploration projects. It contains complicated 
procedures for approving and adopting annual programs 
and budgets. It does not adequately address liability for envi-
ronmental compliance for a withdrawing party. Form 5A is 
an exploration, development, and mine-operating agree-
ment and was created to address a number of issues that 
junior mining companies identified in Form 5, including 
issues relating to financing. Again, the structure created is a 
complex one, with a multistep approach to the decision to 
develop a mine. Ongoing liability is imposed on parties after 
termination or withdrawal for environmental liabilities aris-
ing from conditions as of the date of termination or with-
drawal. Important substantive terms are included in the 
exhibits (tax arrangements and net proceeds calculations, 
for example). Form 5A LLC is a model agreement that envis-
ages the establishment of a limited liability company, with 
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pass-through tax treatment and limited liability. It has 
become the starting point for many U.S. and Canadian joint 
ventures. This model eliminates some of the complexities of 
the Form 5A.
There is no standard form or model agreement in 
Canada. Form 5A is often used as a starting point for draft-
ing and negotiations.
5.4 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A key element in well-designed sector organization is clarity 
of the roles and responsibilities of sector agencies in policy, 
rulemaking, and monitoring. This includes clarity in rela-
tions with agencies in other, nonextractive sectors.
There are four essential actions necessary to achieve this 
clarity: (1) ensuring that appropriate institutional capacity 
is available at each stage in the EI Value Chain; (2) ensuring 
that capabilities are available, in the sense of specialist skills, 
training, adequate resources, and compensation, and insu-
lated from political interference; (3) setting nonoverlapping 
mandates so that each ministry or agency has a mandate 
with clearly defined competencies and responsibilities and 
the resources and staff to fulfil the mandate; and (4) having 
consistency of approach, so that all government bodies are 
working to achieve extractives development in a sustainable 
manner.
The organizational neatness and practical effectiveness 
of the Norwegian approach to sector organization has been 
influential in the hydrocarbons sector as an aspiration. The 
remarkable success of Norway in resource management 
justifies this influence. However, attempts to follow its main 
features have so far underlined the challenges of institu-
tional reform in established resource-rich countries.
By contrast, the mining sector has led the field in explor-
ing ways of adapting institutions to community needs, 
gender issues, and small-scale activities.
A convention has developed in the hydrocarbons sector 
that an NRC is an essential tool in sector organization. The 
assumptions on which this is based may be challenged. 
However, if an NRC is necessary, there is a body of good 
practice or at least good guidance for states seeking to take 
this route.
At key points in sector organization the importance of 
transparency is evident. The Sourcebook has noted the 
prevalence of model contracts that are publicly available. 
Openness in the operations of NRCs is widely regarded as 
desirable even if not always observed, and publication of 
reports and data by government bodies is closely linked to 
efficiency in performance.
Appropriate institutional capacity at each stage in the EI 
Value Chain is critical to overall EI sector management suc-
cess. Targeted skills, training, adequate resources and com-
pensation, and insulation from political interference are 
essential. Technical assistance and the engagement of pro-
fessional advisers can contribute significantly to capacity 
building.
In petroleum-producing states, where government 
petroleum sector income can come from a variety of differ-
ent and often unrelated sources (including PSCs, bonus 
payments, NRC dividends, and income taxes), all petro-
leum sector payments to the government should ideally 
flow into a single treasury account at the central bank.
In mineral-producing states, where government income 
from the mining sector is often much smaller relative to the 
size of the economy than petroleum sector income, the 
main income is generally from income taxes, employment 
taxes, and dividend withholding taxes. General good prac-
tice is for such payments to go directly into the state’s gen-
eral revenue account unless there are special provisions for 
windfall profits taxes because of price volatility.
The aspirations of governments to become involved in 
key aspects of hydrocarbons operations is often linked to 
their goals of enhancing local benefits. Without an under-
standing of the typical joint venture arrangements—and 
ideally some participation in them—the aspirations are 
likely to be constrained. However, an introduction to much 
of the detail about joint venture arrangements is possible 
through the publicly available model contracts.
The organization of pipeline networks raises special 
issues of governance. These networks often have an interna-
tional aspect and require the conclusion of state-to-state 
agreements or treaties. They also raise important questions 
about regulation that differ between oil and gas networks. 
Many forms of model agreement are available to assist gov-
ernments in meeting the challenges.
In contrast to oil, the producer of gas has to worry 
about a much longer chain in which each successive link is 
connected by physically fixed investments. Any one of 
these links may turn into a bottleneck and act to limit the 
capacity to provide and acquire gas. Any major break in 
one of the links will have potentially serious consequences 
for the entire chain, with the links down the line experi-
encing supply problems and the links upstream experienc-
ing cash problems. At the end of the chain, gas has to 
compete with substitute fuels, limiting the price that con-
sumers are willing to pay for it. The successful financing of 
a gas project requires an assurance that all of the links are 
sound and secure. Without such assurance, it is unlikely 
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that the large amounts of finance required to develop a gas 
field will become available. Yet where gas is used in the 
domestic market instead of or as well as for export, the 
dominant position of the gas network owner requires a 
government to ensure that a regulatory regime is in place 
to prevent any abuse of that position, such as in pricing to 
end users.
An important caveat about natural gas markets is their 
evolving character in recent years. Due in part to the 
impact of shale gas commercialization in the United States 
and the liberalization of gas markets in Europe, gas pric-
ing and the duration of gas contracts have changed. The 
impact of these changes is still being felt in international 
gas markets.
5.5 PRACTICAL TOOLS
Much of the content of this chapter has been concerned 
with knowledge that is—at least in model or standardized 
form—available in the public domain. The real challenge 
for a government lies in identifying the kind of education or 
training opportunities to ensure that it possesses a cadre of 
staff able to utilize this knowledge to the country’s benefit. 
To this end, the various kinds of courses offered by 
Sourcebook partners offer a way forward.
For example, the Columbia Center on Sustainable 
Investment (CCSI) offers online training, executive develop-
ment and capacity building programs, and specialist support 
products like its Tanzania Oil and Gas Capacity-Development 
Program, which is a CCSI partnership with the International 
Senior Lawyers Project and Tanzania’s UONGOZI Institute 
to provide tailored support to Tanzania’s Oil and Gas 
Negotiation Team. More can be learned about CCSI at its 
website, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/our-focus/investments-in 
-extractive-industries/.
The Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and 
Policy, University of Dundee, offers a range of practical 
masters and continuing professional development courses 
relating to both mining and petroleum and covering 
diverse topics such as mineral economics, stakeholder 
management, the minerals sector of Latin America, nego-
tiation skills, petroleum regulation and licensing, managing 
contracts and agreements, arbitration, and dispute man-
agement skills. More can be learned at http://www.dundee 
.ac.uk/cepmlp/.
Finally, in a further note on what Sourcebook partners 
offer, the Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, 
University of Queensland, provides practical training across 
a range of relevant topics, including grievance mechanisms, 
community engagement strategies for the facilitation of 
genuine participation and the fostering of civil society 
empowerment, respect for human rights, and mining in 
postconflict situations. More can be learned at https://www 
.csrm.uq.edu.au.
NOTES
 1. The classic exposition of this is Farouk Al-Kasim’s 
(2006) book, Managing Petroleum Resources: The “Norwegian 
Model” in a Broad Perspective. However, the limits to the 
Norwegian approach as a model are clear enough from the 
title to one of Al-Kasim’s chapters, “The Unique 
Circumstances of Norway as a Petroleum Nation.”
 2. On hydrocarbons, the principal studies are Victor, Hults, 
and Thurber 2012; Heller, Mahdavi, and Schreuder 2014; 
Tordo, Tracy, and Arfaa 2011; McPherson 2010; and Marcel 
2006. On mining, examples would include RMG 2011; and 
Humphreys 2009. See also the Natural Resource Governance 
Institute website, http://www.resourcegovernance.org/rgi 
/ soc, particularly its posting of Copper Giants: Lessons from 
State-Owned Mining Companies in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and Zambia (Manly and Wake 2015).
 3. Another way open to governments to achieve this goal, 
with respect to hydrocarbons pricing, is to require the for-
eign oil company to accept a domestic market obligation. 
This commonly requires the foreign company to sell a pro-
portion of crude oil production to the domestic market at 
below the market price.
 4. For a comprehensive survey of this subject see Roberts 
(2012), Joint Operating Agreements: A Practical Guide.
 5. The analogy appears to have been first used by Sandy Shaw 
(1996), a leading oil and gas lawyer in the United Kingdom.
 6. The UROA includes guidance notes and takes into 
account differences between common law and civil law juris-
dictions. The process of drafting the model involved more 
than 160 industry representatives from 26 countries across 
five continents.
 7. US-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement 
(2012); Unitization Agreement for the Exploitation and 
Development of Hydrocarbons Reservoirs of the Loran-
Manatee Field That Extends across the Delimitation Line 
between the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2010); Framework 
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government 
of the Kingdom of Norway Concerning Cross-Boundary 
Petroleum Co-operation (2005).
 8. The issues are extensively discussed by Asmus and 
Weaver (2006) and Cameron (2006, 2016).
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 9. There are 44 landlocked countries in the world and 10 
are hydrocarbons producers or have reserves waiting to 
come into production: Bolivia, Chad, Uganda, Kazakhstan, 
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the Republic of 
South Sudan are examples. See Dimitroff 2014, 295–98.
 10. Typically, the contents of a transportation agreement 
include a description of the system; points of delivery and 
redelivery; operating conditions, quality requirements, and 
control; measurements and allocation; delivery and trans-
portation commitment; priority, curtailment, and shut off; 
tariff, billing, and reports; liens and warranty; termination; 
assignment; liabilities and insurance; force majeure; and 
applicable law. In the appendices that accompany a typical 
agreement there is usually a description of the structure 
and operation of the tariff calculation methodology and 
operations manual.
 11. Crude Oil Pipeline Agreement dated August 27, 1973 
between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the 
Government of the Republic of Iraq, as amended September 
19, 2010: article 2. The South Stream gas pipeline project 
(http://www.south-stream-offshore.com) in Southeastern 
Europe is the most recent example of this model.
 12. The Intergovernmental Pipeline Model Agreement and 
Host Government Pipeline Model Agreement were devel-
oped within the framework of the Energy Charter Secretariat 
(2008) for, respectively, agreements between states and 
between individual states and project investors.
 13. For a discussion of transit systems and many case studies 
see Bringing Gas to the Market: Gas Transit and Transmission 
Tariffs in Energy Charter Treaty Countries, Regulatory Aspects 
and Tariff Methodologies (Energy Charter Secretariat 2012).
 14. See the discussion of these pipeline investments in 
International Energy Investment Law: The Pursuit of Stability 
(Cameron 2010), 398–401 and 402–7, respectively.
 15. See Guiding Principle 4: (United Nations 2011). See the 
discussion in Dimitroff (2014), especially the table at page 332.
 16. For an examination of six countries’ gas policies, see Le 
Leuch 2011, appendix 5.
 17. The National Natural Gas Policy of Tanzania can be 
found on the government website. http://www.tanzania 
.  go .tz/egov_uploads/documents/Natural_Gas_Policy 
_-_Approved_sw.pdf
 18. For an accessible overview of LNG trade practices with 
country studies, see Energy Charter Secretariat 2008. Some 
of these projects may be shelved as a result of the fall in gas 
prices since this study was undertaken.
 19. AMPLA model agreements are produced by working 
groups and owned by AMPLA, Melbourne, Victoria, 
Australia. See “Model Documents,” http://www.ampla.org 
/modeldocuments/documents-2. The Model Exploration 
JVA for Mining was produced in 2010.
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Chapter Title 
C H A P T E R  T H R E E
6.1 KNOWLEDGE CORE
Policy decisions about the fiscal regime and careful drafting 
and administration of the fiscal rules are critical to the success 
of extractive industry (EI) sector management. Yet the design 
of a fiscal regime requires governments to choose from vari-
ous fiscal devices and their respective fiscal rules, each one 
having pros and cons, and to arrange them into what is some-
times called a “fiscal package.” Given the wide diversity in 
country objectives, policies, resource potential, and relative 
development of the extractives industry, it comes as no sur-
prise that a fiscal package suitable for one country will not be 
transferable to another. In every case, there will be a need to 
make choices.
A key feature of any fiscal package is its ability to moder-
ate the effects of the “boom and bust” price cycles that are 
typical of the oil, gas, and mining sectors. This chapter 
examines the principal devices found in fiscal packages and 
their pros and cons and then turns to the subject of fiscal 
administration.
Clarity and simplicity of the fiscal regime
The effectiveness of an EI sector fiscal regime depends on its 
objectives, on the fiscal instruments selected to achieve 
those objectives, on the clarity of the fiscal rules, and on 
the quality of fiscal administration. Common criticisms of 
fiscal design hold that governments choose complex regimes 
and fiscal rules subject to misinterpretations, uncertainties, 
and loopholes. They can be difficult to implement and/or 
insufficiently robust to remain stable over time and there-
fore likely to lose credibility. They can be characterized by 
fragmented responsibilities, and they can be adversely 
affected by capacity constraints and the impact of interna-
tional taxation (Barma et al. 2012, ch.4; IMF 2012, 6). Even 
otherwise simple fiscal instruments, such as a royalty on 
production, may become difficult to administer if the rules 
are incomplete or improperly designed and therefore sub-
ject to interpretation.
Governments face challenges greater than ever, 
despite—or sometimes because of—the current body of 
Fiscal Design and Administration
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knowledge and the instruments it offers. Even if a single 
fiscal instrument could be described as “simple,” the fact 
is that at the extraction phase, oil, gas, and mining tend to 
be subject to a variety of fiscal terms that can include roy-
alties, corporate income tax, windfall or additional profits 
taxes, production sharing (although not in mining) when 
selected, bonuses, fees or other contributions, and indirect 
taxes. Having too many different tax instruments under a 
given tax regime gives a wrong signal to potential investors 
on the effective tax severity and prevents a clear under-
standing of the interaction between the various taxes. A 
basic fiscal design rule is to try to minimize the number of 
fiscal instruments and to focus on the most important 
ones in terms of revenue capability.
Rewards and risk sharing derived from a fair 
fiscal regime
Designing a tax on rents from the extractive sector requires 
appreciation of some basic facts of EI life. In the vast 
majority of cases, foreign investment will be required (see 
chapters 1 and 3). The drivers to attract such investment 
are well established. Governments provide mineral or 
petroleum rights to private sector companies, with the 
expectation that the state will subsequently benefit from 
tax payments if commercial mines or fields are exploited. 
By receiving tax revenue, the government converts a 
resource in the ground into both social and economic 
capital (Sunley, Baunsgaard, and Simard 2003, 153). 
Correspondingly, private companies invest in exploration 
and development projects when a fair fiscal regime applies, 
with the expectation of making a profit commensurate 
with the risks involved and their cost of capital.
For both parties, there are potential rewards and risks, 
and the balancing of those will determine ultimately what EI 
sector development takes place and how beneficial it is to 
the government, the investor, and the local community 
(Stiglitz 2007; Date-Bah and Rahim 1987, 133n35). The 
fiscal regime is a key determinant of how EI sector income 
is shared between the investor and the government. There is 
no model that would immediately lead one to conclude 
what is a “fair” or “reasonable” share. However, there are 
recognized guidelines and best practices to be followed 
when a country designs a fiscal regime and selects its terms 
in hopes of establishing a regime considered fair by the 
parties. Even after initial agreement, there is no guarantee 
that this sharing of benefits will be sustainable over the long 
term, given the volatile and inherently uncertain investment 
life-cycle revenues.
Credibility and predictability of a fiscal regime
A recurring theme in the literature on fiscal design concerns 
the credibility of a fiscal regime.1 A fiscal regime must be 
credible to attract investment, but it also must be credible 
to the citizens of the country applying it. If not, it is likely 
to be challenged over the medium to long term. Linked to 
this credibility theme are the pressures on governments to 
demonstrate returns on publicly owned resources: they can 
act as a powerful incentive to adopt fiscal instruments that 
deliver early revenues from resource development. Reducing 
the frequency of changes to extractive fiscal legislation and 
other mining and petroleum legislation will increase their 
credibility for investors, who value stability. The fiscal 
regimes will also be considered more predictable for effec-
tive decision making.
Impact of different activities and contexts on 
fiscal regimes
Differences of approach and in fiscal regimes arise depend-
ing on whether the activity is oil, gas, or mining, even if they 
share similarities as “extractives.” Differences will also 
emerge according to the context in which a fiscal regime is 
designed (or updated). For some countries, the existence of 
active contracts inherited from the past will constrain the 
scope for change and force it to be incremental. (Examples 
can be found from mining in Guinea, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania.) These 
differences are highlighted in this chapter, along with the 
fiscal solutions to them.
Some understanding of comparable country settings and 
their tax regimes is also required, due to the number of 
areas and conditions in which exploration and production 
can take place and to the fact that investors favor those 
offering the more attractive tax treatment. Tax competition 
is a fact of life in the extractives sector, as in any sector. 
International tax issues can also be expected to play a part 
in other ways, even if many of these are not peculiar to the 
extractives sector.2 Treaty shopping and transfer pricing can 
have significant impacts, especially in the context of 
resource-rich economies.
Several web-based tools have been designed that have the 
potential to assist governments in addressing these fiscal design 
challenges. Some are mentioned at the end of this chapter.
6.2 KEY FISCAL OBJECTIVES
Ideally, the design of an EI sector fiscal regime should reflect 
objectives stated in a government policy document that sets 
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out the overall strategic objectives for development and man-
agement of the sector. The proposed elements of any new fiscal 
regime or proposed changes to an existing fiscal regime should 
be presented clearly in that public document, offering stake-
holders an opportunity to comment. Once a final decision is 
reached, it should be reflected in any resulting legislation. 
In practice, it is not usually the case that a fiscal regime can 
be designed with a clean slate, and some treatment of its pre-
decessor in the policy document is likely to be necessary.
From the government’s perspective, the core objectives 
are likely to be focused on revenue raising: maximizing the 
estimated present value of net government revenues from 
EI. This is a goal best served by taxes, which are explicitly 
targeted on rents—defined as the excess of revenues 
over all costs of production, including those of discovery 
and development, as well as the normal return to capital, 
rather than on gross incomes (IMF 2012). There are, of 
course, various policy objectives that have implications for 
fiscal regime design, such as having broad-based sector 
development, ensuring that revenue arrives early and is 
dependable, limiting exposure to the risk of uncertainty 
and volatility in fiscal flows by designing a tax regime that 
is sufficiently progressive, ensuring the international com-
petitiveness of the fiscal regime, minimizing opportunities 
for tax evasion, and having an administrative simplicity 
that is in line with the institutional capacity of the tax 
authority regarding the EI sector.3
The precise weight attached to these objectives will vary 
according to country-specific characteristics. These can 
include varying degrees of reliance (actual and potential) on 
extractive industry revenues as well as development needs, 
capital scarcity, and absorptive and institutional capacity. In 
many developing countries, capital stock is low, partly 
because investment has been low but also because there has 
been limited institutional capacity to transform investment 
into capital. Standards of governance vary considerably. 
Moreover, a change in resource reserves estimates could well 
extend the number of years during which natural resources 
can be expected to generate revenues (the resource horizon) 
and even the fiscal objectives themselves. Technological 
changes can also affect the market value of natural resources, 
making them easier to extract or increasing the portion that 
can be recovered. Different constraints can arise from past 
agreements made for existing projects, which make changes 
in fiscal objectives for those projects slow to implement—
and further slowed by requiring mutual agreement.
From the investor’s perspective, key objectives are the 
maximization of profits and an early return on investment. 
Also important will be a positive indication that the fiscal 
regime remains stable over time. In resource-rich countries 
that have weak governance or that are perceived as having a 
low level of predictability, this consideration is likely to have 
a greater priority for investors.
Progressive rent capture
Rents are the excess returns from EI sector projects over and 
above what is required to justify investment, arising from 
the relative fixity in supply of the underlying resource, at 
least once it is discovered.4 Most governments take the view 
that the major share of these rents should go to the state, the 
owner of the resource—particularly for petroleum projects, 
but less commonly for mining. It is also widely accepted, 
and has increasingly become a political imperative, that as 
underlying project profitability increases, a state’s percent-
age share in rents or profits should also rise. However, the 
government share in the rents must leave private investors 
with an adequate incentive to explore, develop, and pro-
duce. An International Monetary Fund study concluded 
that in mining, governments commonly retained one-third 
or more of the rents, while in petroleum the share was 
higher at around 65 to 85 percent (IMF 2012, 6).
An increase in underlying project profitability is the 
result of an increase in market prices and production and/or 
a decrease in project costs. A fiscal system that produces 
these results—the share in rents rises as profitability rises—
is called progressive.5 It is positively responsive to changes in 
circumstances affecting underlying project profitability. So, 
a system with a zero share when profitability is low and a low 
share when profitability is high is progressive, as is a system 
with a high share where profitability is low and an even 
higher share when profitability is high. A system that pro-
duces the opposite result (a regime where a government’s 
share or “take” decreases as profitability increases) is called 
regressive. It is inversely responsive to changes in underlying 
profitability (see figure 6.1).
Promoting broad-based sector development and 
tax neutrality
While understandably interested in a high (but fair) rate of 
take from any one petroleum or mining project, govern-
ments are, at the same time, interested in their global take 
from the EI sector as a whole. This means that they are will-
ing to promote exploration and development of mines and 
fields of different sizes and also are interested in maintain-
ing a broad tax base. A government can maximize the tax 
base by, as far as possible, ensuring that new EI sector 
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projects or ongoing resource-producing operations that are 
profitable before tax remain profitable after tax. A fiscal 
regime that accomplishes this is going to make the more 
profitable before-tax project less profitable but still attrac-
tive on an after-tax basis, in the sense that it does not impact 
or distort the decision to invest or produce (such a system 
never takes more than 100 percent of the rent or profit 
available before tax) (Tordo 2007, 14). Those neutral fiscal 
regimes can be expected to encourage new investment 
across a wide range of opportunities and extend the produc-
ing life of existing operations.6 Fiscal neutrality is achieved 
when the fiscal system does not distort investment decisions 
for a project evaluated on either a before- or after-tax basis. 
Getting early and dependable revenue from a 
project
In the EI sector it is the prospect of substantial rents that 
makes these resources an especially attractive source of 
revenue. Particularly where their petroleum or mining sec-
tors are either new or only narrowly developed, governments 
will place a premium (often politically driven) on early and 
dependable income from the EI sector. The emphasis on 
early revenue may be driven by urgent needs or may simply 
be driven by public expectation of revenues once a petro-
leum field starts production or a mine is opened. Dependable 
revenue (such as revenue that is ensured as long as a project 
is in operation) is clearly beneficial to budgetary planning, 
but it is subject to price volatility and other uncertainties. 
However, once an EI sector becomes more fully developed 
and a regular and steady stream of fiscal revenues is being 
generated from a variety of projects, this objective becomes 
less important.
International competitiveness of a country’s 
fiscal regime
Petroleum and mining companies operate on a global scale 
and compare fiscal terms among country projects when 
deciding, after a careful economic study of their portfolio of EI 
projects and opportunities, where to invest (Tordo 2007, 2). 
Governments, therefore, are greatly interested in how com-
petitive their fiscal regimes are. At the same time, govern-
ments are mindful about not being more generous than 
the terms offered in comparable states. Such states are those 
with similar geological potential, cost and operating environ-
ments, track records, institutional capacity, and perceived and 
actual political risk. These elements can be as, or even more, 
important than fiscal regimes in determining the level of 
investor interest.
Fiscal competitiveness may depend on matters such as 
the level and behavior of the government take. This is nor-
mally measured by government revenues; rates of govern-
ment take (see figure 6.2 for an example of a hypothetical 
project); responsiveness to production, price, and cost 
changes; the time and risk profile of the investor; and the 
investor’s internal rate of return.
Administrative clarity and simplicity
Administrative capacity is an issue in most developing 
states. Fiscal design in the EI sectors, often supplemented 
by insufficiently detailed fiscal rules, is not always tailored 
to a state’s capacity to administer a fiscal regime. This is 
one of the reasons that many states struggle to administer 
their regimes. There is an argument to be made in favor of 
simplicity in the design of a fiscal regime (Rio Tinto 2012). 
Above all, it is of paramount importance that the general 
tax rules applicable in the country be sufficiently tailored 
to the EI sector. Most difficulties in tax administration 
derive from the absence of sufficiently clear tax rules and 
guidance notes applicable to EI activities. Such rules 
should be incorporated in a specific part of the tax legisla-
tion or, alternatively, in sector-specific tax legislation, 
provided that it is made fully consistent with the general 
tax legislation.
Trade-offs among the objectives
In practice, it is not possible to achieve all of these objec-
tives simultaneously. Trade-offs are almost always required. 
Many of these trade-offs will become more apparent when 
fiscal instruments are discussed in the following sections. 
Figure 6.1 Progressive, Proportional, and Regressive Fiscal 
Regimes
Income
T
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Source: 11cresma 2010.
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The trade-offs that governments face derive not only from 
inherent conflicts among the state’s different objectives 
but also from the fact that investor objectives—in any 
fiscal regime—may be at odds with the government’s. For 
example, an investor will always want to maximize its 
return and minimize its risk, but the government may also 
be trying to do just that for itself. Fortunately, both parties 
are now beginning to recognize what constitutes a fair 
fiscal regime and that a well-designed regime can address 
each party’s concerns.
Stability of fiscal regime
An investor concern or objective that deserves particular 
attention is the stability of the government’s fiscal regime. A 
long-standing investor fear is that at the end of a long and 
Source: IMF fiscal analysis of resource industries (FARI) model hypothetical simulations (IMF/Ghana Ministry of Finance Seminar 2010.) The use of 2006 
and 2008 for oil for Ghana refers to fiscal terms at the time of the Jubilee discovery (2006), and terms suggested as more appropriate to the reduced geo-
logical risk following that discovery (2008). Similarly, for mining in (b), “current” refers to what was applicable at the time of the IMF review, and “alterna-
tive” suggests how terms might be improved.
Note: AETR = average effective tax rate, the government’s share of the before-tax net present value, usually measured at the government’s assumed discount 
rate. IMF (2012, 26) research on 16 petroleum and 11 mining regimes for a given project suggests that most petroleum regimes have a higher AETR and 
include more progressive elements than do mining regimes. Panels (a) and (b) show standard international comparisons of AETR or “government take” 
for a hypothetical oil and mining project only. Ranking may differ with other projects.
a. Oil, AETR for selected states and a given project
b. Mining, AETR for selected states and a given project
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expensive exploration period, and after the expenditure of 
very significant sums on development, the investor will 
become vulnerable to unilateral, unfavorable revision of fiscal 
terms, especially when circumstances have unexpectedly 
changed in the investor’s favor through resource price increases 
or the discovery of unanticipated large reserves (Tordo 
2007, 2). The overall process in which this can occur has been 
described as the “obsolescing bargain.”7 This investor objec-
tive of stability can be and often has been addressed through 
legal or contractual assurances of stability, but recent writing 
on this topic suggests that contractual assurances are unlikely 
to be entirely effective in addressing this concern (Daniel and 
Sunley 2010; Osmundsen 2010). The government needs to be 
careful when accepting stability clauses or dedicated stability 
agreements. A modern approach to increasing fiscal stability is 
through the design of the fiscal regime: a progressive fiscal 
system that automatically adjusts the government take to actu-
ally achieved profitability would reduce pressures to renegoti-
ate or unilaterally change fiscal terms. (For more information, 
see the section on “Fiscal Stability” under section 6.5, “Special 
EI Fiscal Topics and Provisions.”) Stability can become espe-
cially fragile in the context of price volatility. See figure 2.1 and 
figure 2.2 (chapter 2 of Oil, Gas, and Mining: A Sourcebook for 
Understanding the Extractive Industries) for an illustration of 
price volatility for hydrocarbons.
6.3 THE MAIN TYPES OF EI FISCAL SYSTEMS
Given the multiple objectives of fiscal design and the use of 
several categories of EI contracts, fiscal regimes invariably 
are constructed to include, for each category of contracts, 
several fiscal instruments under a “fiscal package.” (See the 
discussion of contractual forms in chapter 5.) The princi-
pal classifications that have typically resulted from this 
are (1) the tax and royalty system with licensing of areas, 
and (2) contractual systems, such as production-sharing 
contracts (PSCs) or risk-service contracts (RSCs). Each 
category may include state equity participation. Tax and 
royalty systems are dominant in mining. The alternative 
fiscal systems can be designed so that economic outcomes 
are virtually similar, but the respective legal, fiscal, com-
mercial, and operational structures differ. The overriding 
consideration here is that any fiscal regime must be ana-
lyzed as a whole, not instrument by instrument, because of 
the economic interaction between those fiscal instruments. 
It is important to note that the production-sharing and 
risk-service agreements are characteristic of the hydrocar-
bons sector and absent from mining, where the fiscal 
regime comprises taxation and royalties.
Tax and royalty systems
Tax and royalty fiscal regimes may primarily involve a corpo-
rate income tax on profits, a royalty on production, and an 
additional charge on profits or rents (often called “additional 
profits tax” or “resource rent tax”) to achieve progressivity 
and capture rent objectives. Other taxes or fees may be also 
payable, but their weight is generally secondary. Typically, 
these have been popular in North America and Europe, and 
in the hydrocarbons sector, at least, they are becoming less 
common in developing countries.
Production-sharing contract systems
Production-sharing contract fiscal regimes may include 
many of the same types of fiscal instruments used under tax 
and royalty systems. The major difference between the two 
packages is that production-sharing packages typically give 
the state a percentage of actual production in addition to 
any taxes or royalties that may be collected (see chapter 4). 
This is not the case under a tax and royalty system, in which 
all the production is taken by the investor. Since the state 
receives a percentage of production, the package of taxes, 
royalties, and fees will typically be lower than under a tax 
and royalty system. These PSC fiscal systems are common in 
the upstream hydrocarbons sector. Usually they are found 
in developing countries where the host government retains 
a strong interest in attracting foreign investment but where 
there is a preference for sovereignty over natural resources, 
expressed in the form of a contractual regime and getting 
access to a share of production.
Risk-service contract systems
A third contractual system, less common and confined to 
the hydrocarbons upstream sector, involves payments 
by government to the contractor in lieu of access to pro-
duction. Under these RSCs, companies perform upstream 
activities at their risk in exchange for an agreed service fee, 
generally expressed per unit of production and defined so 
as to allow the contractor to achieve a predetermined, 
fixed return on its investment. RSCs are far from wide-
spread (Baunsgaard 2001, 12). They are typically found in 
countries with large known reserve and production bases 
and low geological risk, such as the República Bolivariana 
de Venezuela and in certain Middle Eastern states, such as 
Iraq, where upstream activities were fully nationalized in 
the 1970s. Governments using RSCs see them as transfer-
ring maximum rents to the state.
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There are several downsides associated with RSCs. They 
transfer substantial risk to the state and, given the lack of 
performance incentives for a contractor resulting from the 
embedded service fee mechanism, they may result in signifi-
cant efficiency losses. RSCs are not popular with investors 
because of the limited upside return allowed. This may 
explain why they are found only in states with resource bases 
that are substantial enough to offset the perceived disadvan-
tages of the arrangement (Johnston 2003, 41, 61).
Fiscal regimes applicable to other EI activities and 
ring-fencing
Other activities related to oil, gas, and mining—apart from 
the upstream EI activities related to exploration and exploi-
tation of mines and petroleum fields, which are subject 
to the specific fiscal systems already described—are liable to 
the general tax legislation applicable in the jurisdiction at 
tax rates often lower than for upstream activities. These 
activities may deal, for example, with pipeline or railway 
transportation, gas-treating plants, oil storage and terminal 
facilities for export, liquefaction of natural gas plants, and 
refineries. The differences in taxation depending on the 
nature of activities explain why the upstream EI sector is in 
most countries ring-fenced from the other activities a com-
pany may have.
Selecting an appropriate EI fiscal system
In practice, the choice of a fiscal system will turn on contex-
tual considerations such as tradition, political preferences, 
and existing institutions. Experience suggests that many 
companies are willing to work with the mentioned systems, 
whatever their types. There is, however, less enthusiasm for 
those contractual systems that do not permit them to book 
reserves under stock exchange rules, such as RCSs, or only a 
fraction of the bookable reserves under tax-royalty systems, 
as under PSCs.
A crucial policy consideration is for the government to 
make sure that the complexity of the design of specific tax 
rules under a fiscal regime does not outstrip the state’s 
assessment, collection, and audit capabilities. It is also 
important that the rules are clear. Three broad approaches 
are possible. The first is to grow domestic capacity. The 
second is to limit the complexity of design to the capacity of 
the tax authority. Third, the country’s own tax staff may be 
supplemented with experienced international professionals 
and advisors who are fully able to administer a complex 
regime. The tax audit capacity is all too often the Achilles 
heel of the tax administration. Above all, clear and detailed 
fiscal rules dealing with the specificities of the EI sector 
must be issued to limit fiscal uncertainties and facilitate 
smooth implementation of the regime.
6.4 MAIN FISCAL INSTRUMENTS UNDER 
A FISCAL REGIME
A wide range of fiscal instruments exists and can be found 
in fiscal regimes applied to mining or hydrocarbons projects. 
Some are common to all sectors in the economy, such as 
corporate income tax (CIT), customs duties, value-added 
tax (VAT), dividend or interest withholding taxes (WHT), 
employment taxes, income taxes, and capital gains taxation. 
Others are specific to the EI sector, such as mining or petro-
leum royalties, resource rent taxes or additional profits 
taxes, petroleum production-sharing mechanisms, bonus 
payments, and state participation schemes. In addition, 
specific EI tax rules may be necessary for each of the above-
mentioned instruments, such as for tax ring-fencing, CIT 
rate and depreciation, transfer pricing, carry-forward of 
losses, currency for tax returns, and so forth. For the inves-
tor, the overall tax structure and burden will be critical and 
more important than the particular tax instruments 
and rules a government chooses. For the individual gov-
ernment, the various instruments must be selected and 
combined in ways that fit the context or combination of 
circumstances. If, for example, there is low capacity or a 
record of poor governance, a combination of easy-to-
administer instruments and limited discretionary power 
might be warranted. No two countries tax the extractive 
industries in the same way, which leaves plenty of scope for 
a researcher to differ on which is best among this “diverse 
and potentially confusing array of distinct fiscal regimes” 
(Smith 2012, 3). However, the primary mission of any 
trusted advisor when assisting a country in its policy is to 
explain and recommend the recognized best practice and 
help in designing the most appropriate fiscal package and 
terms for that country.
Fiscal instruments can be individually evaluated against 
fiscal objectives, taking into consideration differences among 
the EI sectors, specific state circumstances, and institutional 
capacity. However, a fiscal regime uses several fiscal instru-
ments in a combination constituting a fiscal package. The 
fiscal instruments in a regime interact, meaning that a piece-
meal evaluation of individual instruments has limited value. 
For example, royalties may be a regressive instrument but 
may well have an important place as part of an overall tax 
and royalty system. The combination of all the instruments 
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and provisions a fiscal regime contains is ultimately decisive 
in assessing the regime’s likely performance.
With that important caveat in mind, this section reviews 
the individual fiscal instruments that are typically used. 
Section 6.5 addresses several related special EI fiscal topics and 
provisions; it also addresses possible incentives such as tax 
holidays and accelerated depreciation provisions, illustrating 
their drawbacks.
Royalty on production
Royalty payments are specific to resource extraction and 
represent one of the possible means by which the resource 
owner (the state) is compensated for the permanent loss of 
valuable, nonrenewable resources. This is the classic ratio-
nale for the use of royalties, and the reason why they are not, 
strictly speaking, a tax. However, the rationale is more likely 
to be based on the political reassurance that derives from a 
regular payment and the predictability it adds to government 
revenue flows. In the literature on royalties, the application 
of the royalty instrument is, however, surrounded by contro-
versy for both hydrocarbons and mining projects.8
The main type of royalty is the ad valorem royalty (that 
is, related to the price of the extracted product); in excep-
tional cases, a unit-of-production royalty (for example, 
per ton) may apply. Royalties for many metal minerals are 
generally calculated as a net smelter return royalty. The net 
smelter return is based on the refined metal price less smelt-
ing and refining costs. Payments are received earlier in the 
life of a project than with other fiscal tools based on profits. 
They are also relatively easy to monitor and administer. 
Different approaches to royalty design exist: it may be based 
on the value of ore at the mine head, on the net smelter 
return, or on the value of exports after netback for trans-
port and other costs. Royalties for coal or bulk minerals, 
such as iron ore, are often charged on the basis of the mine-
head sales price. These are relatively straightforward to 
calculate. Ad valorem royalty rates are often in the range of 
3 to 5 percent for metals and 5 to 10 percent for diamonds 
(Hogan 2008). Royalty rates are often significantly higher 
for petroleum production.
Royalties have the advantage for a government in that 
they are relatively predictable—with the restriction that they 
are subject to price volatility and production uncertainties—
and can help to ensure that companies make some payments 
to government even in times of low mineral prices and low 
revenues. The appeal of royalties on gross revenues lies in 
the early dependable revenue they produce and in their 
apparent simplicity of administration (Tordo 2007, 37–38). 
From the start of the producing life of a project, revenue will 
continue to the end of the life of the field or mine.
The company feels a disadvantage in that the royalties are 
calculated on production, not profits; a high level of pro-
duction does not necessarily equate to a high level of profit. 
A project with high costs could pay as much as one with low 
cost if the production is the same. The company may have 
an incentive to prematurely end an ongoing project and not 
take on one that has marginal production.
The biggest drawback of these two kinds of royalty is in 
their lack of sensitivity to profit, which makes them regres-
sive rather than progressive and distortionary rather than 
neutral in a fiscal sense. Where ad valorem or per-unit royal-
ties feature prominently in a fiscal regime, their insensitivity 
to profit may unduly limit the range of investment projects 
undertaken and/or cause premature abandonment of pro-
duction as costs rise and margins fall.
Another drawback is that they are not as easy to administer 
as is sometimes thought. For example, the valuation of sales 
can be technically demanding, especially in mining, if the aim 
is to use benchmarks to reduce the risk of transfer pricing. 
The establishment of market value at the mine gate or export 
point can also be difficult, because it involves “net-backing” 
of costs arising from processing and transportation—for 
example, from benchmark-refined mineral prices. It may be 
that no international benchmark prices exist on which to base 
valuation.9 The most controversial valuation basis for royalty 
is when the petroleum royalty is assessed on a wellhead value, 
as in the United States or Australia, and not on an ex-field 
basis or other agreed point of delivery beyond that location, 
because there is no way to determine a certain wellhead value, 
leading to many litigation cases when a wellhead reference 
is applicable.
The mix of pros and cons regarding royalty has resulted 
in wide application of royalties in the EI sector but at rela-
tively modest levels. Their importance has been greater in 
the mining sector than the petroleum sector, where addi-
tional profits taxes and PSCs may have been introduced. 
Some countries such as Chile and South Africa have not 
used royalties for mining for many years, and in oil and gas 
production, royalties were favored in North Sea states such 
as Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom but then 
abolished or reduced to a zero rating where additional 
profits taxes are in effect. Moreover, many PSCs do not 
provide for royalty payments.
To better respond to profitability, many countries, 
such as Armenia, Canada, and Ghana, have introduced 
more sophisticated forms of royalty, such as a sliding-scale 
royalty, where the rate is linked positively to production. 
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Depending on how rates and triggers are set, these sliding-
scale tax instruments, common in the hydrocarbons sector 
but much less so in mining, can be designed to have a pro-
gressive tax take. A sliding-scale royalty can also be linked to 
location. For example, Nigeria has used different rates of 
royalty, according to whether hydrocarbons production 
came from land, offshore, or deepwater areas. Other coun-
tries have linked progressive royalties to production and 
price (as in Canada, where the petroleum royalty frame-
work has become quite complex); the date of discovery 
(existing oil fields and projects or new fields and projects); 
the nature of petroleum (oil or gas); or some measure of 
profitability. South Africa uses a profits-based royalty, and 
so do Peru and New South Wales in Australia. Some coun-
tries have also included royalty rates as a bidding item in 
auctions of rights. Sliding-scale royalties can nevertheless be 
more difficult to administer, requiring multiple parameters 
for each mineral. They can also be distortionary, having 
different effects on different projects.
Corporate income tax: rate and allowable 
deductions
The application of CIT in the extractive sector is common 
practice and is a core element in any fiscal system for the 
sector. However, this is a tax on net income and not 
directly a tax on effective extractive rents. It is attributable 
not specifically to the oil, gas, and mining activities but to 
doing business in the country itself. It ensures that the 
normal return to equity is taxed at the corporate level in 
the way that it is in nonextractive sectors. Several coun-
tries use a CIT rate for the extractives sector higher than 
for other activities. Indonesia does this for mining, while 
Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago, and many other countries 
take this approach for the applied CIT rate in their petro-
leum sectors, in order to stabilize the petroleum CIT rate 
and avoid being subject to a general CIT rate decreasing 
periodically, as globally observed in the past two decades. 
The United Kingdom recently adopted that approach by 
selecting a petroleum CIT rate of 30 percent while the 
general CIT rate is lower and set to fall to 17 percent by 
2020. Moreover, in many countries the practice is also to 
design a tailored CIT regime for dealing with issues 
 specific to the oil, gas, and mining sectors. It is better 
when such a regime remains as consistent as possible with 
the general tax code rules, with the exception of those 
fiscal rules specific to the EI sector, which in any case must 
always be introduced for a smooth implementation of the 
EI fiscal regime.10
For the government, the appropriate CIT rate for the 
extractives sector is determined by various, wider objec-
tives. These include whether the government intends 
to reduce the general rate over time; whether it seeks to 
obtain a higher CIT rate for this sector than for others; and 
how it links to other taxes under the fiscal package, such as 
any additional profits or rent taxation. For the corporate 
investor, CIT will be assessed in relation to the aggregate tax 
impact, and especially the effect of tax on its internal rate of 
return or net present value at a threshold discount rate.
Valuation of production sales for CIT purposes 
can present problems. Across the spectrum of extractive 
resources, there are significant differences in identifying a 
reference price. For bulk minerals, such as bauxite, rutile, 
and iron ore, and for natural gas, valuation is often ham-
pered by the lack of readily available reference gas prices 
close to the field. This contrasts with the situation a gov-
ernment faces with the price of oil, gold, and copper, for 
example. Minerals are sometimes sold on a contract basis, 
and arm’s length pricing may not apply. The risk that this 
creates for governments may be mitigated by providing for 
a detailed EI valuation clause, including determination 
of arm’s length sales and selection of reference prices, 
 quality, and transport cost differentials.
CIT will usually be applied to the resources sector accom-
panied by provisions related to the tax base provided for in the 
legislation. This will typically include a ring-fencing of opera-
tions at the project or license level or for the concerned EI 
sector, precise definition of taxable revenues—value of pro-
duction and other revenues such as ancillary income, financial 
income, gains on the disposal of license, or contract interests— 
and allowable deductions such as depreciation rules, interest, 
and decommissioning provisions. (See section 6.5, “Special 
EI Fiscal Topics and Provisions.”)
Signature and production bonuses
Bonuses are one-off (or sometimes staged) payments that 
may be fixed, bid on, or negotiated and are linked to events 
such as license or contract award or signature, or to the 
attainment of a particular level of production. They can 
be part of any fiscal scheme, provide early revenue, and be 
easily administered.
Signature bonuses, especially when competitively bid, 
can be sizeable, and as a result have attracted considerable 
attention in recent years.11 In 2013 the Liberian National 
Oil Company announced it had agreed on a signature 
bonus from Exxon Mobil of US$21.25 million, its largest 
bonus to date. By comparison, high amounts are common 
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in bidding for acreage off the shores of the United States. 
Much larger amounts can be obtained, however. In 2007 a 
consortium of Chinese mining companies (CMCC and 
Jiangxi Copper) agreed to pay the government of Afghanistan 
a signature bonus of US$808 million and a further US$566 
million upon commencement of commercial production. 
In 2006, Angola received more than US$1 billion as a top 
bid in its award of petroleum rights.
Bonuses boost the government’s take in situations where 
there is a concern that other dimensions of the fiscal regime 
may leave money on the table: that is, collect less than 
the investor is willing to pay. However, they should not 
be seen as an add-on to an otherwise comprehensive fiscal 
regime. While that may be the case, it is more general for 
investors to seek some offset to the bonus through other ele-
ments of the fiscal regime. Essentially, the choice of a specific 
fiscal tool, such as bonuses, involves trade-offs. Once paid, 
bonuses are neutral in that they have no effect on investment 
or production decisions going forward. They provide early 
revenue, and they are certainly easy to administer.
Investor doubts about the value of signature bonuses in 
a fiscal regime relate primarily to issues of risk. Where there 
are concerns about a government’s commitment to honor-
ing fiscal terms, investors will tend to be very wary about 
paying large sums of money up front on bonuses. This is a 
sunk cost for companies, recoverable as an allowable CIT 
tax deduction in the event of successful development of the 
project only. The fact that it is sunk may increase the politi-
cal risk if the project turns out to be especially profitable. 
In practice, many governments continue to rely principally 
on other, contingent fiscal instruments: that is, instruments 
linked to actual project outcomes while including up-front 
signature bonuses as a useful complement.
Additional profits tax or resource rent tax to 
achieve progressivity
CIT is by nature a tax on assessable annual profits mea-
sured as revenues, mostly related to production and price, 
minus allowable deduction, mainly costs. However, many 
countries have considered that CIT, although based on 
profits, does not sufficiently consider their key objective of 
progressivity in the government take in relation to the 
achieved rent. For that reason, they have introduced in tax 
and royalty systems a tax supplementary to royalty and 
CIT, which is often named additional profits tax (APT), cash 
flow tax, or resource rent tax or rate of return tax (RRT) and 
may be triggered by various mechanisms.
Many attempts have indeed been made to link such pro-
gressive profit or rent tax to a technical indicator or, better, 
an economic indicator (see table 6.1). For example, produc-
tion is an incomplete measure of profitability because 
it ignores the influence of prices and costs. Price is also 
an incomplete measure of profitability, because it ignores 
Table 6.1 Possible Fiscal Mechanisms in Relation to Government Fiscal Progressivity Objective
Government take is responsive to:
Government take is linked to:
Reserves/ 
production
Oil price 
change Costs
Timing of 
cash flows
Cost of 
capital
Production  
(daily or cumulative) Yes No No Partly No
Price  
(price caps or base prices) No Yes No Partly No
Revenue  
(price and production) Yes Yes No Partly No
Cost recovery 
(uplifts and write-off rates) No No Yes Partly Partly
Simple indicators  
(location, vintage, etc.) Partly Partly Partly No No
Rate of return Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: McPherson 2009.
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production and costs, and both indicators ignore the influ-
ence of time on profitability. Field or mine location at best 
may be a very crude indicator of cost and therefore of profit-
ability, but it is likely to be very inaccurate and, furthermore, 
misses out on the influence of price and production.
Profits taxes, such as CIT, are appealing on neutrality 
grounds, explaining why they are included in EI fiscal 
regimes. A project that is profitable before tax will tend to 
be profitable after tax, because, as long as the rate applied 
is less than 100 percent, some profit in nominal terms is 
always left after tax (Tordo, Johnston, and Johnston 2010; 
RWI 2010). In comparison with other fiscal instruments, 
profits taxes as CIT also contribute to international com-
petitiveness, since the application of a profits tax is, in 
critical investor home states such as the United States and 
the United Kingdom, a prerequisite to obtaining a foreign 
tax credit (for example, a home country credit for those 
qualifying taxes paid to the host country).
Profits taxes are sometimes faulted, however, for the fol-
lowing reasons: deferring fiscal revenues to allow for investor 
cost recovery through depreciation if those are accelerated; 
being less predictable in outcomes than alternatives such as 
royalties; increasing the volatility of government revenues 
(increasing government risk);12 having greater administra-
tive burden related to the need for careful audits of investor 
costs; and creating incentives for companies to minimize 
reported profits.
In the extractives sector, several different instruments 
have been used to capture rent, sometimes with limited 
success. Natural resource rent has been defined as the excess 
of revenues over all costs of production, including those of 
discovery and development, as well as the normal return to 
capital (IMF 2012). A challenge is to design instruments that 
capture rent without making projects unsustainable when 
profitability declines. Governments have therefore devel-
oped instruments that are progressive in the sense that they 
capture an increasing share of revenues as profitability rises. 
These instruments usually are additional to other baseline 
instruments such as CIT (and therefore often referred to as 
“additional profits” taxes). Such flexible instruments to cap-
ture rent are more common in the hydrocarbons sector than 
in mining, but that imbalance is becoming less marked, as 
mineral-rich countries seek ways of capturing a larger share 
of the rent without overtaxing the industry during periods of 
lower profitability.
One way of achieving this is by means of the RRT,13 
which “targets the returns made on investments that exceed 
the minimum reward necessary for capital to be deployed” 
(Land 2010, 241). It gives an investor relief from RRT 
taxation until a satisfactory rate of return has been achieved, 
and after that point, it shares profits with the host govern-
ment on an ex post basis. Dramatic swings in commodity 
prices have made the RRT topical as a possible means of col-
lecting what are commonly referred to as “windfall profits 
tax” or APT. In their favor, it is argued that such taxes do 
not apply to the normal return in projects, since the govern-
ment effectively contributes to costs at the same rate as it 
shares in receipts from production of the resource. As the 
Henry Report stated, “The government is a silent partner 
whose share in the project is determined by the tax rate. 
However, each partner contributes something additional to 
the partnership—private firms contribute rents associated 
with their expertise and the government contributes rents 
associated with the rights to the community’s non-renewable 
resources. These rents are also shared according to the tax 
rate” (Henry Report 2010, Ch.1–3).
This resource rent tax based on rate of return was first 
pioneered in Papua New Guinea in the 1970s but has not yet 
generated significant revenues to the country. Such schemes 
have attracted widely varying responses since then. Some 
reviews are highly favorable, others not so much, deeming 
the scheme inappropriate and unworkable. It is more com-
mon today in oil than in mining, and when used it mainly 
applies to simplified schemes. Typically, it is assessed on 
cash flow, a different base than that used for CIT. These 
bases are quite different: depreciation and finance costs, for 
example, are not included in the resource rent tax base. In 
the resource rent tax, when a hurdle rate is passed (on either 
a before-CIT basis or an after-CIT basis, depending on the 
structure used), a percentage of cash flow is collected as the 
resource rent tax. An important consideration for a govern-
ment in its assessment of any resource rent tax option is the 
timing of tax payments, because by design the allowances 
permitted greatly to postpone payments until costs have 
been fully recovered and the specified internal rate of return 
on the investment achieved.
Controversy has followed the adoption of some taxes: 
recent attempts to introduce a windfall profits tax in 
Mongolia and Zambia were withdrawn in the face of strong 
resistance from the mining industry. Australia’s first attempt 
to introduce a resource rent tax in mining brought about the 
demise of the prime minister. The proposed tax was devel-
oped after a government report (Henry Report 2010) called 
for the introduction of a uniform resource rent tax using 
an allowance for corporate capital system. This involved a 
cash-flow-equivalent tax levied on profit measured as net 
income minus an allowance. The latter was designed to 
compensate investors for the delay in the government’s 
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contribution to the cost of investment due to the slower 
recognition of expense through depreciation and the lack of 
an immediate refund for losses.
A simplified APT scheme, not using the RRT already 
mentioned, has been increasingly implemented with success, 
generating supplementary revenue to the state when the 
profitability of projects becomes higher than predefined 
thresholds. The special tax in Norway, the surcharge tax in 
the United Kingdom, and the variable CIT rate in several 
African countries are illustrative.
If properly designed, and when the applicable tax rules 
are clearly worded with the necessary guidance note, the 
administration of an APT or a rent-based tax can be not 
much more demanding than, say, a royalty or an income-
based tax system. It does require the calculation of a spe-
cific profit base that measures rent, profits, or cash flows 
over time, but these data are normally available. As with 
any tax, detailed accounting procedures need to be agreed 
on by the parties to ensure that any loopholes or uncer-
tainties in tax administration are eliminated. For coun-
tries with limited capacity in their administrations, this is 
an important consideration, which may encourage them 
to shift their attention to less ideal but more practical 
APT instruments. For example, simpler cash flow taxes 
(such as the special tax in Norway), or APT or production 
sharing triggered by the economic R-factor indicator (see 
the subsection “Government’s Share and Taxes under a 
Production-Sharing Contract” for its definition) are 
increasingly being applied (Duval et al. 2009, 223–52).
State participation
State participation in EI sector projects may be motivated 
by nonfiscal objectives, such as knowledge transfer, as dis-
cussed in chapter 5. However, as typically structured, state 
participation in EI sector projects will have a fiscal motiva-
tion or tax dimension as well. The motivation is participa-
tion in production and profits, especially in their upside 
potential. The tax dimension depends on how participa-
tion is structured. Several forms of state participation can 
be found in the EI sectors: (1) full participation interest, 
(2) carried participation interest, and (3) free equity 
participation (see box 6.1).
With the exception of free equity participation, these 
forms of participation, full equity participation included, 
may add little to government revenues relative to the applica-
tion of an efficient tax regime except when the state interest is 
high, although they may add considerably to risk by the obli-
gation to contribute to future costs. They usually entail some 
form of offsetting reduction elsewhere in the fiscal regime, 
resulting in some equivalence between state participation and 
tax instruments. (See the discussion of NRCs in chapter 5.)
In each case in figure 6.3, government revenues come 
overwhelmingly from taxation rather than returns to 
Box 6.1 Forms of State Participation
Governments have embraced state participation in 
their EI sectors in a variety of forms.
1. Full participation interest. The state or its desig-
nated national resource company (NRC) invests 
pari passu with the private sector from the start of 
operations, by acquiring either an equity share in 
an incorporated joint enterprise (common in min-
ing) or a participation interest in an unincorpo-
rated joint venture (common in petroleum).
2. Carried participation interest. This may take several 
forms. The most frequently encountered is the so-
called partial carry during the early stages of a 
project. Under this approach, the private inves-
tor “carries” or advances the costs of its NRC 
partner’s interest through specified stages of a 
project—exploration, appraisal, and possibly even 
development— after which the NRC spends pari 
passu with the private investor as under full partici-
pation interest. The private investor may or may not 
be reimbursed for the funds advanced on behalf of 
the state, with or without interest or a risk premium. 
Where compensation does occur, it is typically paid 
out of the state’s interest in the project revenue.
3. Free equity participation. This option is a simple 
grant of an equity interest in an incorporated joint 
enterprise to the state without any financial obliga-
tion or compensation to the private investor. The 
state, however, receives a share in the joint enter-
prise’s dividends pro rata to its equity interest.
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state participation. Nevertheless, the robust enthusiasm of 
many governments for state participation, particularly in 
the hydrocarbons sector, is unlikely to be affected by such 
considerations. Some investors will continue to favor it too, 
because participation may help to develop a closer, long-
term cooperation with the country.
Withholding taxes on dividends, interest, or 
foreign subcontractors fees
Given the typical financing requirements of petroleum and 
mining projects, and their requirements for special expertise 
and services not customarily available in the host state, divi-
dend and interest payments and subcontractor payments 
to nonresidents are common and usually significant. 
Withholding taxes on these payments—amounts that the 
company is required to withhold from the noted payments 
and hand over to the state on account of actual or projected 
tax liabilities of the payees—allows host states to effectively 
tax this income as there is no practical way to force nonresi-
dents to file returns and account for their incomes. Beyond 
revenue generation, withholding taxes has the additional 
advantage of discouraging excessive payments to nonresi-
dents as a means of shifting profits to lower tax jurisdictions 
(see section 6.5). Withholding tax rates on payments to sub-
contractors are typically set at relatively low levels, reflecting 
the fact that they are levied on gross income.14 Treaties may 
also cap withholding rates in some cases, which is now a 
major area of base erosion.
Import and export duties
Since there is rarely domestic production of the equip-
ment imported for petroleum or mining operations, the 
main purpose of import duties in the EI sectors is revenue 
raising rather than protection of domestic industries. This 
may be appealing in that it produces early revenues (even 
before project start-up), but it can also raise costs in the 
EI sector, lower the profitability of projects for investors, 
and consequently reduce ultimate tax revenues from EI 
sector production. Nonetheless, even though duties may 
be included in costs and therefore result in lower taxes 
paid, the state still receives more as the deduction is worth 
only a fraction of the duty paid. Recognizing this, most 
Figure 6.3 State Participation and Efficient Taxation Compared
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states exempt imports used in an exploration and petro-
leum field or mine development from duties, either on a 
specific list or blanket basis, as an incentive to investors. 
However, inputs at the production stage may or may not 
be duty exempt.
Both import and export duties are becoming less impor-
tant as a source of revenue for most countries due to trade 
liberalization. Most countries have removed export duties 
altogether; only a few others, such as Malaysia, the Russian 
Federation and South Africa, impose them on nonrenew-
able mineral and energy resources. This practice has been 
driven as much by industrial policy as by any of the fiscal 
objectives listed, although revenue generation has played a 
role as well. In a few states, governments introduced export 
duties with the intention of encouraging investment in 
domestic processing and smelting capacity. In some cases, 
where local downstream industry did develop, the duty was 
probably unnecessary: the high cost of transporting raw 
minerals usually provided adequate incentive to domestic 
processing (OECD 2010a). Export duties need to be dealt 
with carefully because they represent another royalty and as 
such (1) can be distortive and (2) rather than adding value, 
may (on a net basis) subtract from it. A legitimate applica-
tion of export duties will go in pair with an analysis of the 
competitiveness of the country in the value chain of the 
downstream processing.
Value-added tax: How to have a workable VAT system 
for EI activities
VAT is a consumption tax levied as a percentage of the value 
of goods and services, with VAT paid on inputs credited 
against VAT paid during the same tax period on domestic 
outputs. Since the EI sectors are largely export-oriented, they 
have no domestic output VAT against which they can credit 
their VAT payments on inputs. Relief for EI sector products 
when exported must come instead from refunds paid by 
domestic tax authorities during the same tax period. Given 
the heavy up-front costs and long lead times characteristic of 
the EI sectors (including the delays experienced in obtaining 
refunds in countries with weak administrative capacity), this 
can pose a serious problem (Boadway and Keen 2010).
Many states, in particular those with a legacy of British 
influence, have resolved this problem expediently by simply 
zero-rating (as is the practice for export sectors) the VAT 
from domestic purchases destined for EI projects (Boadway 
and Keen 2010). However, care should be taken to avoid 
creating a perverse incentive whereby imports are duty free 
and local inputs are taxed to the detriment of local producers. 
Since the overall economic development aim is to see EI 
sector development stimulating other parts of the local 
economy (including the provision of local goods and 
services where feasible and where this is economic), it is 
important that these types of perverse incentives are avoided.
Other countries, in particular those with a legacy of 
French influence, have adopted an alternative approach: 
to provide VAT exemptions for imported capital goods, 
specialized services, and sometimes imported inputs. This 
approach, in Mullins’s (2010, 397) view, is “not considered 
good tax policy as such exemptions are prone to abuse, 
complicate administration, and of course, may cost reve-
nue which often has to be recouped from elsewhere in the 
tax system.” Nevertheless, a specific sector exemption for 
imported capital goods may be necessary if the tax admin-
istration lacks the capacity to administer a refund-based 
system without any delay. It could be limited by project 
and in time, and to those goods and services that are neces-
sary to the extractives sector. The overall guideline is that 
where alternatives to VAT are adopted, these should 
mimic the correct operation of VAT as far as possible, 
along with the introduction of appropriate surveillance 
measures.
Government’s share and taxes under a production-
sharing contract
The production-sharing scheme is very commonly applied to 
oil and gas operations in the developing world, although only 
very rarely to mining operations.15 In their simplest form, these 
regimes allow the investor to recover eligible costs through 
an allocation of production named “cost oil/gas (or cost 
petroleum)” and share the remaining profit oil/gas (or profit 
petroleum) production with the government. The govern-
ment’s share in the profit petroleum is a fiscal revenue scheme 
for the state similar to sharing profits that can be taken either 
in kind or in cash, in conformity with the PSC.
There are four main variants of profit-petroleum- 
 sharing mechanisms, each of which is aimed at increasing 
the government’s profit share on the more profitable proj-
ects (IMF 2012, 17b1) to align with the fiscal progressivity 
objective of the state:
1. Daily rate of production: in which the government 
share of profit petroleum increases with the daily rate of 
production from the field or license, often using several 
tiers. Sometimes this is blended with a scale of prices. Its 
main weakness is that it is not progressive with respect 
to oil costs (and prices, except when provided for).
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2. Cumulative production from a project: in which the 
government share of profit petroleum increases as 
total cumulative production increases. This is not 
commonly used.
3. R-factor: in which the government profit petroleum 
share increases with the ratio of contractor’s cumula-
tive net revenues to contractor’s cumulative invest-
ments (or costs in some countries), from the award of 
the license or contract until the period of sharing 
(the R-factor). This variant is increasingly used, even 
if it does not recognize the time value of money, 
because that mechanism is easier to understand by all 
the stakeholders than the following rate-of-return 
approach.
4. Rate of return: in which the government’s profit petro-
leum share is set by reference to the cumulative contrac-
tor rate of return achieved from the award of the license 
or contract until the period of sharing.
In addition to taking the government’s share in the profit 
petroleum, the state under any PSC may receive, if so pro-
vided, CIT and any other taxes listed in this section, includ-
ing royalty if applicable and benefits from state participation. 
Royalty on production is not mandatory under a PSC 
(Duval et al. 2009, 72): indeed, many PSCs do not provide 
for payment of a distinct royalty. The reason is that, by 
design, under any PSC there is already an implicit payable 
royalty because from the first year of production the state 
always receives annually a certain government share in the 
profit petroleum. This results from the applicability of a 
ceiling percentage rule limiting the portion of production—
often significantly lower than 100 percent—that can be 
allocated under the PSC to annual petroleum cost-recovery 
purposes. Such a restriction on annual cost recovery does 
not apply under a tax and royalty fiscal system, in which tax 
deductions for CIT may reach 100 percent of the taxable 
revenues, justifying under such system a royalty as a mini-
mum annual payment to the state.
By contrast, CIT is always payable under PSCs as under 
a tax royalty system, but two alternatives for CIT payment 
may apply, depending on the PSC wording: (1) either the 
CIT is directly paid by the contractor or (2) the CIT liability 
is deemed included in the government’s share in the profit 
petroleum, which in that case is higher in order to allow the 
CIT payment by the state on behalf of the contractor (Duval 
et al. 2009, 246–47). To prevent difficulties and loopholes in 
assessing CIT liability under a PSC, the country tax legisla-
tion must provide for a specific section dealing with the 
clear determination of the assessable profit under a PSC. 
In particular, the definition of the eligible recoverable costs 
and allowable CIT deductions as well as their depreciation 
rules may be different for the respective determination of 
petroleum cost recovery and CIT base. Such differences 
must be clearly stated, as must be the adjustments to be 
made to the costs jointly recovered by a contractor, to get 
the CIT deductions of each individual entity constituting 
a contractor.
Production-sharing regimes share to some extent the 
pluses and minuses of profit taxes when measured against 
fiscal objectives. At the same time, some elements of 
production-sharing regimes, such as the annual petroleum 
cost recovery limitation, function more like royalties, as 
explained. Payment of CIT in addition to production shar-
ing allows investors to qualify for a foreign tax credit in 
their home country.16 The combination of fiscal instru-
ments under a PSC is illustrated schematically in figure 6.4. 
This overlay of fiscal instruments can create administrative 
difficulties, which are discussed in section 6.6, “EI Fiscal 
Administration.”
Angola provides an example of a fiscal package that 
includes cost recovery, profit petroleum sharing, and CIT 
liability and excludes royalty payment by the contractor. 
(See box 6.2.)
Capital gains taxation for transfers of EI interest
Mining and petroleum license, concession, or contract 
interests and related rights often change hands; they are 
often sold from one investor to another. This can serve a 
very useful function. For example, small companies with 
an appetite for risk may take on EI projects with little 
appeal to major investors. In the event of success, these 
small companies (often called “independents” in the 
petroleum industry and “juniors” in the mining industry) 
will look for their reward through transfers or sales of 
their interest and rights to majors with the financial and 
technical muscle to exploit the discovery. The transaction 
often involves the sale of shares in companies that hold 
mineral rights (indirect transfer), rather than a sale of the 
rights themselves (direct transfer). Such companies are 
often part of a complex web of cross-border ownership 
chains. Any capital gain may be made by a nonresident 
and be protected by a tax treaty.
A large part of the premium, or gains, that independents 
or juniors achieve on such sales (which may be substantial) is 
rent; nevertheless, depending on the legislation and regula-
tions in place, the investor may be able to structure the sale 
so that taxation is limited (for example, by transferring 
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Figure 6.4 Example of a Production-Sharing Contract in Oil Production
Production
Proﬁt oil RoyaltyCost oil
Contractor’s share
Contractor’s after-tax
income
Proﬁt tax
Total contractor’s share Total government’s share
Government’s share
Source: IMF 2011.
Note: The figure assumes that a distinct royalty and corporate income tax is payable, which is not always the case in PSCs.
Box 6.2 Angola’s PSC Fiscal Package for Petroleum
Angola’s fiscal regime for petroleum has gone 
through several iterations since oil activity began. 
Tax-royalty systems are still applied on renewed con-
cessions, but production-sharing contracts (PSCs)—
or in some cases risk-service contracts (RSCs)—have 
been applied to new contracts. The PSC package 
that has now emerged is generally regarded as repre-
senting good practice and includes the following 
components:
1. Signature bonus. Signature bonuses are included as 
bid items in competitive licensing rounds. Angola’s 
positive track record in honoring contracts and its 
oil prospectivity have resulted in significant bonuses 
in recent years.
2. Production sharing. Investors are permitted allowable 
cost recovery of up to 50 to 65 percent of produc-
tion. Remaining profit oil is split for deepwater 
 projects according to a scale that escalates from 
20 percent to 85 percent (or from 30 to 90 percent 
in recent contracts) in the government’s favor 
as a function of the investor’s actual achieved 
profitability.
3. Corporate income tax (CIT) per project. A 50 percent 
tax is levied on the investor’s adjusted profit oil 
share ring-fenced per development project. Capital 
gains resulting from transfers are subject to CIT.
4. State participation. Sonangol (Angola’s national 
resource company) equity participation varies from 
0 to 20 percent (or a higher percentage) depending 
on the contract.
5. No royalty payable by the international oil company.
Under these terms, the state’s share in benefits is 
decidedly progressive, while still allowing the investor 
to share in the upside. The resulting range of govern-
ment take is consistent with Angola’s prospectivity 
and take obtained in comparable states. Emphasis on 
profits- based taxation provides an incentive to extended, 
broad-based development.
Application of the corporate tax allows investors to 
claim foreign tax credits. Sonangol’s participation inter-
est has been kept at relatively modest levels, but a higher 
rate may be provided for in the bidding terms. Angola’s 
decision to seek external audit support has provided 
protection of its interests in fiscal administration.
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interests offshore rather than by a sale of in-country assets 
when the tax rules are incomplete or unclear). The gains 
observed in the past few years have exceeded expectations 
considerably as a result of dramatically increased prices for 
petroleum and minerals, and have understandably encour-
aged reexamination of their fiscal treatment (Nahkle 2007). 
Much media coverage has been given to the way the issue has 
arisen, for example, in Ghana, Mozambique, and Uganda in 
recent years in both hydrocarbons and mining sectors. The 
main issues center on these questions: Should these gains be 
taxed, and if so, who should or who can tax the gain? Best 
practice in the design and enforcement of a response is still 
evolving. A comprehensive review of taxing gains in transfer 
of interest in a mining or petroleum right is available (Burns, 
Le Leuch, and Sunley 2016).
Taxing gains on transfer of interest is becoming more 
important and more controversial for at least two reasons. 
First, gains have been typically much higher due to price 
increases. Second, taxing gains is extensively addressed in 
developed countries, and the basic principle is that gains are 
taxable as an ordinary income subject to CIT. In contrast, 
in many resource-rich countries outside the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
area, either taxing gains is not addressed at all or the tax 
rules contain so many loopholes that international oil com-
panies (IOCs) easily find ways of mitigating taxation on 
transfers of interest. In addition, tax-treaty-shopping strat-
egies using tax havens are often used by IOCs when dealing 
with developing countries to obtain exemption from taxa-
tion of gains.
Recent examples of very large capital gains in the extrac-
tives sector of developing countries raise an ethical question: 
Why should such profits not be taxable in such countries 
when they are taxed in most OECD countries? Is it fair to 
exempt them from taxing of gains? Moreover, the issue of 
taxing gains is usually treated on the basis of concession 
agreements and CIT only, not on the interaction with any 
additional profits tax when applicable—except in a very few 
countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia, where 
the applicability of APT in the event of gains has been 
cleared. Similarly, the treatment of transfers is still rarely 
provided for under production-sharing contracts, where two 
issues must be addressed: the tax treatment of gains and their 
cost recovery treatment. In practice, taxing gains on transfers 
of interest must be treated differently for mining than from 
oil and gas.
An alternative view of good practice would be to recom-
mend that IOCs usually be subject to taxation of gains on 
transfer of interest, except in some specific cases (such as 
under so-called farm-outs, when the consideration is not 
cash but only the performance of work obligations).17 This 
is, however, possible only if the tax legislation so provides 
specifically for exploration and production. Guidance to 
governments of such an alternative approach is contained 
in box 6.3. In terms of fitting such good practice to a par-
ticular context, a government may, in revising its current 
tax regime, choose to distinguish current or existing inves-
tors from future ones in order to ensure that such revisions 
do not trigger negative perceptions about the stability of its 
investment climate.
Box 6.3 Elements for Action on Taxation of Transfer of EI Interest
1. Define the different ways of transferring interests 
in licenses and contracts (because gains result 
from direct or indirect transfers of interests). 
These are:
i. Farm-in/out in a block or contract
ii. Only a work commitment as compensation
iii. Cash compensation plus work commitment
iv. Sale of a participating interest in a block for a 
cash consideration
v. Sale combining shares in a subsidiary (a direct 
subsidiary or a subsidiary in a chain of 
controlled subsidiaries) plus working interest 
in blocks
vi. Swaps of interest in licenses
vii. Other forms of transfers: initial public offering 
and so forth
2. Address the administrative approval of any proposed 
transfer, direct or indirect, in particular in cases 
where the transfer involves a predefined change of 
control in a subsidiary. Why does such approval 
require an assessment of the tax consequences of the 
transfer?
(Box continues on the following page) 
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6.5 SPECIAL EI FISCAL TOPICS AND 
PROVISIONS
Extractives fiscal prices
Price determination for fiscal purposes can be complicated 
in the EI sectors. In all cases, the goal in tax administration 
is to set or agree to a fair price for tax purposes as close as 
possible to that which would be realized in a genuine third-
party, arms-length market sale. This is important for several 
reasons:
1. To avoid fiscal revenue loss by underpricing of the 
resource (see the section on Transfer Pricing below).
2. To avoid government overpricing of the resource to raise 
revenues.
3. To help ensure the availability of foreign tax credits to 
investors (see the subsection “Foreign Tax Credits in 
Home Country”).
The goal is most easily accomplished in the case of oil, 
where well-established international markets exist and ref-
erence price quotes, together with price adjustments for 
crude oil quality and transport differentials, are almost con-
tinuously available. The fiscalization point (at the point of 
export, ex-field, or another agreed point of delivery) must 
be agreed to by the parties but need not present particular 
difficulties as long as associated taxes or royalties are adjusted 
to reflect the choice made. Establishing fiscal prices for 
mining and natural gas is more problematic, because their 
market prices may be harder to identify or observe.
In the case of gas, competitive markets currently exist 
only in the United States, the United Kingdom, and a few 
other countries; readily observable prices for fiscal purposes 
do not exist outside those markets and are often set on a 
project-by-project basis. Further, the marketing of natural 
gas and some minerals may be integrated all the way from 
the petroleum field gate or agreed delivery point or mine 
mouth through processing or smelting and transport all the 
way to final consumer with different tax regimes along the 
integrated chain. Setting the value of the resource along that 
chain will, as a result, have significant implications for total 
fiscal revenues and their sharing among fiscal jurisdictions. 
Good practice generally calls for “netting” the price paid by 
the final consumer back to the agreed field gate or delivery 
point or mine mouth in such a way that fiscal valuation 
accrues at those points.
Transfer pricing and interest deductibility
Transfer pricing refers to the pricing of sales to, or pur-
chases from, parties affiliated with the EI sector investor 
(Daniel et al. 2016, 42–110). It applies not only to the sale 
of products and goods but also to the supply of services and 
the terms and pricing of loans or credit instruments such as 
prefinancing arrangements. More than one half of all cross-
border transactions carried out are likely to be between 
companies that are affiliated, so the importance of this 
subject should not be underestimated (RWI et al. 2013, 96). 
Transfer pricing is considered abusive when underpricing a 
sale or overpricing a purchase results in shifting profits 
Box 6.3 Elements for Action on Taxation of Transfer of EI Interest (continued)
3. Define the gain or profit/loss related to a transfer 
and the ways to tax such gain or profit, taking into 
account the following six considerations:
 i. Is the gain considered to be ordinary income 
subject to normal corporate income tax (CIT) or 
at a different rate applicable to capital gains? 
What rate is applicable when activity is subject to 
an additional profits tax? How should one allo-
cate the transaction cost between several blocks?
 ii. Why should gain be taxed? Why should the 
value of the transaction take into account the 
applicable taxation on gain?
 iii. Does the petroleum tax legislation define a 
special gain taxation regime for the oil and gas 
exploration and production sector? This 
should normally be the case, especially to deal 
with farm-in, swap of licenses, reinvestment in 
the country, and so on.
 iv. What are the accounting issues for the transferor 
and the transferee regarding acquisition costs?
 v. Is there an impact of the cost of acquisition on 
cost recovery under production-sharing con-
tracts? Should the acquisition cost not be a 
recoverable cost even when the transfer is sub-
ject to CIT?
 vi. How should the impact of favorable double 
taxation treaties and international oil compa-
nies’ tax planning strategies be mitigated?
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from a host state resource extraction jurisdiction to a lower 
tax jurisdiction outside the EI host state—with the result 
that the tax payments to the host state are reduced (Sunley, 
Baunsgaard, and Simard 2003, 157–58).
Vulnerability to abusive transfer pricing is not unique 
to the extractives sector. However, very high taxes on 
exploration and production increase the risk of abuse and 
are compounded by the fact that many of the investors in 
the extractives sector are integrated international compa-
nies and often use tax havens as corporate locations. 
Activities such as production, refining, marketing, and 
distribution of the resource could occur in several tax 
jurisdictions, creating opportunities for transfer pricing. 
Similarly, excessive fees could be claimed for managerial 
and technical services shared by a company’s interna-
tional operations.
Monitoring and policing interaffiliate transactions can 
be difficult, but very far from impossible. Three features of 
extractive industries contribute to assist government 
authorities in their tasks (IMF 2012, 37):
1. There are observable physical operations and outputs.
2. There are standard measurements and benchmark inter-
national prices that can produce a comparable uncon-
trolled price with which to value transactions.
3. In the hydrocarbons sector, at least, there is commonly a 
joint venture structure that triggers conflicting interests 
that work in the favor of public authorities in controlling 
costs.
Tax authorities are well advised to set clear, transparent 
rules and procedures for tax treatment of interaffiliate 
transactions.18 Abuses with respect to both sales and pur-
chases (interest costs or subcontractor goods and services) 
can be mitigated by the following:
1. Preparing tax returns, for tax assessment, using either an 
advance pricing agreement for any interaffiliate transac-
tions, agreed ex ante prices, or arm’s length market 
prices with benchmarking by reference to observable 
markets (as suggested in the preceding paragraph for 
pricing of sales).
2. Requiring investors to provide both advance notification 
each year and an annual projection of the value (in terms 
of price and quantities) of any planned interaffiliate 
transactions and then, based on the information pro-
vided, setting a ceiling for such transactions beyond 
which they will not be eligible to be deducted for tax 
purposes.
3. Requiring investors to identify all affiliated and nonaffili-
ate transactions and justify their pricing (this can be an 
important tool in building up data for the enforcement 
of transfer pricing rules).
4. Referencing or incorporating into local legislation the 
OECD (2010b) guidelines on transfer pricing.
Companies sometimes attempt to reduce tax assess-
ments by having highly leveraged capital investment pro-
grams with as much as 95 percent debt financing, a 
percentage that is considered much higher than prudent 
(Sunley, Baunsgaard, and Simard 2003). This can happen 
especially where a subsidiary company takes on excessive 
debt while the parent company maintains more prudent 
debt levels. The problem here, however, is more than having 
a subsidiary taking on imprudent debt. It is rather that they 
are characterizing parent contributions as debt rather than 
equity simply to minimize taxes (and equity payments to 
other, including state, shareholders). In many cases, this is 
not real debt but related party debt that is simply character-
ized as debt.
In the case of interest costs, extra protection may be pro-
vided by not only benchmarking rates against observable 
market rates but also by limiting the total debt allowed for 
purposes of tax calculations in the host state to a set a debt-
to-equity ratio ceiling (for example, a three-to-one ratio 
when the EI project is carried out by an incorporated proj-
ect company, which is not common for petroleum). Other, 
simpler approaches are receiving increasing attention and 
use, such as limiting interest deductions to a set share of 
income. In addition, more and more countries are crafting 
limitations to interest deductions for CIT purposes on 
petroleum projects by imposing specific sectoral debt limi-
tations, such as (1) restricting debt to a maximum specified 
percentage of development capital expenditure and (2) 
excluding exploration costs.
Under good practice, the burden should be on the tax-
payer to use the rules and to demonstrate that it has done 
so. Published benchmark prices should be used where they 
are available. Tax authorities need robust data collection 
programs to support a coherent audit strategy.
Special ring-fencing rules for CIT and other taxes
EI ring-fencing rules may be required for several fiscal 
purposes. The most common is the ring-fencing for CIT 
purposes that aims to limit the consolidation of income 
and deductions for CIT purposes across different activities 
or projects carried out by the same taxpayer in a country. 
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This is a critical, necessary tax rule for EI activities, because 
under general tax laws an entire CIT consolidation rule 
applies. A frequent EI tax rule is a restricted sectorwide 
ring-fence for the EI sector in the country, not allowing 
nonsector activities to be deductible from the extraction 
sector and vice versa. Norway and the United Kingdom, 
for example, have a more restrictive rule allowing a ring-
fencing only for the petroleum offshore activities. If defer-
ral of effective revenue is a concern, it could be done on a 
license basis. This has the advantage of ensuring earlier 
government revenues by not authorizing immediate 
deduction of exploration or development expenditures 
from each new project against the income from a project 
that is already generating taxable income.
The selected rule regarding ring-fencing for CIT may, 
however, have consequences for both the pace of explora-
tion and development activities and the timing of govern-
ment revenues. Ring-fencing per project or license limits 
tax deductions and depreciation allowances from the reve-
nues of a producing petroleum or mining project to costs 
incurred in the same project or license area. This has two 
consequences. The first is positive: ring-fencing avoids the 
delays in government revenues that might otherwise result 
if investors can deduct for CIT purposes depreciation 
allowances for new expenditures or investments made out-
side the producing area against producing-area income. 
The second may be viewed as negative to the investor: the 
ring-fencing does not permit the right to consolidate new 
costs with existing income for fiscal purposes, eliminating 
an incentive to spend on new exploration and development 
outside the producing area. If the government were to allow 
costs to cross, or be consolidated across, a ring-fence it 
may, in effect, be indirectly subsidizing unsuccessful opera-
tions by allowing deductibility of those costs. However, this 
eliminates only the incentive with respect to existing pro-
ducers. In contrast, many states want to encourage new 
investors to come in, and here project ring-fencing may 
help create a level playing field. New entrants have no in-
country income against which to offset exploration costs, 
so they are at a disadvantage vis-à-vis existing producers, 
which will face lower costs for exploration; this is another 
argument for limited CIT ring-fencing.
Policy makers face a trade-off between early revenue 
with deferred activity and accelerated activity with delayed 
revenue. How the trade-off is resolved will depend on both 
country context and country priorities.
Certain fiscal instruments other than CIT also require 
ring-fencing if they are to make sense. This may concern a 
resource rent tax or an additional profits tax ring-fenced per 
project; state participation; royalty when the rate depends 
on production tranches; and petroleum cost recovery and 
profit petroleum sharing under PSCs.
Depreciation of capital expenditure for 
CIT purposes
The tax rules under the CIT legislation, supplemented by 
specific rules for the EI sector, clarify the definition of the 
allowable deductible costs and their allocation between (1) 
expenses immediately deductible, when incurred (or when 
production starts, if later), and (2) capital expenditure, to 
be depreciated under a specific method and duration. Some 
countries may grant accelerated depreciation, while others 
prefer to impose a longer depreciation duration, which is 
the most common practice. Indeed, the annual rate of 
depreciation of capital expenditure for CIT purposes is a 
key tax rule with economic impact, as it may significantly 
delay government revenue when accelerated depreciation 
applies. Depreciation provisions (also sometimes called cost 
recovery or capital allowances for CIT) are deductible from 
the CIT base. They are the means by which the investor 
recovers from gross revenues the costs of exploration, devel-
opment, and operations. They also directly control the 
schedule of actual receipts by the government of CIT, 
depending on the pace of depreciation.
The definition of deductible costs for CIT can generate 
considerable debate unless clear rules apply. Issues arising 
include the deduction of (1) overseas headquarters costs 
(usually limited as a percentage of project costs); (2) interest 
costs (subject to limits on debt and the application of mar-
ket benchmarks on interest); (3) costs related to purchases 
from affiliated parties (addressed by applying OECD rules 
on transfer pricing or requiring demonstration of third-
party pricing equivalence); and (4) costs incurred beyond 
the vicinity of the revenue-generating project.19 The defini-
tion of deductible costs will affect the pace and the size of 
government revenues.
Under PSCs, the contract and its special accounting pro-
cedure clarify the definition of the eligible petroleum costs 
for PSC recovery purposes and how they are recoverable. 
Their definition and the pace of recovery may be different 
for cost recovery purposes under the PSC and CIT pur-
poses, provided that such differences are clearly stated and 
understood by each party. Normally, a PSC will cap the 
amount of annual production allocated to cost recovery 
purposes—while under CIT there is no such ceiling on cost 
deductibility—and will allow unrecovered costs to be car-
ried forward and recovered in successive years.
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Decommissioning costs and provisions
Petroleum and mining investors are now almost univer-
sally required to decommission their site once operations 
cease, although allocation of costs varies greatly from one 
country to another (see chapter 9, sections 9.5 and 9.6). 
Decommissioning requires the investor to close the mine and 
the wells, rehabilitate the site, and restore or remove any 
causes of danger or injury to the environment (World Bank 
2010). Since there is no income against which to recover 
decommissioning costs once operations cease, detailed rules 
need to be made providing for plans and budgets and cost 
deduction for CIT purposes. It is now common to require 
investors to establish from a predetermined date a decommis-
sioning fund or mine reclamation fund in advance of termi-
nation. This may be carried out under specific rules through 
payments made ahead of closure based on estimates of future 
decommissioning costs and placed in an escrow account at an 
approved bank. Under good practice, those payments are 
considered authorized tax provisions and become cost recov-
erable under a PSC and tax deductible for CIT when incurred. 
Mining differs from oil and gas in that decommissioning takes 
place in phases during mine operations, not only after the 
mine is closed. Decommissioning costs incurred in advance of 
closure are normally allowed as deductible expenses.
Specific fiscal issues related to natural gas
Petroleum tax laws usually provide specific clauses on 
natural gas to enable more favorable fiscal terms for gas 
operations, since the profitability of upstream gas projects 
is often lower than in oil projects.20 The reasons are two-
fold: upstream gas operations are often more costly, and 
gas is sold at a lower equivalent caloric value than oil.21 
However, the appropriate gas incentives vary according to 
the kind of fiscal system and petroleum contract that is 
adopted. If adjustments are required under the existing fis-
cal regime, the following tools may apply:
 ■ Under tax and royalty systems, reduced royalty rates for 
gas (for example, in Nigeria, Tunisia, and Vietnam).
 ■ Under PSCs, where most of the fiscal differences between 
oil and gas are of a contractual nature, through more 
favorable cost recovery and production-sharing terms 
applicable to the investor in relation with gas produc-
tion, for example, in Egypt, Indonesia, and Malaysia. 
(Thus, in an Indonesian PSC, the contractor may often 
have a share of 25–35 percent in the profit oil split on an 
after-tax basis, while for gas the contractor’s share may 
rise to as much as 30–40 percent.)
 ■ Lower CIT rates (for example, in Nigeria, Papua New 
Guinea, and Tunisia).
 ■ Exemption from certain petroleum taxes (for example, 
in Trinidad and Tobago, where there is an exemption 
from the Supplementary Petroleum Tax).
Both tax-and-royalty and production-sharing contract 
regimes have recently introduced more progressive fiscal 
devices, as explained in section 6.4. Indeed, these are 
designed to automatically take into account, among other 
things, the differences in economics between oil and gas. 
They consist of either the additional profits tax instrument 
under a tax-and-royalty system or a progressive petroleum 
profit-sharing scheme triggered by an economic criterion 
(such as the achieved rate of return of the project or, more 
frequently, a multiple of the investment incurred—the 
R-factor). That approach is becoming more common, by 
relating rent sharing to the effective profitability reached by 
a project and allowing a country to address upstream oil 
and gas activities using the same terms.
The specific fiscal regime applied to the upstream oil and 
gas sector contrasts with the typical tax regime regarding gas 
downstream activities, which generally consists of the gen-
eral tax code of the country applicable in the same way as to 
any other sector of the economy. Downstream gas opera-
tions tend to be treated as general industrial projects and 
subject only to standard CIT.
Two contractual and fiscal approaches are suboptimal 
for fostering the development of the upstream natural gas 
activities. First, the solution of postponing stipulation of 
detailed fiscal terms for future gas discoveries after they 
are made can prove unwise; it assumes that they can be 
left to be negotiated at a later stage, if and when a poten-
tially viable discovery has been proved. This creates a 
disincentive to the investor to search for gas and appraise 
a gas discovery: if commercial quantities of gas are found, 
the government may regard the investor as having no 
rights at all to that gas and even “invite” it to negotiate for 
a role in competition with other potential investors. 
Second, the solution under a PSC of using the same terms 
for oil and gas, when the progressive profit-petroleum 
sharing is based on a scale of daily oil production tranches 
creates a problem: it only converts the respective levels of 
the oil production tranches into gas production tranches 
on the basis of a simple calorific equivalence.22 The 
strong likelihood that the expected price of gas will 
remain lower than that of oil is not taken into account in 
that purely calorific equivalence approach without any 
price adjustment.
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Specific fiscal issues related to small-scale 
mining activity
The operations of artisanal and small-scale miners have 
attracted considerable attention (see chapter 9 for discus-
sion of legal and environmental issues), not least because of 
their numbers in countries like Brazil, Ghana, Sierra Leone, 
Suriname, Tanzania, Thailand, and Zambia. The fiscal 
issues arising from this sector are few and are comparable to 
small-scale agriculture rather than large-scale mining. 
Emerging good practice, as in Ghana, for example, is to levy 
royalties on traders by requiring them to withhold and pay 
taxes—instead of attempting to tax miners directly, except 
perhaps for a small license fee, and ensuring that consump-
tion taxes are levied.
Tax treatment of infrastructure obligations
Investors may sometimes be obligated to provide the host 
state with social or physical infrastructure as part of their 
contractual undertakings (see chapter 9). This is tanta-
mount to earmarking government revenues. The motiva-
tions behind the requirement may have to do with lack of 
government capacity or with political expediency. Whatever 
the motivations, except where the expenditure is allowed as 
a full credit or offset against the investor’s tax obligation, 
the requirement is analogous to an explicit tax on the 
investor. The scale of such a tax depends on (1) whether 
the infrastructure expenditure is deductible, (2) the actual 
cost of the infrastructure to the investor, and (3) continu-
ing upkeep obligations. Further, since some infrastructure 
may be used in servicing the mine, it would represent a 
business expense rather than full taxes. Shared use by other 
operators (such as railways or ports) will further compli-
cate any such analysis.
Tax treatment of discounted domestic sales prices
In the past, some governments in petroleum-producing 
states (such as Nigeria and Indonesia) have required the sale 
of at least part of oil production to domestic market refiners 
at discounted, below-market prices. This is essentially 
equivalent to a royalty and suffers from the same drawbacks 
as royalties but without the benefits. The benefits of dis-
counted sales prices flow directly to the domestic refiner, 
not the government, and represent an opportunity cost loss 
to the budget. Further, the discounts can be expected to 
distort domestic investment and consumption decisions 
with resulting economic losses. The practice of discounted 
sales at the level of upstream production is now very rare.23
Tax holidays for EI projects: their drawbacks
As their name suggests, tax holidays provide the investor 
with a temporary reduction or exemption from taxes 
and duties for a period of years, possibly as long as 5 to 
10 years. When applied, often in conformity with the 
country investment code, they are used to promote invest-
ment based on zero taxation for a specific period. Profits 
are exempt from tax regardless of their size. Once a com-
mon feature in mining sector fiscal regimes, tax holidays 
are still found in the EIs but are much less well regarded 
now and are nearly inapplicable to petroleum projects. 
Recent research has been highly critical of their effects, 
noting that there is little evidence that they have actually 
encouraged investments and have generally served to 
reduce taxes on investments that would have been made 
anyway without such an incentive. The result is a net 
loss to the host state and a distortion for international 
competition. An Oxfam study of taxation among develop-
ing countries described this as “one of the most damaging 
tax incentives” (Itriago 2011, 15). The study noted the 
potential for abuse: companies that are not eligible for a 
tax holiday may engage in financial transactions with 
exempted companies solely to transfer profits from the 
former to the latter and thereby avoid paying taxes on that 
profit. The study continues:
Tax holidays do not encourage a company whose 
 project is long-term to settle in a developing country. 
It is companies with short-term projects who are 
attracted by tax holidays, because they are conﬁdent 
that in their ﬁrst years they will obtain proﬁts, and the 
tax holiday incentive will exempt them from paying 
any tax on these. When the incentive ends, they pack 
up and leave (74).
Given mining’s long exploration and development 
 periods, high costs, low margins, and long payback peri-
ods, tax holidays were originally promoted and introduced 
as essential incentives to investment. However, their use in 
practice has exposed serious investment and operating 
distortions. Among other things, these relate to the prac-
tice of “high-grading.”24 Investors were found to be unduly 
accelerating mine production, focusing only on high mar-
gin ores, in an effort to extract as much value as possible 
before the tax holiday ended. Tax holidays considerably 
reduced total tax revenues, and in the very worst case may 
have resulted in no taxes being paid at all (even though 
production was highly profitable). Tax holidays have been 
largely discontinued in favor of less distorting incentives, 
CHAPTER 6: FISCAL DESIGN AND ADMINISTRATION 171
such as rapid depreciation rates (ICCM 2009, 47). 
That said, many countries, including Australia and Canada, 
provide generous incentives for exploration, including 
carry-forward allowances. This can be justified by the fact 
that the investor will receive only a part (and perhaps a 
modest part) of the rent once production commences.
Provisions related to expensing and depreciation rates 
have significant implications for the timing of those reve-
nues. The importance of depreciation is that it is an expense 
deducted from income for tax purposes. Tax depreciation 
provisions need careful consideration because of their 
implications for the time profile of tax payments, as dis-
cussed above in this section.
In lieu of granting pure tax holidays, governments may 
decide to use accelerated depreciation for tax purposes—but 
only when justified in special circumstances—to allow accel-
erated capital recovery, which reduces financial risks for 
investors, but not for the government. There are risks, 
indeed, in allowing investors to achieve rapid cost recovery. 
In using this depreciation strategy, governments must fully 
appreciate that if profits increase sharply due to a mineral 
price boom, tax payments may not increase until the permit-
ted annual depreciation has been fully utilized. It is possible 
that annual tax payments could increase in response to price 
rises, however, even in the presence of accelerated deprecia-
tion. Interactions with loss carry-forward rules, for instance, 
can mean that some share of annual windfalls accrues to 
government even if assets are not fully depreciated.
Fiscal stabilization
A major concern of investors, noted elsewhere in the 
Sourcebook (chapter 4, for example), is the possibility that 
the host state will introduce adverse terms—especially, but 
not exclusively, fiscal terms—once risks have been borne 
and major expenditures sunk. This is sometimes called the 
“obsolescing bargain” or “time inconsistency” problem by 
economists. These concerns have been at least partially 
addressed by introducing stability clauses in legislation or, 
more commonly, in licenses or contracts. In some coun-
tries, this may take the form of a specific agreement on tax 
stability. In Ghana, for example, such agreements are made 
between the government and the mining company, then 
submitted to the parliament for approval.
In practice, among the many forms of contract stability, 
the most common are the freezing formulation and the 
rebalancing formulation (see chapter 4, section 4.9). Under 
the former, one version is for the laws in force when the 
agreement was signed to be frozen for the life of the 
contract or for a period of years (Cameron 2006). Under 
the second approach (now thought to be more common), 
one version is for the parties to the contract to agree to 
negotiate in good faith to maintain the original economic 
equilibrium of the contract by introducing compensating 
changes to any adverse revisions to law or to the contract 
itself (Cameron 2006; Cotula 2010, 69).
A growing reluctance to accept stability clauses is emerg-
ing on the part of governments (Cotula 2010, 16–17). 
However, in the absence of a country’s track record of 
broad-based improvements in governance, it seems likely 
that such provisions will continue to be sought by investors 
and granted by states as a way of improving their competi-
tive position.25 At the same time, it is increasingly recog-
nized that good fiscal design (by providing for automatic 
responsiveness of terms to changed circumstances under 
the fiscal progressivity objective) can reduce pressures to 
renegotiate or revise agreements, making it less likely that 
stability clauses will be invoked.
Renegotiating and updating tax regimes
While mature states may be able to ensure stable tax 
regimes, some states have trouble achieving this. States with 
new EI sector industries, states privatizing loss-making 
companies, or states recovering from civil war may make 
certain tax concessions or provide certain tax incentives in 
order to attract early investors. If this is the case, there is a 
risk that a successor government will demand a renegotia-
tion of the fiscal package if the state’s track record in the EI 
sector becomes more established or stable. In the latter 
event, a government seeking a change will typically carry 
out a comparative analysis with peer countries, review its 
tax regime through a transparent process, introduce flexi-
bility mechanisms such as a progressive tax regime, and 
increase its tax rates so that its tax take moves closer to that 
of states with similar prospectivity. This subject is discussed 
in some detail in chapter 4 and in section 6.2.
In practice, many countries have changed the terms on 
which their extractive industries operate: Australia, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom are examples from the developed 
economies. Much depends on the price of the relevant com-
modity. When prices are high, the tendency is to increase 
state control and take; when prices are low, the tendency is to 
reduce them. The resulting uncertainty diminishes the value 
that investors are willing to pay, motivating a progressive 
regime. However, if terms have moved out of line with inter-
national practice or those practices in comparable settings, 
the way is open for a government to consult with investors 
172 OIL, GAS, AND MINING
and attempt to secure change by means of mutual agree-
ment, with a view to strengthening the investment climate.
The issue is not so much whether a regime is in  general 
“stable,” but whether a particular regime applying to exist-
ing investments is stable or not. For future investments, 
governments may of course change the applicable terms as 
they deem appropriate. A second issue is the continuing 
value to investors of stability clauses in agreements as a 
defense against unilateral changes or mitigation of their 
effects. This is discussed in other parts of the Sourcebook 
(in particular, chapter 4, section 4.9).
Foreign tax credits in home country
Whether a credit is available in an investor’s home state for 
income taxes paid to the host state is an important consid-
eration for investors whose home states apply a system of 
worldwide income taxation (for example, states that tax 
foreign source income in the home state).26 However, this 
constraint is less common today. Most host states are aware 
of this issue and adjust their resource tax regimes to ensure 
the availability of foreign tax credits. This can be done with-
out prejudice to host state tax  revenues and has the benefit 
of encouraging inward international investment. Criteria 
for foreign tax creditability include the following:
1. A host-state tax based on net income (ideally closely 
resembling the income tax applied in the investor’s 
home state)
2. Use of actual third-party market prices or equivalent 
benchmarks in the calculation of host state taxable 
income
3. Allowable deduction of all significant costs attributable 
to the taxed operation
Some specialized resource taxes, such as resource rent 
taxes, additional profits taxes, or payments under PSCs, 
may be considered different in nature from a standard cor-
porate tax and face difficulties in qualifying for a credit. The 
treatment of these taxes can be clarified in a double tax 
treaty (see the following subsection, “Interaction between 
Tax Treaties and Country Legislation”). Home states limit 
the total credit available to what would have been paid in 
the home state absent a credit. Host states may want to 
package their EI sector taxes, including for the selection of 
applicable income tax rate, to maximize the home state 
credit available to investors and thus avoid any leakage of 
potential tax revenue to the home state.
Interaction between tax treaties and country 
legislation
Numerous international treaties have been concluded to 
prevent double taxation of the same income or profits by 
two different governments. These were not intended to 
generate double nontaxation, although this has occurred via 
treaty shopping. There are more than 3,000 such treaties in 
existence, “in which two countries agree on how and when 
each will tax activities of the residents (persons and legal 
entities) of the other with respect to certain items of 
income” (RWI et al. 2013).
Tax treaties between home and host states often reduce 
withholding-tax rates imposed by statute on dividends, 
interest, management, or technical service fees due by the 
subsidiary located in the host state to their home-state 
 parents. This is aimed at cases where the parent company 
has its head offices (and head office staff) domiciled in the 
tax treaty state. A host government may negotiate different 
withholding taxes for different treaty partners.
The risks to the host government are that the tax base of 
an extractives project may be significantly eroded and the 
permitted levels of withholding taxes may be reduced or 
even eliminated altogether.
Countries with significant flows of investment into their 
extractives sectors, and negligible outward investment flows 
of their own, must design treaty strategies to minimize this 
risk of tax base erosion and to adopt rules to prevent treaty 
shopping: the routing and characterizing remittances to 
intermediate jurisdictions to exploit advantageous treaty 
provisions. Ineffective tax treaties can also limit a govern-
ment’s ability to tax nonresident entities on capital gains.
If these treaties have special provisions on EI, their aim is 
to ensure taxing rights on income by expanding the general 
definition of permanent establishment to include activities 
for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, in 
addition to the usual coverage of a place of extraction such 
as a mine, gas, or oil well (Mullins 2010). The essential idea 
is that oil, gas, and mining exploration and production 
activities are treated as attributable for tax purposes to a 
permanent establishment in the host country, where the 
business has an enduring presence, so that the source coun-
try has the taxing rights on the profits of the business. The 
investor is not being encouraged to reduce or delay the 
amount of tax payable in the host country but rather is 
being made subject to tax only once for a given source of 
revenue.
Since many companies in the EI sector are multinational 
in character, the treatment of their foreign source income 
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in their countries of residence is very important to them. 
This is particularly so when the countries concerned have 
global taxation regimes (foreign source income earned 
abroad is taxed in the taxpayer’s country of residence), as 
in the United States and the United Kingdom. If foreign tax 
credits are available for taxes paid by the multinational in 
the source country, they can offset home country taxes 
(Mullins 2010, 384–88). Obviously, where this is permitted, 
there are detailed rules governing its operation.27 Such 
double taxation treaties are modified from time to time to 
take into account changing global tax practices.
In situations where tax treaties do not exist to prevent 
double taxation, some parent companies may be tempted 
to set up an intermediary “paper company” in a tax haven 
as the owner of the subsidiary company in order to gain 
those tax benefits. Governments can prevent this by 
including provisions in their tax laws that deem such 
 practice as tax evasion, subject to substantial penalties 
(Calder 2010b, 33). In recent years, tax treaties have 
attracted critical scrutiny. As one authority notes diplo-
matically, “The experience of resource-rich countries in 
entering into double tax treaties varies” (Mullins 2010, 
388). Such treaties make sense in cases where there are 
relatively even flows of capital between signatory coun-
tries, but where capital flows mainly in a single direction, 
which is the case in most resource-rich poor countries, the 
basis for such treaties is less clear, since they work only to 
decrease host-state revenues (Daniel et al. 2016).
Confidentiality of EI agreements
All EI states have a fiscal regime embedded in the law. Some 
states have also negotiated and signed separate, generally 
confidential EI sector agreements that contain special fiscal 
regimes unknown except to the investor, the tax authority, 
and a very small number of officials who have access to the 
agreement (see chapter 8).28 During the commodity boom 
of 2007 and 2008, a number of these agreements in the min-
ing sector came to light when governments found that tax 
payments did not increase commensurate with profitability 
because of fiscal concessions made in the contracts (ICCM 
2009, 32). The risk of corrupt practices, poorly informed 
decisions, and mismatched negotiating capabilities can be 
avoided by keeping the mining fiscal regime in the law 
and refraining from modifying it in separate confidential 
agreements. If separate agreements are made, making them 
public and transparent will give governments and the state 
at large full knowledge of the tax regime.
6.6 EI FISCAL ADMINISTRATION
Many of fiscal administration requirements and procedures 
apply equally to EI and fiscal administration generally. The 
United Nations has classified the following actions as essen-
tial functions of any fiscal administration:
In order to execute its basic mission, a tax adminis-
tration performs certain fundamental functions: tax-
payer registration and identiﬁcation, assessment 
(including valuation), collection and audit. These 
functions have been classiﬁed as “essential.” . . . 
The “essential” functions have also been labelled 
“operational,” since they involve the actual collection 
of taxes and entail close relations with taxpayers 
(UN 1997, 19).
The OECD (2013, 273–95) likewise defines the basic 
functions of tax administration as including assessment of 
taxes, including imposing sanctions to deter and penalize 
noncompliance, and the power to obtain relevant informa-
tion from taxpayers.
Given the very large amounts of money typically 
involved in oil, gas, and mining, and the transformative 
potential they have, it is critical to get the fiscal administra-
tion right.29 A well-designed but poorly drafted or imple-
mented fiscal regime may fall far short of its tax-raising 
potential. The nonrenewable character of the resources 
underlines the importance of sound fiscal administration. 
The irony is that in the EI sector, the bulk of the revenues 
are often paid by a very few large taxpayers, so the scale of 
administrative capacity required should not be large. 
Moreover, for the investors the maintenance of good rela-
tions with the host government will tend to be of great 
importance. A basis for success in fiscal administration of 
the extractives does exist.
Careful identification of fiscal objectives and selection of 
fiscal instruments is of little use if fiscal authorities prove 
incapable of implementing the resulting regime.
Tax policy and administration
Several of the key fiscal objectives identified at the begin-
ning of this chapter argue in favor of a progressive, profits-
based tax regime. Critics have faulted these regimes on 
grounds of their perceived complexity and difficulty of 
administration. However, the simpler systems with 
which the critics would replace them (such as royalty- 
based regimes) have drawbacks of their own in terms of 
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assessment, efficiency, or fiscal neutrality. The conclusion 
seems to be that countries should use a mix of instruments 
based on well-drafted fiscal rules.30
A way of resolving this dilemma would be to opt for 
the simpler, but less efficient, tax design as a starting posi-
tion, while adding capacity and transitioning toward 
something more sophisticated. In assessing these trade-
offs, it is worth noting that the ease of administration 
associated with simpler fiscal regimes may be, and often 
proves, deceptive. Their economic drawbacks can lead to 
pressures for renegotiation, legislative amendments, and/
or special deals that, in the end, considerably complicate 
administration.31
Finally, it should be recognized that administration of 
the progressive regimes requires no more, or very little 
more, capacity than that required to administer any 
income tax. To reject these regimes because they are prof-
its based or income based suggests there are much 
broader fiscal administration problems than those associ-
ated with the EI sectors alone.
In cases where a state lacks the capacity to administer a 
profits-based EI sector tax regime, where such a tax regime 
is not available domestically, or both, there is a way forward. 
They can quickly put in place the capacity by using 
 foreign experts, who could not only undertake and lead 
specific assessment and field-auditing tasks but also provide 
on-the-job training to build the capacity and experience 
needed for state-based staff.
Routine administrative functions
Routine functions are the mechanics of gathering tax: 
registering taxpayers, designing return templates, pub-
lishing guidance notes on fiscal rules, processing returns, 
issuing tax assessments, and collecting the tax. Several 
considerations should make the job of routine adminis-
tration easier in the EI sectors. The oil, gas, and mining 
companies participating in the sector tend to be relatively 
few, easy to find, and for the most part willing and able to 
carry out routine tax obligations. Additionally, adoption 
of self-assessment procedures should facilitate routine 
administration by transferring many routine tasks to the 
taxpayers.
These advantages notwithstanding, many developing 
states have faced enormous difficulties, traceable to the 
obstacles or challenges listed in box 6.4. Building capacity is 
not simply a matter of building skills. It is also very much a 
matter of attention to procedures, infrastructure, resources, 
and institutional organization. In addition, there are plenty 
of reasons the administration might become complicated: 
for example, the complexity of the sector; lack of technical 
knowledge and knowledge asymmetries; and absence of a 
chart of accounts adapted to the EI activities.
Steps required to simplify routine resource tax admin-
istration are immediately suggested by the obstacles them-
selves. While self-assessment—backed up by strong 
penalties for noncompliance and by effective audit and 
enforcement (major challenges in and of themselves)—
may limit the risk of large direct losses attributable to 
weaknesses in routine administration matters, poor rou-
tine administration and associated reporting will confuse 
economic and budgetary planning, undermine sector 
accountability and governance, and damage government’s 
reputation with investors.
Nonroutine functions
Nonroutine functions have to do with ensuring that the 
tax is calculated correctly. The most important among 
them deal with resource valuation (prices and  volumes), 
allowable cost deductions, audit and appeals, and dispute 
resolution. They are demanding functions that require 
professional skill and judgment. Very large amounts of 
money are at risk.
Box 6.4 Routine Tax Administration: Challenges
Many developing states have encountered enor-
mous difficulties in routine EI sector tax adminis-
tration that are traceable to the following:
1. Number of taxes. Too many different EI sector 
taxes with differing filing and payment rules, 
poor fiscal procedures and forms, and absence 
of guidance notes and accounting rules adapted 
to the sector,  creating uncertainties
2. Number of agencies. Different agencies for dif-
ferent taxes
3. Banking and accounting. Different arrange-
ments for different taxes
4. Technology. Poor information technology and 
management information systems, no IT net-
work  connecting different agencies
5. National resource company. Limited or no con-
trol over NRC tax payments
6. Accountability. No one person responsible for 
the overall task
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Resource valuation
Valuation of petroleum or mineral resources needs to be 
established for profit taxes, royalties, and production shar-
ing. The challenges of establishing prices for this purpose 
are discussed in the preceding section. Similarly, physical or 
volume audits can be complicated. Volume measurement 
can be highly technical, involving complex equipment. 
Definition of sales point, valuation points, and measure-
ment points must be clear.
Tax audit and other audits
Under any fiscal regime there is always scope for error, 
differences of opinion, or unacceptable manipulation. 
Where petroleum or mining are concerned, even marginal 
errors in incomes or costs can involve very large sums of 
money; hence the importance of effective tax audits. The 
ideal starting point for effective audit is a clear, well-
designed tax, supported by clear instructions to both tax-
payers and administrators in the form of a public, regularly 
updated taxpayers’ manual. Fiscal administration of the EI 
sector, like other sectors of the economy, is based on a 
self-assessment system whereby companies prepare and 
submit tax returns according to their understanding of tax 
rules. In a tax administration system that is based on self-
assessment, field tax audits of EI sector enterprises, led by 
qualified and experienced staff, are essential to reduce the 
risk of substantial underestimation in tax assessments, 
because companies will always interpret tax rules to their 
advantage unless audited.
A key weakness in many states is that tax administrations 
do not undertake field tax audits, and where they do they 
are at a great disadvantage given that EI sector tax returns 
are generally very large and complicated. Thus, obtaining 
the services of qualified tax auditors experienced in tax 
audits of EI sector companies is essential; this is important 
not only for undertaking audits but also for ensuring that all 
the necessary accounting rules and audit procedures are in 
place. Establishing the accounting rules in advance is essen-
tial in order to have a benchmark to audit against.
In addition, the auditing task can be made much more 
manageable if tax administration staff become familiar with 
the enterprises they are auditing and obtain annual projec-
tions from each enterprise and each project on a quarter-
by-quarter basis of expected tax assessments. The tax 
authority staff and auditors then have an initial reference 
point when examining the actual assessments. EI sector 
projects involve a variety of activities such as exploration 
work, development work, coproduction of different prod-
ucts, decommissioning, reclamation, and restoration that 
are not found in other businesses and for which the 
accounting treatment may have significant implications for 
tax assessments.
The procedures for selection of exchange rates will also 
need very careful attention. The tax authority will be well 
served to agree on a detailed accounting treatment for these 
various activities and projects. Ideally, the tax administra-
tion staff—together with the EI sector ministry staff—
should have computerized, financial models of each of the 
operations and enterprises, preferably using inputs received 
from, or agreed with, the companies.
In the petroleum industry, tax audits are assisted by the 
common practice of investor joint ventures whose rules 
provide not only for detailed (and increasingly standard) 
accounting for costs and revenues but also for partner 
audits of the joint venture operator. The special accounting 
rules and chart of accounts for the sector must be issued or 
agreed to before the commencement of activity.
The mining industry, to date, has not been character-
ized by either unincorporated joint ventures or the kind 
of standardized accounting procedures found in the 
annexes to PSCs, which makes tax audit for mining more 
difficult. Different states take different approaches on 
audit coverage; some opt for full investor coverage with 
comprehensive field audits, and others adopt a varied 
approach that combines risk-assessed field audits of 
selected companies with desk audits of others. For large 
EI sector companies, annual audits are usually desirable 
given the significant amounts of tax at risk. Due to the 
large amounts of tax involved, an effective tax audit usu-
ally repays the cost of the audit many times over in terms 
of agreed adjustments to payments. Both interest and 
penalties on any tax increase resulting from the audit 
should be charged.
Tax dispute resolution and appeals
Resolving tax disputes by formal litigation can be extremely 
expensive and slow. The preferable route is to settle differ-
ences by mutual agreement during the audit. If disputes 
remain unresolved, investors must have some formal right 
of appeal to tax courts or tribunals; in this case, credibility 
and a reputation for nondiscriminatory handling of appeals 
are of fundamental importance. The tax authority should 
also have readily accessible expert legal capacity (either on 
its staff or as outside counsel) so that disputes can be taken 
with confidence to the tax court if necessary.
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Institutional structures
In most sectors of the economy, tax administration is the 
responsibility of the national tax authority, or in some 
cases (such as Canada and Argentina), the provincial tax 
authority. For petroleum, however, tax administration 
may be assigned either to the EI sector or the finance 
ministry or, more commonly nowadays, shared with the 
tax authority and the finance ministry. A typical division 
of responsibilities would assign taxes to the ministry of 
finance and assign royalties to the EI sector ministry. 
Under PSCs, audits performed for cost-recovery pur-
poses and CIT tax audits should be well coordinated. The 
rationale advanced for this division is that physical mea-
surement requires special technical expertise that is avail-
able only in the EI sector ministry. The same reasoning 
has made the EI sector ministry, or more often the NRC, 
responsible for fiscal calculations under production shar-
ing (for instance, in making cost recovery and profit-oil-
sharing calculations), but there are reservations to placing 
this responsibility outside the ministry of finance.
While such divisions may appear logical, the spreading 
of fiscal administration among several agencies has disad-
vantages that include increased complexity, duplication of 
effort, and reduced accountability.32 Where differing insti-
tutional comparative advantage is perceived to outweigh the 
disadvantages of dispersal of administrative responsibilities 
and where responsibilities are divided, clear definition of 
roles and responsibilities, regular communication, and 
effective coordination among the agencies involved become 
vitally important.
Interagency coordination
The tax authority and the EI sector ministry also need to 
coordinate closely in terms of production, costs, and/or 
sales data on which royalties, income taxes, and produc-
tion sharing are assessed. The EI sector ministry should 
work closely with the tax authority so that the authority 
has good comprehension of the production and explo-
ration process and can make an informed judgment 
about the eligibility of charges and expenditures for tax 
purposes.
The central bank should not play a direct role in fiscal 
administration, but it is one of the key agencies that 
must be kept in the loop of communication and coordi-
nation. Ideally, all resource payments made to the gov-
ernment should go in a single unified treasury account 
held in the central bank. The fiscal authority should be 
responsible for preparing comprehensive accounts of 
payments assessed, collected, and paid into the treasury 
account, and these accounts should be capable of being 
reconciled with central bank accounts. In practice, the 
spreading of administrative functions tends to leave no 
single fiscal authority responsible for producing these 
accounts. A single, specialized office is preferable: either 
a stand-alone office or a subdivision of another office 
(such as the main tax authority office).
Even when good accounting rules have been estab-
lished, expert judgment may be needed to determine 
whether rules are being applied correctly: for example, 
whether exploration charges are being correctly assigned 
as development or greenfield exploration charges in situ-
ations where the two have different tax expense or depre-
ciation rules. It will likely take the expertise of the EI 
sector ministry or the geological survey to determine if 
exploration activities have been correctly categorized in 
the tax return. Technical expertise may also be needed in 
cases where EI sector companies claim tax deductions for 
intellectual property.
Finally, the importance of giving these offices the 
skills and resources they require cannot be overstated. 
Where requisite domestic skills are not immediately avail-
able, good practice would recommend engagement of 
qualified international audit, legal, or commercial consul-
tants and twinning their support with the development of 
local capacity.
Fiscal federalism
The design and administration of a fiscal regime can be 
influenced by revenue sharing at the central and subna-
tional levels. The horizontal fiscal disparity that can result 
from different layers of government typically require a 
particular response, sometimes called fiscal federalism. 
This is discussed in chapter 7 under “Revenue Allocation 
and Subnational Issues.” These elements can be linked 
within a country, as they are in Indonesia, where, for min-
ing, subnational jurisdictions have the authority to issue 
local taxes as well as create differing administrative 
arrangements for the collection of mining royalties from 
the central government.
6.7 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The effectiveness of an EI sector fiscal regime depends on 
the objectives established for it, on the fiscal instruments 
selected to achieve those objectives, on the clarity 
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and completeness of the EI tax rules made consistent with 
general tax legislation, and on the quality of fiscal 
administration.
Making a choice of overly complex instruments or com-
binations of instruments in fiscal design makes implemen-
tation difficult, particularly where capacity limitations 
constrain and distort the implementation of fiscal regimes 
in many countries. The goals in any fiscal administration 
should be simplicity and clarity while maximizing revenue. 
However, none of the fiscal instruments considered here is 
free from challenges to administration.
A narrow economic perspective on the making of 
choices in fiscal design has become less common, as an 
appreciation of political economy factors has risen. Context 
in a broad sense will be the prime driver behind choice in 
this as in all other areas of the EI Value Chain. Given the 
kind of states that the Sourcebook has identified as having 
the most pressing needs for cutting-edge knowledge of the 
subjects in the EI Value Chain (emerging producers, fragile 
states, reforming markets), it is more likely than not that 
they will come under early pressure to show results from 
their choices in fiscal design. Their responses will determine 
the credibility of their fiscal regimes with domestic constitu-
encies (their inclusiveness) and their ability to honor long-
term commitments with investors. In all of this, transparency 
will be a key element.
There will be nonpolitical contextual considerations that 
influence the choice of fiscal instruments and the design of 
the overall fiscal package. Among others, these include the 
nature of the resource (oil, gas, or minerals); whether it is 
marginal or not; and its location (on land, offshore, or in 
deep water). Again, these have implications for fiscal design 
and administration generally.
The key principle underlying an efficient and effective 
fiscal regime is to strike the right balance between the risks 
and rewards for the investor (which requires satisfactory 
prospects of profitability to justify a new investment) and 
the government (which requires adequate compensation 
for the use of a resource and a fair share of the economic 
rent associated with the extraction of a nonrenewable 
resource).
The mineral-specific fiscal regime is generally contained 
in legislation and consists of taxes and fees that apply to all 
sectors (such as profits taxes, employment taxes, and 
import duties) plus mineral sector taxes (which generally 
consist of additional taxes and royalties that apply only to 
minerals). The fiscal terms can also be contained in con-
tracts when the legislation is not well developed, but this is 
not good practice. Generally, the mineral-specific fiscal 
regime is administered by the taxation authority and sup-
ported by the ministry of mines.
The petroleum fiscal regime contained in legislation is 
often supplemented by fiscal or other terms specified in 
petroleum agreements or contracts and may provide for 
(1) tax and royalty systems—including CIT with specific 
tax rules, additional profits tax or resource rent tax, and 
the other taxes and fees that apply to all sectors—and/or 
(2) production-sharing arrangements, involving cost 
petroleum, profit petroleum, CIT, and other taxes and 
fees. The petroleum fiscal regime is generally administered 
by the taxation authority in close collaboration with the 
EI sector ministry. Box 6.5 presents an overview of a well-
designed fiscal regime.
Box 6.5  What a Well-Designed Fiscal Regime 
Must Do
1. Provide an investment environment that is 
fair, stable, and predictable with a tax take that 
responds fairly and robustly to changes in 
reserves, production, prices, and costs.
2. Be transparent and applicable to all investors. 
(A regime may change over time as a state 
establishes a positive track record with 
investors.)
3. Have fiscal instruments that are efficient and 
progressive and that provide a dependable min-
imum flow of tax receipts to the government 
each year, starting early in the project life.
4. Ensure that the design and complexity of the 
fiscal instruments are commensurate with the 
administrative capacity of the government enti-
ties administering the tax regime.
5. Have clearly elaborated dispute-resolution 
procedures.
6. Protect against tax avoidance and tax evasion, 
which can significantly reduce actual tax pay-
ments in relation to expected collections by 
providing rules in the law or any related agree-
ments for special issues, such as the use of 
interaffiliate transactions (including transfer 
pricing, loans, and management fees), ring-
fencing, thin capitalization, interest rate caps 
for borrowing, gains on the transfer or sale of 
petroleum or mining rights, stabilization 
clauses, and the domicile of parent companies 
for double taxation treaties.
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A limit to the approach adopted in this chapter is that 
fiscal design has been considered separately from the divi-
sion of rents and revenue sharing, the subject of chapter 8 
in the Sourcebook. Considerations of environmental and 
social sustainability can also play a role but are separated 
into chapter 9. The interrelation among these subjects 
should not be neglected, because in real life it plays a part.
6.8 ACTION TOOLS
The development of open fiscal models has been carried out by 
the IMF (in particular the FARI model for “fiscal analysis of 
resource industries,” which can be found at http://www .imf 
.org/external/np/fad/fari/), as well as the Sourcebook partner the 
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI) in con-
junction with various specialist institutions and nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs). Two early models deserve 
mention. First, there is an open fiscal model for liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) that allows users to test different LNG commercial 
structures, to compare domestic gas use options, and to assess 
the impact of various fiscal tools along the gas value chain. The 
tool is accompanied by a manual that explains the basic con-
cepts around the LNG value chain and assists in using the tool.
A second fiscal tool (developed with IBIS Denmark, an 
NGO) focuses on gold benchmarking. It allows users to 
compare 10 fiscal regimes of gold-producing jurisdictions. 
There is also the option of inserting the fiscal terms of an 
additional mining contract. Benchmarking needs to be 
done among peer group countries (with similar geology, 
infrastructure, and political risk). In a pilot study, the model 
included the fiscal terms of various countries chosen by the 
Africa Center for Energy Policy in Ghana and the 
LATINDADD in Peru.
The CCSI Open Fiscal Modelling text and links for Latin 
America and Africa can be found at the following:
http://www.eisourcebook.org/867_LatinAmerica.html
http://www.eisourcebook.org/864_Africa.html
NOTES
 1. For example, see the discussion in Boadway and Keen 
(2010) and McPherson (2010), particularly in relation to the 
time inconsistency issues.
 2. For an overview of the recent international tax issues 
relevant to the extractive industries, see the chapters in 
Daniel et al. (2016). 
 3. A helpful sketch of the five most important characteris-
tics of a good fiscal policy is as follows. First, it should be 
neutral (and not distort investment and production deci-
sions). Second, it should reserve the major portion of pos-
sible resource rents for the government. Third, it should 
assign risk to government and investors according to their 
abilities to bear risk. Fourth, it should be progressive (higher 
payments to government as the underlying profitability 
increases). Fifth, it should be flexible or adaptable to chang-
ing circumstances, increasing the potential for long-term 
stability (IMF 2010, 18–19).
 4. Costs included in this calculation should reflect any 
negative externalities that may be associated with the project 
(such as collateral environmental or social damage). For a 
discussion of the principles behind rent taxes, see Boadway 
and Keen (2010, 31–37).
 5. There is no standard definition of progressivity. Some 
define it in terms of how the present value (PV) of taxes 
varies with the lifetime PV of a project. The IMF (2012, 
14) defines it as “the extent to which revenue increases as 
the price of the commodity rises or production costs fall.”
 6. Of course, the government’s interest in broad-based 
sector development is not based solely on fiscal consid-
erations but considers expected spinoffs in terms of 
employment, regional development, and expanded 
infrastructure.
 7. The “obsolescing bargain” refers to the changing nature 
of relations between multinational enterprises and host 
states. For a full analysis of this idea, see Vernon (1971).
 8. It may be argued that royalties are valuable in sending a 
price signal, but many advisers are likely to have concerns 
about the links between royalties and depletion rates. See the 
discussion by Boadway and Keen (2010). For a comprehen-
sive discussion on royalties in the mining sector, see Otto 
et al. (2006).
 9. The IMF (2012, 18–19) lists several disadvantages.
 10. One common approach is to insert a specific part in the 
general tax code dealing with the EI sector or alternatively 
to enact petroleum and mining taxation legislation refer-
ring to the general tax code.
 11. Recent signature bonuses in Angola have been as high 
as US$1 billion per exploration block. Nigeria has also 
seen a significant increase in signature bonuses. These 
numbers may be dwarfed by the scale of revenues the 
government can expect to receive over the life of a suc-
cessful project, but they are nonetheless eye-catching, and 
do have “bird-in-the-hand” appeal. While popular in the 
petroleum sector, the bid bonus is very rare in mining, 
where competitive license awards are less common and 
where geological data available in advance of award is 
often limited and complex, which makes preaward evalu-
ation of commercial potential difficult (see discussion in 
chapter 4).
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 12. For example, any x percent increase in prices will 
increase or decrease profits tax revenues by more than x 
percent.
 13. This type of tax is being used in Liberia, Malawi, and 
Zimbabwe. In 2012 a Minerals Resource Rent Tax was 
adopted in Australia to tax 30 percent of the “superprofits” 
from mining companies on operations concerning iron ore 
and coal.
 14. For example, a 5 percent withholding tax might be lev-
ied on payments to subcontractors to approximate a 25 
percent income tax on an assumed profit margin of 20 
percent.
 15. The difficulty of marketing minerals—as opposed 
to crude oil, which has a readily accessed international 
market—is one reason for the absence of production sharing 
in the mining sector.
 16. For a discussion of related issues, see Mullins (2010).
 17. A farm-out is a common type of agreement in petro-
leum activities under which the holder of a petroleum inter-
est transfers all or part of its interest to another party subject 
to the performance of specific work obligations plus a pos-
sible cash consideration.
 18. The OECD (2010b) has published a set of guidelines 
that describe a sequence of acceptable methods for setting 
transfer prices.
 19. Ring-fencing allowable costs to those incurred on the 
project itself will reduce incentives to invest in additional 
exploration or development but will also avoid deferral of 
tax revenues.
 20. Natural gas liquids including condensate are usually 
treated as oil for fiscal purposes under both tax law and 
contracts.
 21. The following paragraphs are based on Le Leuch 2012, 
section 5.2, page 35.
 22. For natural gas liquids, also a by-product of oil produc-
tion, their treatment as crude oil for legal and fiscal pur-
poses is generally appropriate from an economic point of 
view. Condensate tends to achieve prices similar to those of 
oil, so their revenues should logically be treated the same as 
those from the sale of oil and subject to the same fiscal terms 
(Kellas 2010).
 23. Discounted prices at the downstream consumer level, 
however, are still widespread in petroleum-rich developing 
countries. Despite their often significant cost to the budget, 
those subsidies to domestic consumers remain politically 
very popular and correspondingly difficult to remove.
 24. See, for example, the case of Armenia, with regard to the 
adoption of tax holidays (World Bank 2011, 9).
 25. On the design and effectiveness of contractual assurances, 
see Cameron (2010, 2013) and Daniel and Sunley (2010).
 26. Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States all 
have worldwide tax systems, and investors resident in those 
countries will have foreign tax credit concerns. Australia, 
Canada, and France are called “territorial tax systems” 
because they exempt foreign source income from tax in the 
home state of the investor. This is done so that the investor 
is taxed only in the source or host state.
 27. See the discussion about the U.S. regime in Johnston 
(1994, 191–202).
 28. For a critical discussion of contract confidentiality, see 
Rosenblum and Maples (2009).
 29. Highly recommended are two chapters by Calder (2010a; 
2010b) in The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, 
Problems and Practice.
 30. For illustration, many disputes continue to exist in the 
United States regarding the determination of ad valorem 
royalties mainly caused by loopholes in the lease drafting.
 31. For the case of mining, see ICCM and Commonwealth 
Secretariat (2009, 9, 37).
 32. The challenges of changing existing structures are 
underlined by some recent studies that go well beyond fis-
cal administration, such as those in Victor, Hults, and 
Thurber (2012). See also the paper by Thurber, Hults, and 
Heller (2010). 
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C H A P T E R  T H R E E
7.1 KNOWLEDGE CORE
Once extractive industry (EI) revenues have been generated 
and collected, a government must decide on their manage-
ment and allocation. This is the fourth link in the EI Value 
Chain. Mismanagement of the wealth from oil, gas, and 
mining can lead, among other things, to social and eco-
nomic inequalities, the funding of corrupt practices, and 
intrastate, or even interstate, conflicts. The two overriding 
options for this wealth are spending or saving, with deci-
sions required in appropriate channels or mechanisms for 
each. The sharing of resource revenues among levels of 
government and regions is increasingly common and 
requires careful balancing of pros and cons. A challenge is 
to ensure that the approach adopted to revenue manage-
ment and distribution is one that can withstand the sharp 
falls and hikes in prices that the EI sector is prone to 
experience.
The stakes are high. New EI income will relax pressures 
on government budgets, but it also creates challenges. 
Not the least of these is the probability that many citizens 
will remain poor in spite of the large revenues from extrac-
tive resources. Several commentators on revenue manage-
ment have written variations of Arezki, Dupuy, and Gelb’s 
(2012, 1) warning, “The future is not without its dark side.”
Transparency and accountability are crucial to achieving 
success in revenue management and distribution. A lack of 
transparency in fiscal practices is likely to lead to substantial 
costs and a loss of credibility (see chapters 2 and 8). Fiscal 
transparency includes a clear assignment of roles and 
responsibilities to different government bodies, the estab-
lishment of an open budget process, publicly available 
information, and assurances of data integrity.1
Revenue sharing schemes in particular need transpar-
ency. Investors seek clarity about their relationships with 
different levels of government and how payments are meant 
to flow. Stability, predictability, and transparency of 
resource revenue flows are a key part of their social license 
to operate. It is important to ensure that resource revenue 
Revenue Management and Distribution
7
Transparency and Accountability
Sector Organization
and Regulatory
Institutions
Fiscal Design
and
Administration
Sustainable
Development
Implementation
Policy, Legal,
and Contractual
Framework
Revenue
Management and
Distribution
184 OIL, GAS, AND MINING
sharing schemes within a country are workable: that is, effi-
cient, fair, and transparent. Many countries enshrine their 
sharing formula and implementing rules in legislation.
7.2 WHY REVENUE MANAGEMENT IS DIFFICULT
Good practice in resource revenue management is increas-
ingly recognized, yet the experience of most resource-rich 
states in this area has not been especially encouraging (see 
chapters 2 and 8). This suggests that there are continuing 
problems in the implementation of resource revenue man-
agement good practice. As always, the lessons for avoiding 
common pitfalls have to be understood in context. Where 
they appear relevant, they need to be adapted to fit the 
 circumstances of the country concerned. Those circum-
stances include the level of development, nature of the 
resources and their size, fiscal dependence on resource rev-
enues,  institutional capacity, fiscal federalism, budget rigid-
ities, transparency levels, and capital scarcity. There can be 
no combining of the best lessons in a standard model that a 
government can blindly follow.2 Recent research has under-
lined this.3 Indeed, many resource-rich countries have to 
overcome constraints in capacity before they can align 
themselves with successful examples of revenue manage-
ment in the extractives sector.
A country in the developing world that has recently dis-
covered large-scale natural resources likely starts with at 
least three important constraints:
1. A scarcity of capital, with an interest rate higher than the 
global rate, and limited access to international capital 
markets, possibly as a result of the country’s credit rating
2. An undersupply of public infrastructure
3. An investment climate that lacks incentives to private 
investment
To make the starting point even more challenging, there 
is likely to be a difficult issue with managing expectations, 
both of the public and of the government. Inflated expecta-
tions tend to exert pressure for overly rapid spending. The 
problems that contribute to depressed private investment, 
or a poor credit rating, are mainly institutional and political 
and will not be solved in any direct way by the injection of 
resource funds.
From these inauspicious circumstances, the country 
with new discoveries has the prospect of making high-
return investments and putting its economy on a growth 
path that will involve capital deepening with the rate of 
return converging to the world rate. At the same time, 
wages, consumption, and income will move on an upward 
trajectory. As two leading development economists, Collier 
and Venables (2008, 1) have noted, the question for gov-
ernments in such circumstances is “What is the optimal 
consumption profile: i.e., what maximizes the present value 
of the utility of consumption given available investment 
opportunities?”
The four main challenges
The importance of managing these revenues cannot be 
exaggerated. Revenues from oil, gas, and mining are to a 
large part concentrated in the public sector; how this 
 revenue should be spent and distributed across genera-
tions is key to any economic development. Yet, as one 
recent study has noted, “tax authorities often lack the 
confidence and ability to handle it, and general tax 
administration experts may feel unqualified to advise 
them” (Calder 2014, 1).
Four areas of sensitivity lie behind this curious situation:
1. Volatility and uncertainty. This is by far the greatest chal-
lenge for a resource-rich economy. Any design of reve-
nue management rules is complicated by the volatility 
and uncertainty of resource receipts, which affect 
resource wealth estimates as well as the government’s 
cash flow. The literature on the so-called resource curse 
finds that much or all of the negative effect (where there 
is one) can be attributed to increased volatility, which 
studies show to be very costly, (The literature is summa-
rized in chapter 2). This is exacerbated by the unimpres-
sive record of price forecasts and the limited information 
in futures prices. There is also the uncertainty about 
assessments of future reserves and prices to contend 
with, as well as of current prices.
2. Absorptive capacity. There are consequences to spending 
decisions. If revenues are spent at once, the price of plant 
machinery and equipment that enable production will 
be driven up, imposing stress on transport systems, for 
example. Future nonresource sectors with good pros-
pects will be pushed to one side, appearing less attractive 
by comparison, with the effect of reducing learning and 
future growth. The problem is associated with volatility 
because absorptive capacity constraints are most tested 
when revenues and spending are high, although the issue 
can also apply over a longer cycle.
3. Exhaustion. In theory, the exhaustibility of oil, gas, and 
other mineral resources raises intergenerational issues 
and reveals a need for balance between government 
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consumption and saving for the long term. Policy makers 
need to strike a balance between spending today and sav-
ing for tomorrow. In practice, this is often less clearly a 
problem. Apart from the island of Nauru, no country has 
actually run out of mineral (or hydrocarbons) resources, 
although the Republic of Yemen comes close.
4. Undetermined ownership. Resource rents belong to the 
“nation,” but what does that mean? Does it mean the 
government or municipalities in producing areas or 
something wider like “the people”? If the latter, what 
about unborn citizens? These questions go to the heart of 
the accountability problem and beyond questions of 
whether revenue should be shared among today’s 
citizens.
Responding to volatility
Policies have to be designed in ways that avoid transmitting 
volatility (which is outside the control of policy makers) to 
the macroeconomy. This is achievable by smoothing spend-
ing flows; promoting long-term fiscal sustainability and 
intergenerational equity; enforcing measures to mitigate 
Dutch Disease (see the discussion of overall resource policy 
in chapter 2 and section 4.2). In principle, decisions on 
 current versus future consumption and on the form of 
investment can all be made using a model—but volatility is 
a complication.
Experience suggests that success is often elusive. One 
researcher notes, “Capital flows, fiscal policy, monetary 
policy, and sectoral allocation each tend to be more pro-
cyclical in commodity producing countries than econo-
mists’ models often assume. If anything, they tend to 
exacerbate booms and busts instead of moderating them” 
(Frankel 2011, 167). Formal fiscal rules and resource funds 
are not a panacea. A study of increased revenues from oil 
concluded, “Implementation of quantitative fiscal rules has 
proved very challenging, mainly due to the characteristics of 
oil revenue and political economy factors. . . . Many coun-
tries have had difficulty managing funds with rigid opera-
tional rules, as tensions have often surfaced in situations of 
significant exogenous changes or with shifting policy priori-
ties” (IMF 2007b, 3). Large sovereign wealth funds can also 
be raided by future governments, who may also seek to 
divert resource rents outside the budget. For example, in the 
República Bolivariana de Venezuela, almost 70 percent of 
oil rent flows through funds that are outside the budget 
(Rodríguez, Morales, and Monaldi 2012). This undermines 
fiscal rules as well as transparency.
No option is free from risks.
7.3 CONSUME OR SAVE?
The basic question for a country facing the prospect of 
 significant resource revenues is how it should plan the time 
path of spending and saving from this revenue flow (inter-
temporal optimization). How much of the resource wealth 
should a government consume and how much should it save?
 ■ If consumption is the priority, government has to make 
decisions about increasing public consumption or trans-
ferring funds to citizens.
 ■ If investment is the priority (and investment is the 
principal option for the use of savings), there are sev-
eral choices: decisions can involve making domestic 
public investments or to invest abroad in financial 
assets  (sovereign wealth funds).4 Investment in human 
capital can be done by training or education and in 
intellectual  capital through investment in research and 
development. Rather than overseeing the investing 
itself, the government can offer investment incentives 
to private firms.
In either case, the choice could lead to waste and gener-
ate unfair outcomes. Whatever decision is made for the use 
of rents, it will be made under high levels of uncertainty 
about resource revenue flows. For example, sudden slumps 
in demand can follow euphoric booms, and the persistence 
of either is unknown.
Some kind of fiscal framework is required to address 
these issues. Given the inevitable fluctuations in revenues, it 
needs to smooth revenue flows and perhaps involve the use 
of stabilization funds. The fiscal framework may also wish 
to introduce an instrument called fiscal rules as a means of 
addressing stabilization or savings. This does not necessarily 
have a statutory basis.
Other factors and policy choices have to be taken into 
account in making such fiscal choices, including the factor 
of absorptive capacity and choices such as tax reduction, 
increases in expenditure, and debt reduction or savings of 
windfall revenues.
Fiscal rules
Fiscal rules are multiyear formal constraints on govern-
ment spending or public debt accumulation. They rely on 
formal commitments to the achievement of certain 
numerical values for selected and targeted fiscal variables, 
such as the fiscal balance, public expenditure, or the pub-
lic debt. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has 
defined them as “institutional mechanisms that are 
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intended to permanently shape fiscal policy design and 
implementation” (IMF 2007b, 17). Hence there is a ten-
dency to enshrine them in legislation or even in a consti-
tutional document. Some countries like Peru and 
Colombia have fiscal rules in this sense. Others like 
Trinidad and Tobago have preferred “ad hoc rules which 
may not have taken specific issues such as household wel-
fare and fiscal stability, into account” (Primus 2016, 5). 
Those that do have them use various types of rules or 
combinations of them, but essentially a set of fiscal rules 
comprises numerical rules designed to guide and bench-
mark performance against quantitative indicators (such as 
the fiscal balance of debt) and procedural rules intended 
to establish transparency, coverage, and accountability 
requirements (IMF 2007b, 17). See table 7.1 for a recent 
list of countries and their fiscal rules.
The five kinds of fiscal rules found in practice are the 
following:5
1. The balanced budget rule. Sometimes called “hand to 
mouth,” in this rule all annual oil receipts are spent while 
the government’s overall financial position is kept in 
 balance. For example, in Mongolia the structural deficit 
may not exceed more than 2 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP). (The disadvantages are that it tends to 
privilege current over future generations in terms of 
their share of consumption of extractives wealth and it 
may subject governments to boom-and-bust cycles in 
the international markets.)
2. The debt rule. This sets a limit on public debt as a per-
centage of GDP. For example, in Indonesia there is a 
requirement that total and local government debt should 
not exceed 60 percent of GDP. Mongolia sets the ceiling 
of public debt at 40 percent of GDP.
3. The expenditure rule. This sets a limit on spending, in 
absolute terms or terms linked to the level of growth rate 
or percentage of GDP. For example, Botswana has a ceil-
ing on the expenditure-to-GDP ratio of 40 percent, and 
Peru has a statutory limit on real growth current expen-
diture of 4 percent.
4. The revenue rule. This sets a ceiling on the use of overall 
revenues or revenues from oil, gas, or minerals. For 
example, in Ghana a statutory limit is set on the amount 
of oil and gas revenues that may enter the budget; this 
may not exceed 70 percent of revenue averaged over a 
seven-year period. The rest of the revenue has to be saved 
in a stabilization fund or a fund for future generations.
5. The permanent income hypothesis (PIH) rule. With this 
rule, decisions on spending oil, gas, or mineral revenues 
Table 7.1 Country Fiscal Rules
Country Rule and date established
Botswana Expenditure rule (2003)
Supranational rules—Central African 
Economic and Monetary Community 
(CEMAC) (2002, 2008)
Cameroon Budget balance rules (2002, 2008), Debt 
rule (2002)
Chad Supranational rules—CEMAC (2002, 2008)
Chile Budget balance rule (2001)
Colombia Budget balance rule (2012), Expenditure 
rule (2000)
Congo, Rep. of Supranational rules—CEMAC (2002, 2008)
Côte d’lvoire Supranational rules—West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), 
Budget balance rule (2000), Debt rule 
(2000)
Ecuador Expenditure rule (2010), Budget balance 
rule (2003), Debt rule (2003)
Equatorial Guinea Supranational rules—CEMAC (2002, 2008)
Gabon Supranational rules—CEMAC (2002, 2008)
Indonesia Budget balance rule (1967), Debt rule 
(2004)
Mali Supranational rules—WAEMU (2000)
Mexico Budget balance rule (2006), Expenditure 
rule (2013)
Mongolia Expenditure rule (2013), Budget balance 
rule (2013), Debt rule (2014)
Niger Supranational rules—WAEMU (2000)
Nigeria Budget balance rule (2007)
Norway Budget balance rule (2001)
Peru Budget balance rule (2000, 2003, 2009), 
Expenditure rule (2000, 2003, 2009, 2013)
Russian 
Federation
Expenditure rule (2013)
Venezuela, RB Fiscal rules embedded in Organic Law for 
the Public Finances (2000)
Source: Adapted from IMF 2015a, 6, table 1.5.
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in any given year are predicated only on the return on 
the assets already in hand. Only the interest income that 
accrues from accumulated revenues may be spent consis-
tently over time. This “precautionary saving” is based on 
the idea that since these resources are nonrenewable it is 
not fair to future generations to consume them today. It 
may create social tensions, since public expenditure may 
be low while revenues are accumulated during produc-
tion, and there may be a lost opportunity in terms of 
social and infrastructure spending in the early years in 
deference to future spending.
We may also note here the so-called bird-in-hand approach 
to resource revenue management, which suggests that 
resource revenue should be used to accumulate financial 
assets in a sovereign wealth fund; the government should 
limit its spending to only the interest accrued from 
these assets.
None of these rules is likely to prove sufficient in itself or 
in combination with others. There has been a robust debate 
about their benefits.6 For many years the PIH rule was influ-
ential, emphasizing the need to preserve resource wealth 
and avoid the instability that can arise from spending 
resource revenues (in other words, addressing the familiar 
challenges of exhaustibility and volatility characteristic of EI 
and discussed in chapter 2 of the Sourcebook). That view has 
been challenged by several leading economists taking a 
more development-oriented approach to fiscal rules (NRGI 
and CCSI 2014, 7). After all, resource revenues can be used 
beneficially to finance public investments in infrastructure, 
especially where such infrastructure has been physically 
damaged following conflict, or government institutions, 
where these are characterized by a weak civil service, for 
example. Even if no one-size-fits-all principle applies, and 
some fiscal rules may suit an advanced economy better than 
a capital-scarce resource-rich country, the existence of fiscal 
rules in one form or another “can provide helpful and trans-
parent benchmarks for policy” (Gelb 2014, 23). They can 
play a role in providing robust checks and balances on pub-
lic spending and at the same time factoring in the kind of 
uncertainty that will always be present in resource markets. 
However, fiscal rules are neither necessary nor sufficient for 
the achievement of sound fiscal outcomes. Arguably, this 
conclusion also applies to fiscal discipline at the subnational 
level (Ter-Minassian 2007). The decision to consume or 
save does not need a fiscal rule to be determined.
In the extractives sector, fiscal rules are less commonly 
used than the fund instrument (discussed in sections 7.4 
and 7.6), at least in the oil-exporting countries. However, 
some funds, such as those in Chile, Ghana, Kazakhstan, 
and Norway, are governed by fiscal rules. The volatility of 
 revenues in the EI sector plays a large part in the variation 
in approaches. Some fiscal rules target overall or primary 
balances or particular debt-to-GDP ratios, but they can 
transmit oil fluctuations to expenditure and the non-oil 
balance.
Experience has shown the difficulties of implementing 
effective and durable rules, partly due to design weaknesses 
and political economy factors (IMF 2007b). Essentially, the 
rules, often resulting from fiscal policies oriented to short-
term constraints, can be too rigid to adapt to economic 
fluctuations and lack reliable support among political 
elites. During a boom, liquidity pressures can ease and 
governments may find it very difficult to contain spending 
pressures.
There is no shortage of examples of fiscal rules being 
weakened over time or ignored. Equatorial Guinea has an 
expenditure rule, which requires current spending not to 
exceed non-oil revenue; it has been repeatedly breached 
and even interpreted as a medium-term goal. Expenditure 
in this case has even grown substantially faster than EI rev-
enue, rendering the fiscal rule largely irrelevant as an 
instrument to benchmark fiscal policy (IMF 2007b, 19). 
By contrast, Chile changed the target for its structural 
 balance to permit slightly more expansive spending when 
copper prices and the reserves in the stabilization fund were 
high. The benefit of this approach is that the spending 
adjustment, while significant in the longer run if main-
tained, is gradual. This reduces pressure for a more radical 
change in the rules.
The considerable successes of Botswana and Chile with 
resource revenue management are well known. In both 
cases, the fiscal rules have considerable flexibility, in con-
trast to those in some other countries. They have achieved 
stable macroeconomic environments and high growth 
rates. Given the importance of their natural resource sec-
tors (mainly diamonds in Botswana and copper in Chile), 
and their use of fiscal rules, they present worthwhile lessons 
for petroleum-producing countries. This is explained in 
box 7.1.
While fiscal rules have been useful to the conduct of 
sound fiscal policies in Botswana and Chile operationally, 
the evidence suggests that they were not critical  elements—
the keys have been political commitment and good institu-
tions. Both countries’ economic success mostly points to 
strong overall institutional quality, willingness to adopt 
key structural reforms, and political commitment to 
ensure fiscal discipline.7 According to World Bank and 
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Transparency International governance indicators, both 
countries have significantly higher levels of governance 
and institutional quality than most resource-rich 
countries.
Absorptive capacity
While in many circumstances it may be desirable to make a 
significant allocation of EI sector revenues to spending, and 
especially to domestic investment,8 the effectiveness of that 
spending will depend to a large degree on the absorptive 
capacity of the resource-rich economy and the govern-
ment’s institutional capacity. A rapid rise in spending in 
response to a revenue windfall could be inefficient if coun-
tries do not have adequate absorptive capacity, creating 
supply bottlenecks and reductions in the quality of admin-
istration and implementation. The spending path needs to 
be set at a rate that is efficient for the economy.
Experience of both expenditure smoothing to address 
volatility concerns and a gradual expenditure build-up in 
the face of absorptive capacity constraints suggests that part 
of any resource revenue windfall should be allocated to sav-
ing (Iimi 2006). However, this depends on a number of 
factors, including the size of the windfall relative to budget 
expenditure and the potential to increase absorptive 
capacity. Saving of resource revenues may also be justified 
Box 7.1 Botswana and Chile: Experiences with Fiscal Rules
Botswana
Botswana has implemented medium-term national 
development plans (NDPs) closely linked to the budget 
process for decades. A six-year NDP sets broad fiscal 
objectives and associated policy actions. It has contrib-
uted to the implementation of a longer-term strategy 
that has helped contain spending during periods of 
revenue buoyancy and led to overall surpluses for most 
of the past two decades. The framework has incorpo-
rated goals for the overall balance and a type of golden 
rule, where nonmineral revenue should at least cover 
noninvestment recurrent spending. This rule has been 
adhered to in most years, except for a few in the early 
2000s, when fiscal deficits emerged.
Due to the global financial and economic crisis, the 
mining sector contracted by 46.2 percent in 2009, 
while the nonmining sector grew at 4.9 percent, with 
the net effect on overall GDP of −7.9 percent. In 2010 
and 2011, real mining GDP recovered only partially 
and is still well below the prerecession levels, while 
growth in the rest of the economy resumed at rates 
yielding overall GDP growth similar to the rates lead-
ing up to the global financial crisis (Botswana 2013).
Their Sustainable Budget Index rule in NDP 10 
reserves mineral revenue for capital spending, leaving 
only nonmineral revenue to finance recurrent spend-
ing (IMF 2012).
While the fiscal position has been under some strain, 
continued commitment to prudent fiscal policies and 
medium-term planning put Botswana in a strong posi-
tion to face important medium-term challenges.
Chile
Chile introduced an informal fiscal rule in 2001. The 
rule calls for maintaining a structural central govern-
ment surplus over the economic and copper price 
cycles. It is seen as a useful signal to financial markets, 
indicating sensitivity to the risks of procyclical 
spending. The successful implementation of the rule is 
seen in large measure as due to low debt and high 
policy credibility, the result of past prudent policies 
and good institutions.
The rule was enshrined in the Fiscal Responsibility 
Law in 2006. This law adopted a target of 1.0 percent of 
GDP positive surplus, which was reduced in May 2007 
to 0.5 percent effective in 2008 and further to 0.0 per-
cent of GDP in 2009. This has advantages for business 
cycle stabilization, because further asset accumulation 
would require higher taxes and/or lower spending 
today relative to the future, which would induce inter-
temporal effects in consumption and investment 
(Kumhof and Laxton 2009).
However, the implementation of the rule in recent 
years has revealed certain challenges, and in May 2010 
the government established a high-level commission to 
recommend reforms that could make the rule more 
effective (Dabán 2011).
Further, the administration (2010–14) specified a 
target path (to converge to 1 percent of GDP struc-
tural deficit by 2014). A second-generation structural 
balance rule was published in 2011 (available in 
Spanish at http://www.dipres.gob.cl/594/w3- article 
-81713.html).
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on other grounds (such as a precaution against unforeseen 
negative events or to generate wealth for future generations 
in anticipation of the eventual depletion of resources). The 
next section discusses savings funds, an institutional mech-
anism to put gross public financial resources away.
Good practice in response to absorptive capacity issues 
involves credible commitments to improvements in public 
expenditure management and a gradual build-up in 
expenditure. The literature provides some indicators as 
to what institutional features are required for a well- 
functioning system of public investment. Rajaram (2010) 
and colleagues have identified eight “must have” features 
that would address the major risks and provide an effective 
systemic process for managing public investments.9 These 
do not represent best practice, as might be exemplified in 
a high-level Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development or Chile-like system, but rather the bare-
bones institutional features that would minimize major 
risks and provide an effective systemic process for manag-
ing public investments. They include several features that 
would require long-term investment in administrative 
capacity to improve project implementation and making 
credible commitments.
Institutional strengthening
Absorption difficulties of a different kind arise at the insti-
tutional level in many developing states. These result from 
limited capacity, which can constrain government in its 
ability to identify and implement policies and projects 
that are a cost-effective use of resources. If investments are 
badly chosen or badly executed, the state will have wasted 
a unique opportunity for transformative development. 
Highly expensive but ultimately redundant projects and 
half-completed investments are all too common. However, 
absorption is not solely a capacity issue. The flow of 
 revenues tends to undermine the incentives to build institu-
tions designed to manage investments in the first place: if 
you are able to obtain “cheap” money, you may be moti-
vated to think very hard about the efficiency with which you 
are spending it.
The quality of government institutions and public finan-
cial management is critical to the fiscal discipline (and focus 
on sustainability) needed for successful resource revenue 
management (Bacon and Tordo 2006, 13–15). Institutions 
particularly important to this effort are the central bank 
and the ministries responsible for finance and planning. 
These are critical for the setting of aggregate annual and 
medium-term expenditure ceilings and the overall budget 
for different agencies. However, as Barma et al. (2012, 
184–85) note, “Legislative bodies are likely to pay particular 
attention to sectoral capital budget envelopes as part of the 
annual budget process, especially in systems with a single-
district plurality system” (such as Mongolia). Clearly, tech-
nical assistance can make an important contribution in this 
area, but political will may prove as or more important, 
especially where political economy factors place great 
emphasis on short-term horizons and early spending of 
resource revenues.
Moreover, there is a dynamic created by resource in-
flows. With opportunities for rent seeking by established 
groups, undermining of efforts at institutional strengthen-
ing and accountability can be expected from increasingly 
entrenched interests. A more complex variant of this phe-
nomenon occurs when some groups anticipate such a 
strengthening of one set of interests and act to forestall it 
even if it undermines a collective benefit.10
7.4 RESOURCE FUNDS AND THEIR POPULARITY
Interest in natural resource funds, established by setting 
aside a portion of resource revenues, has grown signifi-
cantly over the past few years. Since 2000 the number of 
such funds has grown from 24 to 54 and the assets they 
manage have been estimated at a value of US$3.5 trillion 
(Bauer and Rietveld 2014). At least 14 more funds are at 
the planning stage at the national level, and at the subna-
tional level a number of countries, such as Canada and 
Indonesia, are considering them for revenue manage-
ment among provinces, states, or districts. This renewed 
interest among governments in a not-so-new instrument 
has been partly due to the discovery of new resource 
deposits and is partly a response to dramatic increases in 
resource prices yielding increased revenues during the 
long commodities super-cycle ending around 2014–15. 
For an emerging EI producer, such funds offer a highly 
appealing combination of potential benefits: the accumu-
lation of funds for national development projects, a 
 buffer against budget deficits if resource revenues decline, 
and a way of mitigating spending volatility and improv-
ing the quality of public spending, reducing poverty, and 
insulating revenues from corruption. They could act as 
precautions against major negative resource shocks or to 
generate financial revenues for the future, replacing 
resource revenues when the resource itself is depleted. 
Unlike fiscal rules, resource funds do not constrain fiscal 
policy, although a fund may be a part of a fiscal frame-
work, as in Norway.
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However, such funds have an uneven performance his-
tory. An example is the Kuwait Investment Authority’s loss 
of US$5 billion in less than 10 years on poor investments in 
Spanish firms. Among the reasons for the loss were an 
absence of internal controls, lack of transparency, and lack 
of supervision. There are other examples of poor decision 
making and waste. Some governments have drawn on the 
funds accumulated to address short-term problems or 
finance special projects. Even without such mishaps, they 
should not be seen as repositories of resource revenue wind-
falls off of whose interest a state could potentially live for 
many years afterward (Barnett and Ossowski 2003). There 
is no need for a fund mechanism to accumulate a windfall 
in, and the interest would be unlikely to last for many years. 
So why are they so popular?
Research into these funds—which are a form of sover-
eign wealth fund—has identified at least five reasons for 
governments to create funds: (1) financial savings (to pro-
vide intergenerational equity); (2) macroeconomic stabili-
zation (smoothing government expenditure in the face of 
volatile revenues); (3) earmarking resource funds for future 
development or specific purposes (poverty reduction or 
debt servicing, for example); (4) sterilization (to avoid 
 overheating of the economy in the face of constrained 
absorptive capacity, although some countries have also 
established dedicated infrastructure funds); and (5) ring-
fencing resource revenues. Their main aim is to act as an 
accountable financial instrument in the service of the 
national economy and not become a gray financial tool or a 
parallel budget.11
The two main types of funds—savings and  stabilization—
are defined by their function. A savings fund seeks to create 
a store of wealth for future generations. The raison d’être for 
a stabilization fund, by contrast, is reduction in the impact 
of volatile revenue on the government and the economy. A 
savings fund may be combined with a stabilization fund 
into a hybrid with dual objectives. This may introduce an 
element of increased flexibility. The most successful resource 
fund in the world, the Norwegian Government Pension 
Fund, has mixed savings and stabilization objectives with 
flexible rules. So does Timor-Leste’s successful Petroleum 
Fund. For examples of savings and stabilization funds, see 
boxes 7.2 and 7.3, respectively. A list of 32 oil funds is set 
out in table 7.2, distinguishing their role as savings or stabi-
lization funds.
A key to establishing stabilization funds is often setting a 
reference price and ensuring that if the resource price 
exceeds the reference price, then any revenue collected over 
Table 7.2 Country Oil Funds
Country Name Date 
established
Objective
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund 2000 Stabilization
Angola Fundo Soberano de Angola FSDEA 2012 Investment and development
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan Republic SOFAZ 1999 Stabilization and saving
Bahrain Reserve Fund for Strategic Projects
Mumtalakat Holding Company
2000
2006
Stabilization
Investment
Botswana Revenue Stabilization Fund
Pula Fund
1972
1994
Stabilization
Saving
Brunei Darussalam Brunei Investment Agency
General Consolidated Fund
1986
1984
Saving
Saving
Chad Stabilization Account 1999 Stabilization
Chile ES Fund
PRF
2007
2006
Stabilization
Pension
Colombia Oil Stabilization Fund FAEP 1995 Stabilization
Equatorial Guinea Fund for Future Generations
Special Reserve Fund SRF
2002
2002
Saving
Saving and stabilization
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Table 7.2 Country Oil Funds (continued)
Country Name Date 
established
Objective
Gabon Fund for Future Generations 1998 Saving
Ghana Ghana Stabilization Fund 2011 Stabilization
Indonesia Government Investment Unit 2006 Stabilization and development
Iran, Islamic Rep. National Development Fund 1999 Oil stabilization and development
Kazakhstan National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
NFRK
2000 Stabilization and saving
Kuwait General Reserve Fund
Reserve Fund for Future Generations
1960
1976
Stabilization and saving
Saving
Libya Oil Reserve Fund ORF
Libyan Investment Authority
1995
2006
Stabilization and saving
Saving
Mauritania National Fund for Hydrocarbon Reserves 2000 Stabilization
Mexico Oil Revenues Stabilization Fund of Mexico 2000 Stabilization and saving
Mongolia Fiscal Stabilization Fund 2011 Stabilization
Nigeria Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority 2004, 2011 Stabilization and saving
Norway Government Pension Fund 1990 Stabilization and saving
Oman State General Reserve Fund
Oman Investment Fund
1980
2006
Saving
Investment
Papua New Guinea Sovereign Wealth Fund 2011 Stabilization and development
Peru Fiscal Stabilization Fund 1999 Stabilization
Qatar Stabilization Fund (2000)/Qatar Investment 
Authority (since 2005)
2000 Stabilization/saving
Russian Federation Reserve Fund (Former Oil Stabilization Fund)
National Wealth Fund
2004 Stabilization
Saving
Sudan Oil Revenue Stabilization Account 2002 Stabilization
Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund 2005 Stabilization and saving
Trinidad and Tobago Heritage and Stabilization Fund 2000 Stabilization and saving
United Arab Emirates Several funds
Venezuela, RB Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund FIEM 1998 Stabilization
Source: Adapted from IMF 2015a, 7, table 1.6.
Note: For the Islamic Republic of Iran, the National Development Fund was previously called the Oil Stabilization Fund. For Norway, although the 
Government Pension Fund was established in 1990, it was activated only in 1995. For Trinidad and Tobago, the Heritage and Stabilization Fund was 
previously known as the Interim Revenue Stabilization Fund. The funds for United Arab Emirates include the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Abu 
Dhabi Investment Council, Emirates Investment Authority, IPIC, Investment Corporation of Dubai, Mubadala Development Company, and RAK 
Investment Authority.
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and above the reference is deposited in the fund and not 
channeled through the budget (see “Stabilization Funds” 
under section 7.6). By contrast, it is not the only key for 
savings funds: they also have to take into account the 
expected profile of future revenues and that will in turn 
depend on reserve estimates. As a result, they tend to have 
some noncontingent rule for accumulation (for example, 
x percent of resource revenue or total revenue has to be put 
away, as in Kuwait).
Country context will shape a government’s motive in 
setting a fund’s objectives (and indeed in deciding whether 
a fund is necessary at all). For example, the stabilization 
objective is likely to be stronger among large, established 
producers of oil, gas, and hard minerals with mature prov-
inces. They are likely to be concerned about the impacts of 
cyclical variations in revenues caused by price volatility. 
Similarly, concerns about an aging population and its 
effects may encourage a focus on the intergenerational ben-
efits of a fund (as in Norway).
Common features
Some features are common to savings and stabilization 
funds.
Legal frameworks for funds. Funds may be either vir-
tual or real. (Bacon and Tordo 2006, 8–10). Funds are vir-
tual when they are embedded in the normal budget process 
and require no special approval for establishment or main-
tenance. Strictly speaking, a virtual fund is a subaccount 
under the treasury single account. No new responsibilities 
need to be created. Funds are real where accumulated funds 
are held in a separate managed and audited account, requir-
ing a legal framework. The preference for one or the other 
may depend on the overall transparency of fiscal reporting 
to both the legislature and the public. Where resource rev-
enue dependency and public interest in its use are high, the 
creation of a real fund may be desirable, rendering the link 
between resource revenue generation and utilization trans-
parent. As Bacon and Tordo have observed, “Preference 
for one or the other may depend on the overall transpar-
ency of fiscal reporting to both the legislature and the pub-
lic” (Bacon and Tordo 2006, 9). On the other hand, virtual 
funds might be desirable if it is important that all national 
funds remain fully integrated with the regular budget, which 
would always be a basic objective of public finance manage-
ment (Allen and Radev 2010). If a government decides to 
establish a real fund—which can also be reasonably well 
integrated with the budget—good practice would argue for 
the closest possible coordination of its operations with the 
regular budget process.
In practice, resource-rich countries have used a wide 
variety of legal frameworks to establish an extractives fund 
(usually for oil). Where a distinct legal framework is 
required to set up a real fund, a law or an amendment to 
existing legislation (or even to the constitution) is usually 
required. Deciding on the level of specificity in the law will 
involve trade-offs between ensuring the financial integrity 
of the scheme (for instance, preventing its reversal or per-
version) and providing adequate administrative or execu-
tive flexibility to address unforeseen circumstances.
Payments into and withdrawals from funds. 
Procedures for fund movements are often governed by 
deposit and withdrawal rules. The former define which 
oil, gas, or mineral revenues are deposited and when. The 
latter define how much revenue may be withdrawn from 
the fund in any given quarter or year and also where that 
amount may be sent.
In general, there are two approaches to determining the 
rules for deposits into funds and withdrawals. The first is on 
the budget side, in terms of specifying fiscal deficits to be 
covered by the fund. The second is on the fund side. 
Experience shows that it is the budget side that determines 
the fund practice, rather than the reverse.
These rules may differ depending on the objectives of the 
fund. For savings funds, the focus will tend to be on linking 
any withdrawals to the long-term sustainability of resource 
revenue spending, and its size will be determined by refer-
ence to a policy seeking to keep the wealth in the fund 
constant. For stabilization funds, the goal is different, so the 
size of the fund will depend on assumptions about volatility 
of revenues and the average expenditure required by the 
government. Good practice would link these transfers to 
and from the fund to the annual budget process and near-
term revenue forecasting since the principal intention is to 
allow for expenditure smoothing. Parliamentary or presi-
dential approval may be required to authorize transfers to 
and from a fund.
Transfers in a fund may be direct or indirect:
 ■ In a direct transfer, certain defined categories of revenue 
will be paid to the fund account, which is usually held by 
the finance ministry or central bank. If there is a lack of 
precision about the categories or if the classification is 
incomplete, problems arise. The expected size and use of 
the fund is then determined by means of the rules con-
cerning withdrawals from the fund.
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 ■ In an indirect transfer, all of the revenues have to be paid 
into the finance ministry and then a decision is made by 
the competent authorities to determine the expenditures 
from revenues that will be made through the budget, and 
the balance is transferred into the fund for investment.
In many states, however, operational rules have been 
introduced to make amounts added to, or withdrawn from, 
the funds automatic. Such rules have the perceived advan-
tage of reducing discretion but may themselves create serious 
tensions when their operation proves inappropriate to actual 
state circumstances or developmental priorities. For exam-
ple, it may be desirable in the near term to spend in excess of 
long-term sustainable levels in order to take advantage of 
investment opportunities expected to yield high develop-
mental returns, or to spend less than the long-term sustain-
able amount where near-term absorptive capacity constraints 
apply. In practice, fiscal rules need to be flexible and appro-
priate to national circumstances. They must also have a 
broad-based buy-in from stakeholders, and ideally adher-
ence to the rules should be monitored by an independent 
oversight body (such as the Public Interest Accountability 
Committee in Ghana). However, the need or otherwise for 
an independent oversight body will depend on the circum-
stances, since such a body is not without costs and trade-offs 
arise. For example, few would argue that there is a need for 
such a body in Norway. Where they have been adopted, an 
oversight body will not be able to function unless there is a 
strong degree of transparency of the flow of funds from col-
lection to the time when the revenues are spent. Fund 
administrators should be obliged to publicize and defend any 
deviation from guidelines where these have been adopted.
In practice, a number of countries have found that rigid 
operational fund-accumulation rules prove impossible to 
sustain, and they change them, bypass them, or even elimi-
nate the fund in the face of spending pressures, changing 
policy priorities or reacting to exogenous events that render 
the fund’s operational accumulation and withdrawal rules 
inappropriate. Chad, Ecuador, and Papua New Guinea 
found that their funds became operationally or politically 
unworkable and abolished them (Ossowski et al. 2008, 9). 
Other countries have changed their rules, including 
Kazakhstan, Mexico, Oman, the Russian Federation and the 
República Bolivariana de Venezuela, as well as the U.S. state 
of Alaska and the Canadian province of Alberta.
Financial management. Financial management of 
resource funds requires asset management and decisions on 
asset classes in which funds will be invested. Decisions on 
asset classes depend, to a large extent, on the purpose of the 
fund, attitudes toward risk, and a time horizon. Fund man-
agement is often assigned to the central bank, which may 
engage third-party custodians and specialist asset manag-
ers to safekeep and invest the assets. A set of asset manage-
ment mandates based on risk and return objectives should 
provide benchmarks for the assessment of performance by 
government-selected fund trustees or their delegates.
Governance of funds. Experience with resource funds 
underscores the critical importance of oversight and 
 governance. Funds often lie outside established budget sys-
tems and frequently only a few persons are accountable for 
them, and those persons are often political appointees. Abuse 
of responsibility and susceptibility to political interference 
are a real risk. Constraint and accountability are ideally 
spelled out in legislation. Independent regular audits are also 
essential, but in practice they have often been loose (RWI 
and Vale 2014). Good governance practices include both ver-
tical and horizontal accountability. Vertical accountability 
comes with fund management reporting lines that lead, 
ultimately, to a minister. Horizontal accountability is pro-
vided by regular reporting on performance to elected officials 
independent of the executive branch and widely available 
and readily accessible public information on the fund. 
Transparency with respect to all aspects of fund operation 
and performance is generally regarded as indispensable to 
achieving good governance (see chapter 8). This can be 
achieved through press releases, publications, and audits 
that are made available on the Internet. Bacon and Tordo 
(2006, 15) go further and recommend the “presence of 
watchdog non-governmental organizations (NGOs) [which] 
strengthens horizontal  accountability.”
As discussed under “Fiscal Rules” in section 7.3, operat-
ing a fund often involves the use of both internal and 
external managers. The recruitment of any asset managers 
should be made as independently as possible. Regular, 
independent audits are also essential if confidence in the 
fund is to be established and maintained. In Norway’s case, 
an external performance audit is carried out and published 
in addition to the internal audit, which checks the latter’s 
audit of performance and also checks the actual perfor-
mance against a benchmark.
Savings funds as a means of addressing fiscal 
sustainability
Many funds will have been set up with savings as at least 
part of their overall raison d’être: save now to provide for 
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future expenditure. Bacon and Tordo (2006, 128) find 
at least three reasons for this:
1. To provide income for future generations so that they 
may benefit from natural resource endowment, because 
policies of rapid depletion to meet urgent current expen-
diture needs risk exhaustion of the resource.
2. To obtain the best social return over time by limiting 
current expenditure by government to projects that yield 
an adequate return, whereas limited absorption capacity 
means that too rapid government expenditure could lead 
to Dutch Disease symptoms.
3. To provide precautionary savings against large and 
unexpected shocks to the domestic or world economy 
that would generate abnormal demands on expenditure 
or very large falls in revenue.
The design of the savings fund should focus on the 
 accumulation of financial assets and the generation of 
financial returns adequate to replace resource revenues as 
they decline. Such a design would, one hopes, maintain a 
constant level of government expenditures attributable to 
the initial resource wealth. However, the generation of 
financial returns depends on fiscal policy, not on the 
savings fund. If the government builds assets in the fund 
by running up public debt because it is running fiscal defi-
cits, the accumulation of assets in the fund will not generate 
financial returns adequate to replace resource revenues. It 
is not, in practice, the design of the fund but the design of 
fiscal policy that will generate the financial returns to 
replace resource revenues in the future. The savings fund is 
merely an instrument.
Size. The desirable size of a savings fund will depend on, 
among other things, the scale and expected life of the 
resource deposit. Generally, the shorter the life of the 
deposit, the higher the percentage of resource revenues 
going into the fund ought to be. The asset mix in a savings 
fund is typically longer term and higher risk than might be 
found in a stabilization fund (Ossowski et al. 2008, 8–9). 
Several examples of savings funds in resource-rich countries 
are briefly summarized in box 7.2.
An important concern about savings funds turns on the 
assumptions they necessarily make. For example, when oil 
revenues are the principal source, the government has to 
consider projected profiles of output, extraction costs, 
prices, discount rates, and returns on alternative invest-
ments by keeping oil in the ground.
Box 7.2 Savings Funds: Four Examples
Norway
The Government Petroleum Fund was established in 
1990. It has two main purposes:
1. To act as a buffer to smooth fluctuations in oil rev-
enues and mitigate exchange rate pressures to avoid 
Dutch Disease and preserve a diversified industrial 
structure.
2. To save part of current oil rents to help address 
future needs related to the ageing population and 
eventual decline in oil revenues.
Fund income consists of government net cash flow 
from petroleum activities and the returns on the fund’s 
assets. Detailed guidelines for fund operations are 
decided by government in consultation with parlia-
ment. Its only expenditures are transfers to the govern-
ment’s budget: the fund is an integrated part of the 
government budget.
Transfers to and from the fund require parliamen-
tary approval. Withdrawals from the fund reflect a fis-
cal rule, agreed in 2001, that limits the non-oil 
structural deficit to 4 percent.
Norway’s balanced budget rule is a political com-
mitment and is not set down in legislation.
Information is available in quarterly and annual 
reports. Control and supervisory bodies exist at all 
levels of fund management.
Fund assets have to be invested abroad, instead of 
becoming an additional source of financing for public 
expenditure, to avoid strong impacts on the mainland 
economy and on the exchange rate. 
Alaska, United States
The Alaska Permanent Fund was set up by an amend-
ment to the state constitution in 1976, and receives 
25 percent of all mineral lease rentals, royalties, and 
bonuses taken by the state.
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Box 7.2 Savings Funds: Four Examples (continued)
Only a portion of oil revenues is deposited into the 
fund. For example, corporate income taxes from oil 
companies go straight into the budget.
It has two unusual features. The principal of the 
fund is to be invested permanently and cannot be spent 
without a popular vote. This is a highly unusual feature 
of a fund. A further unusual feature is that income from 
the fund is to be used for inflation-proofing the capital 
and paying dividends annually to citizens; this has had 
the effect of limiting any attempts to broaden the scope 
of the fund.
The determination of individual dividends or direct 
cash payments is made according to a formula set out 
in legislation and does not reflect current oil prices but 
instead is based on a five-year average of earnings on a 
number of securities.
The legislation determines ways that payments flow 
in and out of the fund, leaving little room for even 
legislative discretion. The primary requirement is that 
the real value of the capital is maintained.
The model is rigid as a result: it is unable to respond 
to changing state needs or a decline in oil production.
Internal and external managers are used. Investments 
are always made outside of the state.
Operation of the Fund exhibits a high degree of 
transparency; quarterly and annual reports are 
produced.
Alberta, Canada
The Heritage Savings Trust Fund was set up in 1976 
but has evolved considerably since the 1990s. Initially 
it had goals of economic diversification and social 
improvement, but these were abolished after percep-
tions of limited success. Instead the fund was restruc-
tured into a financial investment fund with the goal of 
maximizing return subject to acceptable risk.
It is required to invest much of its assets within the 
province as part of developing the local economy but 
also invests savings outside the province.
The fund has been de facto decoupled from the oil 
economy and is now a portfolio of financial assets 
with returns being used to pay down provincial debt. 
Quarterly reports are made by the provincial finance 
minister summarizing investments to the legislature and 
the public; annual reviews of the fund’s performance 
ensure compliance with the regulations governing the 
fund. Fund finances are subject to a regular external 
audit by the Auditor General.
External managers have been hired to cover specific 
investment mandates.
The Fiscal Management Act of 2013 created the 
contingency account as a stabilization fund to provide 
budget financing in those years when expenses exceed 
revenues. The 2013 budget adjusted the new deposit 
rule by depositing the first Can$5 billion in resource 
revenue in the Contingency Account. In subsequent 
years, all or some of any fiscal surpluses will be depos-
ited into the Contingency Account. The Alberta 
Treasury determines the portion of fiscal  surpluses to 
be deposited into the account. The size of the 
Contingency Fund cannot fall below Can$5 billion.
The net income of the fund will no longer be with-
drawn after fiscal year 2017/18, and will instead be 
retained in the fund using a graduated process.
One of the objectives of the fund is to save oil 
revenues for future generations. Yet despite produc-
tion and historically high prices at times from 1987 
to 2012, only two relatively small deposits were made 
into the fund over this period. This is due to the lack 
of a deposit rule. In 2013, the Alberta government 
finally instituted a set of fiscal rules with long-term 
savings and fiscal stabilization objectives in mind.
Kazakhstan
The National Fund was established in 2000 as an 
account of the government held at the national bank. 
Oil and mining revenues due to the government are 
first paid to the finance ministry and then paid into the 
fund according to a strict formula.
The fund has a savings and a stabilization function 
and payments are made into two separate portfolios to 
reflect this. A reference price for oil is determined for a 
five-year period, and this determines baseline budgeted 
oil revenues. Ten percent of these are paid into the 
 savings account quarterly and 90 percent are retained 
for the budget. Excess revenues above the budgeted 
amount are paid into the stabilization account; deficits 
below the reference price are withdrawn from the sta-
bilization account. Mining payments have a separate 
reference price. The finance ministry sets benchmarks 
for the fund and the central bank reports to the minis-
try on fund performance against the benchmarks.
(Box continues on the following page) 
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Fungibility. Critically, savings funds suffer from a prob-
lem of fungibility. They receive a share of revenues that are 
automatically put away for future generations. However, for 
this to be effective, they need to lead to higher government 
savings in the aggregate. If, instead of this outcome, the gov-
ernment does not reduce its expenditure and borrows to 
finance the gap left by revenue that has been diverted into 
the fund, the aggregate savings are unaffected. What hap-
pens is that savings fund assets are merely offset by govern-
ment debt (Davis et al. 2001). A way of solving this is to 
change the paradigm and, instead of having a rigid accu-
mulation rule, require the fund to finance the budget: the 
fund receives budget surpluses and finances budget deficits. 
This model has been adopted by Chile, Norway, and Timor-
Leste. While it may appear that these arrangements remove 
the disciplining effect of a savings fund and lead to a loss of 
the automatic mechanism for saving, in fact, as noted, the 
disciplining effects of a savings fund can be illusory as long 
as the government can borrow.
An argument against a fiscal policy that aims at accumu-
lating “excessively” large savings funds is that investment in 
domestic social and physical infrastructure can yield poten-
tially much higher returns; the resulting incremental growth 
(if achieved for a sustained period) may, for many states, 
come to dwarf the income from holding resource wealth in 
financial assets. This argument must be qualified, however, 
by taking into account the absorptive capacity of the 
domestic economy and institutions and the need for pre-
cautionary balances, which can be large.
7.5 ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF ADDRESSING 
FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY
Assessing long-term fiscal sustainability is challenging in 
resource-rich economies due to the exhaustibility of the 
resource and therefore the revenue from its production. 
Although this affects all countries with resources, it is much 
more of a concern for countries with limited resources and 
shorter resource horizons, like Cameroon, Uganda, and the 
Republic of Yemen. In such cases, there is a need to focus 
on how government expenditures can be sustained once 
resource revenues come to an end. If there is no framework 
in place for fiscal sustainability, there will be considerable 
uncertainty about how long a government can sustain its 
current spending and tax practices and other promised 
expenditures. For countries with longer resource horizons, 
the main objective of fiscal policy is how to manage revenue 
volatility as the price of the resource fluctuates. Whether or 
not government spending can be sustained is a less immedi-
ate question for them.
There have been various studies in recent years including 
several by the IMF on the fiscal response of petroleum-rich 
developing states to oil booms.12 They have demonstrated 
that while the prospect of long-term fiscal sustainability was 
improving in many states, that prospect is being seriously 
jeopardized by short-term policies and behavior that sharply 
increased non-oil fiscal deficits through tax cuts or dra-
matic escalation of expenditures. This results in signifi-
cantly increased vulnerability to future revenue shocks from 
Box 7.2 Savings Funds: Four Examples (continued)
All major decisions concerning management and 
altering of rules on payments in and out of the Fund 
have to be made by the president.
Accountability is lower than usual in such funds 
and there is little oversight or transparency of 
information.
Since 2010, Presidential Decree no. 962 introduced 
the most recent rule. Annual transfers are fixed at 
US$8 billion per year, which can now be used to fund 
current budget expenditures in addition to develop-
ment  programs. This amount can be adjusted by 15 per-
cent through legislation.
The balance of the fund cannot fall below 20 per-
cent of GDP in a given fiscal year. If it does, the short-
fall is to be covered by cutting the fixed annual transfer 
by the amount needed to cover the difference.
A further change was made in November 2014, in 
response to a drop in oil prices: withdrawals of US$3 
billion a year will be made from 2015 to 2017 to develop 
transport, energy, industrial, and social infrastructure.
Sources: NRGI and CCSI 2014; Davis et al. 2001; Bacon and Tordo 2006.
CHAPTER 7: REVENUE MANAGEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION 197
price collapses or resource exhaustion. Two macroeco-
nomic management tools that can act as complementary 
mechanisms to funds or fiscal frameworks (rather than 
alternatives) in avoiding these risks are (1) medium-term 
frameworks (MTFs) and (2) revenue forecasting.
Medium-term frameworks
A medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF or MTF) 
can help frame fiscal policy in a longer-term context, pro-
viding structure to decision making and fostering transpar-
ency and accountability.13 MTFs for fiscal and expenditure 
policy are planning tools that help connect the annual bud-
get to longer-term objectives such as poverty reduction and 
sustainability and the policies to achieve them. They also 
enhance analysis of risks of revenue volatility, a positive 
feature given the need for EI-producing countries to be in a 
strong position to deal with exogenous shocks and to facili-
tate orderly adjustment processes when needed. The publi-
cation of medium-term projections, which incorporate the 
policy and economic assumptions used in the framework, 
assist the public in understanding the future implications of 
current fiscal policies (IMF 2007a, 36).
The budgets of many governments in resource-rich 
states are too dependent on volatile and exhaustible 
resource revenues in the short term and suffer from exces-
sively short-term budget planning horizons. They would 
benefit from introducing a medium-term to longer-term 
perspective to budget planning. MTFs for these states 
would typically incorporate estimates of future resource 
revenue earnings, giving important weight to uncertainty 
through evaluation of a range of possible future external 
scenarios and their impact on revenues. Additional rele-
vant considerations would include macroeconomic stabi-
lization, medium-term expenditure priorities, and 
absorptive capacity. They would also usually be formally 
linked to the annual budget cycle in order to be imple-
mented properly. This can be challenging for some 
resource-rich countries because ministries and govern-
ment agencies do not always have adequate technical 
capabilities to develop and implement a multiyear budget 
approach. It can nonetheless help to manage fiscal 
risks and foster expenditure smoothing. An MTF can be 
designed in a way that takes into account the stage of 
development of the country and also the level of adminis-
trative capacity.
An example of an MTF is the system mandated by the 
Fiscal Responsibility Law introduced by Mexico in 2006. 
The law requires the annual budget to be presented to con-
gress with quantitative projections of the next five years and 
explicit costing for new fiscal measures. Other measures 
were included to smooth expenditures, strengthen manage-
ment, promote transparency, and encourage performance-
based budgeting.14
It may be asked what teeth an MTF typically has. The 
short answer is that an MTF forces the government to think 
about the medium term and about fiscal risks; it forces 
spending ministries to think multiyear in their budgeting 
and incorporate the recurrent implications of current poli-
cies; and it fosters transparency and accountability. Even so, 
medium-term fiscal planning will retain a measure of 
flexibility. An MTEF is not a multiyear budget, which would 
entrench rigidity and hamper flexible and efficient responses 
to changing circumstances.
In a practical sense, there are issues that arise over the 
level of flexibility of expenditure. Capital spending is typi-
cally one of the most discretionary forms of public spending 
and is, therefore, vulnerable to periodic fiscal adjustments. 
If most of the recurrent expenditure is largely nondiscre-
tionary in a country and cannot be cut quickly, then, by 
necessity, when faced with volatility governments could 
look to cut capital expenditure in a nonoptimal way to 
spread the pain equally. The investment budget needs 
to have commitment control mechanisms and an ability to 
implement investment spending to be credible (Barma et al. 
2012, 185).
Revenue forecasting
Realistic resource revenue forecasting is the starting point 
for good practice in revenue and budgetary management. 
Good practice suggests that forecasts should be prepared on 
a project-by-project basis, applying simple fiscal models 
and aggregating them to the economywide level. Data 
required from EI sector investors should include expected 
volumes and expenditures. Price projections should be 
consistent with EI sectorwide forecasts, but at the same 
time they need to recognize the volatility of prices and the 
notorious inaccuracy of price forecasts (see figure 2.4 in 
chapter 2). There should be a realistic resource price fore-
cast in the budget for the next year (one price, possibly 
adjusted for quality in some cases) and all resource reve-
nues should be projected on that basis, regardless of how 
individual companies project their revenues on the basis of 
other price projections. The budget can be set on the basis 
of only one resource price projection—the same way that 
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the budgets of other countries are set on the basis of a single 
macroeconomic projection. Then the budget is subjected to 
stress tests (lower resource prices than the price in the bud-
get, or other shocks) to assess the budget’s vulnerability to 
potentially adverse developments and what would be done 
if such circumstances arose.
Finally, price and production assumptions should be 
codified and not made subject to year-on-year or month-
on-month manipulation in order to generate more fiscal 
space. However, revenue forecasting has limits: a govern-
ment can have good revenue forecasting and still run a reck-
less fiscal policy.
7.6 ADDRESSING VOLATILITY: 
STABILIZATION FUNDS
Volatility
The volatility of resource revenues in the EI sector can 
have major impacts on fiscal policy, public consumption, 
and investment spending. High revenues encourage many 
governments to step up spending based on a mistaken 
belief that the revenue windfall will be permanent or a 
politically driven disregard of virtually certain future 
declines in revenue. This gives rise to unsustainable spend-
ing levels with painful adjustments when revenues fall 
(Ossowski et al. 2008, 8).
Revenue volatility is particularly worrisome in its poten-
tial effects on domestic consumption via changes in wage 
income and employment. The poor are especially vulnera-
ble, having limited ability to alter household consumption, 
and often face severe difficulties in either insuring them-
selves or borrowing against fluctuating income. Current 
government expenditures are difficult to cut in low-income 
states where they are likely to be focused on basic services 
and poverty reduction. This is not to argue against alloca-
tion of resource revenues to consumption but to suggest the 
importance of protecting some (recurrent) expenditures 
against the volatility of revenues.
Fluctuations in domestic investment may be more 
manageable and less costly than those in consumption. 
In a mechanical sense, it may seem easier to cut capital 
expenditures as a large piece and in one action. In prac-
tice, existing contracts with suppliers have to be adjusted 
or renegotiated, sometimes at great cost if there are 
 contractual clauses that protect suppliers from such gov-
ernment interventions. Some investments depend on 
other investments: a new school may need a new country 
road for example. Investment expenditures have to be 
reprogrammed. Spending ministries usually oppose such 
cuts, which creates political problems for the ministry of 
finance.
It may be thought that the fluctuating investment can 
be partially offset by the relatively smooth output it typi-
cally produces. However, even if less costly than fluctuat-
ing  consumption expenditures, “stop-go” investment 
behavior carries a considerable cost in terms of efficiency 
losses, a build-up on project contract arrears, and aggre-
gate economic instability (Alba 2009, 14). Effective utili-
zation of volatile resource revenues requires that the 
resulting expenditure in both consumption and invest-
ment be smoothed.
Key features of the funds
A stabilization fund differs from a savings fund (see 
section 7.4) in that it is designed to guard against volatility 
in the international resource markets. Such funds are 
a form of self-insurance against short-term volatility 
(Shabsigh and Ilahi 2007), and so are designed to address 
precautionary objectives and, indirectly, to assist in expen-
diture smoothing, although the latter will depend on 
many other things besides a fund. In many stabilization 
funds, when revenues or prices are high relative to some 
norm, payments are made into the fund. When revenues 
are low relative to the norm, payments are moved out of 
the fund to the budget.
The optimal size of a stabilization fund depends on 
the magnitude of expected resource revenues, their rela-
tive importance in the budget, and the volatility of the 
revenues. The larger the possible variation in revenues 
relative to the total state budget expenditure, other things 
being equal, the larger the amount of precautionary 
assets in the fund should be. Given the objective of stabi-
lization funds, they should hold short-term, highly 
liquid, and low-risk assets. The fund’s assets should be 
held abroad to avoid putting pressure on the domestic 
economy; otherwise, the fund far from contributing to 
domestic stabilization, would actually exacerbate procy-
clicality and transmit resource price volatility into the 
economy.
As is the case with savings funds, a major challenge fac-
ing a stabilization fund is setting a reference price or reve-
nue and ensuring that, if the resource price exceeds the 
reference price, any revenue collected over and above the 
reference is deposited in the fund and not channeled 
through the budget. If the aim is to help to stabilize current 
government revenues, the calculation of future revenues 
CHAPTER 7: REVENUE MANAGEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION 199
becomes very important. Any procedures set down for 
doing this will be highly dependent on price forecasts. In 
some countries, such as Chile (see box 7.3) and São Tomé 
and Príncipe, a formula is used to determine the reference 
price. This avoids arbitrary decisions that may favor the 
current spending plans of the ruling groups and result in a 
depletion of the stabilization fund.
In practice, the focus on a reference price has proven to 
be very difficult due to the stochastic process driving 
resource prices: there does not appear to be a meaningful 
long-term average price, and resource prices do not tend to 
revert to anything. Further, there are problems due to the 
fungibility of money: the government can undo in the bud-
get what it is trying to achieve in the fund. 
Box 7.3 Stabilization Funds: The Experience of Chile
One very important innovation of Chile is the use of 
independent professional committees to issue a projec-
tion for long-term copper prices—vital for revenue 
forecasting—which helps to depoliticize them.
Chile established two funds in 2006, the Pension 
Reserve Fund to help finance pension and social wel-
fare spending and the Economic and Social Stabilization 
Fund to help overcome fiscal deficits when copper 
revenues decline unexpectedly. The funds are governed 
by a strong set of deposit and withdrawal rules under-
pinned by a fiscal rule that has the effect of smoothing 
spending over time.
The Economic and Social Stabilization Fund is 
a countercyclical tool that aims to smooth govern-
ment expenditures, allowing the government to 
finance fiscal deficits in times of low growth and/or 
low copper prices and to pay down public debt when 
necessary.
While external audits are made public, compliance 
with the rules is not assessed by a formal oversight 
body like a multistakeholder committee or indepen-
dent fiscal council.
The funds are very transparent. Information on 
fund managers, returns on specific investments, and 
how deposits and withdrawals are calculated is publicly 
available.
A minimum of 0.2 percent of the previous year’s 
GDP must be deposited in the Pension Reserve Fund 
annually. If the effective fiscal surplus exceeds this 
amount, the deposit amount can rise to a maximum of 
0.5 percent of the previous year’s GDP. The fund is 
capped at 900 billion Unidades de Fomento (approxi-
mately US$1.4 billion as of February 2017). Deposits 
can be financed with funds from the Economic and 
Social Stabilization Fund at the discretion of the min-
ister of finance.
Any remaining fiscal surplus after deposits to the 
Pension Reserve Fund are made, minus any funds used 
for public debt repayments or advance payments into 
the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund made the 
previous year, are deposited into the Economic and 
Social Stabilization Fund.
Funds from the Pension Reserve Fund can be used 
only to pay for pension and social welfare liabilities.
Until 2016, the previous year’s return on the 
Pension Reserve Fund could be withdrawn. From 2016 
onward, annual withdrawals from the Pension Reserve 
Fund cannot be greater than a third of the difference 
between the current year’s pension-related expendi-
tures and 2008 pension-related expenditures, adjusted 
for inflation.
Chile’s Structural Balance Rule allows for estimat-
ing fiscal revenues for budget planning and, therefore, 
whether withdrawals are needed from the Economic 
and Social Stabilization Fund.
Funds can be withdrawn from the Economic 
and Social Stabilization Fund at any time in order to 
fill budget gaps in public expenditure and to pay 
down public debt. However, withdrawals are subject 
to the structural balance rule. Funds can be with-
drawn, at the discretion of the Minister of Finance, 
to finance annual contributions to the Pension 
Reserve Fund.
The Economic and Social Stabilization Fund’s 
investment policy is to maximize the fund’s value in 
order to partially cover cyclical reductions in fiscal 
revenues while maintaining a low level of risk.
The Economic and Social Stabilization Fund invests 
in portfolios with a high level of liquidity and low 
credit risk and volatility in order to ensure that 
resources are available to cover fiscal deficits and avoid 
significant losses in the fund’s value.
Funds are invested in fixed-income assets in reserve 
currencies that typically do well in financial crises. 
Sovereign investments are made exclusively in German, 
Japanese, and U.S. government bonds.
The fund has adopted a passive management invest-
ment policy since May 2011.
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7.7 ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF ADDRESSING 
VOLATILITY
Hedging
Financial instruments such as futures contracts and options 
(designed to lock in prices on future production) can be 
used in resource-rich states to reduce the risk of future 
adverse commodity price movements (J. Daniel 2001).15 
For a government or state company, the assumption is that 
if international energy and mining companies and traders 
can use hedging strategies to reduce risks from price volatil-
ity, why should they not do the same? Instead of trying to 
cope with the effects of a volatile and unpredictable revenue 
stream, the aim of a hedging program is to make the reve-
nue stream itself more stable.
To date, only a very few resource-rich states (such as 
Mexico and the República Bolivariana de Venezuela) have 
tried to reduce their exposure to commodity price risk by 
using these instruments, although a few others, like 
Kazakhstan and Russia, have considered it.16 The Mexican 
experience is the most commonly cited. Each year, the 
country hedges a large part of its exports of oil (about half 
of the volume of oil exports) by means of put options to 
insure against a decline in international oil prices. The Asian 
put options it purchases have a strike price equal to the oil 
reference price used in the budget. In practice, the program 
“has been particularly useful after the collapse of oil prices at 
the onset of the global financial crisis, when oil prices were 
20 percent below the budgeted price” (IMF 2015b, 22).17
The main deterrents are political rather than practical. 
Governments have no control over the commercial deci-
sions taken about hedging and are exposed to asymmetric 
political costs where hedging results in losses. According to 
J. Daniel (2003, 373), “For an individual finance minister 
(or head of a state oil producer), the political costs of hedg-
ing may outweigh the benefits, even if the economic case is 
clear.” For example, this can occur when the hedged sales 
price turns out to be substantially less than the actual future 
market price. In such circumstances, the responsible 
authorities may find themselves out of a job; by contrast, 
they are likely to escape blame when nonhedged prices fall 
in line with a fall in market prices. It may also be difficult to 
justify the expense of hedging, which can be considerable 
(premium payments on over-the-counter transactions, for 
example). In one notorious instance, the government of 
Ecuador lost US$20 million (in 1993 money) to Goldman 
Sachs through hedging (Farchy 2016).
The most significant obstacle of all might be the institu-
tional capacity issue. Hedging requires substantial 
specialized technical capacity, which is not always available 
in emerging resource-rich countries. Given the potential 
scale of losses, it would be extremely dangerous to allow 
people without such expertise to run a hedging program. 
An illustration of this was a scandal in Chile’s national 
 copper company, CODELCO, when large losses were found 
to have accumulated some years ago.18
Further, like resource funds, hedging does not stabilize 
expenditures, directly or indirectly. That would require 
additional fiscal policy decisions. It is perfectly possible to 
have a resource fund or to hedge revenues and yet under-
take a recklessly procyclical fiscal policy funded, if needed, 
by borrowing.
For gas producers hedging presents far fewer problems. 
Many long-term gas contracts are in practice “internally 
hedged”: they set fixed prices with an escalator or are linked 
to a basket of fuels with a floor and ceiling, or they prescribe 
a portion of annual sales to be made at an initially fixed 
price (P. Daniel 2007, 42).
Economic diversification
One response to volatility is to introduce a diversification 
policy. This is discussed extensively in chapter 9. It can 
include “prudent macroeconomic management over the 
resource cycle to help stabilize the economic setting for the 
traded sectors” (Gelb 2011, 64).19 However, experience to 
date among high-rent-producing countries with low linkage 
levels to non-resource sectors is not encouraging. Extreme 
price cycles have proven very challenging to oil-exporting 
countries, in particular, as they try to sustain investment in 
the non-oil traded sectors, which tend to become destabi-
lized by large swings in the real exchange rate. Even the 
poster child of success in avoiding the resource curse, 
Botswana, has been challenged in this respect.20 Malaysia 
and Indonesia stand out as exceptions however, with the 
latter shifting toward manufactured exports over time (RWI 
2012).21 Both had a broad resource endowment and a favor-
able economic location. Indonesia had a large, low-cost 
supply of labor, which encouraged its shift to low-wage 
manufacturing and exports, while it invested strongly in 
agriculture to ensure a cheap food supply. Chile, Sri Lanka, 
and Thailand are other examples (Coxhead 2007).
In this respect, institutional quality is important since 
manufacturing is more transactions-intensive in the local 
economy than subsistence agriculture or offshore infra-
structure: it needs a business environment in which con-
tracts will be enforced after they are concluded and assurance 
that the rule of law will provide elementary levels of 
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security. Where such institutional quality is lacking, the 
discovery of large-scale extractive deposits offers an oppor-
tunity for a country to develop it, either by creating a special 
development zone for this purpose or by ramping up the 
quality of the state institutions and its delivery of services to 
the economy. Policies “to reduce this institutional gulf . . . 
are therefore of the utmost importance for diversification 
policy” (Gelb 2011, 67).
There is a large body of literature that addresses the 
development of domestic links between the mining sector 
and the wider economy.22 This linkage is also given much 
emphasis in the African Mining Vision and similar declara-
tions.23 Key elements mentioned in chapter 1 and revisited 
in chapter 9 are policies on local benefit and resource cor-
ridors. However, it should be noted that forced “value addi-
tion” or “beneficiation” increase dependence on resources 
produced and do not count as diversification.
7.8 SPENDING CHOICES AND USE OF 
GOVERNMENT REVENUES
Resource revenues, like any other revenues, can be put to 
various uses, such as spending through a public investment 
program benefiting the population by developing infra-
structure or through social benefit expenditures such as 
health and education. They can also benefit the population 
by means of direct distribution to the general population 
through the tax system and or “citizen dividends” (Alba 
2009, 14–17). Irrespective of their origin however, they will 
usually become part of total government revenues. Once 
they enter the Single Treasury Account, they are no longer 
distinguishable and cannot be identified separately.
Domestic investment
Growth is usually seen as the main way in which incomes 
and consumption can be increased. It creates employment, 
bids up wages, and broadens the tax base for future public 
spending and service provision. Investment in domestic 
assets, particularly infrastructure, is key to that growth. 
Several Middle Eastern resource-rich countries (such as 
Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) engaged in large public 
investment during the oil boom years between 2003 and 
2008. This was aimed at diversifying the domestic economy 
and improving the quality of infrastructure. However, in 
many resource-rich countries limited state capacity makes 
appropriate and effective investment difficult to achieve. 
Private sector investment, in the long run, may prove more 
important to growth than public sector spending, but its 
scope may also be constrained by public spending in some 
countries (Alba 2009, 14–17).
Against this background, the traditional argument is that 
in the context of a resource-rich country a disproportionate 
allocation of public sector resource revenues should be 
made to domestic investment, with special attention to 
investments that will stimulate private sector investment. 
Subsidies to the poor and debt reduction should also be 
high priority areas. However, this statement cannot apply to 
countries where the stock of public capital is ample and of 
relatively good quality. In those countries, the marginal 
public dollar is likely to be better used in other ways. The 
key question is, what kind of “investment?” Governments 
also need to distinguish between different projects as targets 
for investment, but how? If there is a capacity deficit, not 
only is there a lack of capacity to identify, implement, and 
monitor key investment projects, but public sector corrup-
tion will lead those with influence to allocate high-value 
construction contracts in ways that are vulnerable to mis-
management. Finally, governments need to decide what 
processes (such as procurement, project appraisal, costing, 
and monitoring) they need to put in place to promote effec-
tive spending.
From one perspective, it may be a serious mistake for 
some countries to put all their revenues in a sovereign 
wealth fund (investing only in financial assets outside the 
country) when domestic investment needs are very high 
(van der Ploeg 2012, 98). The resource revenues from EI 
production can alleviate capital scarcity and so create 
opportunities for public investment. Indeed, for some 
countries it may be far better to use the windfall “to steadily 
ramp up public investment, tolerate a temporary fall in the 
efficiency of public investment, and gradually boost the 
efficiency-adjusted stock of public capital and non-oil out-
put” (Van der Ploeg 2012, 98). For certain countries, then, 
this will influence their choice of whether or not to place 
revenues in a fund.24 In any event, it may be sensible to park 
a portion of the windfall temporarily in a fund in the face of 
absorption constraints when investing in public infrastruc-
ture and human capital.
Arguments in favor of direct public spending include 
retention of central control over both the macroeconomic 
trend and microeconomic detail of spending; the chronic 
undersupply of physical and social infrastructure supported 
by public expenditure and the high rates of economic and 
social return on such investments; the potentially signifi-
cant catalytic impact of public expenditure on private sector 
investment; and job creation and employment. With respect 
to private sector investments, direct public spending could 
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be complementary. For example, public investment that 
included strategic investment in key infrastructure, educa-
tion and training, and human capital could facilitate private 
investment in both the EI sector and in complementary 
sectors.
The main argument against direct public spending of 
resource revenues has to do with its ability to handle any 
rapid increase in expenditure in an effective manner (see 
section 7.3). In addition to the problem of absorptive capac-
ity already discussed (including bureaucratic capacity and 
capital expenditure processes), there is the risk of waste and, 
without adequate transparency and oversight, the probabil-
ity of corruption. A rapid escalation in spending can also be 
expected to put upward pressure on domestic prices. This 
can result in a real appreciation of the exchange rate, loss of 
competitiveness of nonresource exports, and, as a conse-
quence, loss of economic diversity as well as a large negative 
impact on overall economic performance. This describes 
the problem known as Dutch Disease, which was discussed 
in chapter 2).
If the intention is to engage in domestic investment, a 
clear benefit to a government would be to establish a public 
investment program for the medium and long terms. This 
could include priorities for strategic investments. With an 
appraisal process that is not capricious, this would set out a 
clear plan as to what projects will and will not receive fund-
ing. It would also support planning and implementation 
capacity at the line ministries. Institutional factors will be 
central to its success, including the capacity to select, imple-
ment, and evaluate projects. In turn, this requires the cre-
ation of robust public financial management systems.
Consumption
Once revenues from resource production begin to flow, a 
case can be made for immediate allocation of part of those 
revenues to recurrent expenditure on consumption in the 
form of subsidies based on the urgent poverty reduction 
needs of large segments of the population. Even setting aside 
the humanitarian motives for such spending, it is some-
times considered essential on political stability grounds.
Once the existence of large-scale resource revenues 
becomes known, allocating at least a proportion to con-
sumption of this kind may become a political imperative 
(Liebenthal, Michelitsch, and Tarazona 2005, 80). At the 
same time, it will have to compete with other political 
imperatives such as increasing investment in hard infra-
structure, which may be as strong as that of providing or 
increasing subsidies for poverty alleviation.
Against this prioritization of immediate action on pov-
erty reduction, it can be argued that a holistic approach 
should be taken to setting expenditure in the budget. All 
needs and potential expenditures would compete in an 
open budget process. In this way, the marginal dollar 
would be allocated to the area where the marginal benefit 
is highest, given efficiency and equity considerations that 
have to be balanced in the political process. Poverty 
reduction is also a priority that is vulnerable to circum-
stances: for example, if the fiscal position is unsustainable, 
inflation is high and the economy overheated, the external 
position precarious, or there is rampant corruption to the 
extent that only a fraction of the resources would reach 
the poor. In such circumstances, immediate poverty 
reduction would make little sense as a priority. Further, it 
is a kind of policy that can generate benefit-dependence if 
not properly designed, targeted, and conditioned and may 
give rise to entitlements that are very difficult to reverse at 
a later stage.
Cash transfer schemes
An alternative to public consumption or investment is the 
direct transfer of resource revenues to citizens. The payment 
of dividends from resource revenues directly to the popula-
tion has been the subject of much research in recent years 
(Moss 2011; Gelb and Decker 2012). Sometimes known as 
“oil-to-cash” and invoking the Alaskan experience,25 the 
idea is to place some revenues from extractives production 
into a fund and through that to pay cash directly to citizens, 
who would be taxed on the income. It establishes a close link 
between the citizen, the government, and the natural 
resources being produced.
This is not a replacement for an established revenue-
sharing mechanism with or without a formula; if that is 
absent, local government activities and expenditures could 
not be financed. It also differs from reduced taxation, which 
is applicable only in countries where there is a large income 
tax base, a condition that does not apply to most resource-
rich countries.26
Arguments in favor of cash transfer. The two main 
arguments advanced in support of direct distribution are 
based either on a governance proposition or on distribu-
tion and efficiency. The first argues that direct transfers 
can always be taxed back by the government, with the tax-
ing relationship forming the basis for long-term improve-
ments in governance and accountability. The second argues 
that direct transfers will be more equitable and efficient than 
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many mechanisms now used to provide either public goods 
or subsidies, and that they better reflect the proposition that 
resources belong to “the nation.” Fuel subsidies, for example, 
are very regressive as well as being distorting. An example of 
a country that has moved at least partly from fuel subsidies 
to transfers is the Islamic Republic of Iran. A key difference 
between these two arguments is that the former requires a 
large share of the rents to be transferred (to make the gov-
ernment dependent on taxes), while the latter does not.
Arguments against cash transfer. The strongest of 
these is that such schemes create entitlements (and an 
entitlement mentality) that soon become entrenched bud-
getary rigidities. Once direct payments to the population 
are granted, it is very difficult to abolish them or change 
them later if circumstances or policy priorities change. This 
is borne out by the experience in Alaska. Another strong 
counterargument is that government can pool resources 
to make large investments in, for example, education sys-
tems, health care, roads, and electricity projects. Individuals 
cannot coordinate these activities and hence there is a role 
for government to invest resource revenues. In economic 
terms, there are externalities that the private sector would 
not address if left to its own, leading to suboptimal effi-
ciency and social outcomes.
Other counterarguments include the possibility that 
 current beneficiaries of the distribution are likely to give 
little weight to the future and therefore invest too little. In 
any case, it is unfair to transfer the benefits of a depleting 
resource to the current generation only, without saving 
or investing for future generations. Also, governments are 
better informed on resource revenue flows, output levels, 
and price volatility than the general population, and gov-
ernments are better placed than individuals to absorb rev-
enue fluctuations. The problem of volatile revenues is also 
a difficult one for transfers. The mechanics of setting up a 
universal and accountable system have, however, become 
more feasible with the advent of new technology for citizen 
identification and payments. As yet, this appears to hold 
little interest to governments, although some, such as 
Mongolia, have been moving in this direction. For a few 
governments, the establishment of a database of its inhabit-
ants will  present problems, particularly in contested areas, 
where ethnicity and population size can be highly sensitive 
issues (for example, in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region and Sudan 
or Abyei in South Sudan).
Further, it is not clear why an increase in direct distribu-
tion (involving transfer of small sums of money to indi-
vidual households) can stimulate “private” investment that 
might lead to a better identification of investment priori-
ties. In many resource-rich countries, the infrastructure 
gaps are so large that such direct transfers are unlikely to 
lead to improvements in infrastructure, or indeed to an 
offsetting against environmental damage (the Niger Delta 
being a good example of this). Direct distribution also 
carries the risk of capital flight to a country’s capital or 
to offshore accounts, exacerbating problems in local areas. 
Inequalities among localities could also end up being 
exacerbated. Private transfers, therefore, face a collective 
action problem in turning the rents into public goods. (It is 
not guaranteed, of course, that government manages this 
transformation well.)
Implementation. Beyond consideration of these  arguments— 
several of which are in direct opposition to each other—the 
merits of direct distribution will depend on the particular 
mechanism chosen for affecting the transfer (for example, 
tax reduction, subsidy, social protection scheme, or citizen 
dividend) and its detailed specifications. For  example, use of 
petroleum revenues to subsidize petroleum product prices 
in a petroleum-rich state may have political appeal, but it is 
distortionary, nonetheless, and often seriously so. The rev-
enues could be poorly targeted, with the rich benefitting much 
more than the poor (except in the specific case of kerosene). 
Conditional social protection transfers, such as those linked to 
school attendance, can be very beneficial. In practice, a deci-
sion on direct distribution is very likely to depend on state-
specific circumstances and available transfer mechanisms. Real 
technical constraints may hamper identifying beneficiaries of 
such schemes or building a transaction system for cash transfer 
delivery, electronic payment, and transfer systems, all of which 
need to be in place for a cash transfer to work.27 Technological 
advances allowing biometric identification through mobile 
devices suggest that governments interested in developing 
such arrangements may have a greater chance of success than 
in the past.
One further issue that needs to be addressed is the need 
to stabilize transfer programs with respect to actual rent 
revenues. A degree of predictability is required so that cen-
tral governments do not alter entitlements on an ad hoc 
basis. Programs need to allow the government flexibility in 
its macrofiscal management.
Examples. Experience of direct distribution has produced 
different and inconsistent lessons. Some might argue that 
direct distribution can indeed improve social welfare, point-
ing to examples of this in very low income countries with 
large oil revenues or in countries with large per-capita 
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 revenues and low government accountability. Once allo-
cation has been made, they could argue, the population’s 
recognition of their entitlement to a share in resource ben-
efits can be expected to increase demands for accountability 
on the part of the authorities. However, there are also cases 
where direct distribution can lead to perverse incentives and 
decreases in social welfare. A common assumption is that it 
will have negative effects on the labor supply, as individu-
als will have less incentive to work (Isakova, Plekhanov, and 
Zettelmeyer 2102, 11–12). It can also have the effect of starv-
ing the government of much-needed financing for domestic 
investment.
The most cited example of direct distribution is the 
Alaska Permanent Fund, established in 1976 by an 
amendment to the state constitution. To date, more than 
US$1 billion has been distributed annually to 600,000 
citizens. One of the reasons for its creation was to provide 
a safeguard against pressures from politicians to spend the 
oil revenue. However, the dividends have come to be seen 
as entitlements, and the government has borrowed sub-
stantially at times to finance increased spending (Ossowski 
et al. 2008, 10). This is not an approach that has yet found 
many followers among resource-rich economies.28 The 
nearest comparable initiative is the Human Development 
Fund in Mongolia, which was set up in 2009 to make con-
tributions to citizens such as cash handouts, payments of 
tuition fees, and possibly financing of other social benefits. 
The initial contribution to the fund came from a negoti-
ated prepayment of royalties from a mining project. 
However, in contrast with Alaska are the decoupling of 
transfers from the performance of the underlying assets 
and their front loading.
In practice, as Barma et al. (2012, 170) note, “Governments 
endowed with natural resource wealth have provided wealth 
transfers to citizens in a variety of different ways.” Resource 
rents have been used to finance large transfer programs, 
even if not expressly linked to resource wealth; Iraq and 
Mexico are examples.
Debt reduction
Although not a spending choice and more a use of govern-
ment revenues, paying off outstanding foreign debt with 
resource revenues is an option for resource-rich states with 
high debt levels. Many African states, for example, have 
international debts to pay to other countries and interna-
tional financial institutions and plans to reduce dependence 
on external aid in their national budgets. Siphoning off 
revenues for this purpose dampens the potential for 
cyclicality in spending, and it raises no domestic absorption 
issues. Its appeal lies in its positive impact on the state’s 
credit standing, investor attitudes, and, most important, the 
cost of capital for the domestic private sector. However, it is 
only an option if the government is running an overall fiscal 
surplus. If not, the foreign public debt will simply be 
replaced by domestic public debt, leading to a rise in 
domestic interest rates if capital is not fully mobile and if the 
central bank does not accommodate the increase in domes-
tic debt with a looser monetary policy.
Between 2002 and 2005, public debt as a proportion of 
GDP in several countries fell dramatically as a result of this 
kind of policy. In Saudi Arabia, it fell from 97 to 41 percent; 
in Russia from 35 to 14 percent; and in Qatar from 47 to 
24 percent. Algeria went further in 2006 when it concluded 
an agreement with France to retire the full outstanding bal-
ance of its bilateral debt. Libya, too, paid off almost all of its 
external debt. As one former minister of Gabon notes, these 
countries’ experiences “have taught us many lessons, one of 
which is that paying down debt early brings greater benefits 
than building up savings that earn a low rate of return” 
(Toungui 2006, 2).
Against these, rather positive, instances of debt reduction 
policies, it should be kept in mind that in many countries 
the debt may have been accumulated by a previous regime, 
creating political challenges for the successor government to 
mount a debt reduction. Also, if the country does not have 
access to financial capital at this stage in its development, 
how would a program of debt reduction reduce borrowing 
costs? Domestic borrowing costs are usually driven by 
short-term liquidity issues, so a significant debt reduction is 
unlikely to have any effect. Finally, there are some countries 
that will benefit from initiatives such as the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries Initiative, the Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative, or commercial debt buy-back initiatives in place 
to assist low income countries.29 These may limit the value 
of a debt reduction program.
Adjusted natural capital
The revenues from extractives represent a transformation of 
natural capital into other assets. A depletion of this natural 
capital requires a corresponding increase in other forms of 
capital, such as financial assets or human capital, whether as 
savings or reinvestment. As noted, for some countries a 
departure from this principle may make sense with clear 
benefits probable from consumption in the domestic econ-
omy. However, if there is a strategy for replacing the natural 
capital lost from extraction with high quality physical and 
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human capital, some indicator will be required. In some 
cases, an indicator has been used to measure whether the 
depletion of natural capital has been compensated for by 
investment of extractives revenues in other assets such as 
education and physical infrastructure such as roads and 
water supply. Natural capital accounting can be a way of 
measuring growth in the context of long-term sustainability 
and can also influence spending choices (World Bank 
2013). Botswana, for example, uses a sustainable budget 
index (the ratio of noninvestment to nonmineral revenues). 
However, there is no enforcement mechanism to ensure 
compliance, nor is there any guidance on the composition 
of public investment expenditure. In practice, mineral rev-
enues “have been entirely devoted to investment in physical 
and human capital assets, and have not been used to finance 
recurrent spending” (ANRC 2016, 13).
7.9 REVENUE ALLOCATION AND 
SUBNATIONAL ISSUES
A major challenge for government policy in the EI sector is 
how to design a method of resource revenue allocation that 
takes into account a key fact of life: natural resources are 
very often unevenly spread geographically within, as well as 
across, countries. This has the potential to lead to wide dis-
parities in income in decentralized systems and to claims 
that allocation should benefit producing areas dispropor-
tionately. Where different layers of government coexist, 
such as central, regional, and local, the resulting horizontal 
fiscal disparity requires a particular response, sometimes 
called “fiscal federalism.”30
For both federal governments and devolved systems of 
government that are not strictly federal, revenue allocation 
issues between central and subnational governments have 
become increasingly common, particularly where countries 
have heterogeneous populations and centrifugal tendencies. 
First and foremost, the form of revenue allocation that 
results is one that follows from a political decision. In most 
countries, resources will be owned by the state, but in some, 
ownership will reside in provincial state bodies, and in the 
United States to a significant degree among private land-
owners. Coastal municipalities also receive rents, even from 
offshore hydrocarbons, as in Brazil. Sometimes the overall 
legal structure may be federal but issues of revenue sharing 
can readily arise among countries with looser, devolved 
structures.
Any form of EI revenue allocation entails a number of 
choices to be made. These include the scope of distribution, 
particularly geographical distribution across producing and 
nonproducing regions, but also the objectives or outcomes 
sought by the distribution of revenues: compensation for 
social and environmental impacts, reduction of income 
inequality, or political economy imperatives, such as con-
flict mitigation and historical legacies, for example. Choices 
also include the method of distribution: should it be 
 formula-based and, if so, what objective indicators should 
the formula include, or should cash transfers be used? Even 
more challenging is the need to find a path between objec-
tives that compete with each other: a government may have 
to reconcile the aims of national cohesion and conflict 
avoidance, on the one hand, with local service delivery and 
effective macromanagement, on the other.
Research on revenue allocation suggests a useful dis-
tinction can be made between revenue sharing and revenue 
assignment (McLure 2003; Ahmad and Mottu 2003). The 
question that arises with respect to assignment is, to 
which level of government should resource revenue 
accrue in a multilayer system of government? Or, who 
should tax extractives, and how? In many cases, it will be 
the central, national level, but in some countries such as 
the United States and Canada it will be subnational. The 
question that arises about revenue sharing is different. If 
the national government obtains the revenue, how does it 
share it with the subnational governments? An option is 
to share the revenue bases, meaning that part of the reve-
nue (arising from the application of a single fiscal regime 
to the sector) directly accrues to the national level and 
part to the subnational level (the extractive-producing 
regions). These questions raise vertical and horizontal 
balance issues.
Revenue assignment
For countries with federal and even unitary systems of 
 government, the approach to revenue assignment will be 
influenced by the following considerations:
1. The generally superior institutional capacity of the 
national government
2. The ability of the national government to offset instabil-
ity in resource revenues based on their larger budgets, 
more sources of nonresource income, greater access to 
credit markets, and the power to engage in monetary 
policy
3. The local costs of providing public services and infra-
structure and the local social and environmental costs 
imposed by exploitation of the petroleum or mineral 
resource
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4. The national government’s ability to make statewide 
decisions on revenue use on the basis of assessments of 
economic efficiency and vertical and horizontal equity, 
offset in part by local government insistence on acquir-
ing a major share of their “patrimony”
5. The prospect of enhanced accountability, expenditure 
program design, and implementation through subna-
tional assignment of revenues
6. Issues of trust between local and national governments 
related to both distribution and expenditure of 
revenues
Balancing these considerations in practice is likely to 
prove very difficult and certainly complicates the task of 
integrated and comprehensive resource revenue manage-
ment. Moreover, in the fiscal federalism literature there is a 
broad consensus that resource revenues should be central-
ized (they should accrue to the central government).31 In 
this respect, the United States and Canada are outliers, since 
in most resource-rich countries revenues are centralized 
and an intergovernmental transfer system is in place to 
share them. If there is a dilemma about balancing, it turns, 
on the one hand, on the value of institutional capacity 
building and technical assistance in public fiscal and expen-
diture management, at all levels of government, and, on the 
other, the importance of fostering effective dialogue and 
coordination. In fiscal decentralization, regional and subna-
tional authorities may lack the capacity to manage revenues. 
This means that there is a role for the central ministries of 
economy and finance (and civil society bodies) to provide 
assistance, supervision, and scrutiny at that level and ensure 
that an optimal utilization of the revenue occurs.
Revenue sharing
This is an intergovernmental financial relationship between 
the central government and subnational governments. 
Revenues from EI production could be collected in a single 
account and then distributed according to an agreed for-
mula between the central and subnational governments.32 
A derivation principle is often used, whereby each subna-
tional government’s share is related to the oil revenue that 
originates in its territory. The formula may be needs based 
or resource based. The criteria on which a formula is based 
may include population ratios; land mass; the need to 
ensure an equal standard of public services between regions 
or provinces; distinctions between current and future pro-
ducing resources; central-national and local-provincial 
needs for expenditure; payments to producing areas; and 
compensation to provinces, districts, and indigenous peo-
ples for resource development and any related environmen-
tal or social damage. In fairness, such criteria could also be 
used for many intergovernmental transfer systems.
In some cases, it may be appropriate to fix in legislation 
a percentage from the total amount for local communities. 
An alternative, procyclical approach would be to fix the 
percentage annually at the moment of approval of the 
national budget. As shown in box 7.4, in Nigeria the for-
mula used by law requires the parliament to take several of 
these criteria into account before approving a formula every 
Box 7.4 Examples of Revenue-Sharing Formulas
Indonesia
 ■ The scheme was established in Law 33/2004.
 ■ It requires 15 percent of oil revenues and 30 percent 
of gas revenues to be transferred to the originating 
provinces and the districts in them.
 ■ Within this scheme there is a distinction between 
producing and nonproducing districts.
 ■ Special asymmetric arrangements exist (for exam-
ple, for Aceh) that allow receipt of 70 percent of the 
oil and gas revenues produced in their jurisdictions 
instead of the general arrangement.
 ■ The allocation of revenue sharing is based on the 
actual, realized, oil and gas revenue. This means 
that revenue sharing received by regions fluctuates 
with variations in the oil and gas price.
The net oil revenues are distributed 84.5 percent to the 
central government and 15.5 percent to the relevant 
subnational government. Net gas revenues are divided 
as 69.5 percent to the central government and 30.5 to 
the subnational government. Of the revenues received 
by the subnational government, 20 percent is allocated 
to the provinces, 40 percent to the producing district, 
and the remaining 40 percent is equally distributed 
among other districts within the province.
Revenue from mining, particularly from land rent 
and royalty, is shared between central and subnational 
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governments. Of the land rent, 20 percent is allocated 
for the central government, while the remaining 
80 percent is shared among the provinces (16 percent) 
and the producing districts (64 percent). The arrange-
ment for the shared revenue from royalty is similar, 
with 32 percent for producing districts and 32 percent 
equally divided among the nonproducing districts 
within the province (article 14 Law 33/2004).
Iraq
The federal government as well as producing provinces 
and regions are given the authority to manage oil and 
gas extracted from present oil and gas fields. This is 
conditional on the distribution of revenues in propor-
tion to the population distribution and specification of 
a share for previously disadvantaged areas (Constitution, 
article 112.1).
Articles 17 to 20 of Iraq’s 2009 Budget Law out-
line the country’s current revenue-sharing arrange-
ments. “Sovereign expenditures” for the Council of 
Representatives, the administration of the national cabi-
net, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of 
Defense, oil export production, and other national gov-
ernment functions are prioritized. Of the remaining 
hydrocarbon revenues, 17 percent is allocated to the 
Kurdistan Regional Government and the remainder is 
allocated to national ministries in other governorates 
(both hydrocarbon producing and nonhydrocarbon 
producing) in proportion to the population distribution 
and specific needs. The 2010 budget also includes a pro-
vision that will deliver US$1 to producing governorates 
for each barrel of oil and refined fuel they produce.
Source: Blanchard 2010.
Nigeria
Parliament decides on a formula for distribution of oil 
revenues every five years. The constitution sets out 
criteria to be taken into account in the formula:
 ■ Population
 ■ Equality of states
 ■ Internal revenue generation
 ■ Land mass, with a minimum of 13 percent reserved 
for oil-producing states (article 162.2)
Oil-producing states receive 13 percent of revenues 
from the oil produced in their state, in addition to 
standard revenue allocations. The current vertical allo-
cation formula, based on Presidential Executive order, 
is as follows:
Federal government: 52.68 percent
State government: 26.72 percent
Local government: 20.60 percent
Sudan
Net oil revenues are split equally between the govern-
ment of Sudan and the government of South 
Sudan, with 2 percent of oil revenue reserved for the 
producing states in accordance with their proportion 
of production (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 
Wealth Sharing Protocol Arts 5.5–5.6).
Since independence, South Sudan appears to be 
continuing this practice. The National Legislative 
Assembly passed the Petroleum Law in April 2012 and 
in 2013 passed a petroleum revenue management bill. 
The latter states that counties in oil-producing states 
are to receive 3 percent of net petroleum revenues.
República Bolivariana de Venezuela
The constitution requires 15–20 percent of the national 
budget to be transferred to the states (article 167.4), 
and special shares are envisaged for states with hydro-
carbons and mining activities (article 156.16).
Of the total, 80 percent is assigned to states, while 
municipalities receive 20 percent.
Until 2009, three main mechanisms served to 
decentralize public spending:
1. Constitutional revenue sharing: This arrangement 
consisted of the distribution of 20 percent of the 
ordinary fiscal income to subnational levels of gov-
ernment, of which 80 percent went to states and 20 
percent to municipalities.
2. Special allocations law: This arrangement consisted 
of the distribution of a minimum 25 percent of the 
collected fiscal income to subnational levels of gov-
ernment. Of this, 42 percent went to state govern-
ments, 28 percent to municipalities, and 30 percent 
to communal councils.
Box 7.4 Examples of Revenue-Sharing Formulas (continued)
(Box continues on the following page) 
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five years.33 Iraq, Sudan, and the República Bolivariana de 
Venezuela have also adopted formulas but, as illustrated in 
box 7.4, these are different in character.
The approach taken in Indonesia merits comment. It 
was expressly designed to counter centrifugal tendencies 
and support the organizational integrity of the country by 
meeting demands from regions and local communities for 
a large measure of control over resource revenues. Under 
the scheme set up by Law 33/2004, the central government 
makes transfers quarterly, based on estimated profits for 
the current quarter and with an adjustment for the differ-
ences between projected and actual profits in the previous 
quarter transfers. Some delays have been reported in the 
transfers, a familiar concern among subnational authorities. 
There is also a transfer of oil and gas revenue indirectly to 
subnational governments through a general allocation 
transfer that forms the largest transfer to subnational 
entities. This is based on forward estimates. However, 
“There is an incentive for the central government to under-
estimate the revenue by assuming a low oil price” (Agustina 
et al. 2012, 14). An effect of the regime is to create a signifi-
cant disparity across provinces and districts. For mining 
revenues, the amounts are much smaller and comprise land 
rents and royalties, which are shared between central and 
subnational governments, such as Papua New Guinea. The 
locations are often remote, and so mining has a significant 
impact on local development and generates employment 
for many local people. However, recent research has found 
the effect of the resource-sharing scheme to be one of 
creating significant disparity among provinces in terms of 
revenue sharing per capita.
Example: Nigeria. One consequence of a growing depen-
dence on EI revenue at the expense of alternatives over time 
is evident from Nigeria. The local authorities have become 
increasingly dependent on the federal authorities, and not 
only for a share of revenue (they have become increasingly 
unable to generate revenue internally from alternatives 
such as agricultural produce). The federal government has 
 assumed more responsibilities from the states and local gov-
ernments on matters such as environment, defense, security, 
and transportation. This leads to the federal government 
arguing for a greater share of the revenues to discharge 
these responsibilities. State authorities have also annexed 
allocations that are intended for local government councils, 
the next layer of government down the chain (Idelare and 
Suberu 2012).
Example: Peru. Dissatisfaction with the distribution 
of mining revenues in Peru led to the establishment of a 
mechanism for direct distribution of mining revenue from 
the central government to subnational government enti-
ties. The Canon Minero Law (2004) allows 50 percent of 
corporate income tax collected from mining companies 
to be earmarked in this way. The distributed amounts 
are to be spent on projects contributing to sustainable 
development by districts, provinces, and departments. 
Its impact has been primarily on infrastructure projects, 
but for provincial governments these revenues have been 
“transformational” for their revenue base (WGC 2011, 14). 
Its  effectiveness is nonetheless dependent on sound gover-
nance and public fiscal management. It also requires an 
appropriate administrative capacity at the subnational 
Box 7.4 Examples of Revenue-Sharing Formulas (continued)
3. Intergovernmental Decentralization Fund: This 
consisted of the distribution of no less than 15 per-
cent of the income collected from the value-added 
tax (VAT) to subnational levels of government; 
42 percent of this amount went to state govern-
ments, 28 percent to municipalities, and 30 percent 
to communal councils.
In 2010, the Intergovernmental Decentralization Fund 
was eliminated, and the Inter-Territorial Compensation 
Fund (FCI) was created. This fund does not have a rule 
for allocations. Instead, its income sources are decided 
by the executive, the subnational levels of government, 
and other sources defined by law.
The Federal Government Council decided to dis-
tribute the FCI funds in the following manner: 35 
percent for communal councils, 37 percent for states, 
and 28 percent for municipalities. The 65 percent for 
states and municipalities is distributed considering 
population and a relative development index.
Source: Ríos, Ortega, and Scrofina 2012.
Overall source: Adapted from Haysom and Kane 2009.
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level to ensure that projects supported are ones that deliver 
tangible benefits to the local population.
An alternative approach in Peru is the Voluntary 
Contributions Program, which adds a social welfare com-
ponent to the Canon Minero. Established in 2006 with a 
five-year duration, the idea was to promote social develop-
ment through public-private partnerships between mining 
companies and their surrounding communities. Companies 
would agree to contribute a percentage of their profits 
toward projects compatible with a list of social development 
priorities. It was not an industrywide agreement but rather 
agreed with individual mining companies, as a way of 
responding to higher metals prices but avoiding a windfall 
profits tax. Not all mining companies joined the scheme, 
but the larger ones did. The four participating mining 
 companies contributed 3 percent of profits after taxes, 
amounting to around US$140 million for projects relating 
to social development among subnational governments 
(WGC 2012, 10). The scheme underlined how the mining 
industry could be a catalyst for sustainable development, 
and appeared to bring benefits to working relationships 
between the communities and the mining companies.
Delays in payment and a lack of transparency
These are among the most frequent concerns about revenue 
sharing. Sharing ought to be automatic on the basis of the 
agreed principles and formula, but in practice the fear of 
subnational governments that the payments will not be 
made in a timely fashion from the central account is often 
well founded. Their lack of trust in the central government 
may extend to fears of political interference and a lack of 
transparency about their share of the revenues (although the 
problem may also be attributable to institutional weak-
nesses). This has been a factor in negotiations about revenue 
sharing in Indonesia, Iraq, and Sudan. One solution may be 
to outsource the collection and sharing of revenues to a third 
party rather than leave them to the ministry of finance and/
or treasury. An alternative approach to revenue sharing is to 
assign certain taxation powers to different levels of govern-
ment. In Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and Sudan, for example, 
the state or provincial governments have the right to directly 
collect certain types of revenues (for example, royalties, fees, 
and excise or production taxes), leaving others to be col-
lected by the central authority (for example, corporate 
income taxes and export charges). Revenues can be distrib-
uted by the particular level of government as it deems appro-
priate or according to its own set of rules. This has the 
advantage of circumventing the distrust that often exists 
between the central government and regions, but it has the 
disadvantage of increased complexity, potential duplication 
of taxation and monitoring, and reduced competitiveness of 
national resources. Without an element of redistribution, 
such systems risk an unequal provision of public services 
between provinces or uneven levels of development. Each of 
the foregoing is evident in, respectively, Canada and the 
United Arab Emirates (Haysom and Kane 2009, 23–24).
The assumption behind revenue sharing according to a 
formula is that local representatives in subnational jurisdic-
tions are better able to meet the diverse preferences and 
investment needs of the producing regions. The resources 
are physically located in the region even if legal ownership 
is vested in “the people” as a whole, and costs of EI develop-
ment are all too often evident at the local level. However, 
tensions may develop among the various producing and 
nonproducing regions and districts, and indeed within a 
particular region in spite of this decentralization. Moreover, 
the common assumption in the fiscal federalism literature 
that subnational governments respond to the wishes of their 
constituents may be a brave one to make in the context of 
the EI sector of some countries (McLure 2003, 205).
Revenue volatility
A source of potential concern about subnational manage-
ment is the considerable fluctuation in revenues that 
results from the overall budgetary process and commodity 
prices. An IMF study, which concluded that revenues 
should be fully centralized, included in its reasoning a con-
cern about precisely this factor: revenue sharing between 
central and subnational levels transmits volatility in com-
modity prices to the subnational level (Ahmad and Mottu 
2002). Some mechanism needs to be put in place to mini-
mize the potential for unpredictability in fiscal transfers to 
subnational governments, which are likely to be less well 
placed to manage the macrofiscal risks because of their less 
diversified revenue base. A formula also needs to be found 
that shares the spending and saving decisions across all 
levels of government in a way that gives subnational gov-
ernments confidence that savings made in their name will 
not be expropriated.
Delays in investing in projects and reduced levels of gov-
ernment service may be a consequence. In their review of 
the results of revenue sharing, the authors of a study on the 
Indonesian approach note, “The biggest danger remains 
that of heightened expectations concerning public services 
and improving living standards being unfulfilled. This 
could create a political backlash” (Agustina et al. 2012, 30).
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There are other reasons for concern, however. In many 
countries, subnational administrations lack the techni-
cal expertise and administrative capacity—or even the 
authority—to utilize revenues to complement private 
investments with the kind of strategic public investments in 
related areas, such as infrastructure (ports, roads, power 
plants, and so on) and education to provide the necessary 
local skills. As a result, even if resources are allocated to the 
local level, management of their implementation might 
remain under the authority of the national government.
Revenue management laws
Sometimes the sharing among regions is enshrined in con-
stitutional arrangements or in a dedicated piece of legisla-
tion such as a revenue-sharing law.34 Any such rules should 
be clear and specific if they are to work. This formal 
approach to the design and adoption of a scheme should 
not be underestimated: its emergence from a formal, legal 
process can be a response to the lack of trust that is com-
mon in postconflict environments and present in many 
other countries. It can be key to establishing a consensus on 
the sharing of power over the resources and to balancing 
provincial demands for a direct share of locally generated 
resource revenues with equally strong claims that the 
resource wealth belongs to all citizens in the country. 
Revenue distribution can be as sensitive an issue as owner-
ship of the resources themselves, and in some contexts even 
more sensitive.
The timing of the design of legal arrangements can have 
a crucial impact. Prior to the discovery of any resources, it 
will be much easier to reach an amicable result. As McLure 
(2003, 204) notes, “Decisions on revenue assignment can 
be made behind the ‘veil of ignorance,’ not knowing how 
much revenue will be at stake or which will be the oil-rich 
jurisdictions. Regional vested interests will not yet have 
arisen and a nationally oriented view of costs of compli-
ance and administration, of distributional equity and of 
allocative efficiency is possible.” Once oil, gas, or other 
minerals are discovered, the context changes forever, and a 
different view of distribution issues is likely to dominate: 
how revenues are to be distributed between the central and 
subnational governments and among subnational govern-
ments. Brazil is an interesting case in this respect, because 
certain states and municipalities obtained a distinct fiscal 
advantage in 1988 by having a favorable allocation of 
hydrocarbons revenues written into a new constitution 
when those resources were relatively small. As a result, 
although the resource is federally owned and managed, 
most of the revenues flow to the states and, unusually, to 
the municipalities. Often these revenues are generated 
from offshore production at a great distance from the 
states’ coasts (Anderson 2012, 390–91; Gobetti, Pinto, and 
de Carvalho Sardinha 2012).
In São Tomé and Príncipe, the revenue management 
law expressly sets out regional allocations but avoids any 
detailed requirements for priority sectors such as a pov-
erty reduction strategy or a national development plan. 
Instead, there is only a general requirement that the 
 revenues be used in “education, health, infrastructure, and 
rural development,” because the drafters considered more 
detailed limitations on future governments to be inconsis-
tent with their democratic preferences; future govern-
ments “should be free to determine the details of their 
own expenditure choices within the ceilings” (Bell and 
Maurea Faria 2007, 294).
Any such law faces the risk that a future government 
may simply direct EI funds to its own short-term needs. 
Trying to mitigate this risk is a real challenge because fetter-
ing a future government is, as São Tomé and Príncipe con-
cluded, not desirable either. In Alaska, a change in the legal 
regime for resource management was made more difficult 
by adoption of a provision in the state constitution. Article 
IX, section 15, states, “At least 25 percent of all mineral 
lease rentals, royalties, royalty sale proceeds, federal min-
eral revenue sharing payments and bonuses received by the 
State shall be placed in a permanent fund, the principles of 
which shall be used only for those income-producing 
investments specifically designated by law as eligible for 
permanent fund investments. All income from the perma-
nent fund shall be deposited in the general fund unless 
otherwise provided by law.”
Contrasts among EI sectors
Allocation of revenues may well have different effects 
according to whether the revenues derive from oil and gas 
or mining. A revenue assignment scheme may alleviate ten-
sions between governmental levels with respect to oil devel-
opment in many cases—but not in all: Iraq and Nigeria are 
examples where difficulties have arisen. However, the 
impact of such arrangements on mining may be less dra-
matic. Essentially, the environmental and social costs of 
mining are borne at the local level while the benefits often 
accrue mostly at the central level. Arguably, the same could 
be said about oil and gas. This is a key dilemma in EI reve-
nue allocation, even if it may be more vividly illustrated in 
the mining sector. Local impact is a critical dimension in 
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countries that have significant subnational and provincial 
rivalries or which have recently emerged from serious 
conflicts.
7.10 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Two features of oil, gas, and mining create challenges for 
revenue management. First, the exhaustibility of the 
resource requires the identification of a resource horizon: 
the time profile of expected production and the probability 
of finding new reserves. Second, the volatility of commodity 
prices creates major challenges for resource-rich countries 
for the development of a macroeconomic framework that 
has the effect of smoothing impacts that can be sudden and 
of uncertain duration. To date, evidence suggests this has 
failed more often than not.
Country characteristics play differing roles in each state, 
but common variables that matter in managing revenues 
are capital scarcity, options for spending, and the political 
economy, because decisions on spending are highly politi-
cal. The quality of institutions matters for both manage-
ment and distribution of resource revenues. Accountability 
and the quality of public administration need the closest 
attention. These features can change over time and there-
fore require a periodic reassessment of the suitability of the 
revenue management scheme in place.
Even if no one-size-fits-all approach applies, and some 
fiscal rules may suit an advanced economy better than a 
capital-scarce developing country, the existence of fiscal 
rules in one form or another can assist policy makers by 
providing transparent benchmarks. They can play a role in 
providing robust checks and balances on public spending 
and at the same time factor in the kind of uncertainty that 
will always be present in resource markets. However, fiscal 
rules are neither necessary nor sufficient for the achieve-
ment of sound fiscal outcomes. Arguably, this conclusion 
also applies with respect to fiscal discipline at the subna-
tional level.
However popular a resource fund is in current practice, 
the choice of a separate fund is not essential for savings 
from revenues, although it may make the management of 
saving easier. Equally, it is not a substitute for sound finan-
cial and economic management, even though it may be 
supportive of it.
The design of funds is highly diverse; sometimes the two 
aims of savings and stabilization are combined in a single 
fund. In many cases, there is much less transparency than is 
optimal, undermining the credibility and efficiency of the 
fund itself.
Direct distribution of revenues to citizens is to date 
 little used but much discussed by experts; recent techno-
logical developments suggest that it has acquired greater 
potential than ever before and surely merits further explo-
ration by governments as an option. It has redistributive 
potential to counter the widening inequality that can 
accompany extractives development. It could also comple-
ment savings measures.
Whatever the benefits of decentralization of revenues 
management, subnational administration may prove poor 
in practice. The administrations may, for example, lack the 
technical expertise, authority, or administrative capacity to 
complement private investments with strategic public 
investments.
Transparency is a critical variable in revenue manage-
ment, because it is essential if a broad consensus is to be 
reached on policies. With respect to spending by funds, this 
should be provided for in a law that specifies their purpose 
and encourages independent oversight, such as parliamen-
tary scrutiny.
7.11 PRACTICAL TOOLS
The complexity of revenue management is formidable, 
but the body of research into it is growing rapidly, as are 
the country case studies and an understanding of what 
good practice means. A particularly difficult area for many 
governments is how to allocate revenue between the cen-
tral and subnational levels within their country borders. 
In this area, it is possible to distill the available knowledge 
around a set of policy considerations and guiding princi-
ples. This has been done by a Natural Resource Governance 
Institute (NRGI) team in connection with a country 
analysis that merits attention (Bauer, Shortell, and 
Delesgues 2016). The research team identified eight policy 
considerations that government officials should address:
1. What are the objectives of any resource revenue sharing 
regime in your country?
 Without a clear sense of what the objectives are, the 
policy makers are going to find it very difficult to negoti-
ate on details, such as a revenue-sharing formula. Among 
typical objectives of revenue-sharing schemes are the 
following: to compensate local communities for the 
negative impacts of extraction, to mitigate or prevent 
violent conflict, to respond to local claims for benefits 
based on ideas of local ownership, and to promote 
regional income equality between the resource-rich and 
non-resource-rich regions.
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2. How would vertical distribution be determined?
 A decision needs to be made on the share of revenues 
assigned to each level of subnational government, 
authority, or institution (the split). In Ghana 91 percent 
of the royalties are allocated to central government while 
4.95 percent goes to municipal governments in produc-
ing areas and 4.05 percent to private landowners such as 
traditional institutions. The transferred revenues ought 
to match expenditures over the medium term.
3. Which revenue streams would be shared?
 Some governments choose to share all revenue streams 
between levels of government but others choose only a 
selected few. Typical streams are royalties, signature bonuses, 
border taxes, and production entitlements. Are onshore 
activities to be considered only or both on- and offshore?
4. What revenue-sharing formula would be used?
 The main kinds of formula are derivation based (a higher 
proportion accrues to the producing area), indicator 
based (where revenues are allocated according to needs, 
poverty for example), or one based on revenue- generating 
capacity (population, for example).
5. Who is to receive a share of the revenues?
 It may seem that region- or state-level authorities are the 
obvious recipients, but in practice transfers can be made 
to traditional authorities, municipalities, landowners, 
and even directly to residents.
6. How can incentives be improved for efficient spending?
 The way in which revenues are transferred—earmarked 
for specific expenditures such as education, for  example— 
helps to determine whether or not they contribute to 
improving development outcomes.
7. What transparency and oversight mechanisms to verify 
accurate resource revenue transfers may be appropriate?
 Without these, local governments cannot verify whether 
they are receiving their resource revenue entitlements 
under the law, and conflict may ensue.
8. How can a negotiating process for a revenue sharing 
formula be best conducted?
 Consensus among the key stakeholders needs to 
be sought if there is to be long-term stability for the 
outcome. Key elements in this are to share knowledge, 
identify the stakeholders, and depoliticize the debate. 
Ultimately the outcome—the formula and the imple-
menting rules—should be enshrined in a law.
Transparency
Little success in the management of resource revenues can be 
achieved without sound data on government revenues. 
Guidance on this can be found in the IMF (2014b) “Template 
to Collect Data on Government Revenues from Natural 
Resources 2014.” The template is based on the IMF’s (2014a) 
Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014. This is the interna-
tionally accepted standard for compiling financial statistics.35
The guidance in the template aims to facilitate the task of 
assigning the various revenues streams in the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) reports for each 
country to the corresponding category or subcategory in the 
template. Among the substantive points is that the definition 
of reported revenues needs to be clearly and publicly stated, 
with an independent agency, such as an auditor-general, 
assigned to assess whether revenues are being correctly and 
fully reported. International standards should be applied, par-
ticularly those that have been developed specifically for report-
ing on natural resources. The benefits can be expected to 
include an informed understanding and scrutiny of revenue 
flows by parliaments, citizens, and third parties. This should 
help ensure that revenues are used efficiently in accordance 
with national objectives, that revenues are all incorporated 
within the national budget, and the risk of misuse is reduced.
NOTES
 1. For a comprehensive discussion of these issues see IMF 
(2007a), Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency.
 2. For case studies of resource revenue management, various 
sources are available. For example, there are papers available 
from a joint project of the University of Oxford Centre for 
the Analysis of the Resource Rich Economies and the Revenue 
Watch Institute, covering the experiences of Cameroon, Chile, 
Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Zambia. These can be 
found at http://www.oxcarre.ox.ac.uk/index.php/Projects 
/ revenue-watch.html. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) Fiscal Affairs Department has produced a series of 
working papers and several collections of papers in book form 
over the past 10 years. A recent example is Arezki, Gylfason, 
and Sy (2011), Beyond the Curse: Policies to Harness the Power 
of Natural Resources. References to IMF working papers can be 
found throughout this chapter in the notes.
 3. For example, the work of the Natural Resource Governance 
Institute and Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, 
www.resourcegovernance.org/natural-resource-funds.
 4. One caveat here is that the inclusion of all public invest-
ment as savings carries the risk that fiscal discipline will be 
undermined.
 5. The typology is used in Budina et al. (2012) and in RWI 
and Vale (2014, 50). There are other kinds of fiscal rule but 
these are the most common by far. As table 7.1 indicates, 
 fiscal rules can also be imposed.
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 6. Various IMF papers have been produced that illustrate 
how its own views on this subject have evolved in recent 
years. “Since the mid-2000s, calls for reconsidering the 
 conventional advice (i.e., based on the PIH formula) and 
prompting investment spending of resource revenue in 
developing countries have emerged” Berg et al. (2012). 
Examples of literature that supports the use of fiscal rules 
include Collier et al. (2010); RWI and Vale (2014, 47–58); 
and Lassourd and Bauer (2014).
 7. For example, Iimi (2006, 3) notes, in developing coun-
tries in particular, “The quality of regulation, such as the 
predictability of changes of regulations, and anticorruption 
policies, such as transparency and accountability in the pub-
lic sector, are most important for effective natural resource 
management and growth.”
 8. It will not be desirable if the fiscal position is unsustain-
able, if inflation is high, if the external current account of the 
balance of payments is in a nonfinanceable deficit, if public 
spending is of poor quality and resources are wasted, or if 
the public capital stock is decent. Specific circumstances are 
a crucial determinant of whether a significant allocation of 
revenues to spending is desirable.
 9. The eight features are investment guidance, project 
development, and preliminary screening; formal project 
appraisal; independent review of appraisal; project selec-
tion and budgeting; project implementation; project 
adjustment; facility operation; and project evaluation. Core 
weaknesses are also identified by the study team to encour-
age reforms to focus resources where they are likely to have 
the greatest impact. These include poor project selection 
including wasteful projects; delays in design and comple-
tion of projects; corrupt procurement policies; cost over-
runs; incomplete projects; and a failure to operate and 
maintain assets effectively, resulting in benefits less than 
they should be.
 10. Taking the case of Mongolia, one study has concluded 
that members of parliament have an incentive to overspend 
on smaller projects that bring benefits to specific geographical 
localities and to underspend on large infrastructure that 
would bring economic benefits to Mongolia as a whole. 
Large infrastructure projects carry a political risk because 
the political faction in control of the particular ministry 
involved would have access to very large rents and become 
politically too powerful. Anticipating this risk, members of 
parliament are reluctant to fund these projects, even though 
they are essential for national growth (Hasnain, 2011).
 11. There is a large body of research now available, with 
the work of the Natural Resource Governance Institute 
 project standing out for comprehensiveness: http://www 
.resourcegovernance .org/natural-resource-funds#. On min-
ing, there is Wall and Pelon (2011). For oil see Bacon and 
Tordo (2006). For funds in general see Gelb et al. (2014).
 12. For example, see Shabsigh and Ilahi’s (2007) “Looking 
beyond the Fiscal: Do Oil Funds Bring Macroeconomic 
Stability?” and Villafuerte, Lopez-Murphy, and Ossowski’s 
(2010) “Riding the Roller Coaster: Fiscal Policies of Non-
renewable Resource Exporters in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.” For earlier work on this theme, see the volume 
edited by Davis, Ossowski, and Fedilino (2003), Fiscal 
Policy Formulation and Implementation in Oil Producing 
Countries.
 13. The generic acronym for a medium-term framework for 
fiscal policy is MTF, connecting the annual budget to longer-
term policies and sustainability objectives and enhancing 
risk analysis. A simple form of MTF is the medium-term 
fiscal framework (MTFF). More advanced in terms of their 
implications for how budgets are put together are medium-
term budget frameworks (MTBFs) and medium-term 
expenditure frameworks (MTEFs). The former incorporates 
realistic projections of spending by individual agencies that 
allocate resources in line with strategic priorities, consistent 
with overall fiscal objectives of the MTFF. The latter takes the 
analysis further and provides more detailed costing within 
sectors and performance measures. Their implementation, 
especially in the more advanced forms, has to be consistent 
with administrative capacity.
 14. For a discussion of MTFs in general and further exam-
ples, see Ossowski et al. (2008, 20–23).
 15. There are three possible approaches: (1) use of futures 
to fix the price a government will receive in the future, 
 giving it certainty about the oil revenue it would receive for 
budgetary purposes; (2) use of options, which would work 
like the purchase of an insurance policy; and (3) engage-
ment by the government with a financial institution to 
provide a tailor-made arrangement to hedge the oil price 
risk according to the government’s risk preferences and the 
cost of the arrangement (over the counter, including com-
modity swaps, bonds or loans or combinations of all instru-
ments). See P. Daniel (2007, 41).
 16. Algeria, Colombia, and the U.S. state of Texas are 
reputed to have experimented with it. The Finance Ministry 
of Kazakhstan was reported to be in discussions to develop a 
hedging program with Goldman Sachs in November 2014 
due to a fall in oil prices, but by early 2016 had not pro-
ceeded with this option. See Tully 2014. Russia was similarly 
reported to be preparing the technical infrastructure neces-
sary to implement an oil hedging program like that of 
Mexico. This was very much a matter of preparation for 
possible future use, however (Farchy 2016).
 17. The program is discussed in detail by Duclaud and 
Garcia (2012).
 18. Between 1993 and 1994, Juan Pablo Davila (the compa-
ny’s former chief of the future markets department), con-
ducted several deals, mainly copper transactions, without a 
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production backup and at a price that was lower than the 
company’s official quotation, generating total losses of 
US$218.3 million (Henriquez 2003).
 19. See also OECD and UN (2011), which looks at the 
economies of five African countries and analyses their diver-
sification profiles and strategies, noting that the small size of 
some African economies means there are benefits in terms of 
economies of scale from regional initiatives, and opportuni-
ties from South-South linkages. For the Middle East, see 
Hvidt (2013).
 20. “The mining sector continues to be the backbone 
of Botswana’s economy, despite efforts to diversify” (ANRC 
2016, 7).
 21. The RWI study includes case studies of Azerbaijan, 
Botswana, Chile, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and Malaysia. 
It finds that firm commitments, sound macroeconomic 
 policies, investments in infrastructure, and strong institu-
tions are critical to success.
 22. For example, IFC (2013) and other literature cited in 
chapters 2 and 9 of the Sourcebook.
 23. See the literature review in chapter 2 of the Sourcebook.
 24. If the fund were to be used to invest domestically, it 
would not be offsetting the risks associated with Dutch 
Disease and would be vulnerable to special interests and rent 
seeking.
 25. Fifty percent of the state’s oil revenues are pooled in a 
sovereign wealth fund with five-year average earnings 
divided among the population. By contrast, in Bolivia a con-
ditional cash transfer program was developed with hydro-
carbon revenue. Bono Juancito Pinto was used to incentivize 
primary school enrolment and completion and Bono Juana 
Azurduy was designed to incentivize uninsured new mothers 
to seek medical care during and after pregnancy.
 26. In developing countries, VAT and sales taxes are more 
important proportionately than in advanced countries, 
because direct tax revenues are weak. It is possible to distrib-
ute resource revenues in the form of low VAT rates. There are 
very low or no sales taxes or VATs in the Persian Gulf states, 
for example. That is one way in which rents are distributed 
to the population there. Another example is the low taxes 
adopted in Alberta, Canada.
 27. For an optimistic view of the potential of direct cash 
transfers, see Moss 2011 and Gelb and Decker 2011.
 28. Some see it as having applications in such contexts, 
 however. See Moss 2012.
 29. Learn more about IMF and World Bank initiatives 
at “Debt Relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) Initiative,” April 8, 2016, http://www.imf.org 
/ external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm, and “The Multilateral Debt 
Relief Initiative,” https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts 
/mdri.htm.
 30. The literature on this subject is very extensive but the 
following provide a good start: Ahmad and Brosio 2006; 
 Ter-Minassian 1997; and Boadway and Shah 2009. It can be 
relevant for the study of fiscal arrangements in devolved 
systems of government that are not strictly federal. Another 
good analysis is by McKenzie 2006, 247 et seq.
 31. Various authors in Davis, Ossowski, and Fedelino 2003 
posit this view. For example, Brosio (2003, 243) notes, “The 
theory hardly recommends revenues from oil and gas as an 
ideal source of finance for subnational governments—with 
the exception of funds to compensate social and environ-
mental damages and to finance additional needs for infra-
structure in the producing areas.”
 32. For a review of the options that is still useful today, see 
Ahmad and Mottu 2003.
 33. For a review of many related issues in the Nigerian 
 context, see Ojo 2010.
 34. For a good discussion of this, see Haysom and Kane 
2009.
 35. There is also a pillar to the IMF’s Fiscal Transparency 
Code, devoted to resource revenue management, that sets 
out transparency practices in certain areas. See IMF (2016), 
“How Does the IMF Encourage Greater Fiscal Transparency.”
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8.1 KNOWLEDGE CORE
There is no alternative
Investors and governments in resource-rich countries now 
have no choice but to engage with evolving new interna-
tional norms and standards on transparency and account-
ability. Legal norms are being adopted in the home states of 
many large extractives firms that require them to meet 
transparency standards. Governments are increasingly 
becoming engaged with the requirements of the Extractives 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
Why?
The poor record of governance in many resource-rich states 
and its damaging effects on their development have encour-
aged a consensus around transparency as a policy response. 
The guiding idea behind the new norms, standards, and 
legal rules is that if more information is available to the 
public, governments and extractive industries (EIs) will 
become more accountable and resource revenues will be 
better spent, to the advantage of the countries concerned. It 
has become a cornerstone of good practice that EI compa-
nies increasingly must comply with or face strict penalties.
In light of the large sums of money involved with EI sector 
activities, it is hardly surprising that it has led to high and 
pervasive levels of corruption all along the EI Value Chain.1 
Advocates of greater transparency argue that it provides safe-
guards against many of the powerful incentives for corruption, 
such as high entry costs, the multiplicity of parties involved, the 
technological complexity of resource development, complex 
revenue accounting, and traditions of sector secrecy.2 
Transparency and accountability are now thought to be critical 
to combat these and permit the efficient and prudent manage-
ment of natural resources and their revenues throughout the EI 
Value Chain. For that reason, the Sourcebook treats them as a 
cross-cutting topic. Transparency can limit the opportunities 
for misuse of power and corruption, while accountability can 
ensure that those entrusted with the management of public 
resources are held responsible for their actions or inactions.
Transparency and Accountability
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Limits to this focus
Transparency is not an end in itself. To be effective, it must 
be combined with effective stakeholder dialogue in order to 
achieve accountability. Improving transparency and 
accountability requires multiple measures, both voluntary 
(among many stakeholders) and mandatory (regulatory). 
For several years, global norms and standards have been 
emerging, but wide differences exist in the weight given to 
them by particular players and in their manner of imple-
mentation. Voluntary initiatives led primarily by civil soci-
ety or international agencies have forged ahead of mandatory 
measures for many reasons. In the case of both types of 
measures, questions that arise in the shaping of global 
norms and standards include the following (IMF 2007b):
 ■ What is an appropriate level of contract disclosure?
 ■ How can host-state and investor-state transparency 
requirements be balanced?
 ■ What is the best way to engage citizens more directly in pol-
icy formulation and monitoring processes and outcomes?
What does cross-cutting mean?
Transparency and accountability are cross-cutting topics 
because they apply to all segments along the EI Value Chain. 
They call for the following:
 ■ Transparency around the decision to extract
 ■ Transparent and competitive procedures for issuing 
licenses and allocating mineral or hydrocarbon explora-
tion or production rights in the design of legal, contractual, 
and policy frameworks
 ■ Competent and noncorrupt institutions with clear and 
nonoverlapping mandates in the regulation and moni-
toring of operations
 ■ Publicly reported fiscal regimes that avoid nonpublished 
special deals and minimize tax avoidance and evasion in 
the collection of taxes
 ■ Transparent revenue management
 ■ Transparent and participatory budgeting based on develop-
ment priorities
If there is a lack of transparency at any point in the EI Value 
Chain, a spread of misinformation may result, sowing mis-
trust in the management of the resources. In turn, this can 
lead to instability and, ultimately, to conflict. These topics 
are, therefore, dealt with in the individual chapters on the EI 
Value Chain as well as in the following material.
8.2 DEFINITION AND SCOPE
Under a broad definition to encompass its many objectives, 
transparency refers to the degree to which information is 
available to outsiders that enables them to have an informed 
voice in decisions and to assess the decisions made by 
insiders. Transparency issues in the EI sector are diverse and 
relate to laws and regulations, policies, administration, rev-
enues, expenditures, and other factors. While this list might 
apply to all economic sectors, its coverage is especially sig-
nificant in the EI sectors of states with heavy dependence on 
EI revenues. Indeed, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) considered the differences to be so significant that, in 
2007, it published a supplement to its Manual on Fiscal 
Transparency, setting out a more detailed set of guidelines 
specific to the EI sector (IMF 2007c), and in May 2016 it 
published a revised draft code for fiscal transparency in the 
natural resources sector. It adapts the entire code to the 
needs of natural resource producing countries.
The sheer size of natural resource rents for many states, 
combined with the technical complexity and the volatility of 
the transaction flows, means that transparency issues are 
especially important to the good governance of the EI sector 
(see chapter 2 and chapter 3). For example, Nigeria, Africa’s 
largest oil producer, experienced financial discrepancies in 
excess of US$8 billion between what companies reported 
paying and what governments reported receiving between 
2009 and 2011, due largely to missing payments resulting 
from incorrect fuel subsidy deductions.3 These discrepancies 
were revealed following Nigeria’s effort to strengthen the 
management of its EI sector projects across the EI Value 
Chain by implementing an EI sector-specific transparency 
initiative, the EITI,4 through its own Nigeria Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI), which was made 
law in 2007 by the National Assembly.5 NEITI focuses on 
promoting due process and transparency to remediate defi-
ciencies revealed by EI sector audits. These efforts include 
continuing comprehensive audits of the EI sector, developing 
a revenue-flow interface among government agencies, 
improving oil and gas metering infrastructure, developing a 
uniform approach to cost determination, building capacity 
across Nigeria’s regulatory agencies and civil society, and 
improving overall governance of its EI sector.6 Nigeria was 
certified as EITI compliant in March 2011, demonstrating a 
successful move toward stronger, more transparent gover-
nance of its EI sector despite the unique challenges presented 
by EI projects.7 However, the recent revelations about miss-
ing payments confirm that local EITI legislation alone will 
not result in the benefits of transparency. The Nigerian 
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example demonstrates that there must be concerted, ongoing 
development in the practices across the EI Value Chain and 
this change must be constantly and consistently monitored.
8.3 THE BENEFITS OF TRANSPARENCY
Government effectiveness
Transparency can be a key contributor to public policy 
effectiveness and efficiency. It can counter rumors and 
speculation about how resource revenues are being 
allocated. Motivated decision makers need feedback on how 
their policies are working in practice. However, feedback 
is possible only when information flows freely in both 
directions. The prospect of public scrutiny based on trans-
parency can also be expected to deter wasteful expenditure 
and encourage the development of appropriate institutional 
capacity, as demonstrated by the Nigerian example.
Reduced corruption
Transparency will almost certainly reduce the risk of cor-
ruption and rent seeking, which is a persistent and endemic 
issue in resource revenue management and allocation 
(Kolstad and Wiig 2009). The work of one of the leading 
anticorruption organizations, Transparency International,8 
supports the connection between a rise in transparency and 
a reduction in corruption related to the EI sector (RWI and 
TI 2011). Research by the IMF across a wide range of coun-
tries has also identified a strong correlation between trans-
parency and the control of corruption. Independent 
research provides further support for the EITI approach 
(David-Barrett and Okamura 2013).
In preference to secret deals with individual companies, a 
transparent and balanced tax regime is the best way to avoid 
corruption and provide citizens and investors with assurance 
that rents from the EI sector are shared fairly (OSI 2009). 
However, corruption is so pervasive in the petroleum industry 
that one study identified a typology for it: policy corruption, 
administrative corruption, commercial corruption, and grand 
corruption, meaning diversion of massive amounts of money 
through production, products, or revenues (MacPherson and 
MacSearraigh 2007). Common indicators of corruption in 
making agreements include a very short negotiating period, 
unusual payment arrangements, disproportionately high 
remuneration, secrecy, criminal background of some of the 
parties, and corruption in the local context. Given the rise of 
petroleum and mining activities in Sub-Saharan Africa, there 
has been particular interest in ensuring that such patterns do 
not arise or are quickly countered.9
Where bribes are common, one effective countermeasure 
can be a publicly accessible register in which all mining and 
hydrocarbon licenses and rights are recorded. Such a registry 
was recently established by the government of Sierra Leone; 
it covers data on all mineral rights, export licenses, and 
related payments.10 This data should be readily available so 
that license applicants and the public have unrestricted access 
to information on licenses that have been granted or are 
being considered. This would address bribery arising from:
1. The granting of exploration and production licenses and 
contracts, environmental permits, or other permits that do 
not meet the requirements stated in the law and regulations
2. The granting of licensing, environmental, or fiscal terms 
and conditions in agreements that are highly favorable to 
the license holder and highly unfavorable to government
3. Situations in which a mineral or hydrocarbon right is 
provided to a favored local party for which a bona fide 
license application has been previously received from 
another company (The result is that the bona fide min-
ing or petroleum company has to negotiate with and pay 
the local company to obtain the mineral right and to get 
access to the area it wants to explore or mine.)
This is an area in which the EITI moved in 2013, extending 
its remit beyond a focus on revenue transparency alone.
Information disclosure
Access to information is an essential precondition for checks 
and balances to be effective and for social accountability to 
be possible (Cameron 2010, 415). Achieving access requires 
clearly defined company requirements for timely and detailed 
reporting to regulators and the local community. This 
should be accompanied by public reporting of obligations 
and related performance, public debate and dialogue, and 
the government provision of regulatory requirements that 
can lead to performance improvement where it is needed.
In 2012 the International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
committed to disclosing future financing agreements as part 
of its revised Sustainability Framework: Access to Information 
Policy (IFC 2012; IMF 2010). Specifically, the IFC promotes 
transparency as “essential to building and maintaining pub-
lic dialogue and increasing public awareness about IFC’s 
development role and mission” (IFC 2012, para. 3). It 
requires clients receiving EI project financing to “publicly 
disclose their material project payments to the host govern-
ment” and for “the principal contract with government that 
sets out the key terms and conditions under which a resource 
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will be exploited” to be made public (32–33). The IFC has 
gone beyond revenue disclosure requirements to include 
transparency about the terms and conditions in contracts 
with host governments. Similarly, the IMF has designated 
the following information disclosure standard as good prac-
tice in the EI sector: “contractual arrangements between 
government and public or private entities should be clear 
and publicly accessible” (IMF 2007a).11 Various develop-
ment banks have taken a similar approach, including the 
African Development Bank and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development.
Democracy
Transparency plays a key role in building more stable and 
accountable institutions to counter the poor governance 
that characterizes most autocratic regimes. If the EI Value 
Chain is properly husbanded, EI projects have the opportu-
nity to facilitate the transition to democracy (Ross 2012). 
The transparency of government actions and rights of citi-
zens to access information is generally seen as fundamental 
to the functioning of a democratic society. The essence of 
representative democracy is informed consent, which 
requires that information about government policies and 
practices be disclosed. Informed democratic debate can, 
among other things, help determine priorities in the alloca-
tion and expenditure of resource revenues.
Human rights
Access to information may be a fundamental human right 
in itself, but is also a core principle necessary for the realiza-
tion of many other human rights, such as political and civil 
rights (for instance, freedom of speech) and social and eco-
nomic rights (for instance, the right to an adequate educa-
tion). The right of access to information is the focus of at 
least one international convention, the 1998 Aarhus 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation 
in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters, but it is also recognized in a multitude of other 
international agreements including, but not limited to, the 
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 
principle 10, and the 2007 International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 
article 12. Each of these instruments has resonance in EI 
sector projects. Where this right is missing or not enforced, 
as is the case in many developing countries, the resource 
curse beleaguers EI development across the value chain 
(Wenar 2008, 21 et seq.).
Access to information is also an essential feature of many 
mainstream development programs, and the IFC, again, has 
made great strides in spelling out the importance of this 
principle in its Sustainability Framework: Access to 
Information Policy, which outlines not only its responsibili-
ties but also those of its clients (IFC 2012, 8–9). The policy 
begins with a presumption in favor of disclosure if there is 
no compelling reason not to disclose; nondisclosure is 
assessed on the likelihood of harm that might be caused to 
parties, not on the benefits of disclosure itself.
Finance
Lenders and credit rating agencies have a strong interest in 
transparency, and serious government commitments to 
transparency can improve access to both commercial and 
concessional finance (World Bank 2009, 2). Research by the 
IMF and others has found a significant positive correlation 
between transparency and credit ratings (Glennerster and 
Shin 2008).
8.4 CHALLENGES AND SPECIAL ISSUES
The major challenge to progress on transparency comes from 
entrenched interests—those with a significant stake in avoid-
ance of transparency to advance their personal or political 
agendas. The low scores of resource-rich developing states in 
transparency assessments suggest the seriousness of this chal-
lenge: on one measure, only 11 out of 58 resource-abundant 
countries have satisfactory standards of transparency and 
accountability (Westenberg and George-Wagner 2015). In 
addition to the obstacle of entrenched interests, a number of 
special, more technical issues have arisen relating to the 
implementation of transparency. A number of examples that 
relate primarily to resource revenue transparency follow.
Mandatory versus voluntary
Admittedly, information disclosure, a key benefit of transpar-
ency, is complicated by the various standards of mandatory or 
voluntary disclosure.12 The various principles put forward by 
the IFC, the IMF, and others are primary examples of volun-
tary information disclosure standards except on the occasion 
that they are integrated specifically in a contract. This is also 
the approach adopted by the EITI (see section 8.5). Critics 
object that this approach lets the most recalcitrant country 
performers off the hook (although the EITI showed its teeth by 
suspending four countries in early 2017 for noncompliance) 
and instead advocate mandatory transparency on the part of 
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EI companies, regardless of location, with respect to their pay-
ments to resource-rich countries. Transparency under this 
approach would become mandatory through laws and regula-
tions in the home state of the EI sector companies, making 
disclosure a requirement for listing on major stock exchanges.
A state’s decision to promote transparency and the prac-
tical measures that follow from that decision are sovereign 
matters and are generally considered to be voluntary at the 
state level. However, once a government decides to imple-
ment a transparency measure, it may well become manda-
tory for EI sector participants operating in that state. This 
approach has in fact been adopted in Liberian, Nigerian, 
and U.S.13 legislation, for example. Almost every EITI 
implementing country has embedded mandatory payment 
and revenue disclosure for companies and government 
agencies into its regulations, so EITI cannot easily be cate-
gorized as either voluntary or mandatory. Most recently, the 
European Union (EU) has introduced new disclosure 
requirements designed to increase transparency regarding 
EI sector businesses listed on EU regulated markets.14
Some argue that mandatory disclosure as required by 
inflexible rules, most often found in legislative acts or regula-
tions, may place too great a constraint on commercial interests 
and distort competition, an argument voiced against section 
1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) (Sepp 2012).15 Section 
1504, also known as the Cardin-Lugar Provision and formally 
as the Energy Security through Transparency Amendment, 
would require EI project issuers who are otherwise obliged to 
report to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
to report all information relating to any payment made by the 
resource extraction issuer, a subsidiary of the resource extrac-
tion issuer, or an entity under the control of the resource 
extraction issuer to a foreign government or the U.S. federal 
government for the purpose of the commercial development 
of oil, gas, or minerals. The aim of the section is to provide 
greater transparency in that the obligation attaches to every 
commercial, public, or private entity involved in an EI project, 
no matter how small its role. It was not until late 2015, how-
ever, that a revised proposal to implement section 1504 was 
adopted by the SEC to mandate certain types of disclosure and 
put the information in the public domain (see box 8.1). It had 
a short life. In February 2017, President Trump approved 
legislation that canceled the SEC rule.
Equally ambitious and far-reaching, the already men-
tioned EU Transparency and Accounting Directives specifi-
cally recall EITI standards in order to “provide civil society 
and investors with information to hold governments of 
resource-rich countries to account for their receipts from 
the exploitation of natural resources”16 through enhanced 
financial reporting procedures on the part of private EI sec-
tor participants. However, the directives have an element of 
reporting flexibility at the discretion of individual EU mem-
ber states, and small to medium businesses have reduced 
reporting requirements. Other mandatory legal measures 
are discussed in section 8.6. 
Box 8.1 Balancing Transparency Interests: Opposing Dodd-Frank
American Petroleum Institute v. Securities and Exchange Commission
U.S. Dist. Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 12-1668, 2 July 2013.
In 2013, the American Petroleum Institute (API) 
filed a civil action against the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) challenging its rule 
implementing section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The 
API is an association of EI sector actors, including 
BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Shell, among many 
others. A primary argument advanced by API was 
that some information required under the new 
reporting procedures should be confidential and that 
the SEC should have greater discretion as to what 
entered the public domain. The argument reflected 
comments made during legislative debate on 
section 1504. In a summary judgment, the District 
Court of Washington, DC, vacated the initial 
disclosure rule promulgated by the SEC, holding that 
the SEC rule would harm investors due to the 
“fundamentally miscalculated” lack of discretion in 
the rule’s current form. The SEC proposed a new rule 
in December 2015, which was subsequently struck 
down by the U.S. Congress. It is important to note 
that there is no unified corporate position on this 
matter in the oil, gas, or mining industries, with a 
number of companies (BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, 
Statoil and Tullow, for example) providing detailed 
disclosures for some time.
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Confidentiality
Almost all EI sector contracts contain clauses covering the 
confidentiality of certain financial and technical data, and 
these have acted to restrict transparency and information 
access (RWI and TI 2011). An important distinction needs 
to be made here between public disclosure of information 
produced or derived under a contract and disclosure of the 
contract itself. Much of the data derived from operations 
under the contract can reasonably remain confidential, 
although for limited periods of time only. After all, a gov-
ernment as the resource owner needs information to be 
confidential for a while as it builds a sound database for 
future licensing. Companies too may wish to limit disclo-
sure for periods of time as a means for protecting what they 
see as sensitive commercial information.
With respect to contract disclosure, many observers 
favor lifting confidentiality restrictions, with limited excep-
tions, on the grounds that EI sector contracts relate to pub-
lic assets, revenues, and expenditures—often on a very 
substantial scale—and to decisions that affect the public 
interest. Therefore, such contracts belong in the public 
domain (RWI 2010).
Confidentiality is an underlying concern, particularly 
when information disclosure deals with revenue reporting. 
Some information may legitimately need to be kept confi-
dential in order to protect a government’s security and stra-
tegic interests and investors’ commercial interests (Waelde 
1996). However, sometimes confidentiality provisions are 
invoked by the government or investors to control informa-
tion without a legitimate justification for doing so. 
Confidentiality, particularly in the commercial context, is 
often put forth by investors as a counterargument against 
disclosure of data; thus, clearly defined parameters about 
what information should be deemed confidential is neces-
sary. The IFC, for example, has included an outline of what 
materials will be considered commercially sensitive or confi-
dential and will not be subject to a disclosure requirement. It 
is important that the need for confidentiality in some cases is 
not used illegitimately to protect corrupt practices and vested 
interests or to hide the kind of deals that would not stand up 
to public scrutiny. Confidentiality considerations can also be 
used to disadvantage communities particularly at risk from 
EI sector operations (Rosenblum and Maples 2009).
Credibility and auditing
If payments to governments are to be published in the inter-
est of transparency and accountability, they have to be 
credible and trustworthy. To this end, many argue that pub-
lished payments should be subject to professional third 
party audits (Katz et al. 2004, 54). However, there are a 
number of issues that arise over audits: How are they to be 
conducted? How can it be ascertained whether a payment 
has been made or received? How is it to be determined 
whether the payment made was the payment that should 
have been made under existing legal contractual and fiscal 
requirements?
Level of aggregation
Many EI sector companies have suggested that publica-
tion of data on payments to governments should be 
restricted to sectorwide aggregate data. While this 
approach is likely to serve the objective of promoting 
accountability in government, it could also leave unde-
tected irregularities at the individual company level. Civil 
society groups tend to take the position that disaggregated 
EI sector data is the best way to assess whether a company 
is actually paying what it should and to that end they 
argue that EI sector companies should disclose payments 
at the individual level (Ravat and Ufer 2010, 4–5). The 
Revenue Watch Institute (now the Natural Resource 
Governance Institute), for example, has issued a series of 
reports on EITI reporting that point to disaggregation as 
essential to good practice.17
Civil society engagement
Public disclosure of important information has little value if 
it cannot be easily accessed and used to promote govern-
ment and company accountability. If transparency is to lead 
to accountability, civil society must be recognized and 
allowed to participate in the discourse. To achieve this, civil 
society must be able to analyze the information disclosed 
and be able to respond with policy recommendations. 
International civil society groups have played an indispens-
able role in the past, and local civil society groups in many 
resource-rich states are increasingly involved in promoting 
public participation in the development of the EI sector.
Social accountability
This approach, which is highlighted in box 8.2, is most effec-
tive where there are established coalitions of groups partici-
pating with both companies and government on EI sector 
issues across the whole sector (especially on licensing, fiscal, 
environmental, and social issues).18 However, civil society 
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engagement can succeed only if government and companies 
are willing to facilitate civil society participation.
Where companies and governments do encourage civil 
society participation, effective engagement will also need 
civil society to be objective and constructive and to have 
realistic expectations about outcomes. Issues regarding the 
minimization of negative local community impacts from 
mining operations may improve rapidly from civil society 
engagement; issues relating to a mining company’s 
operational and marketing decisions are likely to be more 
difficult for civil society to engage with.
International financial institution conditionality
Often it is suggested that loans or support from interna-
tional financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank or 
IMF be conditioned on credible government commitments 
to transparency programs such as the EITI. The IFIs have 
Box 8.2 EIs and Social Accountability
Successful and sustainable EI sector management 
depends on the participation of all key stakeholders—
parliament, government, industry, civil society, and 
international financial institutions. While objectives 
and focus may differ among them, constructive and 
successful models of collaboration are emerging. Social 
accountability represents one important good practice 
for governance. It can hold state institutions 
accountable by providing checks and balances and 
thereby help reduce the risk of state failure.
Social accountability has two basic principles:
1. Transparency, defined as the mandatory public 
disclosure of information to civil society at large
2. Participation, defined as the ability of and opportu-
nity for civil society to engage with government and 
industry on issues of concern
Effective social accountability includes the following:
 ■ A diverse range of civil society organizations that 
take on the role of forming coalitions that focus on 
specific issues across the EI Value Chain and that 
are supported with capacity-building activities to 
improve knowledge about what information to seek 
out and how to use it effectively
 ■ A focus on social equity and achieving positive 
development outcomes on the ground by holding 
governments accountable for their development 
priorities and holding companies accountable for 
their management and mitigation of risks
 ■ Tools such as media and letter-writing campaigns 
(to draw attention to public issues), hearings, formal 
audits, enquiries by parliamentary subcommittees, 
independent budget analyses, participatory budget-
ing and public expenditure tracking systems, citizen 
report cards, community score cards (to develop 
and present information and analysis regarding 
issues of concern), policy statements, citizen char-
ters, and legislative reforms, including grievance 
procedures and ombudsmen offices (to bring about 
improvements)
The achievement of effective social accountability may 
include the following:
 ■ An initial approach that is confrontational and 
requires organizing media campaigns and seeking 
policy change through nonviolent protests (Once 
issue awareness is achieved, engagement of compa-
nies and governments can follow.)
 ■ An evolutionary approach that progresses toward 
the recognition of common ground and collabora-
tion with governments and companies to achieve 
policy and regulatory improvements and improved 
practices on the ground
 ■ Important international stakeholder partnerships 
and networks such as the EITI, which publishes and 
reconciles tax payments by EI sector companies 
with the tax receipts published by governments, and 
the Publish What You Pay campaign (These part-
nerships can provide a vehicle for international 
nongovernmental organizations to transfer knowl-
edge and build the capacity of local civil society 
participants.)
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resisted making this a blanket requirement, recognizing the 
multi-issue complexity of their relationships with client 
governments. In some cases, however, transparency has 
been made an explicit requirement and, more generally, 
IFIs—especially in resource-rich states—have main-
streamed transparency in their country dialogues. Strict 
conditionality provisions in IFI agreements have provided 
the basis for IFI intervention when governments fail to keep 
their end of the transparency agreement. For example, fol-
lowing amendments to the EI revenue management law in 
Chad, the World Bank froze the country’s petroleum reve-
nues held abroad (BWP 2006). It must be recognized, how-
ever, that conditionality has often been cited as the downfall 
of projects in developing, resource-rich countries, and 
many question whether the principle should endure 
(Koeberle 2003; Bird 1998).
8.5 TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVES
From the early 2000s there has been a significant prolifera-
tion in transparency forums and initiatives focusing on the 
EI sector (World Bank 2010, 18). EI transparency has been a 
regular item on the agenda of UN agencies, country group-
ings (such as the G8), and regional groupings (such as the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development). However, in 
terms of dedicated EI sector transparency initiatives, there 
are currently four major but varied forums that have been 
developed and each approaches the subject from a slightly 
different platform: the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme (Kimberley Process), the Publish What You Pay 
(PWYP) campaign, the EITI, and the World Bank Governance 
of Extractive Industries (GOXI) online platform.
Kimberley Process
Established in 2003, the Kimberley Process was one of the 
very first initiatives to use transparency requirements to 
track so-called blood diamonds (rough diamonds used by 
rebel movements to finance wars against legitimate govern-
ments) and restrict their import from states where they 
were used to support conflict.19 Under this scheme, mem-
ber states can certify their diamonds as conflict free before 
entering the international market. This initiative was devel-
oped from UN resolutions aimed at limiting conflicts and 
atrocities linked to diamonds in states such as Angola, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo.20 It has provoked controversy in its implementa-
tion, with opinions differing on its effectiveness.
PWYP campaign
Established in 2002, the PWYP campaign is an international 
coalition of more than 650 civil society organizations in 
more than 30 states.21 It undertakes public campaigns and 
policy advocacy to achieve greater transparency in EI reve-
nue reporting and contracts. Its two main goals have been 
(1) to encourage companies to publish what they pay and 
for governments to publish what they earn as a necessary 
first step toward a more accountable system of resource 
revenue management and (2) to encourage public disclo-
sure of EI contracts and transparency of licensing proce-
dures in accordance with best international practice.
EITI
Established as an independent international body in 2007, 
the Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative is a mul-
tistakeholder initiative intended to promote accountability 
and good governance in resource-rich states through the 
generation and publication of credible data on payments 
made by EI sector companies to host-state governments.22 
The number of petroleum and mining states compliant 
with or candidates for the EITI standards was 51 as of 
March 2017. Committed stakeholders include host and 
home governments, investors, industry, international orga-
nizations, and civil society. Its operation is linked to a ver-
sion of the EI Value Chain concept illustrated in figure 8.1. 
A Standard for compliance with the EITI process has been 
agreed to, and procedures for validation of country perfor-
mance have been established and are currently being 
applied. The seven requirements of the EITI Standard are 
summarized in box 8.3.
In many countries, the most important contribution of 
the EITI has come about because governments have decided 
to act on recommendations that have emerged from EITI 
reporting. Experience suggests that the nature of the recom-
mendations in EITI reports and the extent to which the 
EITI multistakeholder groups and the government follow 
up on the recommendations significantly influence the 
impact of the EITI.
In many countries, EITI reports have been useful diag-
nostic tools identifying weaknesses in government systems. 
EITI reports have often made recommendations aimed at 
addressing such weaknesses and improving sector manage-
ment. They are making an important potential contribution 
to policy reform and change.
However, even where EITI reporting has revealed short-
comings, the recommendations have often focused on 
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improving technical aspects of the EITI reporting process, 
such as reporting templates or data collection for EITI 
reports, rather than improving extractive sector governance. 
Failure to implement recommendations has too often con-
tributed to lost opportunities for impact and reform.
There is increasing documentation on how EITI report-
ing has highlighted shortcomings in government systems 
and recommended actions for improvements (EITI 2016b). 
The stories illustrate the impact in countries that have acted 
on these recommendations and highlight the potential and 
importance of considering EITI recommendations in the 
countries that have not yet done so.
The EITI was essential in turning around EI sector 
administration in Nigeria. Other countries such as Ghana, 
Liberia, and Norway have also achieved EITI compliance, 
and there are many candidate countries working toward 
satisfying the EITI Standard. EITI reports from the recently 
confirmed EITI-compliant Peru show that since the country 
A country’s EITI report informs
the public of what happens with
its natural resources. 
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Figure 8.1 How the EITI Works
Source: EITI 2016a, 5.
Box 8.3 The Seven Requirements of the EITI Standard
1. Effective oversight by the multistakeholder group
2. Timely publication of EITI reports
3. EITI reports that include contextual information 
about the extractive industries
4. The production of comprehensive EITI reports that 
include full government disclosure of extractive indus-
try revenues and disclosure of all material payments to 
government by oil, gas, and mining companies
5. A credible assurance process applying international 
standards
6. EITI reports that are comprehensible, actively pro-
moted, publicly accessible, and contribute to public 
debate
7. A multistakeholder group that takes steps to act on 
lessons learned and reviews the outcomes and 
impact of EITI implementation
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began implementing the initiative, reported figures on reve-
nues received from EI projects have increased sixfold, a testa-
ment to the positive benefits of transparency and a boon to 
Peruvian citizens. However, important gaps remain among 
nonsignatories in the energy and mining sector: the Russian 
Federation, the República Bolivariana de Venezuela, and 
most Middle East resource-rich states.
Moreover, after more than a decade of operation, expec-
tations of EITI’s future contribution to transparency and 
accountability and to extractive sector governance more 
widely are a matter of debate. Transparency is, of course, not 
an end in itself. However, in terms of the transparency that 
the EITI had achieved, one interesting outcome is the vol-
ume of data that is now available in its reports. If properly 
analyzed, they offer the potential for contributing to policy 
making and public debate. This is discussed in section 8.8.
A key feature of EITI is the EITI Standard, which out-
lines the requirements applicable to countries implement-
ing the EITI. In February 2016, a new standard was 
launched (EITI 2016a). It contains six notable features.
First, it allows countries the flexibility to mainstream 
disclosures into government and company reporting sys-
tems, such as portals, and webpages, instead of simply 
reproducing reports that they created to comply with EITI 
disclosure requirements. Stakeholders will be able to deter-
mine which aspects of the EITI Standard are mainstream 
priorities and focus on improving them (such as govern-
ment and company information systems on license alloca-
tions or social and economic expenditure).
Second, all countries must now disclose the identity of 
those that own and profit from EIs. The companies that bid 
for, operate, or invest in extractive projects must declare 
who their beneficial owners are. This requirement will 
take effect January 1, 2020, allowing countries time to make 
the necessary preparations. A roadmap is to be produced by 
January 1, 2017, that outlines how countries will pursue 
these disclosures. Because a company has a complex or 
opaque structure of ownership does not mean that it cannot 
prove to be a reliable and reputable investor. However, 
secrecy can obviously benefit tax evasion and conflicts of 
interest and hide corruption. Information about beneficial 
owners’ identities will have to be assured by the companies 
that provide it, and EITI reporting needs to disclose any 
companies that have failed to submit all or part of the ben-
eficial ownership information.
Third, reporting has been required on commodity trad-
ing transactions since 2013, but the 2016 Standard enhances 
existing requirements so that data on commodity sales has to 
be broken down by the buying company (not by individual 
sale). Oil, gas, and mineral transactions by governments 
and state-owned companies generate large revenues. This 
requirement can mitigate corruption, encourage oversight, 
and discourage self-dealing by government officials.
Fourth, recommendations that result from EITI reports 
must be actively considered by stakeholders. The recom-
mendations have to be listed, and activities undertaken to 
address each have to be noted, as does the progress made in 
implementing each recommendation. The rationale behind 
any decision not to act on a recommendation has to be 
documented by the government. This has the potential to 
contribute to improving governance beyond transparency.
Fifth, an open data policy is included in the 2016 Standard. 
It encourages governments to release data under an open 
license and in formats that are interoperable with national and 
international standards. This goes some way to remedy the 
lack of open data in EITI reports, which limits use and analy-
sis. Data standards are to be developed further on this basis.
Sixth, the 2016 Standard incorporates a revised civil 
society protocol which provides guidance on how to assess 
a country’s civil society environment. 
In March 2017, the EITI took a decision to implement more 
thorough project-level reporting by requiring it in all EITI 
reports covering fiscal years ending on or after December 31, 
2018, at the latest. National multi- stakeholder groups are to 
devise and apply a definition of “project” that fits the specific 
national legal regime as well as the relevant international norms. 
The aim is to strengthen transparency and accountability.
GOXI
As of March 2017, the World Bank Governance of Extractive 
Industries (GOXI) community membership was in excess of 
3,800. GOXI is “a space to share, learn and connect for action 
toward greater accountability and, in turn, better development 
outcomes of extractive industries.”23 For this greater account-
ability, enhanced transparency is a vital precursor, and hence 
transparency functions alongside accountability as the core 
focus of the GOXI. While the initial focus of GOXI was Africa, 
it is now a truly global initiative convened by the United 
Nations Development Programme. The EI Sourcebook website 
and the GOXI website are strongly aligned and mutually sup-
porting in terms of content, links, and shared understanding.
Public-private alliance for responsible 
minerals trade (PPA)
The PPA is a new, joint initiative among governments, 
companies, and civil society to support supply chain 
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solutions to challenges related to conflict minerals in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and the Great Lakes Region 
(GLR) of Central Africa. Leaders worldwide are calling for 
action to address conflict-mineral concerns while deliver-
ing solutions that benefit those involved in responsible 
minerals trade in the GLR. The PPA aims to demonstrate 
that it is possible to secure legitimate, conflict-free minerals 
from the region.
Fair trade
Specifically operating in the context of artisanal and small-
scale mining (ASM), fair trade has been defined as “a trad-
ing partnership based on dialogue, transparency and respect 
that seeks greater equity in international trade. It contrib-
utes to sustainable development by offering better trading 
conditions to, and securing the rights of, marginalized pro-
ducers and workers—especially in the South” (WFTO 
2014). Fair trade organizations (backed by consumers) are 
engaged in supporting producers, raising awareness, and 
campaigning for changes in the rules and practice of con-
ventional international trade. The Communities, Artisanal 
and Small-Scale Mining initiative’s document Certification 
and Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining considers a detailed 
analysis of ASM in the context of fair trade, including 
 practical detailing steps for community-based mining 
engagement and drivers (CASM 2008).
8.6 EMERGING GLOBAL NORMS AND 
STANDARDS
As is true for good EI sector management in general, the 
effective introduction, implementation, and maintenance 
of EI sector transparency will depend on the participation 
of all affected parties. However, the diversity of approaches 
to transparency and accountability has been evident in the 
proliferation of governance-related initiatives in recent 
years.24 In the previous section a number of voluntary 
initiatives were presented. This section focuses on efforts 
that states themselves have taken toward clarifying global 
transparency standards, such as article 10 of the UN 
Convention against Corruption, which requires signatory 
states to enhance transparency in the administration of 
their obligations (UNODC 2004). Both individually and 
collectively, states themselves are instrumental in creating 
a more transparent EI sector. The emerging norms and 
standards are summarized in the following material by 
reference to the players who drive them or who have a 
stake in them.
Host governments
Two kinds of national governments are involved: those in 
resource-producing states (host governments) and those in 
investor states (home governments). They are not mutually 
exclusive. Resource-producing states have a key role in any 
initiative to require transparency and to foster accountable 
processes. A significant number of these states have committed 
themselves to revenue disclosure through the EITI process,25 
as has been discussed. Some have considered a further step of 
contract disclosure. Increasingly transparent proactive host-
government legislation, regulation, and administration across 
the EI Value Chain stands to provide instructive examples for 
other countries seeking to improve their own EI sectors.
Home governments
Among host governments, some investor states are compel-
ling companies to disclose information and modify behavior 
according to legislative measures adopted in these states. 
Among the examples of this are the Canadian Extractive 
Sector Transparency Measures Act of 2015, the U.K. Reports 
on Payments to Governments Regulations of 2014 No. 3209, 
and the EU Accounting and Transparency Directives (see 
 section 8.4). Norway has also been a leader with respect to 
transparency, having required since 2014 that extractives com-
panies disclose payments to governments at the project level.
This supplements existing antibribery legislation in some 
countries, such as the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
the U.K. Bribery Act, and other acts specifically prohibiting 
bribery of foreign public officials in Canada and Australia. 
Given the large percentage of extractives market share that 
is represented on international stock exchanges, the collec-
tive impact of the noted mandatory legal requirements is 
likely to be significant. Specifically, 68 of the world’s 100 
largest oil and gas companies and 40 of the 100 largest min-
ing companies are registered with the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and therefore captured by 
section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Also of the 100 largest 
oil and gas companies and mining companies, 24 and 28, 
respectively, are listed on an EU-regulated exchange or 
incorporated in an EU member country and therefore cap-
tured by the EU Transparency and Accounting Directives; 
14 and 16, respectively, are listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange; and 2 and 1 on the Oslo stock exchange, with 
similar effects from the national legislation (PWYP 2015).
The practices of some major stock exchanges underline the 
trend but perhaps also the limits of these efforts to promote 
adoption of mandatory rules. For example, the Hong Kong 
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Stock Exchange (HKEx) proposed changes to strengthen its 
Environmental, Social, and Governance Reporting Guidelines 
in 2015 that encourage increased transparency. Earlier, in 
2012, the exchange decided to move from a “recommended 
practice” framework toward a “comply or explain” system by 
2015 (HKEx 2012). However, the lack of mandatory rules 
addressing what is increasingly seen as the international trans-
parency standard (as set forth by the EITI) at the HKEx was 
criticized by civil society (Oxfam 2012). Among the world’s 
top 100 mining companies, 13 are listed on the HKEx, as are 
5 of the 100 top oil and gas companies (PWYP 2015).
Conflict minerals have been a particular focus for mea-
sures aimed at promoting accountability. In 2017, the EU 
introduced “due diligence” rules—to enter into force in 
2021—that require EU companies to source their imports of 
tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold responsibly and ensure that 
their supply chains do not contribute to funding armed con-
flict (EU 2017). Competent authorities will carry out inspec-
tions, and nonbinding guidelines to assist companies are to be 
drafted. The regulation builds on OECD Guidelines of 2011, 
which set the benchmark for supply chain due diligence.
All of this legislation might not have been adopted had it 
not been for the efforts of civil society groups (see box 8.4). 
The Cardin-Lugar and Conflict Minerals provisions in the 
Dodd-Frank Act demonstrated the power of nongovern-
mental organizations to influence the case for improved 
governance of the extractives sector, but arguably this has 
been given crucial support by the actions of various oil, gas, 
and mining companies themselves, and their associations, 
and the leadership of several other key home governments 
(Germany, for example). The same civil society commit-
ment to assisting governments in achieving greater manda-
tory transparency is evident in the efforts to promote 
contract disclosure (Rosenblum and Maples 2009).
Industry
For reasons having to do with reputation and legitimacy, 
industry has usually engaged in this process, especially 
through associations (see box 8.5). Industry initiatives have 
provided a platform for improved dialogue on transparency 
and accountability standards and norms. For example, in 
the mining sector the International Council on Metals and 
Mining promotes more transparent reporting through its 
Reporting and Assurance Work Program. The thrust of 
industry initiatives has been to press for voluntary stan-
dards based on, and aimed at, promoting more responsible 
corporate behavior and impacts. Initiatives include the 
widely adopted Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights,26 an effort among states, industry, and civil 
society to offer practical guidance for strengthening human 
rights safeguards in company security arrangements in the 
extractive sector. Companies have also signed up to interna-
tional initiatives such as the UN Global Compact, the 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
Box 8.4 Civil Society–Led Initiatives
Supply chain due diligence has the potential to do more 
than remove illicit material from supply chains. As in 
other commodities, “ethical trade” in the EIs can help 
protect the rights of artisanal and small-scale mining 
(ASM) communities and ensure they get a fair return for 
their labor. It can also influence the standards of 
environmental, health, and social performance in these 
communities and the welfare of the people working at 
mine sites. It generally promotes sustainable development 
and acts to counter the poverty and vulnerability of the 
miners. Ethically based certification assures buyers that 
minerals are mined, processed, and traded in ways that do 
not compromise defined ethical standards. The terms 
attached to such schemes illuminate their focus: fair trade, 
ethical, green, sustainable, development, responsible, 
origin, fair mined and fair made, and so forth.
Several initiatives have explored the prospect of 
certification as a tool for stimulating sustainable devel-
opment in ASM communities—using procurement 
from artisanal miners that agree to adopt some basic 
standards as a tool for retailers to assure consumers of 
the provenance of their products and, of course, to 
establish a market niche.
One of the leaders in this field is the Alliance for 
Responsible Mining (ARM). ARM focuses on fair trade 
standards that provide a market niche for small-scale 
producers and develops standards following the ISEAL 
Code of Good Practice for standard formulation. 
ARM has partnered with the Fairtrade Labeling 
Organization—FLO—in developing and field testing 
of a Fairtrade and Fairmined standard for gold from 
artisanal and small-scale mining.
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Box 8.5 Private Sector–Led Initiatives
The private sector has also undertaken initiatives to 
protect specific commodities. Chief among these are 
the International Tin Research Institute’s iTSCi 
(International Tin Supply Chain Initiative) and the 
World Gold Council’s Conflict Free Gold Standard.
iTSCi is a joint initiative of traceability and due 
diligence for cassiterite from Central Africa that assists 
upstream companies (from mine to the smelter) to 
institute the measures necessary to conform to the 
OECD’s Due Diligence Guidance. Its focus includes 
small and medium-size enterprises, cooperatives, and 
artisanal mine sites. It is designed for use by industry 
but with oversight and defined roles for government 
officials in keeping with the OECD Due Diligence 
Guidance. It also takes into account the recommenda-
tions of the UN Security Council to expand due 
diligence to include criminal networks as well as 
armed groups and to include violations of the asset 
freezes and travel bans on sanctioned individuals and 
entities.
The iTSCi system supports companies wishing to 
maintain trade with responsible supply chain actors in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo and adjoining 
countries. iTSCi has three components: chain of cus-
tody data collection (traceability), risk assessment, and 
independent third party audits.
More recently the World Gold Council engaged 
in an extensive consultation exercise to develop a 
Conflict-Free Gold Standard, an industry-led approach 
to combat the potential misuse of mined gold to fund 
armed conflicts. The intention is to promote respon-
sible mining practices throughout the gold-mining 
industry and to protect the (large-scale) legitimate 
suppliers in conjunction with other schemes, such as 
the Kimberly Process. The idea is that gold produced in 
conformance with the Conflict-Free Gold Standard 
would provide confidence that it has been extracted in 
a way that does not cause, support or benefit unlawful 
armed conflict or contribute to serious human rights 
abuses or breaches of international humanitarian law.
and the ILO Convention 169: the Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention.
Donors
Donors, too, have taken specific actions. An example is the 
Policy and Performance Standards on Social and 
Environmental Sustainability (IFC 2011), introduced in 
2006 by the IFC with updated standards coming into effect 
in 2012. The standards apply to all investment projects, 
including those in the EI sector. The aim is to minimize the 
impact on the environment and affected communities. The 
standards have been extended to cover more governance 
issues, such as transparency requirements, and include 
phased-in requirements for disclosure of EI contracts. 
Several states are progressing toward contract transparency 
by mandating that contracts be publicly available, as in 
Niger, where the new constitution requires publication of 
all EI contracts in the official gazette (Heller 2011).27 
Another example is the IMF (2007a) Code of Good Practices 
on Fiscal Transparency. This sets out robust requirements 
for all member governments to inform the public about the 
use of public goods, which includes natural resources.28
IFIs
International financial institutions have taken a growing 
interest in governance issues in recent years. The Equator 
Principles framework,29 a credit risk management frame-
work for determining, assessing, and managing risk in proj-
ect finance, is based on the IFC Performance Standards and 
hence includes some transparency requirements for Equator 
Principle Financial Institutions,30 although the principles 
focus primarily on after-the-contract issues such as com-
munity engagement and consultation and government-
mandated reporting rather than licensing procedure or 
contract disclosure. The Equator Principles have now been 
adopted by 79 financial institutions in 31 countries and, de 
facto, have become an industry standard.
There is significant scope for cooperation and learning 
from related programs that have a wider or a different focus 
than on the EIs. Several initiatives that focus on better gover-
nance of natural resources focus on forestry, for example, and 
face similar challenges to the EI sector. Sharing learning experi-
ences across the natural resource sectors is undoubtedly bene-
ficial. Moreover, there is also potential to learn from broader 
anticorruption or good governance initiatives. An example of 
that would be the efforts to strengthen procurement and 
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public financial management processes, such as the Public 
Expenditure and Financial Accountability program.31 
8.7 CONCLUSIONS
Transparency, by promoting accountability, minimizing 
waste and corruption, fostering democratic debate, guiding 
macroeconomic management, and enhancing access to 
finance is fundamental to good governance in the EI sectors 
(see box 8.6). Good practice in EI sector management in gen-
eral depends on the participation of all affected parties in the 
effective introduction, implementation, and maintenance of 
EI sector transparency. For each of these parties, good practice 
with respect to revenue transparency suggests the following:
1. All governments should promote transparency and act to 
remove, to the maximum extent possible, any legal or 
political impediments to public disclosure of EI sector 
information. They should support international trans-
parency initiatives, such as EITI, and the possibility of 
international treaties.
2. Host-state governments should be responsible for the pub-
lication and widespread, easily accessible dissemination 
of contract terms and credible data on EI revenues 
received and related allocation and expenditures.
3. Home-state governments should promote good transpar-
ency practice on the part of EI companies that they host, 
particularly with respect to the payments those compa-
nies make to resource-producing states.
4. Companies should be responsible for the public disclo-
sure in a regular, timely, and disaggregated manner of all 
EI sector–related production, costs, and payments made 
to resource-producing state governments.
5. Civil society, both nationally and internationally, should 
strengthen capacity to collect, analyze, explain, and dis-
seminate information. It should develop independent 
monitoring capability; lobby governments, companies, and 
IFIs; and form umbrella coalitions, such as PWYP, uniting 
the various constituencies affected by EI sector operations.
6. IFIs should continue to mainstream transparency objec-
tives in lending and policy dialogues with all resource-
rich client states and in international forums; where 
appropriate they should include transparency commit-
ments in lending conditions.
Implementation Example: EITI. The key to leveraging 
extractive resources to attain beneficial development out-
comes is to increase accountability and transparency as well 
as improve governance in the sector. A useful publication, 
Implementing EITI for Impact: A Handbook for Policymakers 
and Stakeholders, analyzes the importance of implementing 
Box 8.6 Summary: Transparency and Accountability
Transparency, by promoting accountability, minimizing 
waste and corruption, fostering democratic debate, 
guiding macroeconomic management, and enhancing 
access to finance, is fundamental to good governance in 
the EI sectors and should do the following:
1. Apply to all segments of the EI Value Chain, providing
a. effective expenditure monitoring and reporting
b. sustainable development policies and projects
2. Establish formal and informal processes, such as the 
EITI Standard, and encourage more countries to 
implement such principles so that different stake-
holders can hold EI sector producers and govern-
ment agencies accountable
3. Involve mandatory information disclosure and 
public reporting to both regulators and the local 
community with regard to the following:
a. The obligations and the performance of EI sector 
producers, including the disclosure and public 
reporting of actual production figures and 
financial information regarding revenues and 
receipts, taxes, and costs associated with the 
production, processing, and sale of minerals and 
petroleum
b. The budget allocation and actual expenditure of 
government income alongside the ownership, 
management, fee structure, and performance of 
any sovereign wealth funds receiving mineral or 
petroleum funds
4. Facilitate public debate and dialogue and help pre-
vent “commercial confidentiality” being invoked to 
restrict the release of information to other stake-
holders without commercial justification
5. Support states enacting their own anticorruption 
laws
6. Support participation in initiatives such as the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and the 
OECD Financial Action Task Force
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the EITI to domestic economies, governance structures, and 
local populations and suggests measures to leverage its 
potential to ensure inclusive growth and sustainable 
development.
8.8 ACTION TOOLS
The benefits of transparency can be maximized by the use of 
EITI data. From almost 300 EITI reports published by over 
45 countries up to October 2016, information has been col-
lected by EITI and the Natural Resource Governance 
Institute in datasets and made publicly available (NRGI 
2015). These classify data according to countries and proj-
ects, providing also a summary and list of sources used for 
production volumes, commodity prices, and macroeco-
nomic and social indicators.
The datasets on both websites are accompanied by 
 visualization tools that assist in placing EI revenues in per-
spective across countries and years. They might, for exam-
ple, compare extractive revenues with total government 
revenues, with the estimated value of production, and with 
the government’s overall spending on health, education, 
and aid receipts.
As mandatory reporting legislation takes effect in 
Canada, Europe, and other countries, the volume of this 
data will increase significantly and will require the develop-
ment of similar tools for this to be effective in achieving the 
benefits that transparency can bring to global governance in 
the extractives sector.
NOTES
 1. MacPherson and MacSearraigh (2007) explain the ways 
in which corruption appears in the links along the EI Value 
Chain in the hydrocarbons sector. The scale of corruption in 
developing countries has been estimated at around US$500 
billion a year in a study by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (Dawson 2014). This goes beyond the 
EI sector, however.
 2. There are numerous studies to support these concerns at 
the website of the Natural Resource Governance Institute, 
http://www.resourcegovernance.org/.
 3. See “Nigeria Overview,” EITI website, https://eiti.org 
/ implementing_country/32.
 4. See the EITI website, https://eiti.org.
 5. See the NEITI website, http://www.neiti.org.ng/.
 6. See “Nigeria Overview,” EITI website, https://eiti.org 
/ implementing_country/32, and the NEITI Nigeria website 
in general, http://www.neiti.org.ng/.
 7. To be EITI compliant, a country must satisfy EITI 
requirements in accordance with the EITI Standard. An 
independent validator makes an assessment of EITI imple-
mentation. The EITI board, through the secretariat, reviews 
all validation reports. Only if the board considers that the 
country meets all of the EITI requirements will the country 
be designated as EITI compliant. Compliant countries must 
undergo validation every three years or at the request of the 
EITI international board.
 8. See the Transparency International website, http:// 
transparency.org/.
 9. For example, four articles in a special issue of the Journal 
of World Energy, Law, and Business (2014, vol. 7) addressed 
anticorruption laws and practices in Angola, Ghana, 
Mozambique, and Nigeria.
 10. See the Government of Sierra Leone Online Repository, 
http://sierraleone.revenuesystems.org/login/auth.
 11. See also IMF 2016b, “How Does the IMF Encourage 
Greater Fiscal Transparency?”
 12. For a thorough account of the mandatory versus volun-
tary debate, see Gillies and Heuty 2011.
 13. For Liberia, see the Act Establishing the Liberia EITA, 
July 10, 2009, http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/January%20
2016/Liberia%20EITI%20Implementation%20Act%20
2009.pdf. For Nigeria, see the already mentioned NEITA. For 
the United States, see the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376-2223 (July 21, 2010).
 14. Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council, 26 June 2013, OJ L182/52 (2013) (2013 
Accounting Directive), see particularly para. 44 and chapter 9; 
Directive 2013/50/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, 22 October 2013, OJ L294/13 (2013) (2013 
Transparency Directive), para. 7.
 15. See Cardin-Lugar Provision (section 1504) of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376-2223 (July 21, 2010).
 16. 2013/109/EC of 22 October 2013 (Transparency 
Directive), para. 7 of Preamble. 
 17. See, for example, Gillies 2011.
 18. For a successful example of coalition building relating to 
transparency issues, see the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) 
Campaign website, www.publishwhatyoupay.org.
 19. See the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme website, 
https://www.kimberleyprocess.com.
 20. It should be recognized the Kimberley Process has not 
been without its setbacks, such as the 2011 arguments over 
the scheme’s approval of resumption of selling diamonds 
from the Marange mines in Zimbabwe. This decision was 
condemned by both the EU and the United States.
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 21. See the Publish What You Pay website, http://www 
. publishwhatyoupay.org.
 22. See the EITI website, https://eiti.org/. An EITI factsheet 
is available in several languages at https://eiti.org/document 
/factsheet.
 23. See the UN Development Programme and World Bank’s 
Governance of Extractive Industries (GOXI) website, http://
goxi.org.
 24. Examples of these initiatives include the UN Global 
Compact, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the 
Ruggie Guiding Principles, and the Global Reporting 
Initiative. For more information on these initiatives, see the 
Overview on Guiding Principles for Government and Industry 
on the Sourcebook website, http://www.eisourcebook.org 
/ cms/files/Overview,%20Guiding%20Principles%20for%20
Government%20and%20Industry.pdf.
 25. Fifty-one countries are EITI-implementing countries, 
31 of which have completed validation and have been 
declared EITI compliant. See the EITI website, https://eiti 
.org/countries.
 26. See the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human 
Rights website, http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org.
 27. An important document that makes the case for con-
tract transparency is “Contracts Confidential: Ending 
Secret Deals in the Extractive Industries” (Rosenblum and 
Maples 2009).
 28. Government adherence to transparency requirements is 
monitored by civil society. For example, see “Revenue Watch 
Index” (RWI and TI 2010).
 29. See the Equator Principles website, http://equator 
- principles.com/.
 30. Equator Principle Financial Institutions are those inter-
national financial organizations that have officially adopted 
the Equator Principles.
 31. See the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability 
website, http://pefa.org.
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Chapter Title 
C H A P T E R  T H R E E
9.1 KNOWLEDGE CORE
Implementing sustainable development requires stakeholders 
to take a big-picture approach to extractives investment. They 
have to consider strategically the environmental and social as 
well as the economic aspects of development. The integrity of 
ecosystems and areas rich in biodiversity need to be protected, 
and the interests of poor, vulnerable, and marginalized com-
munities need to be recognized in the planning of resource 
development if it is to be truly sustainable. This cannot be left 
to project-planning stages, when investments are committed 
and plans are well advanced. That is the road to costly delays 
(even cancellations) caused by conflicts with authorities, 
communities, and other members of civil society.
The larger goal defined
Although sustainable development means different things to 
different people, the generally accepted definition is from 
the Brundtland Commission (1987, 41): “Development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” It is 
now often associated with the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals, a set of 17 aspirational goals with 
 targets set between them (United Nations 2015, 13).1 With 
their emphasis on water, gender, and climate change, the 
goals are relevant to many of the issues in this chapter, even 
if they are couched in rather general terms.
The implementation of sustainable development (the pro-
cess of getting to the common goal of sustainability) is less 
well defined and more a series of optional tracks. There are 
various ways of contributing to sustainability, and the way 
that exploitation of nonrenewable natural capital contributes 
is known as nonrenewable natural capital conversion.
Natural capital conversion
Essentially, extractives-led investment is a transformation 
of one class of assets—finite, nonrenewable natural capital 
in the form of oil, gas, or minerals—into financial, human, 
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social, manufactured, or other forms of capital. The capital 
conversion in the extractives sector must contribute to the 
creation of more sustainable opportunities and livelihoods 
if the sector is to have any legitimacy in the sustainable 
development agenda. The process should trigger the kind of 
economic and social development that generates wider 
effects and proves sustainable beyond the horizon set by the 
resources themselves.
In this process the extractives companies can be seen as 
development partners, especially for countries where devel-
opment and poverty reduction are most urgent. During 
the capital conversion process (mining, drilling, refining, 
smelting, and so forth), actions need to be managed in ways 
that minimize negative environmental and social impacts and 
maximize benefits in these areas. If this does not happen, citi-
zens will increasingly see extractives development as a 
Faustian bargain in which the gains prove temporary and 
unsustainable, and the long-term costs will impede the ability 
of the environment to sustain ecological and human welfare.
Sustainable development entails balancing and the inter-
play among social, economic, and environmental values. 
Often these values may seem to conflict with each other in 
the short term. For example, industrial growth might con-
flict with protecting renewable natural resources. However, 
responsible use of oil, gas, and mineral resources now will 
help ensure that there are resources available for human 
well-being and sustained economic growth far into the 
future. This confronts decision makers with difficult chal-
lenges, often involving trade-offs.
Cross-cutting themes
The challenges of sustainability arise at all stages of extrac-
tives operations, from the activities examined in the first 
chevron of the EI Value Chain in chapter 4 of the Sourcebook 
to those analyzed under the fourth chevron in chapter 7. 
It is quite wrong and contrary to current good practice to 
view sustainability policies as matters that can be left to a 
later stage, once production is well under way. Policies need 
to be thought through and designed at the very outset to 
address these challenges, and they need to be capable of 
evolving as development unfolds.
The role of research in sustainable development
Theoretically, the need is to ensure that extractives invest-
ments have, over their life, at least not a net loss to human 
and environmental welfare. Further, they should aspire to 
result in net positive outcomes. These concepts are not easy 
to convert into practical figures in the implementation of 
truly sustainable extractives. Considerable research is under 
way into the metrics of these concepts to give them more 
practicality. Some stakeholders suggest that where there is 
much doubt about the potential to achieve sustainability 
goals from an investment, the resource should be left in the 
ground.
Managing the transformative effects of oil, gas, and min-
ing development so that the balance remains a positive one 
for the long term will benefit from an awareness of the lat-
est research and thinking about how to conduct extractive 
industry (EI) activity in a sustainable manner. This is an 
area that is rapidly evolving, with contributions from the 
private sector as well as civil society, international organiza-
tions, policy institutes, and government practice. For many 
states, such thinking will be useful only when adapted to 
their unique country contexts, integrated into policies 
developed, and approved by the government concerned.
Policies and rules
In the EI Value Chain framework, the “Implementation of 
sustainable development policies” chevron differs from 
the other four in at least two ways. First, elements of sus-
tainable development are woven throughout the chain, 
especially in the first chevron. It does not simply follow on 
from the previous chevrons. Second, in certain areas such 
as environmental, health, and safety impacts, the notions 
of “good practice,” which have been used throughout the 
Sourcebook, and “good-fit practice” are insufficiently 
demanding when one is designing a response to a specific 
problem. They may have to be replaced by the more 
demanding standard of “best practice,” although for 
health and safety there already should be no option but to 
pursue best available practice.
Governance
For all countries, a strengthening of governance, institu-
tions, laws, and regulatory policies is critical if sustain-
able development policies are to be effective. How the 
benefits are accrued, leveraged, and distributed requires 
attention to management and oversight. Securing the 
consent of communities in this process requires the 
establishment of mechanisms for consultation and 
cooperation. These challenges and their implications are 
examined in chapter 10.
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Differential approach
This chapter makes three distinctions that help in under-
standing how sustainable development issues arise and can 
be addressed in the EI sector and with what instruments. 
These distinctions are between
1. hydrocarbons and mining activities,
2. social and environmental impacts, and,
3. where appropriate, the stages in the life cycle of the par-
ticular activity.
Oil, gas, and mining can be vastly different in the 
terms of their potential social and environmental impacts 
and of their management processes. Pollution from oil 
spills can be major challenges without parallels in mining 
(although tailings spills in large mining projects may be 
an equivalent). Issues associated with artisanal and small-
scale mining (ASM) are equally important but have no 
parallel in the oil and gas sector. Oil and gas are almost 
exclusively capital intensive, while mining has various 
gradations from capital intensive down to ASM, which 
is labor intensive but has very little capital investment. 
Where these differences appear, they are treated sepa-
rately. They sometimes involve different sets of actors, 
tools, regulations, guidelines, and analyses. These and 
other differences also vary in importance according to the 
life cycle of extractives projects. There are no one-size-
fits-all solutions.
9.2 TWO KEY CHALLENGES
Of the various sustainability challenges in the EI sector, two 
have an overriding importance.
1. How does a government meet the challenge of identify-
ing and implementing policies to ensure that EI sector 
investments lead to positive and sustainable impacts on 
growth and development (the development question)?
2. How can policies be developed to avoid, minimize, 
 manage, and mitigate the environmental and social costs 
and risks that accompany a decision to develop a mining 
or hydrocarbons industry (the environment and social 
question)?
It is important to note that the two questions are not 
mutually exclusive or independent of each other. 
Successful environmental and social policies, for example, 
underwrite positive and sustainable impacts on growth 
and development. Environmental protection puts the sus-
tainable element into development.
The challenges are particularly stark in the case of 
emerging extractives producers, the countries identified 
as a key target group for the Sourcebook. Countries like 
Afghanistan, Ghana, Guinea, Mongolia, Mozambique, 
and Myanmar may be attracting investment in their 
extractives sector, but they suffer from deficiencies in 
areas such as transport infrastructure and a small pool of 
skilled labor. They also typically suffer from limited 
 government capacity to manage the new developments. 
Rectifying this is a priority, but experience suggests it 
will not be easy or quick. Equally, all countries should be 
potential beneficiaries of integrated resource planning 
that takes into account environmental and social con-
straints and impacts.
The development question
The leveraging or catalytic effect of EI development was 
introduced in chapter 2 of the Sourcebook. EI sector 
development, through its links to other sectors, can gen-
erate benefits to the economy beyond the direct contri-
bution of revenues and job creation. It can act as a 
catalyst for pro-poor job creation, poverty reduction, an 
end to aid dependence, and the establishment of forward 
and  backward links, meaning sectors that deliver to 
and take deliveries from a particular sector (Liebenthal, 
Michelitsch, and Tarazona 2005, 1). The forward links 
can entail support for local or national small and 
medium-sized enterprises by involving them in the inves-
tors’ supply chains and developing nonmineral-resource-
dependent clusters of industrial activity. The backward 
links entail measures to process the resources or to use 
the resources to build local industry. The distinction is 
used largely to quantify the impact of changed output in 
the extractives sector on the rest of the economy.
As a lever for infrastructure development (such as 
roads, railways, water systems, and power delivery) in 
settings where it is seriously deficient, the EI sector can 
open up opportunities in new industries, including 
 agricultural exports and tourism. These can endure long 
beyond the exhaustion of the resources of the initial 
anchor project. If one were to seek a single justification 
for supporting the EI sector in low- and middle-income 
countries, in spite of the undeniable risks discussed in 
various chapters of the Sourcebook, this could be the 
most persuasive. It is addressed in section 9.3. It should 
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also be noted that opening up infrastructure can result in 
the destruction of biodiversity and ecosystem integrity.
The environment and social question
The development of either the mining or the hydrocarbons 
industry entails risks but also benefits to the environment 
and always imposes costs in some measure. The impor-
tance of planning ahead to maximize the benefits, mini-
mize the risks, and manage the impact of EI activity on the 
environment is much better understood in the 21st century 
than it was before. The overabundance of toolkits, guid-
ance, and standards shows both an appreciation of the 
problems and a confidence that preproject preparation can 
bring about benefits. Alternatively, it may demonstrate a 
concern about poor standards that influenced decision 
making in the past.
However, in spite of greater knowledge, environmen-
tal and social questions remain enormously challenging, 
 particularly when extractives activity occurs in sensitive or 
protected environments such as rainforest or coral reefs. 
(Areas needing attention can be expanded to include 
 ecologically vulnerable environments; regions increasingly 
affected by climate change and prone to droughts and 
floods; or regions already depleted from previous explora-
tion or extraction.) We cannot assume that mining should 
and will happen in all of these areas; it should not be allowed 
at all. Evidence of oil spills from tankers, pipelines or wells; 
of gas leaks; of mineral excavation; and even of disasters is all 
too abundant, in spite of important advances in technology 
and significant efforts by the respective industries. Damage 
may be long term and possibly irreversible. This is discussed 
in sections 9.4 to 9.5).
The potential impacts of EI development on local com-
munities, indigenous peoples, and women are much better 
understood now than in the past but still require deter-
mined action by policy makers—and enforcers—to be 
translated into benefits and, where there are risks, to take 
preventive and remedial measures. In particular, there is 
greater appreciation of the risks to vulnerable and disadvan-
taged groups in society who, by definition, are likely to have 
little impact on the design of policies.
Based on all the foregoing considerations, governments 
have to decide whether or not to allow EI sector develop-
ment. The decision should be guided by a comprehensive 
cost-benefit assessment and extensive public consultation 
incorporating best estimates of the social and environmen-
tal trade-offs of development.
9.3 CHALLENGE 1: DESIGNING AND 
IMPLEMENTING POLICIES TO ENSURE THAT 
EI SECTOR INVESTMENTS CREATE POSITIVE 
AND SUSTAINABLE IMPACTS
The problem
Substantial research and debate has focused on the role of 
public policy in leveraging EI investments to create long-
term benefits to the host country.2 To some extent this level 
of interest is a reaction against previous thinking about 
development, in which the dominant policy objectives, 
 recommended and often followed, were the attraction of 
inward investment and the use of oil, gas, and mining 
resources as a way of generating revenue. Not infrequently 
the benefits have enriched local elites at the expense of the 
general population, in contrast to the often implicit 
assumption that they would trickle down. The results of 
that narrowly economic focus are not generally regarded as 
having established a springboard for development.3
Instead of offering a range of benefits, extractives opera-
tions have all too often acquired an “enclave” character. 
They have been located in remote inland or offshore places 
far from the major population centers, and the economic 
development they have generated has been limited to a 
very tightly defined geographical area around the project. 
Moreover, the project has often involved a single company 
or consortium, managing a particular operation that is 
overwhelmingly dominant in the national economy. 
However, times have changed. In terms of environmental 
and social performance, operating “out of sight and out of 
mind” is no longer possible in the era of social media and 
instant news coverage.
The focus among some governments and their advisers 
has shifted to finding ways of embedding the extractive activi-
ties in the evolving local economy, guided by broad plans for 
economic growth in the countries that host them. The African 
Mining Vision (AU 2009) has been a seminal document in 
this evolution in thinking, most recently by introducing a 
Private Sector Compact. It is based on the idea that the min-
ing sector in Africa has to be evaluated on a regular basis in 
terms of its contribution to long-term development goals. It 
is a small step from this to giving greater weight to the use of 
EIs like mining to assist in the development of economic links 
and diversification. The assumption, sometimes explicit but 
always present, is that the EIs have the potential to provide 
this leverage for development purposes. However, to achieve 
sustainable and long-term benefits, these opportunities need 
to be consciously identified and pursued.
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Example. The development of a mining project can depend 
on large-scale investment in infrastructure, including trans-
port, power, and water supply. In landlocked countries, 
this is likely to be particularly challenging. In a country like 
Mongolia with the lowest population density in the world 
after Greenland, and with distances that are vast and trans-
port networks that are minimal, infrastructure acquires 
enormous economic and social significance. The export 
of large quantities of copper and coal becomes impossible 
without a substantial upgrading of transport capacity. In 
turn this offers the prospect of substantial spin-off benefits 
if the parties can agree on an equitable formula.
The tools
What policies and practices (both public and private) 
should be adopted to promote sustainable development at 
the local, regional, and national levels? A key consideration 
is the development stage of the EI in a given country. Is it 
established, being established, or yet to be established? 
These stages exist, respectively, in Nigeria, Mozambique, 
and Kenya.
Local benefit. Job creation and the growth of small and 
medium-sized businesses are central components of the 
promise of extractives-led development. Without them, 
oil, gas, and mining activities cannot act as a springboard 
for diversification and wider development. They counter 
the enclave character that has historically seemed a feature 
of EI operations, with staff, goods, and services brought 
in from abroad and with limited impacts on the domestic 
economy. As a response, a policy of local benefit (often 
referred to as local content in the literature) seeks to cre-
ate value added anywhere in the domestic economy, as a 
result of the actions of the foreign investor. It has grown in 
popularity to such an extent that it is now a central policy 
aim of most governments in resource-rich economies (for 
an example in the oil and gas sector, see Tordo et al. 2013). 
However, there is considerable debate about the most 
appropriate instruments to use to achieve it, and even the 
very definition of it. A company may be deemed “local” 
according to its place of registration, the percentage of 
local ownership, the presence of nationals on the compa-
ny’s board and among its shareholders, its workforce, or 
its value-added activities carried out in the country. There 
is a spatial dimension too: how “local” is local benefit? 
Does it ultimately mean national? In most local benefit 
laws, such as those in Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria, the term 
local in local benefit is not defined. In the Nigerian Oil and 
Gas  Industry Content Development Act, 2010,4 Nigerian 
content (benefit) is defined as “the quantum of compos-
ite value added to or created in the Nigerian economy 
by a systematic development of capacity and capabilities 
through the deliberate utilization of Nigerian human, 
material resources and services in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry.” The Ghanaian Petroleum (Local Content and 
Local Participation) Regulations (2013) are less clear,5 
favoring “locally produced materials” in their definition, 
but a national perspective appears to be the intention 
rather than the subnational locality or region where the 
oil and gas activities occur. The risk from this approach is 
that the investor will fail to obtain a social license to oper-
ate. Instead, the focus could be on “community content” 
described as “the interface between community investment 
programmes with local content” (Warner 2007). As a sub-
component of a local benefit policy, “community content” 
may generate local community preferences in employment 
and procurement.
There is no universally agreed definition of local benefit 
(content). At best, it will be country-specific, but even then 
there may be variations. Nor is there any generally agreed 
body of good practice in local benefit, although that may 
not be far away.
Experience to date has often been disappointing. With 
only a few exceptions, such as Norway and Canada, the EIs 
have not proven to be engines of job creation for local peo-
ple and have created few links to local firms. Much recent 
research has focused on why EI activities have failed to 
deliver in these areas and why in particular instances local 
benefit policies and laws have not met expectations. One 
important reason has to be that large extractives companies 
are becoming increasingly capital intensive, particularly in 
the mining sector, as well as more efficient and computer-
ized. Reconciling this with local job creation is a challenge. 
This section reviews the main features of local benefit poli-
cies and practices.
What Local Benefit (Content) Includes. Allowing for a wide 
variation from country to country, the two broad catego-
ries of local benefit normally sought by a host government 
are local procurement and capacity building. Within these 
categories two further distinctions may be drawn: between 
upstream and downstream links. The first subcategory 
involves the promotion of local firms in the supply chains 
of foreign investors, the increase in local firms’ capacity in 
fields that often involve specialist skills, and the development 
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of clusters of economic activity that are not resource depen-
dent. The second subcategory involves activities such as 
processing and refining, and even the use of the resource, 
particularly if it is coal, gas, or oil, to build local industry. An 
example of this is Anglo American South Africa’s enterprise 
development and investment fund, Anglo Zimele. From 
1989, it has supported more than 1,000 businesses provid-
ing jobs to more than 20,000 individuals.
Objectives. Usually, local benefit objectives fall into one of 
two types:
1. Those that set specific minimum targets
2. Those that set flexible goals
In the first type, objectives are typically set for local 
employment or suppliers in the form of minimum targets 
for the employment of local labor. In Angola’s petroleum 
sector, for example, companies are required to ensure their 
workforces consist of at least 70 percent of Angolan 
nationals. Foreign workers may not be hired except in 
circumstances in which no national worker with equiva-
lent qualifications is available. Tanzania takes a different 
approach. If a foreign national is employed in the petro-
leum sector, a succession plan has to be submitted along 
with the work permit application so as to ensure that a 
Tanzanian national “succeeds” to the job. Targets may be 
extended to senior managerial positions and be reserved 
for nationals. A specific percentage may be reserved, as in 
Ghana where, for a company to be treated as indigenous, 
no less than 80 percent of its executive and senior manage-
ment positions have to be held by Ghanaian citizens.
In a Liberian mining contract, the targets are also 
fixed. The parties must agree on progressive implementa-
tion of an employment schedule so as to cause citizens of 
Liberia to hold at least 30 percent of all management 
positions, including 30 percent of its 10 most senior 
positions, within five years of the Effective Date, and at 
least 70 percent of all management positions, including 
70 percent of its ten most senior positions, within 
10 years of such date.”6
Similarly, in Mongolia, the Oyu Tolgoi Agreement 
(2009) requires that “not less than 90% (ninety percent) of 
the Investor’s employees will be citizens of Mongolia.” This 
does not extend to subcontracting, however, where the 
investor is required only to use its “best efforts” to ensure 
that at least 60 percent of construction employees and 75 
percent of mining-related employees are Mongolian 
citizens.7
As an example of flexible goals in the second type of 
benefit objectives, the Afghanistan Qara Zaghan mining 
contract requires the investor to “employ Afghan personnel, 
to the extent practicable in all classifications of employ-
ment, for its Gold Production Facilities construction and 
operations in Afghanistan.”8
Objectives are also set for local participation but may be 
expressed as preferences or mandatory requirements. 
Usually, foreign companies will be required to form part-
nerships with local entities, but further conditions may be 
imposed. In Uganda, for example, if goods and services 
required by the investor are not available in the country, 
they have to be obtained from a company that has entered 
into a joint venture with a Ugandan company, which must 
have a stake of at least 48 percent in the venture.
Preferences may also be invited for the procurement of 
local goods and services to boost local supply chain devel-
opment. However, this is usually accompanied by the con-
dition that such goods and services are of comparable 
quality and quantity to international materials and services 
and that the price does not exceed that of foreign goods and 
services by a certain percentage. In Africa, such conditions 
are found in Angola, Mozambique, and Kenya. In Nigeria, 
local service companies are required to have exclusive treat-
ment if they can demonstrate that they possess the requisite 
capacity.
Local benefit is an example of a policy where various 
stakeholders have a common interest. Governments seek 
to maximize the number of jobs created by the extractives 
activity and to introduce new skills, know-how, and 
technologies into the local economy. Investors have a 
shared interest in generating local jobs, skills, and industry. 
There are also complementary interests among the pri-
vate and public sectors in areas such as training and access 
to finance.
Policies. Some governments include commitments to local 
benefit in broad policy statements. Ghana, for example, 
has a Local Content and Local Participation in Petroleum 
Activities Policy Framework,9 setting out its strategies on 
how the government intends to develop the oil and gas 
industry in these areas. In practice, these broad policies 
must be understood in combination with regulations and 
investor-state agreements such as concessions or produc-
tion-sharing contracts, which usually contain the legally 
binding requirements on local benefit, such as the prepara-
tion of a detailed plan.10
A risk of legal measures to promote local benefit is 
that they conflict with the requirements of international 
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economic law, whether this is World Trade Organization 
(WTO) rules or the provisions of a bilateral or multilateral 
investment or trade agreement. This will depend on the 
circumstances of the country concerned. There has been 
research into the various barriers that local benefit regimes 
can erect and why they may invite a response from the 
WTO (Cimino, Hufbauer, and Schott 2014; Ado 2013). At 
the same time, this research suggests that WTO rules 
impeding the application of local benefit policies are rarely 
enforced.
Legislation. Two kinds of legislation are typically used 
(but not necessarily together) to give a legal form to  local 
benefit.11 Some countries have specific legislation to 
implement local benefit policies. In practice, this is done 
in the oil and gas industry but much less so in mining, 
where the contract instrument is preferred. An example of 
this in the oil and gas industry is the Nigerian Oil and Gas 
Industry Content Development Act (2010), which applies 
to all transactions or operations carried out in Nigeria’s 
oil and gas sector and to all operators in it. There are four 
main objectives in the Nigerian legislation:
1. Development of indigenous skills across the oil and gas 
value chain
2. Promotion of indigenous ownership of assets and use of 
indigenous assets in oil and gas operations
3. Enhancement of the multiplier effect to promote the 
establishment of support industries
4. Creation of customized training and sustainable employ-
ment opportunities
Alternatively, there may be local benefit–relevant provi-
sions in sector legislation, usually in rather general terms. 
For example, countries that have broad local benefit provi-
sions for mining set out in their national legislation are 
Indonesia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Under Indonesia’s 
Mineral and Coal Mining Law (2009),12 companies are 
required to give priority to local employees and to domestic 
goods and services, and to divestment of foreign sharehold-
ings in local companies after five years of production. The 
law also contains provisions to encourage development of 
processing and refining of mining products in Indonesia, 
with the promise that “the extent of the required local pro-
cessing and refining are to be specified in the implementing 
regulations” (articles 95–112 and 128–133). This is dis-
cussed further in the subsection “Beneficiation.”
Regulations may also be issued to clarify the provisions 
in the legislation. These may be specific local benefit 
regulations or sector regulations that contain specific local 
benefit obligations. Subnational governments may also set 
and enforce local benefit–relevant regulations, although 
that is unusual.
These links can also be promoted by regulatory controls 
and project approval requirements. Local benefit plans can 
be required as part of broader economic development 
plans.
Contracts. Many extractives contracts between investors 
and states include requirements to maximize the economic 
opportunities from investment (see chapter 4). The goal is 
to ensure that the extractives activity is aligned to sustain-
able growth and development. Typical provisions in a con-
tractual clause would include the following requirements:
1. To promote participation by local firms (supply chain 
procurement)
2. To hire nationals for certain tasks (employment)
3. To provide programs of skills enhancement (training)
It is less common for the contract to require the investor 
to provide for downstream links, as in processing of miner-
als, for example. Such development links may be desirable 
but nevertheless prove to be not economically viable. This 
important consideration is evident in a provision of the 
Mongolia-Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement (2009),13 
which states the following:
3.19 Within 3 (three) years after the Commencement of 
Production, the Investor will, if requested in writing by 
the Government, prepare a research report on the eco-
nomic viability of constructing and operating a copper 
smelter in Mongolia to process mineral concentrate 
Products derived from Core Operations into metal (the 
Smelter). . . .
3.20 If the Government either alone or in conjunction 
with others or a third party plans for the construction of 
a Smelter in Mongolia, the Investor will, if requested in 
writing by the Government, provide on agreed terms, 
with preferential access, Rio Tinto’s (or its Affiliates) 
Proprietary Technologies held in joint venture with 
Outokumpu, for the operation of the Smelter.
3.23 If the Investor constructs a Smelter in connection 
with implementation of the OT Project, that smelter will 
be in Mongolia.
This highlights the importance of design in local bene-
fit provision. Downstream links can be highly capital 
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intensive, yielding low profitability for the investor. For 
countries with little comparative advantage (lacking inex-
pensive energy, proximity to the market for the finished 
product, or skilled labor or a stable currency), it may make 
no sense at all to seek to persuade an investor to embrace 
such links, and instead rely upon the more familiar 
upstream ones.
Investors seek to identify whether parties to contracts 
such as production-sharing contracts (PSCs)—such as 
national oil companies (NOCs) or national privately owned 
companies with political connections—can exert additional 
leverage on the pursuit of local benefit objectives.
The ambiguity of some approaches to enforcement is 
evident from the Mongolian OT contract (2009) which 
imposes fines on the company if it hires too many foreign 
employees (article 8.7):
If the Investor employs more foreign nationals than 
the specified percentage set forth in Clause 8.4, the 
Investor shall pay a monthly fee of 10 (ten) times the 
minimum monthly salary for each foreign national in 
excess of the specified percentage.
However, the contract also states that a breach of local 
hiring requirements will not constitute a breach of the over-
all agreement and cannot be used by the government as a 
ground for terminating the contract (article 8.9).
Community Development Agreements (CDAs). Local benefit 
requirements can be built into agreements reached by min-
ing companies with local communities. These can be dedi-
cated agreements such as are found in Australia and Canada 
or community development agreements (see World Bank 
2012). Investors will be keen to learn if they are expected 
or required to commit to CDAs or similar benefit-sharing 
agreements with local community organizations or specific 
socio-economic groups.
Industry and Other Initiatives. Companies have an inter-
est in supporting the development of local skills in their 
countries of operation. This is often associated with the 
idea of “shared value,” which “views the competitiveness 
of a company and the vitality of the communities where 
it operates as mutually dependent” (IPIECA 2016, 8). The 
idea can be extended to an understanding of shared value 
vis-à-vis natural resources in the region, such as the use of 
water resources in a watershed.
International organizations also encourage initiatives to 
support new solutions to fill skills gaps, such as the African 
Skills Initiative, a private-public partnership comprising the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, AngloGold 
Ashanti, and AusAID. In 2015 the African Development 
Bank set out a strategy for the African Natural Resources 
Centre to deliver capacity-building programs to regional 
member countries of the bank. Subsequently, the center has 
developed a generic roadmap to help policy makers formu-
late effective local benefit policies.
Such initiatives may prove more effective than ones that 
are based on a combination of mandatory primary and sec-
ondary law. They may be more sensitive to the need for the 
level of local benefit to be increased gradually as the avail-
ability of qualified local professionals and firms grows.
Making It Work. The use of mandatory legal requirements 
on local benefit (in terms of providing services and hold-
ing upstream equity shares) can be problematic. Various 
studies agree that two major challenges face many local 
benefit initiatives: poor design and weak enforcement.14 
Particular failures identified in recent research include the 
following (McKinsey Global Institute 2013):
 ■ A lack of sector-specific requirements, preferring blanket 
provisions that apply across all sectors
 ■ A failure to set the correct value pools in terms of fit with 
local capabilities
 ■ No time frames set or sunset clauses defined (An imme-
diate fulfilment of local benefit shares is often preferred 
to a gradual build-up of local benefit shares. Local firms 
may have little incentive to reach global competitiveness 
due to the absence of any sunset clause on preferential 
treatment given to them.)
 ■ No supporting government institutions for local benefit 
policies and regulations
“Forced marriages” are sometimes encouraged by govern-
ments, whereby foreign companies are required to support a 
particular local company, with little opportunity or ability to 
vet the local partner. On a number of occasions, investiga-
tions have been launched into transactions under the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, in for example Angola. The beneficia-
ries of local benefit requirements can in practice be a small 
number of companies, often with political connections. This 
can lead to the phenomenon of “elite capture” of domestic 
economic entrepreneurs and is not going to lead to large-
scale job creation (Nwapi 2016, 21–23).
Often capacity will be lacking, making enforcement of such 
regulations difficult. Nigeria, for example, lacks the personnel 
to replace expatriate workers, and its infrastructure capacity is 
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limited in, for example, steel production. There is no reason, 
however, why this should not be challenged by means of gap 
studies examining industry-specific weaknesses related to cost, 
quality, procurement readiness, and health, safety, and envi-
ronmental compliance. In Tanzania, just such a mapping 
exercise was carried out in relation to local content develop-
ment opportunities arising from the country’s oil and liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) project.15 The idea was to prepare Tanzania 
to capitalize on oil and gas investments but also to support the 
economy in ways that made it sustainable independently of the 
investments linked to construction of an LNG facility.
In understanding what works and what does not, there 
is much to be gained by comparative analysis. In local 
 content, there are many country profiles available for this 
purpose. The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 
(CCSI) has conducted surveys of local content frameworks 
in various countries, noting the legislation, regulations, 
contracts and non-binding policies and frameworks that 
have addressed local content in both the hydrocarbons and 
the mining sectors. Its series of Local Content Profiles 
examine each country’s implementation, monitoring, and 
enforcement provisions as well as the relevant WTO agree-
ments and investment treaty provisions that may impact on 
local content standards (CCSI 2016a).
Beneficiation. Beneficiation policies, which promise the 
addition of value in exports of EI commodities, have cap-
tured growing interest among governments. In mining, 
this might involve the prohibition of exports of unpro-
cessed commodities, as has happened in Indonesia with 
copper and nickel. The Indonesian experience is salutary 
although not conclusive. The aim behind a blanket prohibi-
tion on exports (itself part of a wider reform of the coun-
try’s Mining Law) was to increase participation by domestic 
companies in the mining sector. The coordinating eco-
nomic minister stated that its intention was to “add value 
to mineral exports by having them processed in Indonesia 
and create more jobs” (Freehills 2016). Upstream produc-
ers would be compelled to refine minerals before export 
and so grow domestic processing businesses. A transition 
period of three years was set from January 2014. By early 
2016 there had been a negligible increase in Indonesia’s 
mining-processing capacity. Various factors can be attrib-
uted to this failure to date. For example, in the background 
commodity prices have been low, foreign investment has 
been directed at other emerging markets, and the capacity 
of the Philippines for nickel exports to China has increased. 
This context means that most of the current smelter proj-
ects are economically unviable and also adversely affected 
by public infrastructure problems. The prohibition was 
also followed by supplementary government regulations, 
which add to the complexity of the measure and create 
greater uncertainty for investors. Finally, there is a planning 
approval system in place for foreign companies seeking to 
establish or increase in-country processing that duplicates 
provincial and national regulatory requirements.
The thinking behind the Indonesian initiative is not 
unique. Several African countries have taken a similar route. 
South Africa has imposed many export controls on 
 unprocessed minerals; Botswana in diamonds; Zambia in 
copper; Zimbabwe in unrefined gold and raw chrome; 
Ghana in oil; and Mozambique in natural gas and coal. 
There are differences, however, within the policies. South 
Africa’s policy aims at transforming final products of mineral 
processing into manufactured products, while Zimbabwe’s, 
for example, is targeted mainly at a limited downstream 
change, particularly to include smelting and refining 
(Euromix Research 2015). A contrasting approach is that of 
Chile, where copper processing in-country has not been a 
focus and instead exports of copper to China and India as 
concentrate have been the overriding objective (Halland 
et al. 2015, 93–98). Similarly, Norway’s policy on diversifica-
tion selected sectors for which capacities already existed, 
such as construction and the provision of specialized techni-
cal services, and avoided most downstream industries (except 
oil refineries and gas processing plants). A challenge for the 
beneficiation approach arises from the very different kinds of 
industry involved in primary extraction and downstream 
processing and manufacturing. Having a comparative advan-
tage in one does not imply a similar advantage in the other.
Unintended consequences of local benefit measures 
can include the risk of enhanced corruption as local ben-
efit decisions align with local vested interests. Tensions 
arise from the perception that certain interests are being 
favored over others or dependence on demand from the 
extractives sector increases, only to prove vulnerable to 
the usual economic cycles discussed in chapters 2 and 7 
of the Sourcebook.
Local Benefit Summary. None of the negative features of 
 local benefit experience to date are fatal to the general idea 
behind it or the aspiration that it represents. Indeed, many 
shortcomings are linked to the stage of development of 
the EI in the country concerned: capacities can be built, 
 institutions can be improved, and governance quality can 
be enhanced. Comparing and contrasting approaches to 
local benefit policy and implementation has never been 
as easy as it is today. We might usefully recall one set of 
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principles as a guide when designing effective local benefit 
(McKinsey Global Institute 2013):
 ■ Identify areas where local benefit is likely to be effective; 
job creation differs significantly between oil and gas and 
mining, and within each from one stage of investment to 
the next.
 ■ Understand competitive advantage; a lack of industrial-
ization means that the opportunities for local benefit are 
limited, at least initially.
 ■ Assess the opportunity cost of regulatory intervention; if 
regulations raise costs and cause delays, the impact will 
overall be negative.
 ■ Enable local suppliers; the aim of local benefit regulation 
should be supportive by encouraging skills development, 
providing financing, and coordinating local suppliers.
 ■ Monitor progress; ensure that a regulatory body can 
coordinate efforts with some enforcement powers.
Resources-for-infrastructure. The lack of infrastructure 
required for extractives development in new  resource-rich 
countries has already attracted the attention of develop-
ment advisers as a significant barrier to wider development 
from extractives projects. Mining projects, especially of low- 
 value, high-volume commodities (coal, iron ore, and cop-
per),  require significant investment in infrastructure such 
as railways, roads, and ports. Oil and gas projects are less 
infrastructure intensive but still require ports and substantial 
networks of pipelines. Given the need for such investments 
among the new states, there is clear potential for leveraging 
extractive activities to the host country’s advantage. Not only 
could they help address to the obvious need for infrastructure 
in the wider economy, but they could also help link a coun-
try to financial services, logistics, and technological develop-
ment. Excess capacity could be built into new grids to benefit 
industry and other users; similar provision could be made 
with respect to roads. Different operators could share the 
use of power capacity in mining projects and pipelines in oil 
regions. Examples can be found most readily in frontier  areas, 
new to large-scale extractives projects, such as Mongolia, 
Guinea, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone (see box 9.1 for a 
summary of the Liberian approach).
Box 9.1 Liberia: Open Access Regime in Mineral Development Agreements
“The Government shall, in consultation with the 
Concessionaire, and on reasonable notice to the 
Concessionaire, authorize third parties’ use of excess 
capacity of the Railroad (including the portion of the 
Railroad located within the Concession Area) and the 
Port Facility, provided that the Concessionaire confirms 
that excess capacity exists and third party use of such 
excess capacity does not unreasonably interfere with the 
efficient and economic conduct of the Operation. [empha-
sis added]
“The technical and commercial terms for such third 
party use of the excess capacity of the Railroad and the 
Port Facility shall be mutually agreed to, in good faith, 
among the Government, the Concessionaire and such 
third parties in accordance with applicable use and 
International Standards, it being understood that third 
parties shall be treated on a nondiscriminatory basis. A 
formula to proportionately share the revenue fees to be 
derived from such third party use of the Railroad shall be 
agreed upon in good faith between the Government and 
Concessionaire.
“Such third party access and use shall be at no cost to 
the Concessionaire and all related costs shall be borne by 
the third party.
“In the event that the Government believes that the 
Concessionaire is withholding third party access to 
the Railroad or the Port Facility in contravention of 
this Agreement, the Government may request a review 
of the Concessionaire’s decision not to grant access. 
The review shall be heard by the Committee described 
below.
“There shall be constituted a Committee with five 
(5) members. Two (2) members of the Committee shall 
be appointed by the Government and two (2) members 
shall be appointed by the Concessionaire. The final 
member shall be appointed jointly by the Government 
and the Concessionaire. The Committee shall hear and 
review all complaints regarding third party access to, 
and third party modernization or expansion of, the 
Railroad and shall forward its recommendations 
together with an explanation of its rationale for such 
recommendations, to the Parties to this Agreement.”
Source: Liberia, Mineral Development Agreement 2012.
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Essentially, governments may be able to piggyback on 
large infrastructure investments by extractive companies to 
fill capacity gaps and save on their overall capital spending. 
Similarly, extractive companies “can share their infrastructure 
capital spending with others, thereby managing some of their 
capital exposure risk” (McKinsey Global Institute 2013, 53).
This idea of sharing may seem obvious and hardly sur-
prising. However, in the past international investors have 
tended to be reluctant to invest in infrastructure other than 
in telecoms and energy in many countries and hesitant to 
invest in some social development programs, due to long 
paybacks and uncertain cash flow, as well as country risk 
premiums.
Partly because mining and hydrocarbons projects are 
often located in remote areas, on land or offshore, investors 
have long tended to adopt the enclave approach to develop-
ment, gathering around them the power, water, informa-
tion technologies, and transportation services they require 
to ensure reliable infrastructure for their operations. 
Contract provisions reflected this, requiring governments 
to ensure rights of access and a right to construct the neces-
sary infrastructure. In recent years, the growing role of non-
OECD investment funds from China, India, and Arab states 
and their preference for linking finance for infrastructure to 
resource access has underscored the limited developmental 
benefits accruing from the enclave approach. It has fallen 
from favor as a result.
There is now enthusiasm in using project finance to 
achieve development goals. For example, the African Union 
Commission and United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa have argued in the African Mining Vision that 
using minerals as the core for infrastructure development 
planning will simultaneously co-opt private participation 
and unlock major sources of public finance (AU 2009; AUC 
and UNECA 2011). Governments should, in their view, 
engage mining companies, mining associations, and cham-
bers of mines in partnerships for infrastructure finance. 
They should also undertake studies for mining spatial devel-
opment initiatives. Other initiatives in this area have come 
from the African Industrialization and Development 
Strategy,16 the International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
and the OECD Development Centre (IFC 2013). There have 
also been guiding principles issued from the World Bank’s 
Energy and Extractives Group addressing mine-related 
infrastructure (Stanley and Mikhaylova 2011).
Against this, the IFC has noted the “dearth of examples 
of successful, relevant, greenfield transport mining” public-
private partnerships, which “suggests that there are limited 
options with respect to commercial structures that will 
result in successful project financing and execution.” It may 
be rooted in the “limited interest among mining companies 
to share infrastructure” (IFC 2013, 9). Among the projects 
discussed, only a few will progress and those probably at a 
slow pace, given the decline in investor interest following 
the commodities downturn and resulting capital 
constraints.
Practice. As much as the idea may be clear, the practice is 
not. Arguments abound over the most appropriate models 
for the ownership, operation, and financing of infrastruc-
ture, but two kinds of infrastructure arrangements can eas-
ily be distinguished:
1. Resources-for-infrastructure arrangements: this involves 
the granting of rights to provide infrastructure for green-
field operations but also for providing infrastructure that 
is not necessarily related to a mining project (harbors, 
public buildings, and so on).
2. Infrastructure-related arrangements: this kind of infra-
structure is directly associated with a mine or a petro-
leum project, such as transportation links.
Resources-for-infrastructure arrangements are the 
kind of deals associated with and championed by Chinese 
companies in Africa (see the Angola model mentioned in 
chapter 2). An example is the joint venture established 
between the governments of China and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, with the foreign investors agreeing to 
finance up to US$3 billion in infrastructure projects. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) criticisms have been 
made of it, and the amounts have been reduced.
Other vehicles for resources-for-infrastructure have 
been discussed but none appear to be ideal. The use of 
foundations, trusts, and funds in the mining sector may 
offer a way forward.17 Usually, these entities are associ-
ated with community investment, compensation to miti-
gate impacts of projects, and government payments. They 
have several advantages, such as flexibility, transparency 
of governance rules, and assurances with respect to flows 
of money. They could therefore be used as funding struc-
tures to finance infrastructure projects and as a manage-
ment tool for a variety of projects. Even if this model were 
to be adopted, the requirements for the infrastructure 
project would need to be set out in the tendering docu-
mentation, and an independent party would have to 
ensure or oversee the performance of the works. Provision 
would have to be made for early termination of the min-
ing rights if performance was unsatisfactory.
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For the host country, the identification of resource links 
is a task that has to be timed carefully. If it is not done at the 
outset, it will be very hard to amend the terms of the con-
tract so that they are required if a project subsequently 
proves to be commercial. Yet both parties will face 
unknowns at such times. Will the project ever reach com-
mercial discovery and development and, if so, what is the 
scale of the deposit and the market price for it? The African 
Mining Vision has underlined the importance of these links, 
noting that if rights are awarded at the outset the local 
economy may not yet be in a position to take advantage of 
the opportunities that the links offer. In particular, the 
African Mining Vision notes the importance of third party 
access to the resource infrastructure (transport, energy, and 
water) at nondiscriminatory tariffs. Further, at an early 
stage of the project, even when in development, it will be 
difficult for the parties to determine what infrastructure is 
necessary. Typical requirements will include power supply, 
extension of road and rail network, water supply, and port 
facilities. Without any open tendering, it will be difficult to 
attach economic value to the proposed infrastructure.
So far, the ways in which this infrastructure deficit has 
been addressed have enjoyed only very qualified successes in 
sustainable development terms. To begin with, the infra-
structure has tended to be project focused only and restricted 
to privately owned assets. Financing has usually been 
obtained through government-to-government partner-
ships. The resource-for-infrastructure swaps are an illustra-
tion of this. This model can produce results in the near 
term, but questions have been raised about quality, envi-
ronmental impact, transparency, and debt sustainability.
Obstacles to a strategy of promoting such deals are 
many:
 ■ On the legal side, two may be noted. Sometimes the 
resource rights are awarded in ways that do not accord 
with the kind of tendering requirements normally appli-
cable in public works contracts or concessions. In some 
countries there are legislative provisions that prohibit the 
implicit or explicit sale of planning or exploration per-
mits in return for public benefits. However, the business-
related obstacles are perhaps more fundamental. After 
all, the risks attaching to mining and infrastructure 
projects are different and require different skills. The key 
players are not the same in each field. Lenders will not 
accept a mixing of risks that have a different profile.
 ■ Infrastructure projects will normally require costly 
design and feasibility studies that mining operators will 
not wish to undertake or support as long as the 
profitability of the mining project is uncertain. The 
funding requirements of an infrastructure project will 
not usually fit well with the long payback period of a 
mining project.
 ■ The companies involved will include both mining com-
panies and construction companies, creating additional 
complexity for the contractual arrangements.
 ■ It should also be noted that these arrangements do not 
imply local benefit. There is usually no guarantee or 
requirement that local labor or local companies would 
be employed on such infrastructure transactions. Indeed, 
the guiding assumption is more likely to be that foreign 
expertise, equipment, services, and even labor will be 
brought in to carry out the infrastructure project, with 
resulting losses in economic benefits.
 ■ Finally, there will be a need for the parties to design and 
implement complex transactions and for government 
policies and approvals to be coordinated. Many projects 
rely on “regulation by contract” to compensate for the 
absence of a clear legal framework, but this will work 
only if the overall legal framework in the country is sup-
portive (contracts will be legally enforceable, for exam-
ple). Many of the new resource-rich countries are also 
ones in which the rule of law is weak and negotiating 
capacity for complex contracts is limited, so both of 
these features are likely to act as a deterrent for lenders. 
(See box 9.2 for a summary of parties’ objectives in 
negotiations for an infrastructure project.) As the IFC 
notes, “The magnitude of potential losses from dis-
criminatory, unjust legal and regulatory action is so 
large that the presence of risk can overwhelm all other 
considerations and make the project nonbankable” 
(IFC 2013, 20).
Resource Corridors and Infrastructure Access. The idea 
behind the resource corridors concept is that the link 
between rigs and mines to port, rail, and road investments 
can catalyze supporting and ancillary economic activ-
ity, creating development corridors alongside extractives-
related infrastructure.18 An example is the Nacala Corridor 
linking Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia by rail and con-
necting coal-mining areas to the Nacala port. Linked to 
this idea is a requirement that third party access to such 
infrastructure be facilitated. Such shared infrastructure is 
thought to benefit sustainable economic growth.19 In many 
parts of the world there are regions that have been iden-
tified as having resource corridors that could act as plat-
forms to catalyze and deliver economic growth and wider 
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development, such as economic diversification, regional 
integration, increased trade, and improved livelihoods.
On the negative side, however, such corridors have the 
potential to open up areas to illegal trade in forest and wild-
life products, create barriers to migration routes, and risk 
introducing invasive, alien species that can act as carriers of 
diseases or replace indigenous species (Hobbs and Kumah 
2016). They also take years to develop, due to the phasing of 
extractives projects because they are not built in isolation 
but must compete for funding and interest with all other 
forms of economic activity. Price volatility will impact on 
the extractive activities in the meantime. Initial experience 
suggests the expected benefits are still far from being 
achieved.20
One study has noted, “Concerns exist that to-date cor-
ridors have not been properly planned by governments, that 
infrastructure investments have taken place with little or no 
strategic consideration to environmental degradation and 
climate change resilience, and that this will ultimately 
reduce the positive economic and social development 
impact of the corridors. For this to change, the corridors 
need to be planned not only from an infrastructure and 
investment feasibility perspective, but taking into consider-
ation socio-economic and environmental factors, as well as 
the protection of critically important areas of high conser-
vation value in situ” (IRCI 2015, 2).
The idea behind this critique is that such corridors 
require an integrated approach. For example, investment 
and policy decisions should build in adaptation to pre-
dicted impacts of climate change and should be screened 
for compatibility with a sustainability vision. From the very 
outset, a corridor project needs comprehensive baseline 
information that identifies the sensitive areas that need to 
be protected (Hobbs and Kumah 2016). They require 
development coordinated among multiple branches of gov-
ernment, in conjunction with the private sector, communi-
ties, and civil society organizations. With this level of 
integration, a resource corridor project should be driven by 
best practices and should be able to protect the integrity of 
the ecosystem.
Shared Use. A strong determinant of resource corridor 
definition is the potential for shared use of infrastructure. 
There are two ideas at work in the notion of shared use. 
Box 9.2 Objectives of the Parties to an Infrastructure Project
Project Sponsor Objectives
Critical
 ■ Avoid disputes with government
 ■ Have operational control over rail network, 
including access
 ■ Have priority rights over acquired capacity
 ■ Avoid any material adverse impact on operating 
costs:
 – Disruption of operations
 – Additional inventories
 – Repair and maintenance costs
 ■ Avoid benefiting direct competitors
 ■ Have flexibility in case of breakdown, force 
majeure, and so forth
 ■ Have future expansion rights
Secondary
 ■ Have access to cash flow from third parties for:
 – Recovery of portion of capital cost
 – Generating cash from third party
 ■ Have ability to have joint venture or otherwise 
participate with local mining projects
State Objectives
Critical
 ■ Promote open access in a manner that does 
not prevent the development of key projects
 ■ Preserve possibility that marginal deposits can 
be developed
 ■ Diversify exploitation of mineral resources 
among various sponsors
 ■ Promote future uses by new industries (for 
example, agriculture)
 ■ Ensure access rules are clear and transparent
 ■ Maximize fiscal position
Secondary
 ■ Minimize required regulatory oversight
Third Parties’ Objectives
 ■ Have bankable access rights:
 – Secure capacity
 – Long-term horizon
 – Predictable tariff
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The first refers to a multiuser approach in which several 
companies in a region develop or use common infra-
structure. This can lead to economies of scale among the 
various companies and increase tax revenues to the gov-
ernment. The second refers to a multipurpose activity, 
where nonmining users share the infrastructure with the 
mining company. This also offers efficiencies in terms of 
access to water, energy, transportation, and telecommuni-
cations services, all of value to economic development in 
the region.
The viability of a shared-use concept is dependent on 
ownership structures. Companies that have built their own 
infrastructure or bought it from a predecessor are unlikely 
to be willing to share it. For infrastructure that is strategic to 
the extractives operation, such as ports or railways, a 
shared-use approach may constrain capacity or entail high 
costs of coordination. Where such infrastructure is nonstra-
tegic or less so, flexibility can be expected.
An alternative model of ownership would involve own-
ership by a third party or a state-owned company. The 
government will be better able to limit exclusive access to a 
particular company. The trade-off is that the project may be 
developed more slowly as a result. A government demand 
for such access is also likely to lead to a less favorable deal 
on fiscal terms.
It is important to note the differences in opportunity 
between various minerals. For example, a bulk commodity 
such as coal or iron ore will require the development of 
railways, while gold extraction will require only roads but 
correspondingly more access to water resources. Similar 
differences will arise with respect to energy demands. This 
will have an impact on demand patterns for third party 
access to infrastructure.
9.4 CHALLENGE 2: ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
SOCIAL IMPACTS
The conventional view is that the environmental and 
social footprint of mining is greater than that of the 
hydrocarbons sector. With the rapid expansion of the 
hydrocarbons sector in the early 21st century into many 
new countries around the world, both on land as well as in 
offshore waters, this view needs revision. During this 
period, many oil and gas companies have joined the inter-
national mining industry in designing and publicizing 
best practices in these areas. Sometimes the results have 
even been published jointly.
In the following subsections, the range of potential 
impacts are enumerated, first with respect to environmental 
subjects and second with respect to social issues. In each 
case, those which are peculiar to oil and gas, and those 
peculiar to mining are noted, even though in the real world 
overlaps exist, and where possible these have been high-
lighted. Also noted are the different points in the life cycle 
of an investment at which they are likely to materialize and/
or at which efforts need to be undertaken to mitigate and 
prevent them. In practice, environmental and social impacts 
will often be managed together rather than separately, but 
for analytical purposes, they are on the whole treated sepa-
rately in the sections that follow. A legally binding approach 
to management of environmental risks with penalties for 
noncompliance is common, but for social issues this is less 
usual. The reason is that environmental risks are well 
understood and measurable, so that the compliance criteria 
can be clearly defined. Social impacts however, tend to 
be more complex and as a result are not always subject 
to quantification or empirically measured compliance 
criteria.
The environment
Good practice in managing environmental impacts of 
extractives activity involves the continued and dynamic 
development of an overall sector policy framework. An 
important part of that framework should concern how to 
address social and environmental impacts, health and 
safety, and the interests of internal stakeholders such as 
employees and contractors. Protection of vulnerable groups 
such as children should also play a role in the overall policy 
framework.
Identification of the likely or actual impacts of an oil, gas, 
or mining project is clearly one of the first orders of busi-
ness, since the goal will be to avoid or at least minimize 
negative impacts and to maximize the potential positive 
impacts. Some impacts may be readily defined, while others 
are less known or are contingent on what may actually 
occur in the affected areas, and indeed they are dependent 
on whether an initial investment moves on from the explo-
ration stage to full development. Even so, the process of 
identifying impacts is generally more straightforward for 
environmental than social concerns because they are at 
present better understood. Social impacts are more complex 
and elusive, and the tools for addressing them less tested 
than those for environmental impacts.
Environmental impacts take place along the entire EI 
Value Chain, but they will vary in their impacts according 
to the life of the project. Depending on the kind and size 
of extractives activity, and also their location and the 
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technology they deploy, they will generate a mix of positive 
and negative impacts. In general, the larger the project is, 
the greater the risk of environmental impacts. If it is 
located near ecologically sensitive areas, such as a national 
park or pristine rain forest, the impacts are likely to be 
more complex.
Oil and gas. Even at the early stages in the life cycle of an 
oil or gas investment, there can be environmental impacts. 
For example, the seismic testing and test drilling of explora-
tion wells can generate various, short-term impacts, often in 
remote and environmentally sensitive areas. Seismic survey 
activity will generate loud and low frequency sound waves 
that can disorient marine life and affect its behavior and 
movement. Reduced catches of fish have been observed in 
areas of seismic activity.
If the activity moves on to other stages such as develop-
ment and production, the impacts will grow. Their extent 
will vary according to several variables: the nature of the 
project, characteristics of the site and its environment, and 
the effectiveness of the implementation of environmental 
management instruments to prevent pollution and to 
mitigate and control impacts (UNCTAD 2012, 10). The 
main impacts from oil and gas activities are typically the 
following (E&P Forum and UNEP 1997, 12–16):
 ■ Atmospheric impacts derived from flaring and venting 
of excess gas, combustion processes through the use of 
diesel engines and gas turbines, and fugitive gases from 
operations for loading and tankage
 ■ Aquatic impacts through the generation of liquid waste 
in drilling fluids, chemicals for well treatment, drainage 
water, sewerage and sanitary waste, spills and leakage, 
and cooling water
 ■ Terrestrial impacts by contamination from spills or leak-
age, solid waste disposal, or site construction
 ■ Ecosystem impacts on various components of the bio-
sphere that affect the animal habitat, which in turn 
affects the ecology of the site
 ■ Deforestation from on-site operations; oil leakages spill-
ing throughout the supply chain and accidents that have 
polluting effects on the natural life of the area, the land, 
and water; and the economic activities based on the envi-
ronment, such as fishing or tourism, over a long period
 ■ Decommissioning of installations and structures at the 
end of their commercial life, a potential source of nega-
tive environmental impacts, particularly if it involves 
structures in offshore waters
Some aspects of oil and gas activities require particular 
attention because their potential impacts are significant or 
particularly complex to address or both: oil spills, flaring of 
gas, climate change, and biodiversity effects.21
Oil Spills. The very large 2010 Macondo oil spill in the Gulf 
of Mexico, involving the Deepwater Horizon rig, drew atten-
tion to the risks arising from offshore exploration and pro-
duction of hydrocarbons in frontier areas (see box 9.3). Spills 
of oil are not unusual, but the source is commonly from 
tankers, pipelines, storage tanks, and barges. Usually the 
Box 9.3 The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
A major oil spill occurred in 2010 in U.S. territory in 
the Gulf of Mexico and led to a loss of 53,000 barrels of 
oil a day for many weeks. The spill covered 6,500 
square kilometers and involved 5 million barrels of oil. 
The source, the Deepwater Horizon field, was operated 
by BP under a joint operating agreement with Anadarko 
Petroleum and Mitsui Oil Corporation. The owner of 
the rig was Transocean and the cementing contractor 
was Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Company. The 
blowout began on April 20, 2010, and the well was 
capped on July 15, with well cementing completed by 
August 5, 2010. The resources required to remove over 
800,000 barrels of oil liquid and 265,000 barrels by 
controlled burns comprised 28,400 personnel, more 
than 4,000 vessels, and dozens of aircraft.
The financial consequences of the spill are still being 
managed. BP created a US$20 billion escrow account 
on June 16, 2010, and the cost of response measures 
was at least US$8 billion.
There is no international legal framework in place 
to deal with the question of liability arising from pol-
lution following a blowout. In the past, international 
law on environmental pollution has usually been 
concerned with oil pollution from tankers. As a result 
of this lacuna, it is left to national laws to deal with 
this matter. Such laws vary enormously, both in the 
way that the law itself deals with it and with the way 
contractual indemnities are interpreted and enforced, 
or not.
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spill occurs during transport, as oil is being loaded on 
a tanker or being taken from a railway to a storage facil-
ity, for example. The Macondo spill was not the first time 
a spill had occurred from a deepwater well, but spills from 
that source are unusual. For a growing number of countries, 
such as the emerging producers in West Africa, the fact that 
their hydrocarbons reserves are located in deep water, with 
complex geological structures, will raise concerns about the 
adequacy of available technology to address the risk of a well 
explosion and its consequences. The limited capacity in gov-
ernment institutions draws attention to this issue.
Flaring of Gas. About 5 percent of the gas produced around 
the world is being flared or vented on existing producing 
oil fields, mostly in developing countries (Le Leuch 2012, 
11–12). Five countries are responsible for about 60 percent 
of the total (the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, 
Nigeria, and Russia).22 The flaring of gas in association with 
oil is generally discouraged. It releases carbon monoxide, 
nitrogen oxides, and sulphur oxides, which can cause smog 
and acid rain. Where gas is not flared, it may be vented 
into the atmosphere, releasing large quantities of methane 
gas. The trend is for flaring and venting to be reduced, not 
least due to government policy and the influence of multi-
lateral initiatives such as the Global Gas Flaring Reduction 
Partnership, a public-private partnership.23
Climate Change. Climate change remains an important 
global environmental issue. Petroleum operations are major 
emitters of greenhouse gases, particularly through the flaring 
of natural gas. However, carbon dioxide emissions can occur 
in each segment of the oil and gas supply chain. Concerned 
governments have responded in a variety of ways, including 
taxes and penalties and mandatory flare reduction or “flares 
out” requirements (Liebenthal, Michelitsch, and Tarazona 
2005, 123). The complex of issues involved in climate 
change concerns not only the countries that produce oil and 
gas but those that are highly vulnerable to the environmen-
tal impacts of climate change due to location or a lack of 
investment for mitigation: examples include island states or 
ones with low-lying territory vulnerable to flooding. A key 
to success in reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is 
engagement by oil and gas companies to develop best prac-
tice guidelines for emissions monitoring, reporting, and 
management and to develop and implement new technol-
ogy for sustainable energy options.
Biodiversity. Oil and gas activities present challenges for 
biodiversity (the variability among living organisms within 
an ecosystem). Protection requires identifying areas where 
biodiversity may be adversely affected by operations, which 
is not always obvious. It also requires a willingness to mod-
ify business practices to minimize risks and to maximize 
opportunities to contribute to biodiversity conservation 
and improve ecosystem services.
Decommissioning. Onshore oil and gas operations present few 
problems for decommissioning and require only a limited work-
force and supplies. Offshore structures are, by contrast, very 
complex and require advance planning to be decommissioned. 
Over several decades the expansion of oil and gas activity into 
offshore waters has led to a proliferation of structures and pipe-
lines that are likely to prove costly to remove.24 The high costs 
may prove daunting to some foreign and domestic investors, 
depending on how the costs are shared between investors and 
governments. The risk of default on decommissioning obliga-
tions is to be taken seriously. In contrast to most infrastructure 
projects involving removal and disposal, it is the legacy hazard 
that marks these projects: toxic materials left in the installations 
need to be disposed of safely.
There is a body of international guidelines, and an 
established set of good industry practices, that requires 
companies and governments to make plans for decommis-
sioning and carry out actions to ensure it is done to a high 
standard. Simply walking away from an operation that is 
no longer commercial is not an option for the company, 
and it is not an option for a government to let a structure 
rust. Decision making is complicated by oil price move-
ments, which can accelerate or decelerate the timing of 
decommissioning. More and more governments have to 
prepare for eventual decommissioning and ensure that the 
costs are provided for according to a formula that the par-
ties agree to in advance.
Mining. The typical environmental effects of a mining 
project are landscape alteration (erosion, formation of 
sinkholes, and so forth) and air, soil, and water pollution 
(both groundwater and surface water). Mining is a water-
intensive industry (like fracking), and its utilization of this 
resource can be particularly critical in areas where water 
is scarce or is heavily used by other local activities, such as 
agriculture or drinking, or is needed by ecosystems. Later, 
the decommissioning and closure of mines can also be a 
source of negative environmental impacts, although there 
is considerable experience of this, yielding lessons about 
its optimal management. As is the case with hydrocarbons, 
there is an element of the unknown to grapple with: plan-
ning ahead is done on the assumption that a project will be 
CHAPTER 9: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IMPLEMENTATION 255
deemed commercially viable on the basis of data obtained at 
an early stage.
Thinking about environmental effects has also under-
gone a change with respect to the miners themselves. In the 
more recent literature, attention has shifted from a focus on 
the impacts of large-scale, capital-intensive mining to the 
major environmental challenges presented by the activities 
of artisan and small-scale miners. ASM communities often 
operate without any environmental safeguards, due to a 
country’s lack of resources to manage environmental (and 
social) impacts. ASM activities therefore contribute either 
directly or indirectly to environmental degradation, through 
deforestation, loss of biodiversity, wildlife poaching for 
bush meat, soil erosion, dust, noise, habitat destruction, 
introduction of invasive species, siltation, and pollution of 
water bodies or alterations to rivers’ regimes. As one com-
mentator has noted, “Their activities leave legacies of haz-
ards and dereliction” (Hobbs 2014).
Water. The most significant impacts of a mining project are 
likely to be in terms of water pollution and water scarcity. 
The very large consumption of water by mining activities 
is the source of the problem. Without a secure and stable 
supply of water the operations will be threatened. However, 
large-scale consumption will lower the water table and 
dry up rivers and lakes in parts of the world where water 
is scarce. The impact on water quality as well as availabil-
ity will be very significant. Toxic elements such as mercury 
from ASM may well infiltrate the water table from surface 
mining and processing operations, especially in tropical or 
temperate countries with high water tables. The question 
then arises whether such water is fit for humans, plants, and 
animals. Downstream or nearby communities reliant upon 
agriculture can also be deprived of the water they need by 
the use, diversion, or pollution of water in mining opera-
tions, with destructive effects on farmland.
The challenges for the mining industry are growing: 
droughts and floods are becoming more common, due 
probably to the effects of climate change, and communities 
around mining projects increasingly oppose them or create 
disruption leading to shutdowns.
Toxic Materials and Acid Drainage. Mining operations pro-
duce large quantities of solid and slurry waste, with different 
kinds of waste being produced at different stages of the pro-
cess. Large quantities of waste rock will be removed, so that 
the miner can reach the minerals, and stored on the land 
surface, in abandoned mine pits, or even underground. The 
amount of waste relative to the minerals extracted can be 
very large (RWI et al. 2013, 116). Another waste product— 
tailings—results from concentration or treatment of the 
mineral and can include heavy metals, cyanide, chemical-
processing agents, sulphides, and suspended solids. Such 
waste needs to be contained well beyond the life of the 
mine, sometimes for decades, to allow for decomposition 
and settling.
Air Pollution. Mining operations can generate significant 
amounts of dust, creating the risk of airborne pollution. 
If there is a smelting plant, there is the further risk of gas 
emissions, which can be toxic and present a long-term risk 
to human life and well-being. Where the smelters are older, 
as are many lead-zinc smelters in Australia and Peru, the 
risk is much greater.
Biodiversity. The impact on biodiversity from mining opera-
tions can change the relative populations of species in an 
ecosystem, but not evenly. Some species are more toler-
ant than others to land disturbance and loss of habitat and 
exposure to metals and acid. Habitat fragmentation is more 
likely than wholesale destruction of habitats. Fragile and 
pristine areas rich in biodiversity may be located far inland, 
in coastal zones or offshore: with the opening of resource 
corridors, such as the Southern Guinea Growth Corridor 
for the Simandou project to take iron ore from mine to port, 
they may be threatened.
Mine Closure and Rehabilitation of Mined Areas. Global 
practice has long been directed toward progressive reclama-
tion, through which disturbed areas are reclaimed during 
the life of the mine as well as after closure. Good prac-
tice now is to design and finance closure from the project 
start-up to make reclamation easier and more effective. 
Monitoring is required, however, from the outset to ensure 
that mechanisms are in place to cover the ultimate costs of 
rehabilitation of the mine. This is sometimes complicated 
since there are residual minerals in tailings that may one day 
be valuable to rework. Legal issues also arise with mergers 
and acquisitions and the resultant responsibility.
Climate Change. Some forms of mining are intensive users 
of heavy fuel oil, a contributor to carbon dioxide emis-
sions. Where coal mining is part of the chain for electri-
cal generation, it is ultimately responsible for substantial 
quantities of GHGs. In these ways, mining is a major con-
tributor to global warming. Countries that host mining 
activities may also be vulnerable to the effects of global 
warming, due to geographical location.25 The ratification 
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of the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change has lent 
urgency to the practical impacts of government actions for 
mining and other EI companies.
Areas of Particular Vulnerability. Governments may wish 
to protect certain terrestrial or marine areas of physical 
beauty or uniqueness, for maintenance of biodiversity, for 
protection of game, or for cultural heritage. Mining activi-
ties may be prohibited or permitted in these protected areas 
subject to rules and conditions. The International Union 
for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
(IUCN) defines a protected area as “a clearly defined 
geographical space, recognized, dedicated and managed, 
through legal or other effective means, to achieve the long-
term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem 
services and cultural values.”26 It can include a national 
park or wilderness area, a community conserved area, or 
nature reserves. There are also areas of high conservation 
value that do not yet have protected status but which may 
nonetheless be worthy of it. UNESCO’s World Heritage 
Sites are a starting point for designating areas in which 
mining would not be allowed. They are globally significant 
and must be left inviolate. The International Council on 
Mines and Minerals (ICMM) has agreed that such areas 
should be sacrosanct and encourages its members not to 
mine in them.
In Africa, for example, mineral operations in equatorial 
forest areas (rich in biodiversity) have been particularly 
controversial. It has been estimated that the global network 
of protected areas stores at least 15 percent of terrestrial 
carbon.27 ASM is a particular problem for such areas, since 
it frequently encroaches into remote, pristine, protected 
areas, as the ASM–Protected Areas and Critical Ecosystems 
(PACE) program revealed (see box 9.4). A source of tension 
can arise between the short-term needs of governmental 
authorities and the influence of mining companies, on the 
one hand, and legitimate environmental concerns, on the 
other. This is a “charged context for decision making” 
(International Study Group 2011, 52).
Social impacts
Social impacts from the EIs vary according to the life cycle 
of the project. They can be positive as well as negative—
positives can include job creation, education and skills 
development, fostering of urban and trade centers, and 
investment in the improvement of local infrastructure and 
services. The challenge is to ensure that these positive 
impacts are sustainable.
Some issues are common to oil, gas, and mining proj-
ects: community relations, rights of indigenous peoples, 
the acquisition of land and resettlement, human rights 
abuses, and community dependency, among others. Those 
social impacts that are more usually associated either with 
oil and gas or mining are addressed separately in the sec-
tions that follow. The impacts of each can differ. For 
example, the financial flows from royalties and taxes will be 
orders of magnitude greater in oil and gas than in mining, 
and the physical footprint from oil and gas extraction will 
usually be less than for solid mineral extraction, even 
though oil or gas infrastructure and processing plants take 
up land space. The impact of pipeline networks will be 
more linear in impact than with any comparable mining 
structures. The impact on employment will be less in oil 
and gas than in mining.
Common issues
Community Relations. Given the high impact of extractives 
projects on the surrounding area, there have been instances 
when relations between investors and governments with 
local communities have been fraught with tension. Without 
a so-called social license to operate, or the free and informed 
consent of the communities concerned, the risk is that the 
project will become hard and even impossible to run. Oil 
operations in the Niger Delta are an infamous example of 
Box 9.4 Work of ASM-PACE Project: Artisanal 
and Small-Scale Mining (ASM)—Protected Areas 
and Critical Ecosystems (PACE)
ASM-PACE began as a partnership between 
Estelle Levin Limited and the World Wide Fund 
for Nature (WWF) to address the environmental 
impacts of ASM in some of the world’s most 
important ecosystems. Active since 2010, the pro-
gram is focused, as its name says, exclusively on 
addressing the impacts of ASM in protected areas 
and critical ecosystems. ASM occurs in or impacts 
a wide range of critical ecosystems, including arc-
tic landscapes (for example, Greenland), tropical 
rainforests (Brazil and Gabon), and coral reefs 
(the Philippines). It is practiced in approximately 
80 countries and in 32 of 36 countries ASM-
PACE has studied—and in or around 96 of 147 of 
the protected areas in those 36 countries. Affected 
sites include at least 7 natural World Heritage 
Sites and at least 12 WWF Priority Landscapes.
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this kind of tension and breakdown in community relations 
leading to youth violence and armed militias. Poverty too 
can follow from a degraded environment on which com-
munities have to depend.
Indigenous Peoples. Indigenous peoples can be regarded 
as a distinct type of stakeholder for oil, gas, and mining 
companies. They have rights under international law and 
under some national legal systems and have often experi-
enced marginalization and discrimination. They will usu-
ally have distinct cultural, economic, and political practices. 
Impacts on indigenous peoples will vary between oil and gas 
operations and mining activities, but both industries now 
understand that this group of stakeholders requires special 
attention when designing a project proposal.
Definitions of indigenous can be controversial. A 
recent study has noted four key elements in the concept 
of indigenousness: early occupation and use of a specific 
territory; cultural distinctiveness, applicable to language, 
social organization, spiritual values, laws, and institu-
tions; self-identification, as well as recognition by other 
groups or by state authorities; and experience of subjuga-
tion, including discrimination or marginalization (Max 
Planck and BGR 2016, 12).
The rights of indigenous peoples in the context of 
resource development pose special moral and political 
issues for investors and governments. The issues derive 
from the perception that indigenous peoples have inherent 
rights derived from their distinct ethnic and cultural identi-
ties and their close and special attachment to ancestral 
lands. Ideally, the rights and customs of indigenous peoples 
should be fully protected by law. Even in countries where 
this is not the case, investors will usually be encouraged to 
respect the rights and culture of indigenous peoples and 
undertake exploration or mining activity only if they have 
well-documented evidence that their activities have broad 
support of the concerned indigenous peoples. Resettlement 
of indigenous peoples with cultural ties to the land is par-
ticularly sensitive.
Land Acquisition and Resettlement. The displacement of 
populations and resulting disruption of livelihoods can be 
a source of social resentment toward a project. Disruption 
can be caused by land purchases, leading to forced evictions, 
which may extend beyond the area of the project to land 
needed for transport corridors and transmission lines. A 
physical relocation of communities may also be entailed if 
the project is to proceed, entailing a loss of livelihoods and 
sources of income. Resettling populations involuntarily to 
allow a project to proceed “for the greater good” raises ethi-
cal issues and can have significant harmful effects for the 
local community if not well managed. Impoverishment of 
the communities may also happen. Good practice argues 
that it should be avoided, or at least minimized where fea-
sible, by exploring all viable alternative project designs and 
mitigation strategies.
Resettlement may also affect the communities that 
receive people, both those resettled and others. New min-
ing projects can lead to an influx of people from neighbor-
ing areas looking for jobs on the project or to set up 
businesses. Mining generates support and service jobs, and 
if it leads to greater infrastructure, that in turn attracts 
more people. The pressures on water, land, housing, sani-
tation, and social services that an influx can bring will have 
some negative impacts. Forward-thinking strategies by 
companies can minimize the negative impacts, however. 
Policies can be developed in cooperation with local and 
central government.
Economic displacement can also occur, whereby peo-
ple’s livelihoods can be lost or disrupted. Governments and 
companies can anticipate this by providing alternatives. 
Local benefit measures may also generate opportunities.
Social problems can arise from artisanal miners working 
without a license in areas where large-scale miners operate, 
leading to confrontations and conflict if displacement is 
involved. Any such problems will be exacerbated by the fact 
that the artisanal miners are likely to be itinerant and even 
expatriate.
Human Rights Risks. Many different kinds of human rights 
abuses have allegedly been associated with oil, gas, and min-
ing activities, and these vary considerably from one country 
to another. A list of commonly cited abuses would include 
arbitrary detention and torture, especially by private secu-
rity units or militias; loss of land and livelihoods without 
negotiation or adequate compensation; forced resettle-
ment; the destruction of ritually or culturally significant 
sites without compensation; violation of the right to a clean 
environment; labor rights violations; and the disappear-
ance of people. Although it can reasonably be assumed that 
extractives companies will treat respect for human rights as 
part of their social license to operate, the scope and kind 
of the obligations imposed on them by international and 
many national laws is unclear, since many of the former 
are addressed to states not companies. Moreover, it should 
not be assumed that the human rights risks are identical in 
the large-scale mining sector and ASM. They are likely to 
exhibit important differences.
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The scope of human rights risks is potentially very wide. 
One study has tried to capture this by identifying human 
rights risk areas, where the risk of adverse human rights 
impacts is most significant.28 It examines risks in industrial 
and large-scale mining and in artisanal and small-scale min-
ing, but even so, there is a vast field of particularly affected 
groups, such as women and children, that can raise complex 
issues (child labor, for example) and constitute a subset of 
risks to be identified and monitored.
Women and child-specific aspects of human rights are 
particularly important in the extractives sector and have 
been the subject of research.29 Child labor in the mining 
sector is almost exclusively found in ASM operations in 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America, with more than 1 million 
children working in this sector (Max Planck and BGR 2016, 
105). Although the risks to health are the same as those for 
adult miners, the risks to immature bodies are more intense. 
Violations to children’s rights to health and to education are 
common.
Dependency. Many communities become overly dependent 
on EI projects in their area; and without advance measures 
to address this issue, they will become vulnerable to a ‘boom 
and bust’ cycle, suffering contraction or even collapse when 
production ceases or when profitability declines. The key to 
success for sustainable development is to prevent these from 
happening. Thus, social aspects and their associated costs 
should be included in decommissioning and closure plans, 
and initiatives should be taken from the earliest days of pro-
duction to develop economic activities in the community 
that are independent of the EI sector activity. Alternative 
business development in the area needs to occur concur-
rently to foster links in and outside the community and 
reduce dependency. The aim should be for them to survive 
when production declines and eventually ceases.
Oil and gas. Oil and gas activities can have social and 
cultural impacts when they affect communities and indig-
enous groups by changes in their land use and traditional 
activities in local areas, their lifestyles, and their liveli-
hoods, such as in agriculture, logging, and fishing (IPIECA 
2011a; E&P Forum and UNEP 1997, 11–12). Disruption 
of community life will follow influxes of migrant workers, 
the introduction of changes and differences in income and 
social structures, and uneven distribution of benefits and 
liabilities. Health risks can arise from disease and the use 
of potentially hazardous chemicals. Like mining compa-
nies, oil and gas companies may be the first foreign inves-
tors that local communities encounter in areas in which 
services, health, and education are poor and government 
processes are still evolving.
More dramatic impacts can be seen in the Niger Delta, 
for example, where human rights abuses by security forces 
have been documented. Communities have been largely 
unable to redress their grievances in the absence of an inde-
pendent judicial system. The resulting confrontations 
between communities and oil companies have been consid-
erable and intense. One result of these conflicts is that the 
time required to bring an oil project online has nearly 
doubled over the past decade, leading to a significant 
increase in costs (Davis and Franks 2014, 11).
Mining
Positive Social Impacts. For example, both large-scale 
 mining and ASM can contribute to local employment and 
income and poverty reduction, often where few alternatives 
exist (see box 9.5 and box 9.6) (Davis and Franks 2014, 14). 
However, it can also be negative, when during the explo-
ration and development phases, disruption can occur in 
land tenure and access, road construction, river diversion 
and large numbers of people, including foreign workers, 
Box 9.5 Reframing the ASM Debate: Integrating It into the EI Value Chain
Shifts in policy articulations of artisanal and small-scale 
mining (ASM) have generally  corresponded to specific 
political and economic global periods. Pelon and Martel-
Jantin (quoted in De Sa, Perks, and La Porta 2013) pro-
pose that since the postcolonial period, the position of 
ASM within mineral policy has transitioned from one 
of “isolation” to “integration.” Such a transition was 
evidenced first by a firmer inclusion of ASM in national 
mineral legislation and policy starting in the late 1980s 
and into the mid- 1990s. This legislative reform focus 
was accompanied in several instances by technical 
assistance, such as small grant programs or credit and 
loan schemes to establish more viable small-scale min-
ing operations. Furthermore, specific ASM government 
departments or agencies, typically under the umbrella of 
the ministry concerned with mining, were established or 
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Box 9.6 Potential Opportunities Generated by ASM
Job creation. The global employment gap has spurred 
renewed discussions on how jobs are defined and 
created. Of note in these discussions is evidence of the 
predominance of the informal sector as a main arena for 
employment at present. Artisanal and small-scale min-
ing (ASM) participation has grown from 10 million in 
1999 (ILO 1999) to potentially upward of 20 million to 
30 million (Buxton 2013). This increase, largely still in 
informal employment, provides a rich policy ground for 
promoting a good job agenda. This agenda focuses on 
making available the necessary knowledge and techno-
logical resources to increase productivity coupled with 
provision of social protection and fair labor standards.
Rural development. Linked to the job agenda is 
ASM’s added value as part of rural livelihood diversifi-
cation strategies (Banchirigah and Hilson 2010; 
Maconachie and Hilson 2011), meaning the manner in 
which ASM is pursued alongside other income oppor-
tunities by individuals and families. Development 
research has demonstrated how ASM assists rural 
households in building more dynamic and resilient 
livelihood strategies portfolios by, for instance, dove-
tailing ASM and farming economies. It furthermore is 
a stimulus for trade and subsidiary business develop-
ment around mine sites, similar to activity around 
industrial or larger-scale mining operations. The ques-
tion of links—how mining interplays with other 
aspects of local economies—and how to promote more 
integrated rural development strategies to capture 
mineral benefit distribution is equally an important 
question when concerned with ASM.
Renewed bilateral partnerships to assist national 
governments in ASM formalization. The work of the 
Communities and Small-Scale Mining (CASM) proj-
ect and its partners over the past decade helped to 
generate an increase in national government demand 
for ASM technical assistance programs. Such assis-
tance would entail capacity-building programs by 
international financial institutions and bilateral part-
ners to address outstanding constraints facing ASM in 
mineral development. For instance, seven countries 
have specific ASM pillars in active World Bank proj-
ects. The Africa Governance Initiative provides 
national governments with mining experts to build 
internal ministry capacity, including capacity to 
address ASM in such countries as Rwanda. The 
International Finance Corporation is extending its 
business advisory service tools to include an ASM 
checklist for baseline studies for its investment part-
ners. In 2012 the Kimberley Process adopted the ASM 
for Development framework, to be implemented by 
its member states. The African Union recognized 
ASM formalization as one of its six areas of engage-
ment under its 2011 Africa Mining Vision. Other 
bilateral partners include GIZ, AusAid, and CIDA, 
who work not only with national governments but 
equally with nongovernmental organizations and 
regional governmental institutions.
further supported to provide advisory and technical 
services to artisanal and small-scale operators.
Such a mineral-development-centered approach 
toward ASM further evolved in the late 1990s to one of 
poverty-alleviation and development. This approach 
took advantage of the Millennium Development Goals 
framework. By aligning ASM more closely to the 
 poverty-alleviation agenda, ASM support strategies 
changed significantly. Nongovernmental organizations 
and even large-scale mining companies became more 
critical agents of intervention, with reduced visibility of 
government institutions. Issues such as fair trade 
minerals and conflict management between ASM and 
large-scale operations were critically raised alongside 
concerns over child labor reduction and women’s 
socioeconomic disenfranchisement (Pelon and Martel-
Jantin quoted in De Sa, Perks, and La Porta 2013).
Earlier concerns from the 1970s and 1980s, such as 
improving environmental standards, appropriate tech-
nology, security of tenure, and access to finance 
remained highlighted agenda items. It was also an era 
in which the World Bank hosted a multidonor trust 
fund for ASM, called Communities and Small-Scale 
Mining (CASM).
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moving into communities located near a project, creating 
resentments and conflicts.
Noise, Vibrations, and Blasting: Local Effects. These have 
an impact on the stability of infrastructure, buildings, and 
homes of people living near mining operations.
Gender. Increased gender inequality can result from unequal 
access to employment in mines or a loss of male support 
for household work. Women may need to expend increased 
time and energy to access clean or available supplies of water 
and food because of a degraded environment.30 General dis-
advantages for women arise from issues surrounding the 
ownership and possession of land, mineral rights, capital, 
and equipment. As one study notes, in the “relatively few 
instances that they have access to resources, women do not 
control them or the resultant benefits” (International Study 
Group 2011, 74). Women are also often left out of com-
munity decision-making processes. In ASM they often have 
unique, specific roles that can lead to health and safety risks; 
in the ASM production chain, “most women take part in the 
activities allocated to them by society (mainly men) and are 
barred from others because of cultural taboos.”
Areas of particular vulnerability. Even when an EI 
sector project has support from community leadership and 
brings benefits to them, all too often such projects make life 
worse rather than better for the disadvantaged and the most 
vulnerable sections in the community. These can include 
women, youth, children, and the elderly, who might typi-
cally bear the risks of extractives activities while the benefits 
accrue to the more affluent and to men. However, impacts 
of EI sector projects on the poorest and most vulnerable are 
sometimes not part of the regular monitoring or report-
ing and all too often occur out of sight of the government, 
the EI sector company, financiers, and aid agencies (Ross 
2001). Thus, proactive interventions are needed to gauge the 
impact on the poorest and most vulnerable and take cor-
rective measures. Community leaders can make sure that 
representation is inclusive of the poorest (and not just an 
elite), and community women (not just men), have a voice 
in community decision making.
The movement of land by excavation and people by dis-
placement or migration to industry sites can create risks to 
cultural sites, either archaeological or spiritual in character. 
Protection of such sites can be required by means of the 
mining agreement and local laws, by requiring surveys prior 
to the commencement of any activities, and by taking pro-
tective measures.
9.5 TOOLS: LEGAL AND REGULATORY
Governments can and do use legal tools to manage environ-
mental and social impacts of development. From a perspec-
tive of sustainability, it is most important to use them to 
anticipate impacts and take action to minimize or avoid 
them. It is increasingly common to see social and environ-
mental protection policies, together with related proce-
dures, instruments, compliance standards, and assignment 
of responsibilities, spelled out in laws and regulations as 
opposed to contracts or agreements. Where this is done, the 
laws and regulations will typically stipulate the process by 
which the various data, impact assessments, and manage-
ment plans will be reviewed and by whom; the process by 
which any needed corrections and improvements will be 
made; and the process and criteria for approvals to be given 
and by whom.
The array of legal and regulatory instruments that gov-
ernments typically have at their disposal to manage impacts 
and ensure compliance with policy on extractives is wide. 
When determining whether a project will facilitate long-
term sustainable development or not, the following four 
tools have particular importance.
Environmental and social impact assessments
Environmental and social impact assessments (ESIAs) have 
become standard preproject planning tools to assist in 
anticipating impacts, proposing actions for their manage-
ment and mitigation, and for monitoring compliance. They 
are routinely required by project sponsors (for example, the 
majority of governments, the Equator Banks, and the IFC) 
per domestic legislation and/or contract. However, they are 
often also tied in to programs of corporate social responsi-
bility. This would make them voluntary, whereas many 
countries have them as a legal requirement. Their findings 
can shape or even prevent a project from going ahead.
The primary intention of the ESIA is to analyze short-
term and long-term impacts and risks, including (1) 
direct impacts (the project site and neighboring communi-
ties, infrastructure such as ports, pipelines, pumping 
stations, roads and railways, as well as all plant, equipment, 
landfills, and other facilities at the site); (2) indirect impacts; 
(3) cumulative impacts; (4) transboundary impacts; (such 
as from air emissions); and (5) global impacts (such as from 
GHG emissions). These impacts are identified through all 
stages of the planned EI sector project (predevelopment, 
development, production, abandonment, or closure and 
postclosure). Alternative ways of carrying out the project 
would typically be included.
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ESIAs translate into Environmental Impact Management 
Plans (EIMPs) and Biodiversity Action Plans, against which 
a mining company will be audited for legal compliance. The 
EIMP is important as it includes the conditions under 
which a mine will legally be allowed to proceed.
Assessment of potential social impacts might include 
impacts on local communities and local land use, resettle-
ment, rights based on custom or tradition, and issues affect-
ing women, youth, and the elderly. Assessment of 
environmental impacts would typically include air and soil 
resources, marine resources, water and wetlands, and bio-
logical and biodiversity resources. Legislation usually 
requires that ESIAs be prepared by qualified and registered 
experts in accordance with international good practice 
standards31 and that the documents be made public, allow-
ing sufficient time for review and comment before the EI 
sector project is given permission to commence or not. 
They can also identify and highlight positive impacts, such 
as eradication of invasive species and the protection of 
specific species of fauna and flora.
The manner in which the ESIA is carried out is impor-
tant. Independence and public participation are essential. 
Sometimes a government will require the company to carry 
out the assessment and pay for it, such as in Mongolia, where 
it is done “in accordance with the Law on Environmental 
Impact Assessment prepared by a competent, independent, 
professional firm.”32 Unfortunately, this approach may call 
into question the independence of the ESIA process, if it is 
entrusted to the potential beneficiary to carry out.
Critics of these tools note that they are not always 
applied in an efficacious way, and that they may attempt to 
justify decisions and protect investments already made. The 
benefit is that they establish baseline conditions against 
which potential impacts will be anticipated and necessary 
avoidance, mitigation, and restoration measures recom-
mended. An ESIA will highlight environmental and social 
risks to be managed and how the layout, design, and imple-
mentation of projects can be improved. It should also 
include, but rarely does, a “no go” option on mining activity 
if the impacts cannot be effectively predicted and managed 
(Hobbs and Kumah 2016).
Strategic environmental assessment
A commonly used tool to counter criticisms of the ESIA 
tools is the strategic environmental assessment (SEA) 
(OECD 2006). This involves an environmental assessment 
focused on policies rather than the project-focused approach 
of an ESIA. It is a governance tool that evaluates the 
environmental risks and opportunities of proposals, whether 
they be policies, plans, or programs. It “assists decision mak-
ers to think through, with other stakeholders, how eco-
nomic, social and environmental considerations can fit 
together, suggesting trade-offs should they be necessary. It 
provides a framework for more inclusive, transparent and 
better-informed decision making and is, therefore, an 
important contribution to good governance” (OECD 2006; 
Hobbs and Kumah 2016). It can counter the risk that 
stakeholders only read about project proposals in the media 
once they are approved by the authorities and the resulting 
response of reactive and adversarial positions. By thinking 
through how economic, social, and environmental consider-
ations can fit together, decision makers and stakeholders can 
develop trade-offs if they seem necessary. In this way, a con-
text can be created in which a project can be implemented.
Construction and operational planning
The project sponsor’s environmental and social impact 
management plan (ESMP) is also a standard feature of 
modern EI sector regulation. Based on the ESIA, the ESMP 
focuses on management and compliance with the condi-
tions set forth in the project approval process. The relation-
ship between the ESMP and the ESIA is explained well in 
the Afghanistan Qara Zaghan agreement of 2011 for a gold 
mining project. The ESMP is the plan proposed by Afghan 
Krystal & MoM [Ministry of Mines], and which must be 
accepted by the MoM, which details the measures to be 
taken to minimize or alleviate the Environmental and Social 
factors applicable to the Qara Zaghan Project that are iden-
tified and detailed in the ESPA (Agreement, 1.10).33
The EIMP consists of operational policies, procedures, 
and practices designed to comply with applicable laws and 
regulations and reduce the risk of adverse impacts during 
each phase of a project. It should reflect international 
good practice standards, of which there are several exam-
ples available (see one example in table 9.1). Generally, it 
also includes an in-migration management plan, resettle-
ment and compensation plan, biodiversity action plan, 
and so forth. The sponsor is expected to amend and 
update the ESMP as necessary to reflect changes in cir-
cumstances or applicable standards. ESMPs are required 
to include emergency preparedness and response mea-
sures designed to address both unforeseen and foreseeable 
accidents and events. As with the ESIA, ESMPs are meant 
to be disclosed to affected stakeholders for comment and 
feedback. This should not be a one-off exercise but a con-
tinuous dialogue.
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Compliance standards
Many countries set compliance standards for environmen-
tal impacts. International institutions also set these for 
environment and social aspects of projects.34 In addition to 
the World Bank’s safeguard policies, directed at the identi-
fication and mitigation of potentially adverse environmen-
tal and social consequences of projects supported by the 
bank, the IFC has a set of policy and performance stan-
dards on social and environmental sustainability. These 
have become the global benchmark for managing environ-
mental and social risk by financial institutions. There has 
also been uptake of these standards by private banks 
through the Equator Principles, a risk management frame-
work for determining, assessing and managing environ-
mental and social risk in projects.35 Its aim is to provide a 
minimum standard for due diligence to support responsi-
ble risk decision making. Further, there is a series of 
International Standards Organization (ISO) standards on 
environmental management, including the highly influen-
tial standard ISO 14001 Environmental Management 
Systems. These standards have been widely adopted by 
national standards organizations. Although voluntary, 
they are a condition for obtaining IFC funding and can 
serve as a reference point for the definition of good prac-
tice in oil, gas, and mining activities (Wagner and 
Armstrong 2010).
Standards are most effective when they are achievable 
and set in line with good international practice. If they are 
unrealistically strict, the risk is that they will become mean-
ingless given the institutional capacity limitations of most 
developing countries. Equally, if they are too lax, good 
enforcement will not accomplish very much. Indeed, it is 
the lack of effective enforcement that is the key issue in ESIA 
regulation. The best results are achieved when compliance 
standards are well set and the capacity to implement them 
is put in place.
Human rights frameworks
Protection of human rights has become an important mat-
ter for international legal frameworks,36 both in the sense of 
hard legal rules such as the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and International 
Labour Organisation conventions. More recently, standards 
have been developed that are expressly targeted at the con-
duct of business by extractives companies. The most impor-
tant such event in recent years is the development and 
adoption of the United Nations Protect, Respect and 
Remedy Framework (the Framework) in 2008, which seeks 
to provide principles to guide states and businesses in pro-
tecting and respecting human rights.37
Table 9.1 World Bank Group Social and Environmental Standards
Policy Requirements Consultation
Environmental assessment Screen early for impacts. Select instruments to assess, 
minimize, and mitigate adverse impacts.
Affected groups and NGOs as early as 
possible.
Natural habitats Provide no support to projects that degrade critical 
habitats. Support projects that affect noncritical habitats 
only if no alternatives are available and mitigation 
measures are in place.
Consult local people in planning, designing, 
and monitoring projects.
Indigenous peoples Ascertain presence of indigenous peoples. Design 
policies based on expected impact and reflective of 
indigenous peoples’ cultural preferences. 
Conduct informed prior consultation and 
obtain broad community support. 
Involuntary resettlement Avoid where feasible. Assist those displaced in improving 
or restoring their living standards. Displaced persons 
should share in project benefits.
Resettlers and expected host community; 
incorporate views in resettlement plans.
Disputed areas Ensure that claimants to disputed area have no objection. No public consultation; claimants informed.
Source: World Bank, “Safeguard Policies,” http://www.worldbank.org/safeguards.
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The Framework establishes three pillars:
1. The state’s duty to protect against human rights abuses 
by third parties
2. The corporate responsibility to respect human rights
3. Greater access by victims of human rights abuses to 
effective judicial and nonjudicial remedies
Although this is a generic framework applicable to all 
business, it has attracted particular interest in the EIs. It 
invites governments to view human rights protection 
against abuses by business as a responsibility that goes 
beyond the environmental protection, approval, and moni-
toring of projects. Instead, they could reinforce legal obliga-
tions and foster a culture of respect for human rights among 
public institutions as well as businesses, imposing reporting 
obligations on them for example.
With respect to contract provisions, the IFC and the UN 
Special Representative for Human Rights John Ruggie car-
ried out a study of stabilization clauses that might constrain 
a government’s ability to protect human rights (Shemberg 
2008). It found that the EIs were likely to include the most 
constraining clauses. In 2011 the UN Human Rights Council 
considered a proposal for 10 principles that would integrate 
human rights risks into state-investor contract negotiations. 
One of the goals of the proposal was to reduce the risks of 
incoherence in the policies and actions of the host state.
Since the Framework was adopted, companies have both 
individually and collectively begun to implement its guide-
lines. One example is the Global Business Initiative, a 
company-led initiative of 14 multinational companies from 
the global North and South, aiming at implementing them 
internally. A group of international banks has publicly 
committed to working together to understand what the 
Framework means to them and to publish a related 
best practice guide on this (Thun Group of Banks 2013). 
Documentaries on the resolution of disputes between com-
munities and major investment projects have been produced 
by Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government 
and Special Representative Ruggie.38 The UN Office of the 
High Commissioner has also published further guidance for 
business (UNOHC 2012).
In 2015 new interactive platforms were launched for 
business and government by the Business and Human 
Rights Resource Centre,39 an international NGO that tracks 
the human rights impacts of more than 6,000 companies in 
over 180 countries. The responses from many companies 
and governments on human rights commitments and prac-
tice is presented online so that users can view individual 
responses, compare responses across regions and sectors, 
and search for specific issues or actions. The center notes 
that there is momentum among governments to develop 
national action plans on business and human rights.
It should be emphasized that extractives companies 
themselves often initiate a human rights policy. Mining 
companies, in particular, have done so for several years, and 
are constantly updating their policies. For example, Rio 
Tinto produces detailed human rights guidance for its busi-
ness units. This covers local-level human rights consider-
ations in dealing with communities, employees, and 
security. In a section titled “Difficult Issues,” it considers the 
company’s role and tactics in situations where it may have 
little control, such as abuse being committed by the govern-
ment or third parties (ICMM 2009, 8; Rio Tinto 2015). 
Newmont, another mining company, underpins its com-
mitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
with a policy of 19 management standards and 14 disci-
pline-specific standards, several of which are relevant to 
human rights. A “Human Rights Primer” and a “Human 
Rights Training Guide” are available to sites to support their 
knowledge building on these subjects (ICMM 2009, 8; 
Newmont 2016). BHP Billiton, Glencore, and Goldfields 
are other examples of internationally operating mining 
groups that have explicit, formal commitments to human 
rights in their operations (BHP Billiton 2014; Glencore 
2016; Goldfields 2014).
Summary of common tools
A modern environmental and social protection regime will 
have the following instruments prepared for each operation 
and submitted to the environmental authority for approval:
1. Baseline environmental and social data
2. Sector strategic environmental and social assessment 
(SESA or SEA);
3. Environmental and social impact assessments (ESIA)
4. Environmental and social management plan (ESMP)
5. Management plans for health and safety impacts
6. Hazardous material handling, transport and storage 
management plan
7. Community development agreement (CDA)
8. Biodiversity action plan
9. Decommissioning and closure management plan 
(including postclosure monitoring if needed)
The various baseline data, impact assessments, and 
management plans need to be prepared not only for the 
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core EI sector operation itself but also for (1) associated 
water storage; (2) product, fuel, and materials transport, 
handling, and storage facilities; and (3) processing plants 
and infrastructure associated with the operation including 
roads, railway routes, waterways, and ports along which 
hazardous materials may be transported and locations 
where they are stored.
For mining, waste dumps and tailings impoundments 
will also be included.
Environmental audits should also be required in all 
cases. The need is particularly evident in situations where 
there has not been strong enforcement of environmental 
requirements or where there are community or other stake-
holder concerns about environmental performance and 
practice (INTOSAI 2010).
Baseline studies. Almost all social and environmental 
legislation today would require that, before any EI sector 
activity begins, baseline social and environmental data be 
collected and reported. Baseline data should include year-
round measurement of environmental conditions, infor-
mation on vegetation and animal life, and identification 
of established legal and customary community residents 
and users and their assets, crops, and livelihoods. The lat-
ter should be done at the earliest stage practical so that they 
can be identified separately from any newcomers who arrive 
as news of a potential development spreads. This might be 
conducted in parallel with an initial scoping study indicat-
ing the likely social and environmental impacts of develop-
ment and providing a basis for initiation of consultations 
with affected communities (Liebenthal, Michelitsch, and 
Tarazona 2005, 15–16).
Environmental permits. Environmental permits should 
be required for all EI sector operations to manage and miti-
gate key environmental impacts such as (1) water use and 
wastewater discharge quality, (2) atmospheric emissions, 
(3) noise, and (4) mining-related waste such as tailings 
storage and disposal. Processing these permits accord-
ing to a common timetable would enable investors and 
operators to plan construction and operation in an orderly 
manner. Environmental and social regulations can be used 
to provide clear guidelines and specify requirements for 
the preparation of baseline data, assessments, and manage-
ment plans.
Penalties. The law and regulations should clearly present 
the penalties for violations of environmental requirements 
and compliance standards. These should range from fines 
for minor violations to suspension of permits and licenses 
for the most serious violations. In the most extreme case, 
licenses would be subject to termination. Companies should 
pay penalties commensurate with the violation, and where 
other parties are harmed, they should provide compensa-
tion commensurate with the harm.
Corporate reporting. Corporate environmental report-
ing is an important tool. Investors, shareholders, and 
other stakeholders are increasingly requesting improved 
environmental disclosures in company reports. More and 
more organizations are seeking this kind of data from 
their suppliers, no matter what the size of the company. 
The idea behind environmental reporting by companies is 
that they will benefit from lower energy and resource costs 
and gain a better understanding of the risks such as those 
related to climate change. In the United Kingdom, reg-
ulations made under the Companies Act (2006) require 
companies to report on GHG emissions for which they 
are responsible, as well as on other environmental matters 
(DEFRA 2013).
Environmental concerns
Oil and gas. Two areas of environmental concern related 
to oil and gas are particularly worthy of note: cleanup and 
decommissioning. They arise when operations go wrong or 
where they approach closure for commercial or resource 
exhaustion reasons. In each case there is a body of legal rules 
and good practice, sometimes not particularly cohesive, but 
always relevant to policy makers in designing tools for pre-
vention, avoidance, and mitigation. These cases are exam-
ined in the following subsections.
Cleaning Up. Many oil and gas jurisdictions have begun 
a review of contractual exclusion clauses, liabilities, and 
indemnities; definitions of gross negligence and willful mis-
conduct; and other contractual terms, such as those relat-
ing to insurance, choice of law, and jurisdiction.40 A major 
problem is the lack of any consistent national legislation in 
this field or an international convention that would guide or 
even require operators to adhere to the established industry 
practice. Further, there is a question as to which regulations 
imposing fines and penalties apply exclusively to operators 
and which apply to contractors as well. The result is that 
contractors could be heavily and perhaps fatally exposed. 
They may have no ability to fully mitigate the risk entailed, 
over which they have not enjoyed full operational control 
and decision-making powers.
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For governments in Sourcebook target countries, there 
are likely to be three important considerations for these 
situations.
First, the existence of NOCs in most countries and the 
use of PSC and service contract arrangements have implica-
tions for the allocation of liability. It is far from clear that 
NOCs would accept the kind of liability that BP has in the 
event of even a more modest event than the Macondo spill. 
NOCs are very different from internationally operating 
companies, and their accountability for oil spills of this 
nature has yet to be tested. Their bargaining power vis-à-vis 
contractors in certain countries is such that they may 
assume they can impose whatever conditions they wish. 
Moreover, in some countries such as Russia and China there 
are service contractors that are part of vertically integrated 
NOCs, in contrast to international oil companies (IOCs) 
elsewhere, which do not usually have a service affiliate. This 
underlines the fact that there are different kinds of opera-
tors: some are IOCs and others are NOCs; some are large 
companies, some medium, and others small. The capacity 
of operators to pay for catastrophic risk will therefore vary.
Second, local law requirements are such that exclusions 
of liability are unlikely to be upheld. In some regimes, such 
as Brazil or Indonesia, local law will not allow the enforce-
ment of indemnity provisions such as the ones currently 
used in the industry. Contractors would, therefore, be liable 
under local law in the event of negligence. Similar conditions 
can be expected in countries such as Russia and Argentina.
Finally, an important problem in many cases is a lack of 
capacity in ministries that have responsibility for oil spill 
prevention and response. Ghana, for example, has a 
national oil spill contingency plan (and already has had an 
oil spill offshore), but the country’s legal regime does not 
clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the various 
stakeholders. It lacks the relevant bodies to complement the 
activities of the environmental authorities in addressing oil 
pollution. It is vague in its requirements on the funding of 
equipment to combat oil spills, and it has only general 
plans on the training of personnel.
Cleanup Rules: Europe. There is a regional, northwest 
European convention that may offer some guidance to coun-
tries seeking to adopt a regional approach. The Offshore 
Pollution Liability Agreement (OPOL) was set up in 1975 as 
a short-term measure and an alternative to a projected 1976 
international convention that never came into effect.41
OPOL requires each operator to accept strict liability, 
with a few exceptions, for pollution damage and for the 
cost of remedial measures incurred from a spill from its 
offshore facilities, up to a maximum of US$250 million per 
incident. It requires that all claims have to be lodged 
against the operator who has caused the pollution and that 
the operator is solely responsible for meeting these claims. 
In the event that an operator defaults, OPOL provides for 
a mutual guarantee from all its other members that claims 
up to US$250 million will be settled. It applies to offshore 
operators only, the majority of which are U.K. based. 
Although European in focus, it does not apply to the Baltic 
or Mediterranean seas, in which deepwater drilling is a 
prospect. Moreover, the scale of the costs arising from 
Macondo raises the question of whether the limit of 
US$250 million is anywhere near sufficient to address a 
catastrophic oil spill.
OPOL applies to all offshore facilities from which there 
is a risk of a discharge causing pollution damage. It is not a 
fund nor is it a limitation of liability regime. The operator 
may be liable for losses that exceed the maximum recover-
able under OPOL or those that go beyond the scope of 
OPOL. OPOL acts as a back-up to the individual company’s 
own insurance provision if that proves insufficient to 
address compensation claims arising from offshore pollu-
tion incidents from exploration and production facilities. 
The scheme involves strict liability compensation with no 
need for proof of fault. Payment is to be rapid and there is 
no need for legal action. It is also secure: members must 
provide evidence of financial responsibility, and OPOL 
members give mutual guarantee of each other’s obligations. 
There are two categories of claims: reimbursement of public 
authorities for remedial measures and compensation to 
third parties for pollution damage.
Cleanup Rules: The United States. In the U.S. regime, the 
principal national rules are contained in the Oil Pollution 
Act of 1990 (OPA). There is no need to show fault; strict lia-
bility applies. It authorizes the use of money and collection 
of revenue for the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, designed to 
ensure a rapid and effective response to oil spills. The OPA 
rules on compensation and liability over the loss of natural 
resources, removal, and cleanup costs, property damage, 
loss of profits or earning capacity, loss of government rev-
enue, or increased public services costs. It includes liability 
caps that vary according to the type of spill and type of dam-
age caused.
In addition, each state has its own environmental legisla-
tion with provision for damages. Tort claims may be made 
under state and federal law. The Clean Water Act permits a 
government to seek fines on a per barrel basis, which can 
increase if a judge finds that the company has been grossly 
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negligent in allowing the pollution to occur. In BP’s case, 
this may lead to billions of dollars of liability.
Insurance. Most joint operating agreements (JOAs) require 
the operator to take out insurance for joint operations. 
Partners can join in the operator’s insurance or take out 
their own. Some larger oil companies do not insure with the 
market. Usually, an operator will maintain various insur-
ances relevant to blowout, including third party legal liabil-
ity and control of wells, redrill, and cleanup of sudden and 
accidental pollution from a well out of control. For contrac-
tors, nearly all contractual liability insurance excludes blow-
out or subsurface pollution or below-wellhead risk.42
Decommissioning. The framework of public interna-
tional law obligations for the removal and disposal of 
offshore installations and structures is linked to the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982). Article 60(3) 
refers to “generally accepted international standards 
established in this regard by the competent international 
organization.” These were set out by the International 
Maritime Organization in “Guidelines and Standards 
for the Removal of Offshore Installations and Structures 
on the Continental Shelf and in the Exclusive Economic 
Zone.”43 This is a legally nonbinding document, like a 
recommendation. It sets minimum standards for removal 
and disposal and recommends a general removal principle 
on coastal states requiring that all disused installations 
and structures should be entirely removed, except when 
special circumstances consistent with the guidelines and 
standards can be shown to apply. It allows for the pos-
sibility of partial instead of total removal. A case-by-case 
approach is required to determine whether special cir-
cumstances permit a coastal state to do this.
This is a dynamic area, however, in which perceptions of 
appropriate action to protect the environment may change 
in the direction of increasing strictness. One step down 
from the global level, regional conventions also play a role, 
although the level of development of these varies a great 
deal from one region to the next, influenced by the degree 
of cooperation the states can achieve.
In 1995 an attempted decommissioning in the North 
Sea area led to a review of the regional requirements and 
had global repercussions. The proposed decommissioning 
was for a floating oil storage and off-loading facility called 
the Brent Spar, located originally in the Brent field in the 
U.K. North Sea in 140 meters of water. It commenced 
operations in 1976 and was decommissioned in 1991. Shell 
carried out the requirements for disposal under the then 
domestic legislation, and a license for dumping was issued. 
Following extensive protests by environmental groups, 
these plans were shelved, and the structure was eventually 
taken away for disposal elsewhere. The process underlined 
the importance of having public participation in the design 
of a decommissioning plan.
Subsequently, the regional convention for North Sea 
states, the 1992 Oslo and Paris Convention for the Protection 
of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic 
(OSPAR), also covering the North Atlantic, was revised in 
1998 to require all installations to be brought onshore for 
decommissioning and to make it much harder for installa-
tions or structures to be exempted from total removal. 
Exceptions remained for fixed steel jackets over 10,000 
tonnes and concrete jackets. However, with advances in 
technology and contractor capabilities it can be expected 
that future applications for exemptions (derogations) will 
be scrutinized more and more carefully.
Who Pays? International law (and that includes regional 
conventions) does not specify who pays for decommis-
sioning. This will be determined by the national regime, 
the JOA or unit operating agreement, the terms of any 
decommissioning agreement, and the security provided for 
costs. A key feature of international law and especially 
OSPAR Decision 98/3 is that it makes the government a 
decommissioner of last resort for disused installations and 
the ultimate payer if a company or companies default on 
their obligations.44
In this light, and in line with rising environmental stan-
dards, some governments have taken action to introduce 
new legislative provisions addressing the problem or over-
hauling existing legislation to ensure that the problem is 
addressed properly. The minimum content of national leg-
islation on this would include the following:
 ■ Inclusion of an outline decommissioning plan when a 
development plan for the field is submitted
 ■ Submission of a full decommissioning plan (covering 
costs, time, and instruments) at a specific date in advance 
of decommissioning
 ■ Submission of a revised decommissioning plan at a 
specified date (for example, six months) prior to the start 
of decommissioning work
 ■ Provision for government review and approval at the 
preceding stages
 ■ Initiative to be taken by company to submit all plans and 
to include the preparation of options for removal to be 
reviewed by government
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 ■ Joint and several liabilities of the owners or joint venture 
partners
 ■ Security provided for performance of the obligations
 ■ Fixing of liability for decommissioning: on the licensee 
or contract holder but also the operator and/or owner of 
the installation, the parties to the JOA if different from 
the rights holders under the host-government agree-
ment, and entities that may own interests in the installa-
tion such as banks, former rights-holders, and respective 
parent and associated companies
 ■ Penalties for failure to do the work—the government 
could do the work directly or subcontract it and charge the 
companies for costs (Penalties will also apply where there 
is a failure in certain areas, such as to provide financial 
information or to comply with notices requiring remedial 
action to carry out a decommissioning plan.)
On the final point about liability, if the government takes 
the view that the joint and several liabilities of each company 
are to bear the costs of decommissioning even if they do not 
have a continuing interest in a field, this means that any 
transfer of interests requires the incoming company to pro-
vide an acceptable financial security for its decommissioning 
liabilities. For incoming investors, this is not a problem, but 
for established investors, much will depend upon the word-
ing of the contract, probably concluded several decades 
earlier. At a postdecommissioning date, damage may be 
caused by remains exposed above the sea surface, remains 
called “footings,” drill cuttings, or debris. Ownership of resi-
dues left after the main installations have been decommis-
sioned will typically remain with the owners and any liability 
remain with them in perpetuity.
How do they pay? On the contractual side, it would appear 
that any problems are likely to arise more from the design of 
appropriate funding instruments rather than from the type 
of state contract. Their design seems still to be quite embryonic. 
There are merits of trust funds, which provide a level of secu-
rity for both the state and the oil company or consortium but 
leave open the question of how to ensure fairness between the 
state and its partner. Such funds can be established by the 
contractor in a bank of its choice in an interest-bearing U.S. 
dollar account—the decommissioning fund—with funds 
being paid in from time to time to meet the expected costs of 
implementing an approved decommissioning plan. Such pay-
ments should be treated as cost recoverable. Any payment 
should be considered an operating expense for the purpose of 
industrial taxes. However, money remaining in such a fund 
after the approved decommissioning plan is implemented 
should be treated as income for tax purposes and as profit oil 
in the case of a PSC. The remaining balance could be shared 
out. However, there are merits, too, of opening escrow 
accounts, especially in countries that have fairly undeveloped 
legal and financial systems.
Planning Ahead. The role of environmental impact assess-
ments and other forms of forward planning seems likely to 
increase. This will play an important part in predicting what 
sort of abandonment will be satisfactory and what forms of 
structure should be designed to facilitate decommissioning.
Governments may seek security from the start of an oil 
and gas project if necessary (that is, the development stage). 
For industry there is a clear additional cost in providing 
guarantees at such an early stage, whether in the form of 
letters of credit, cash, or fund provision. There are also dif-
ficulties in engaging in such preparations when the actual 
timing of decommissioning cannot be predicted with any 
certainty (and can often be postponed).
Warranties in the decommissioning plan may also be 
required for completion of abandonment or closure work in 
accordance with government requirements and with respect 
to liability for persistent postclosure risks. Governments 
should obtain both closure-related warranties (that the clo-
sure will be completed subject to government requirements 
and approval) and postclosure warranties that the company 
will remain legally responsible for any environmental risk 
that persists (such as acid mine drainage in the case of min-
ing) or emerge (such as slope stability of impoundments for 
mining) and will be corrected by the company even after the 
license is handed back (World Bank 2010).
Mining. Closure of mines has been occurring for hundreds 
of years. Experience is therefore very much more advanced 
than with the decommissioning of oil and gas structures 
and installations. However, the kind of mine closure hun-
dreds of years ago was often not done in a very responsible 
manner. Care about this is a relatively new development, 
brought about by the dereliction left by early mines. Toolkits 
are available on this topic (World Bank 2010).
Initial plans and cost estimates for rehabilitation of the 
site will typically be required (see box 9.7). Some contracts 
will require additional financial guarantees.
Provisions in a mine closure plan include decommis-
sioning and removal of plant and equipment and land 
reclamation and restoration to an alternative use. 
Decommissioning and closure plans should also address 
the handover of potentially useful social assets such as 
buildings (for example, health or educational facilities 
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and possibly even repair shops for small road vehicles) 
and equipment (for example, working vehicles) that can 
be used by the community after the mine is closed.
If any such buildings and assets are identified early in the 
project life, toward the end of the project they can be 
handed over progressively and operated and maintained 
by the community agency or organization that will eventu-
ally receive and use them, so that that this group is well 
equipped to own and operate them once the operation 
closes and the company has departed. Buildings that are not 
suitable to be handed over, such as laboratory or office 
buildings or workshops for large mining trucks and shovels, 
should be closed and removed. In situations where there 
may be legacy issues from past operations, environmental 
audits and surveys of the legacy sites should be undertaken 
on a regular basis to identify any environmental risks, set 
action priorities, and mobilize needed funding according to 
the severity of the risks (World Bank 2010).
The mining agreement can be used to require the mining 
company to provide funding for rehabilitation and mine 
closure. The Liberian Model Mineral Development 
Agreement (2008) states the following, for example:
The closure management plan must also set forth the 
means by which the Company proposes to ensure the 
availability of funds to finance its environmental 
restoration and remediation obligations under 
Sections 8.2 and 8.3 of the Mining Law so that the cost 
of closure will be borne by the Company and not the 
public or the Government. If the Company does not 
agree in writing with the Government to a “pay-as-
you-go” funding scheme, then a funding guarantee 
reasonably satisfactory to the Minister of Finance 
from a third party financial institution with a long-
term credit rating of at least A (or its equivalent) from 
at least two internationally recognized credit-rating 
agencies with provision reasonably acceptable to the 
Minister of Finance and the Minister [of Lands, 
Mines and Energy] for redetermination of estimated 
closures costs at least triennially and adjustments in 
the amount of the funding guarantee will normally be 
acceptable.45
Social concerns
While not all social impacts are amenable to regulation, 
requirements related to mitigating social risks should be 
included in laws and regulations to ensure they are imple-
mented in an orderly and responsive manner. These 
requirements include community notification, information 
dissemination, community consultation, land acquisition, 
compensation, and involuntary resettlement.
Hydrocarbons. Oil and gas companies have undertaken 
social investment programs in many of the countries where 
they operate. These are voluntary contributions made to 
benefit communities and broader societies, usually made 
in terms of transferring skills or resources (IPIECA 2011a). 
Initial experience of this has indicated that an approach 
limited to donations and infrastructural programs will not 
be effective and will likely lead only to short-term positive 
public relations in the local area. Day-to-day stakeholder 
management of such investment appears to be crucial and 
rather than programs of social investment. The way in 
which a social investment program operates can in practice 
create or feed into divisions between groups and even lead 
to community violence (IPIECA 2011a, 13). Some compa-
nies have adopted a regional rather than a local strategy to 
counter this. Companies have also found that partnering 
with NGOs, government agencies, and universities is a use-
ful way to obtaining the expertise that they lack. Boosting 
the capacities of local authorities is also appreciated in 
communities as a worthwhile goal. It can increase trans-
parency and improve the authorities’ ability to respond to 
demands and requests from their own citizens.
Box 9.7 Decommissioning and Environmental 
Protection Plans
A well-designed environmental protection regime 
will also require closure and a decommissioning 
plan and should
1. start as early as the feasibility stage (design with 
the end in mind) and continue on a regular 
basis throughout the life of the operation;
2. be completed with arrangements in place for 
any environmental hazard post closure site 
maintenance or environmental monitoring 
that might be needed after closure is com-
pleted;
3. include planning for the decommissioning and 
removal of plant and equipment, long-term 
land reclamation and stabilization and restora-
tion to an alternative use; and
4. provide for handover to the community of any 
remaining useful social or productive assets.
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Evidence of evolving practices is evident in the Oil and 
Gas Industry Guidance on Voluntary Sustainability Reporting, 
published by the International Petroleum Industry 
Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA), the 
American Petroleum Institute, and the International 
Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IPIECA, API, and 
IOGP 2015). It incorporates feedback from public consulta-
tions and improvements in reporting practices. A key change 
is an alignment of the social and economic issues with the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. It 
also includes a new issue area on water, with comprehensive 
updates to two water indicators and a new indicator cover-
ing planning and execution of decommissioning activities. 
Similarly, IPIECA (2015a, 15) has created a library of 
 questions and resources to assist procurement officers in 
identifying and managing human rights and environmental 
risks in the supply chain. It addresses company concerns 
about labor practices and environmental issues, such as child 
labor and young workers, forced labor and human traffick-
ing, health and safety, and environmental responsibility.
Mining. Alongside the economic opportunities it brings, 
the opening of a mine in or near a community may lead to 
economic and social disruption. The mining company may 
be required in its contract to provide some social services 
to the affected communities, or even financial compensa-
tion. This is an area of great sensitivity for a mining project 
and guidance on actions is available in various forms: the 
ICMM has toolkits, the IFC has principles and standards, 
the International Bar Association has a community tool-
kit, and there is guidance from Sourcebook partner insti-
tution, the University of Queensland’s Centre for Social 
Responsibility in Mining.
A further step in providing this kind of social engage-
ment with a legal basis is the requirement that the company 
conclude a dedicated agreement on cooperation. For exam-
ple, the 2009 Mongolian agreement for the Oyu Tolgoi 
mine states:46
The Investor shall establish cooperation agreements 
with local administrative organizations in accordance 
with article 42 of the Minerals Law and these agree-
ments may include the establishment of local devel-
opment and participation funds, local participation 
committees and local environmental monitoring 
committees.
A CDA is used to formalize agreements relating to the 
improvement of economic development at the local 
community level. This can be done through a variety of 
measures, processes, and structures as vehicles for deliver-
ing development benefits to communities.47 CDAs can 
include the preparation and implementation of community 
economic development plans, incorporating or supported 
by building local planning capacity, job skills training pro-
grams, microfinance schemes, provision for community-
controlled trusts and development funds, undertakings 
with respect to local employment and local procurement, 
and sourcing of goods and services. The CDA is normally 
concluded between the local community and the project 
sponsors and is a vehicle for building mutual trust and 
understanding.
The CDA practice reflects the growing importance 
assigned by investors to close and regular consultation and 
communication with affected communities on EI sector 
projects and their social and environmental impacts. This is 
not always done well, but even so it can act as a catalyst to 
further effort. To do this properly requires building local 
capacity (of both government and community) to plan well 
and implement the mining project effectively and with good 
accountability. It also requires checks and balances and 
capacity regarding local expenditure control systems—a 
substantial task—and the avoidance of elite capture of the 
processes and economic benefits.
Representation. Two critical aspects require further con-
certed efforts. First is overall representation for miners in 
the sector and its dialogue with national policy makers. 
Latin and South America are considerably more advanced 
in this regard than Africa, with viable cooperatives, unions, 
and federations in place that truly represent the interests 
of their members. Second is the representation of women. 
Though women make up at a minimum 30 percent of the 
ASM sector (Hinton, Viega, and Beinhoff 2003), and much 
more in certain materials such as coal and salt (Lahiri-Dutt 
2008), they continue to face a range of discrimination—
some is gender neutral but some is gender specific and has 
to do with health and sexuality. Efforts to promote organi-
zational representation through cooperatives, unions, fed-
erations, and trade associations should be a key policy focus 
moving forward.
9.6 THE RESPONSES
To help countries respond to the kinds of issues described 
in sections 9.4 and 9.5, there is a wide range of indus-
try guidelines, voluntary initiatives, tools, international 
standards, and frameworks for evaluating, measuring, 
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managing, or preventing specific types of impacts. A feature 
of these diverse guides to good practice is that many of 
them are voluntary and are not based on legislation or 
the provisions of binding agreements. Improvements in 
 managing environmental and social impacts have often 
been attributable to extractives companies themselves in 
subscribing to and following international corporate 
responsibility schemes. These not-legally-binding initia-
tives are the subject of this section.
Ideally, extractives policy and project design should pro-
vide support to, or encourage, beneficial externalities while 
mitigating or offsetting any negative consequences. Pursuit 
of these objectives is in the interest of investors and govern-
ments alike. In the case of the former, appropriate attention 
to social and environmental issues provides a social license 
to operate from the EI project host country or community; 
this goes beyond the strictly legal license. From a govern-
ment’s perspective, it demonstrates responsiveness to the 
legitimate interests of its citizens.
There is an institutional aspect to the design of effective 
responses. Good policies and good project-specific deci-
sions may be ineffective in the face of limited institutional 
capacity to pursue or enforce them. In some instances, if 
certain outcomes are desired, there will have to be addi-
tional resources available. This means that resource require-
ments have to be identified and developed at an early stage 
or as early as possible.
Good industry practice may be referred to in a contract 
and may even refer expressly to a set of standards such as 
the IFC performance standards or to a standard-setting 
body such as the ICMM. The aim in such cases is to clarify 
the kind of good conduct that is expected. Many of these 
standards exist in the extractives sector, based on intergov-
ernmental, multistakeholder, and industry association 
sources. While most of these are voluntary initiatives, they 
are highly influential in thinking about good practice.
One of the best-known examples of standards is that 
adopted by the IFC in 2006 and updated since then. These 
performance standards have been adopted by many other 
internationally operating institutions including the more 
than 80 financial institutions that have signed the Equator 
Principles. These standards cover social and environmental 
baseline and impact assessments as well as environment 
management plans, safeguards for indigenous peoples, and 
land acquisition and resettlement.
An emerging standard for the certification of mine sites 
has to be mentioned. The Initiative for Responsible Mining 
Assurance (IRMA) is a group of nongovernmental organi-
zations, businesses that purchase minerals and metals for 
resale in other products, affected communities, mining 
companies, and trade unions and seeks to develop stan-
dards for environmental and social issues related to mining. 
These issues include labor rights, human rights, indigenous 
peoples and cultural heritage, conflict response, pollution 
control, and site closure. The goal is to produce a system of 
independent, third party verification to enable mines to 
“credibly demonstrate that they are operating in a manner 
that is consistent with healthy communities and environ-
ments and that leaves positive long-term legacies” (IRMA 
2016). Already it has a draft Standard for Responsible 
Mining aimed at industrial-scale mines. This outlines a set 
of best practice requirements that mining companies are 
expected to adhere to; companies are expected to demon-
strate compliance by participating in IRMA’s independently 
verifiable responsible mining assurance system. It should be 
noted that IRMA does not provide assurance for oil, gas, 
uranium, and other energy fuels.
With respect to decommissioning and closure, there are 
distinct differences between the decommissioning of a 
petroleum structure and the closure of a mine. The learning 
database differs greatly between mining and hydrocarbons 
in this area. While mining has been carried out for hun-
dreds, indeed thousands of years in some places, the issues 
arising from decommissioning of hydrocarbons fields are 
relatively recent, particularly with respect to the many 
structures located in offshore fields. There is very little expe-
rience of actual decommissioning outside of the on-land 
and offshore activities of the United States. For countries 
with operations in deeper waters than the Gulf of Mexico, 
the North Sea provides some indications of the nature of the 
problem.
It is also generally understood as a series of processes that 
start at the time of project design and continue throughout 
the life of project operation. Preparation well in advance is 
crucial to effective decommissioning and closure.
Research too has demonstrated some particular chal-
lenges with respect to ASM (see box 9.8). Whenever possi-
ble, ASM has been separated out from large-scale mining in 
this chapter.
Environmental
The reduction of environmental impacts can have a positive 
benefit for employment. It can provide opportunities to 
develop local skills while mitigating the carbon footprint of 
EI activities and their effects on climate change. Promoting 
renewable fuel sources of energy and energy efficiency are 
important initiatives in this respect. Local producers of 
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Box 9.8 Challenges Associated with Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM)
Access to suitable deposits and security of tenure: 
Whereas small-holder farmers can gain recognized 
communal rights to land, small-scale miners must 
conform to the same principle established for indus-
trial mining operations. This principle, often enshrined 
in national law, confers sole ownership rights to the 
state of all mineral endowments found within its given 
territory. The state then has the right to lease prospec-
tive mining areas to third parties capable of extracting 
these resources. Given the potential contribution such 
endowments can make to national development—
whether through export earnings, taxes, or, to a 
lesser extent, employment and subsidiary business 
development— it is natural that the state would wish 
to control extractive activities. However, it can lead to 
a situation in which permit areas are prioritized for 
industrial mining. The effect of this is to leave arti-
sanal and small-scale miners with few suitable areas to 
work, forcing encroachment onto industrial conces-
sions, or worse, into protected areas such as national 
parks and reserves. When artisanal zones or areas are 
established, they often are an afterthought and prove 
to have few valuable resources suitable for small-scale 
development.
Enforcement of mining codes and legislation: 
While governments have made significant strides in 
integrating ASM into legal instruments such as min-
ing codes and legislation, there is still abundant work 
needed to enforce these instruments and to make 
people aware of the rights and opportunities con-
ferred on them by legislation. Furthermore, there 
is continued need to strengthen the government insti-
tutions responsible for promoting ASM through 
capacity- building programs.
Adequate market conditions: There is a critical 
gap that leads to the undercapitalization of mineral 
assets. In the absence of robust financing options, 
many ASM operations rely on prefinancing arrange-
ments with buyers, which have both benefits and 
disadvantages.
Access to finance: Whether access is through small 
revolving loan facilities, self-savings groups, local 
banks, local finance markets, or mining federations, 
this remains a significant policy challenge, requiring a 
much more robust and coordinated effort with other 
national ministries and the private sector to widen 
options. Lessons from Rwanda’s village banking 
system have proven to be a suitable starting point for 
providing Rwanda mining cooperatives with entry 
level capital that could serve as a replication model 
elsewhere (Perks 2012).
Environmental, social, and labor standards: The 
lack of enforced standards in most ASM areas remains 
one of the subsector’s largest and most critical areas of 
criticism. Despite efforts by international agencies 
such as the International Labour Organisation or the 
World Bank to develop mine site standards, few coun-
tries have sufficient mechanisms in place to enforce 
and monitor adherence. ASM marginalization explains 
further the lack of appropriate incentives and capacity 
to mine in a more environmentally and socially sensi-
tive manner. Without effective formalization of the 
sector, adhering to industry standards remains eco-
nomically unattractive for many operators.
Market links: The International Institute for 
Environment and Development estimates that 15–20 
percent of global minerals and metals derive from 
ASM (Buxton 2013, 3). Although globalization of 
mining processes is not new, it has led to new sourc-
ing of raw materials in resource-rich but also more 
isolated areas of Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin and South 
America, and Southeast Asia. This more pronounced 
penetration of mineral buyers and small investors 
into isolated regions of the world gives rise to further 
concerns over how ASM is affected by these markets 
demands and how it accordingly responds. Piloted 
efforts to model clean supply chains, or fair trade 
minerals, are reemerging as a means to diffuse the 
principle of responsibility across the supply chain—
companies, manufacturers, smelters, buyers and 
traders, and national governments. It is yet to be seen, 
however, whether such initiatives will be capable of 
driving deep structural change needed to the sector, 
as noted in the formalization framework.
Natural resource management and biodiversity: 
The global rise in specific mineral prices, such as gold, 
has precipitated recent pockets of mining rushes 
worldwide. Some of these environments include previ-
ously untouched places that are ecologically sensitive, 
including protected areas and critical ecosystems such 
as arctic landscapes (Greenland), tropical rainforests 
(Brazil and Gabon), and coral reefs (the Philippines). 
Environmental impacts of mining methods—such as 
clear-cutting forests, river dredging, or use of toxic 
(Box continues on the following page)
272 OIL, GAS, AND MINING
technology can be stimulated to produce energy solutions 
using local renewable energy sources.
In this context, companies have an interest in drawing 
on industry good practice standards and generally becom-
ing proactive; this includes working with communities to 
build the skills necessary for resource employment and the 
provision of goods and services. At the same time, compa-
nies are able to draw on the growing body of standards and 
soft-law mechanisms that require a voluntary response 
from the players for compliance. A summary of the essen-
tials of a good environmental protection regime is con-
tained in box 9.9.
Oil and gas. In the field of petroleum sector governance, 
a distinct initiative should be mentioned. Given the impres-
sive track record and global influence of the Norwegian 
approach to resource governance, it is perhaps unsurpris-
ing that the Government of Norway should have supported 
a Petroleum Governance Initiative (PGI) with the World 
Bank. Based on three pillars (transparency and revenue 
management, environmental sustainability and community 
development). It provides support to countries undertak-
ing oil and gas activities by assisting in the implementation 
of appropriate governance frameworks. Environmental 
implications are considerable: organizing support for 
chemicals—are compounded by livelihood practices 
that support mining populations—gathering firewood, 
hunting for food, or trading goods. Furthermore, on a 
global scale, artisanal and small-scale forms of gold 
production remain the biggest environmental chal-
lenge due to mercury use. The Minamata Convention 
on Mercury 2013 to further limit and in some cases 
ban mercury use in countries presents a renewed 
opportunity to tackle its use in ASM. However, the 
environmental agenda surrounding ASM must be 
integrated into broader governance discussions, as 
often environmental degradation caused by ASM 
occurs within a vacuum of government regulation and 
presence.
Box 9.8 Challenges Associated with Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM) (continued)
Box 9.9 Essentials of a Good Environmental Protection Regime
If well designed, a regime will provide for the following:
 ■ Coverage of both the mineral or hydrocarbon 
operation and all related infrastructure
 ■ Environmental permits that cover key impacts such 
as water use and waste water discharge quality, waste 
storage and disposal, atmospheric emissions, and noise
 ■ Community hearings open to the public where all 
data collection, impact assessments, and manage-
ment plans are presented as part of the approval 
process—final, approved documents should be pro-
vided to communities
 ■ Participatory community monitoring that can help 
reduce community concerns
 ■ Identification of assets for handover at an early 
stage and setting up of arrangements for them to be 
jointly operated and maintained by the community 
agency or organization that will receive them
 ■ The establishment of financial assurance mecha-
nisms needed to ensure that sufficient funds are 
in place for plant removal and disposal and land 
reclamation and rehabilitation at the time of closure 
and decommissioning—they should also require 
that reclamation and restoration be built into the 
production plan to take place on a progressive basis, 
in which case there is less to do during closure and 
decommissioning
 ■ Penalties that are clearly stipulated for violations of 
requirements and compliance standards, and com-
pensation set out for harmed parties where needed, 
all of which should be commensurate with the seri-
ousness of the violation
 ■ Environmental audits and surveys of any legacy 
issues from past operations as well as identification 
of environmental risks and action priorities and 
mobilization of any funding required
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environmental management systems; support for a tool-
kit providing guidance on decommissioning policies and 
building specific country experience through a Social and 
Environmental Strategic Assessment in Mauritania.
Oil Spill Cleanup. Where a significant environmental acci-
dent occurs, it is crucial to have funds available to meet the 
costs. Some contractual provision will usually have been 
made to help address this: deposits paid into funds, par-
ent guarantees, or a requirement that the company obtain 
insurance. This is a way of ensuring that the government 
is protected from having to make payments for such even-
tualities if they happen, and if the company defaults. Very 
significant differences are found in levels of preparedness 
between countries, with areas of particular vulnerability 
in institutional capacity, interagency cooperation, detail of 
available rules, and company mix. The Gulf of Mexico inci-
dent involving BP’s Macondo well involved a large privately 
owned oil company; in many cases, the operating company 
will be a NOC or a smaller company, with less predictable 
outcomes in the event of a large spill.
For industry it is important for reputational and cost 
reasons to engage in oil spill preparedness and response 
activities. Knowledge is pooled through associations.48 
Prevention is treated as the priority, and it requires coop-
eration with regulatory authorities. A particular action is 
the joint IPIECA and International Maritime Organization 
Global Initiative, which brings together industry and gov-
ernments to enhance oil spill preparedness and response. 
This is an umbrella program that encourages and facilitates 
the development and implementation of oil spill contin-
gency plans and the ratification and implementation of oil 
spill–related international conventions. Three regions are 
active in this arrangement: the Caspian and Black Sea 
Region, West and Central Africa, and Southeast Asia.
A series of 24 good practice guides has been produced 
by a joint industry partnership comprising IPIECA 
and the International Oil and Gas Producers Association, 
established following the Macondo incident, to imple-
ment learning opportunities about oil-spill preparedness 
and response. These guides are available online and are 
being translated into French, Spanish, Portuguese, and 
Russian.49
The industry has also established so-called tier 3 response 
centers worldwide. These sites offer resources such as spe-
cialist equipment and trained personnel, as well as funding 
mechanisms, held in readiness to combat an oil spill. The 
idea is to integrate them rapidly into a local response where 
a spill is already under way. Some mock oil spill response 
exercises have already been held in the Latin American and 
Caribbean region.
Gas Flaring. Two principles are generally accepted. First, 
flaring of associated gas should not be authorized by gov-
ernments, except in cases of emergency for operational rea-
sons or when no alternative economic solutions exist. This 
is usually supported by the domestic legal and regulatory 
framework. For example, Mozambique has adopted the fol-
lowing wording in its amended Petroleum Law:50
1. The flaring of natural gas shall only be permitted on 
terms to be defined by the Government and only if it is 
demonstrated that all the alternative methods for the 
disposal of the natural gas are unsafe or unacceptable for 
the environment.
2. Authorization shall be required when the natural gas is 
flared for the purpose of testing or verification of infra-
structure, on terms to be regulated.
Second, a priority should be to use associated gas when 
it is produced. Operators can be required to identify on a 
case-by-case basis the possible uses of associated gas in the 
country. They should select the most viable use for oil 
recovery, but in the absence of any such use, the gas may 
be temporarily reinjected in the oil reservoir. In this way, 
the gas is not lost and is stored in the oil reservoir for use 
at a later stage of the field production life. An example of 
this is the Republic of Yemen’s reinjection of associated 
gas over a 20-year period, in the absence of commercial 
uses for the gas. Subsequently, the construction of a pipe-
line and a liquefied natural gas plant allowed the export of 
both associated and nonassociated natural gas, and the 
supply of gas to a power plant in the country and to other 
end users (Le Leuch 2012, 13).
Research has been carried out into how particular coun-
tries address the challenge of associated gas, and has 
resulted in various publicly available case studies that are 
relevant to the topic of flaring (CCSI 2016b). This may 
furnish guidance to regulatory authorities, policy makers, 
and industry when considering practical steps to address 
this issue.
A major initiative in this area is the Global Gas Flaring 
Reduction Partnership (GGFR). This is a public-private 
partnership comprising national and international oil com-
panies, 18 national and regional governments, and 3 inter-
national institutions.51 A major goal is to remove technical 
and regulatory barriers to flaring reductions. The partners 
to the GGFR have established a collaborative Global 
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Standard for gas flaring reduction. This provides a frame-
work for consultation, as well as collaborative action, and 
aims to reduce barriers to associated gas utilization. Over 
15 GGFR partners have formally endorsed the Global 
Standard. They have committed to zero flaring in new proj-
ects, except where no feasible alternatives exist.
The Clean Development Mechanism may also assist in 
the reduction of gas flaring. It allows funding of projects 
specifically aimed at reducing associated gas flaring in devel-
oping countries and can therefore improve the economics of 
such projects. Under article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol on 
Climate Change, an international agreement committing its 
signatories to reducing carbon emissions, a country with an 
obligation to reduce or limit its emissions can implement an 
emissions reduction project in a developing country and 
thereby gain credit equivalent to a tonne of CO2 and set that 
against its emission-reduction target. This clean develop-
ment mechanism might involve a rural electrification project 
using solar panels or the installation of more energy-efficient 
boilers. It might also allow the funding of projects.
Climate Change. The oil industry association for envi-
ronmental and social issues, IPIECA, participates in the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change activi-
ties. Through this means it provides its members with 
updates on the actions that governments are taking and the 
arguments made with respect to climate change. IPIECA has 
a working group that has been developing GHG emissions 
management guidelines as well as other documents that assist 
in raising the level of oil industry best practice on this mat-
ter. In 2015 it published a guidance document, jointly with 
the American Petroleum Institute, Addressing Uncertainty 
in Oil and Natural Gas Industry Greenhouse Gas Inventories 
(IPIECA and API 2015). This summarized the technical 
considerations that are important for understanding and 
calculating GHG emission inventory uncertainty, and assists 
companies to navigate the uncertainties around establishing a 
corporate carbon footprint, publicly reporting on emissions, 
and assessing life-cycle emissions. A further step was taken 
in 2015 with the release of a pilot Climate Change Reporting 
Framework, providing voluntary guidance for oil and gas 
companies developing climate related sustainability reports. 
It assists companies in disclosing relevant data in a simple, 
straightforward manner using a consistent methodology.
When the Paris Agreement entered into force on 
November 4 2016, a group of 10 oil and gas companies 
including Saudi Aramco, Statoil, and the China National 
Petroleum Corporation, announced a plan to spend US$1 
billion on climate change mitigation measures (Clark 2016). 
As the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI), they plan to 
invest the funds in supporting start-ups and developing and 
demonstrating innovative technologies that have the poten-
tial to reduce GHG emissions significantly.
Individual companies continue to take actions to limit 
GHG from their own operations and to help their customers 
use their products more efficiently. This includes working 
with governments, research organizations, and other sectors 
to develop innovative ways of supplying energy in an envi-
ronmentally sustainable manner, deploying low carbon tech-
nologies, and investing in new fuel technologies, including 
renewable, hydrogen, biofuels, and fuel cell technologies.
Biodiversity. Oil and gas companies take individual actions, 
but best practice achieves momentum through the more 
systematic actions of industry associations such as IPIECA. 
It has a working group to improve the way that the industry 
recognizes and manages biodiversity conservation issues. 
The aims of the working group include the integration of 
biodiversity and ecosystem service concepts and manage-
ment into oil and gas operations by developing science-
based good practice tools using a mitigation hierarchy and 
a reference framework. The main contribution of this kind 
of industry body is to develop tools and guidance while at 
the same time organizing workshops to raise awareness 
of industry action. In particular, there is a Cross-Border 
Biodiversity Initiative, a collaborative partnership between 
IPIECA, ICMM, and the Equator Principles Association. 
This aims at integrating biodiversity conservation mecha-
nisms into the EIs. It has published guidance documents 
such as Good Practices for the Collection of Biodiversity 
Baseline Data (Gullison et al. 2015), which is designed 
to help companies incorporate biodiversity indicators 
into their environmental and social impact assessments; 
Biodiversity and Eco-system Services Fundamentals, bringing 
together information essential to informing biodiversity 
and ecosystem services strategy development and decision 
making at the corporate level (IPIECA and IOGP 2016); 
and Cross-Border Guide for Implementing the Mitigation 
Hierarchy (Biodiversity Consultancy 2015), which defines 
four clear steps to manage biodiversity throughout the life 
cycle of a project. IPIECA has also been monitoring the con-
cept of natural capital—an emerging approach to assessing 
the monetary value of natural wealth and its ecosystems.
Decommissioning. For governments new to oil and gas 
developments, it makes sense to review the practice of 
countries with mature hydrocarbons areas, where the issues 
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of closure have become pressing and actions have already 
been taken to prepare for decommissioning. Sometimes 
decommissioning is a legal requirement and not a matter of 
choice. In Brazil the Petroleum Law (1997) provides that the 
concessionaire shall “adopt the industry international best 
practices,” and the PSA Law (2010) refers twice to industry 
best practices, requiring the regulatory agency to enforce 
them and requiring all operations under the production-
sharing agreement (PSA) to be carried out in accordance 
with industry best practices. It thereby imposes the require-
ment on the state company, Petrobras, as the only entity 
allowed to operate under the PSA. There is also extensive 
literature on the principles and practice of decommission-
ing, albeit with still relatively few examples of actual remov-
als and disposals.52 Two common themes stand out in the 
literature in its analysis of decommissioning:
1. Funding of costs: How is decommissioning to be paid 
for?
2. Timing of response: When is the best time to start prepa-
rations for decommissioning?
The major concern of a government is to ensure that 
payment for the costs falls mostly if not entirely on the 
contractor or licensee and not on the state. Since the actual 
timing of decommissioning is rarely foreseeable, a variety of 
issues need to be addressed well in advance to improve the 
likelihood of a good outcome. It is particularly important to 
ensure that when costs are due the obligation to pay has 
been clearly linked to a specific company or consortium 
and that the funds are available to meet the costs.
For government, the risk is that once production 
declines, one or more investors will default on their decom-
missioning obligations. This has already happened in the 
U.K. sector of the North Sea, where companies developing 
the Ardmore field defaulted.53 When the defaulting com-
pany is part of a consortium, the obligation to pay can be 
shared among the remaining parties.
Determining exact liabilities involves making estimates 
far in advance of the event, and these will include a margin 
of error. Moreover, each decommissioning is unique, with 
its particular combination of technical, commercial and 
environmental features. Given this uncertainty, if a party 
wishes to leave the JOA early, it may prove hard to agree on 
a security for its decommissioning obligations. The con-
tinuing parties will have to rely upon the covenants and 
indemnity that are in the JOA.
Timing will also present challenges because contractors 
will have difficulty knowing exactly when to commence 
preparations, given variables such as the international oil 
price, technological developments leading to potential for 
enhanced recovery, and environmental knowledge. All may 
change, or some. ConocoPhillips began the process of 
decommissioning the Maureen field in the U.K. North Sea 
in 1993. The platform was not removed until 2001.
There are a variety of country experiences to learn from 
when designing a decommissioning regime. Some coun-
tries, like India and Cyprus, opt for a relatively simple set of 
provisions. Most others, however, prefer to provide for the 
establishment of a fund, the possibility of abandonment 
agreements, some provision of security against default and 
the form of such security, residual liabilities, trust funds 
and their fiscal treatment, and a measure of public account-
ability, clearly evident after the Brent Spar experience.
There is a potential for jurisdictional conflicts among the 
various ministries and agencies involved in the decommis-
sioning process. This is a real issue and needs to be prepared 
for. Given the wide-ranging effects of a decommissioning, 
several government departments will at some stage become 
involved, including those responsible for navigation, fisher-
ies, defense, energy, communications, transport, environ-
ment, ports, and scientific research. State-owned companies 
will also be involved in many cases. Channels and priorities 
need to be created and identified, something that only the 
government, not the company, can do. In the U.K. case, this 
has involved the identification of one ministry as the lead in 
decommissioning matters.
For countries that operate a production-sharing system, 
there are likely to be some specific problems. The first arises 
from the operation of the contract mechanism by which a 
share of the produced oil is received by the investor to com-
pensate for costs incurred (cost oil). In any well, produc-
tion volume reaches a plateau, after which it declines. The 
removal of installations and structures will generally occur 
when no more oil remains to be produced. The question 
then arises of how the contractor is going to recover the 
cost of removing the structure or installation when oil is no 
longer being produced—in other words, when there is no 
income from which the contractor can finance the removal 
cost. If it is seen as a problem for the NOC as the asset 
owner (as seems likely under many present arrangements) 
and not a problem for the contractor, the company is left to 
make provisions to finance the cost of removal.
The second problem involves the accounting period 
for cost oil recovery (see the discussion of this subject 
under production sharing in chapter 4). This occurs every 
quarter when, for example, 20 percent (perhaps as much as 
50 percent in recent PSAs) of oil produced in the first 
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quarter of production is recovered as cost oil. When such 
expenditure is not recovered it is carried forward to the 
next quarter when a further 20 percent (in this example) of 
the oil produced may be treated as cost oil. This process 
continues for every quarter. Ideally, all of the contractor’s 
expenditure should be recovered by the end of the PSA. 
This might not occur, however. A situation could arise in 
which the contractor may have unabsorbed cost oil at the 
end of the PSA. In such cases, if the contractor then has to 
finance the cost of the removal of petroleum installations 
and structures, there is no mechanism to permit the con-
tractor to recover its own expenditure or to pay for the 
cost of the removal.
A third problem arises from the operation of those cost 
oil recovery mechanisms that permit recovery of cost oil 
based on contract areas. Each PSA has its own contract area, 
and the contractor is not allowed to recover expenditure 
incurred in one PSA area from the income produced in a 
different area. Therefore, if a contractor has two PSAs in a 
single country, the oil in the first contract area cannot be 
utilized as cost oil in the second contract area. The recovery 
of cost oil from different contract areas is discouraged in 
some countries by a ring-fencing mechanism that treats 
each PSA as separate from the other even when the con-
tracting company is the same in both cases. The second 
problem outlined above will be further exacerbated by this 
feature of the PSA system.
There are a number of countries in which the PSA has 
been combined with a decommissioning regime: Cyprus, 
India, Tanzania, and Trinidad and Tobago, for example. In 
Malaysia the approach in the more recent PSAs has been to 
require the contractor to prepare an estimate and secure 
agreement on the cost of decommissioning. The cost is then 
multiplied by the annual production or future reserves. 
Cost recovery is granted, and the amount provided has to be 
paid in cash to the government. On decommissioning an 
application has to be made to the government for a return 
of the fund to settle decommissioning costs. An interesting 
feature of the Trinidad and Tobago PSC is that the contrac-
tor is required to restore the surface of the land during the 
exploration phase, before relinquishing the areas on which 
no commercial discovery has been made or from which 
production has commenced.
Mining. Among industry associations in the extractives 
sector, collaborative responses to environmental and social 
challenges have become more common. An example is the 
Cross-Sector Biodiversity Initiative between ICMM on the 
mining side and IPIECA on the oil and gas side, joined by 
the Equator Principles Association. The guidance outputs, 
already discussed, aim broadly at developing and sharing 
good practices relating to biodiversity and ecosystem ser-
vices in the EIs (Biodiversity Consultancy 2015; Gullison 
et al. 2015; IPIECA and IOGP 2016).
Funding Rehabilitation and Closure. One or more finan-
cial mechanisms, contained in legislation or the petroleum 
or mining agreement, should be put in place to ensure 
that funding is in place for work related to closure once 
production— and therefore revenue—ceases. Such mecha-
nisms can include cash held in trust, bonds, and certificates 
of guarantee; letters of credit; securities; deeds; and assign-
ments. The value should be built up progressively over time 
so that sufficient funds are available at closure. Funds should 
be tax deductible at the time they are irrevocably commit-
ted. The amount of funding needed should be updated and 
approved each time the decommissioning and closure plan 
is updated, and the financial assurance provisions adjusted 
accordingly. Where cash or comparable financial instru-
ments are used, they should be held by an independent 
trustee, satisfactory to both the government and the license 
holder, and kept in a safe but income-bearing form in a stable 
currency so that value is preserved and increases over time.
Social
Community relations. Obtaining broad community 
support is a social license to operate and one of the most 
important issues in EI development (see boxes 9.10 and 
9.11). Despite improvements in social impacts, there are 
many communities that oppose EI sector operations in 
their vicinity. Companies are much better able to manage 
their operations, and are at far less risk of unexpected oppo-
sition that can cause work stoppages, if they have obtained 
broad-based community support for their activities. Such 
support is generally built on four pillars:
1. Good information dissemination so that local commu-
nities are satisfied with information from, and commu-
nication and consultation with, the company operating 
in their vicinity
2. The adequacy of compensation for land required and 
lost assets and livelihoods due to EI investments and 
operations
3. Good access to local economic benefits from EI activi-
ties, such as direct and indirect employment, and 
company-based community programs for local health, 
education, sanitation, and other services by the 
government
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4. Adequate mitigation of potential impacts that may 
adversely affect local living conditions, including land 
reclamation, environmental protection, safety, and crime
Another social consideration that should be taken into 
account is EI development’s impacts on salaries and taxes.
Indigenous peoples. The leading guidance in this area is 
IFC Performance Standard 7 on Indigenous Peoples (PS7), 
as updated in 2012 (IFC 2012b). It applies to any private 
sector project that seeks IFC financing. Some oil and gas 
companies have chosen to follow IFC PS7 explicitly, while 
others have adopted their own specific policies and stan-
dards and others still have approached the issue by means 
of implementing broader human rights and community 
relations policies (IPIECA 2011b). The mining industry 
has had extensive experience in this area. Its association, 
ICMM, adopted the “Position Statement on Mining and 
Indigenous Peoples” in 2008, updated it in 2013, and subse-
quently launched a Good Practice Guide: Indigenous Peoples 
and Mining to support its members in implementing the 
underlying vision and particular commitments set out in 
Box 9.10 Social Impacts: Special Issues 
There are a number of special social risks and benefit-
sharing opportunities that require very close attention. 
These require tripartite engagement among the inves-
tor, the government, and the community—not just the 
community leaders and elite but representatives of the 
most vulnerable groups, such as women and youth.
Well-designed social mitigation measures will do 
the following:
1. Include the identification of established legal and 
customary community residents and users and their 
assets, crops, and livelihoods at the earliest stage 
practical so that they can be identified separately 
from any newcomers who might arrive as news of a 
potential development spreads
2. Specify mandatory requirements related to mitigating 
social risks such as community notification, informa-
tion dissemination, and community consultation
3. Ensure that any involuntary resettlement takes 
place according to applicable laws, guidelines, and 
agreements in an acceptable manner to those being 
resettled, with acceptable forms of replacement or 
compensation for lost land, dwellings, crops, and 
livelihoods
4. Require the preparation of in-migration manage-
ment plans and management plans for any commu-
nity-related health and safety impacts and for site 
security arrangements
5. Ensure that social audits take place if required
6. Undertake initiatives to reduce the dependency 
of the community on the mineral or petroleum 
operation to avoid the community collapsing when 
production ceases (including developing economic 
activities that will survive cessation)
7. Fully protect citizen populations by law, but even 
in countries where this is not applicable, companies 
should respect the rights and culture of indigenous 
peoples and only undertake exploration or mining 
activity only if they have well-documented evidence 
that their activities have the broad consent of all 
concerned peoples
8. Ensure that petroleum and mineral operations offer 
real economic development opportunities
Well-designed benefit-sharing arrangements will 
include the following activities:
1. Developing a shared understanding among the 
government, the company, and the community 
of how benefits can be increased, improved, and 
shared and including related commitments in 
the development agreement among the three 
parties
2. Preparing and implementing community economic 
development plans supported by job-skills training 
programs, microfinance schemes, and agreements 
with the company regarding community programs, 
local employment, local procurement, and sourcing 
of goods and services—all linked to the community 
economic development plan
3. Building the local capacity (government and com-
munity) to both plan and effectively implement EI 
sector projects with good accountability in order to 
avoid elite capture of the benefits
4. Identifying opportunities for growth through 
resource clusters and or resource growth corridors, 
where mineral and petroleum development can 
contribute to broader regional growth
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the position statement (ICMM 2013, 2015). This compre-
hensive guide highlights good practice principles and pro-
vides examples of how mining companies have addressed 
particular challenges.
In addition to corporate policies there are reporting 
guidelines for companies such as the Global Reporting 
Initiative,54 which has reporting requirements for compa-
nies that operate in areas where there are indigenous peo-
ples. Companies with express recognition of policies and 
initiatives to respect and promote the rights of indigenous 
peoples include BHP Billiton, Newmont, Rio Tinto, and 
Xstrata.
Land acquisition and resettlement. Resettlement or land 
displacement tends to be influenced by expectations about 
consultation with the affected communities and support for 
resettled people. International companies now subscribe to 
the IFC’s Performance Standard 5 on Land Acquisition and 
Involuntary Resettlement (IFC 2012a), which sets out an 
express framework for consultation, planning, implemen-
tation, and monitoring of resettlement, including income 
 restoration. There may be international rules or standards 
that are relevant to resettlement of peoples that governments 
have to take note of. Individual companies may well develop 
tools, polices, and standards within their suite of global 
Box 9.11 Goal Setting and Community Participation
Community participation in addressing social and 
environmental impacts and concerns has been main-
streamed to all aspects of EI sector management, 
impact assessment, and mitigation plans. Community 
and institutional capacity to enforce good practice are 
critical to success.
EI sector projects can have significant environmen-
tal and social impacts that need to be identified, moni-
tored, managed, and mitigated. A regulatory and or 
audited oversight approach is often needed.
However, in countries with a large EI sector and 
effective capacity, an approach placing more responsi-
bility on operators (those with a good track record 
working within agreed codes of conduct) may be 
equally effective and more practical. The key is to have 
an outcome-oriented approach to reducing and man-
aging risks while maximizing development benefits. 
A well-designed environmental and social regime will 
do the following:
1. Have environmental standards and compliance 
 criteria that are in line with good international 
practice, including the environmental and social 
requirements of international finance institutions, 
particularly the IFC performance standards
2. Give particular attention to monitoring and report-
ing arrangements, including public reporting of, 
and government verification of, company-reported 
environmental and social data
Given that most of EI development impacts take place 
at the local level, a second key principle is that develop-
ment should have broad-based community support 
and prior informed consent of the local population. 
A well-designed consultation and consent regime will 
do the following:
1. Specify regulatory requirements for a high degree of 
information disclosure and dissemination, notifica-
tion, and consultation at the local level prior to 
decision-making points—for example, starting at the 
exploration stage and continuing through project life
2. Ensure very close collaboration and cooperation 
between the environmental and social authorities 
and EI sector ministries and agencies in view of the 
nature of the risks involved
3. Require full EIAs and SIAs or combined ESIAs includ-
ing baseline assessments and associated ESMPs) to 
be prepared for all commercial-scale investments 
and submitted for verification and approval
4. Include separate consultations with women, youth, 
and other potentially vulnerable and disadvantaged 
groups and rather than limiting consultation to just 
the local male leaders and elite
5. Require that information be provided to local 
groups in a form that is readily accessible and 
understandable
6. Encourage company officials to develop trust-
building relationships with leaders of a broad range 
of local community groups, to include effective 
grievance mechanisms
7. Give due consideration to cross-border and/or 
regional and global environmental protection issues
8. Provide direct support, and encourage others (such 
as donors) to provide support, to communities for 
capacity building so that communities can respond 
effectively in an informed manner to information 
received from companies
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management standards to assist operations where resettle-
ment is required.
Resettlement of indigenous peoples is addressed in IFC 
Performance Standard 7, in which it is stated that no such 
resettlement may take place without the consent of the 
people concerned.
Where it is unavoidable, resettlement should take place 
according to applicable laws, guidelines, and agreements in 
an acceptable manner to those being resettled. These gener-
ally include details on acceptable forms of replacement or 
compensation for lost land, dwellings, crops, and liveli-
hoods and government-approved compensation standards 
for lost assets including land. Requirements on this subject 
are increasingly found in mining contracts themselves 
(RWI et al. 2013, 130).
Human rights. An interesting human rights–based approach 
has been adopted in Mongolia to assist in the formaliza-
tion of ASM. By means of the Sustainable Artisanal Mining 
Project, a bilateral cooperation between the Swiss Agency 
for Development and Cooperation and the government of 
Mongolia, an enabling regulatory and policy environment was 
created in which Mongolia’s artisanal miners were able to for-
malize their status (Singo and Levin 2016). In about six years, 
the approximately 7,000 miners (about 11 percent of the total) 
have done so. The adoption of a rights and duties approach 
took the following form. Government agents were encour-
aged to be first movers or enablers by providing an appropri-
ate framework for ASM and helping miners to comply with it 
by understanding and claiming their rights. Miners were also 
encouraged to become aware of what their rights and duties 
were and what they could expect the government to deliver. 
Structures and relationships of mutual accountability between 
government officials and miners and other citizens emerged.
In a different use of human rights language, local com-
munities in Turkey brought a case against their government 
in which they alleged that the operation of a gold mine 
violated their human rights. The Turkish Supreme 
Administrative Court concluded that rights had been 
awarded in ways not compatible with the public interest, 
given the location and use of sodium cyanide. In a separate 
case involving the mine, the European Court of Human 
Rights found that the approval by the government and its 
lack of oversight of the operations, including cyanide and 
use of explosives, constituted a breach of the villagers’ right 
to privacy and family life (Southalan 2012, 118).
Gender. There is a growing appreciation of the benefits 
of treating gender issues affected by extractive operations 
right across the EI Value Chain. There are distinct features 
of mining or oil and gas activities that have an impact on 
gender. Rather than treating these in isolation, the trend is 
to analyze these within a wider framework. An example is 
a study by Publish What You Pay and UN Women (2014), 
Extracting Equality—A Guide. Using a value chain concept, 
it combines gender with good governance. At each stage 
of the chain the guide summarizes the considerations that 
should be made and the questions that should be asked 
to ensure that women are not left out of natural resource 
governance. For example, are women as well as men being 
trained in contract monitoring? Have women been con-
sulted about and participated in impact assessments? The 
driver behind such studies is an appreciation that women 
are often the first to bear the negative impact of extraction.
Mining companies, for example, can act to promote, 
conduct, and/or require gender-sensitive social baseline 
assessments and social mapping to determine the potential 
impacts of mining operations on gender relations in the 
relevant communities. Capacity-building opportunities can 
be provided by governments and mining companies for 
women so that they can take advantage of business and 
employment opportunities in the mining sector.
There have been case studies in countries where women 
and girls play an important role in the ASM sector. The 
Democratic Republic of the Congo is one example, where 
women represent between 20 and 50 percent of the total 
population at mineral extraction sites (Partnership Africa 
Canada 2014). Mongolia is another country that has attracted 
researchers to study gender issues in relation to mining.55
Oil and gas. Industry has taken initiatives in address-
ing social impacts both through associations and through 
companies acting individually. The main association that 
has contributed to studying and addressing social impacts 
from oil and gas activities is IPIECA, the oil industry asso-
ciation for environmental and social issues. There have been 
corporate programs such as prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV/AIDS in the Republic of Congo and the 
use of insecticide-treated mosquito bed nets for malaria pre-
vention in Sub-Saharan Africa. Among individual company 
programs, Chevron, for example, has promoted awareness 
of HIV/AIDS prevention to African women journalists and 
a health care program in Nigeria that involves the use of 
river boat hospitals.
Another initiative taken at the industry level is the pub-
lication of a manual of practical step-by-step guidance on 
how to plan and implement community grievance mecha-
nisms (IPIECA 2015b). This is linked to the industry’s 
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response to the United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights. It is based on the recognition 
that social and environmental impacts can vary, no matter 
how much a company seeks to implement best practice, and 
that complaints and concerns can arise that need to be 
addressed in a prompt, fair, and consistent manner. 
Guidance on voluntary sustainability reporting has also 
been updated by the oil and gas industry to reflect, among 
other things, a need to align with the UN Guiding 
Principles.56
Mining
Water. Mining companies like Rio Tinto and associa-
tions like ICMM have recognized the importance of water 
impacts and have issued their own standards and best prac-
tice guidelines for responsible water management (Rio Tinto 
2011; ICMM 2012).57 Water stewardship involves business 
cooperating with governments, other businesses, NGOs, 
communities, and others to protect shared water resources 
(WWF 2015). It is an opportunity for businesses to demon-
strate environmental responsibility and leadership. Among 
recent initiatives, CCSI has done research on how water-
related infrastructure investments can be leveraged by 
mining companies to address water needs in surrounding 
communities and thereby help the companies to obtain a 
social license to operate (Toledano and Roorda 2014).
Resettlement. Usually, a mining company has the right to 
move residents if that proves necessary. The mining agree-
ment might set forth the conditions for doing so. For exam-
ple, article 15.8 of the Guinea-Koumbia contract (2010) 
states the following:
If the Company judges the presence of Users 
incompatible with its mining operations under the 
Mining Concession, it must indemnify these Users 
before the date of signature of the agreement and to 
help them to relocate. The Company must disburse 
an indemnity to the Users for every resettlement 
or for every loss of use, habitation and crops. 
The above- mentioned indemnity must correspond 
to the amount necessary to relocate and reinstall 
the said Users and must encompass the fair market 
value of every loss (RWI et al. 2013, 132–33).
A key aspect of resettlement involves protecting the interest 
of the poorest and most vulnerable populations in regard to 
land tenure and use. This means ensuring not only that land 
owners are compensated but also that compensation is paid 
to land users where these users are not also owners, and 
those with housing or livelihoods dependent on the land. 
These include customary land owners and users, who may 
not have formal rights. All too often, however, providing 
cash compensation as an exclusive remedy is not sufficient. 
An additional requirement is the provision of viable alter-
native livelihoods and replacement land and structures for 
housing.
Tools that mining companies use include, in Anglo 
American’s case, the use of resettlement planning imple-
mentation in its Socio-Economic Assessment Toolbox (Anglo 
American 2003, Brooks 2015) and a resettlement policy. 
This is to be used in conjunction with best practice guide-
lines, such as those of the IFC (2012c).
Dealing with social and environmental impacts presents 
a number of challenges and special issues. Over the past 
several years, general principles have evolved and been 
largely accepted as good practice in this area. Specific 
instruments have been designed to ensure their effective 
practical implementation.
Areas of Particular Vulnerability. Many mining operations 
are located near or adjacent to traditional lands of indigenous 
peoples or communities, triggering conflicts about a social 
license to operate. Relevant to this problem is the principle 
of free prior and informed consent (FPIC), which was for-
mally introduced through the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples of 2007. It states, “No relocation shall 
take place without the free, prior and informed consent of 
the indigenous peoples concerned” (article 10). This should 
be sought by means of good faith consultations with indige-
nous peoples before governments adopt legislation or other 
measures that may affect those people. This is authoritative 
but not legally binding. IFC Performance Standard No. 7: 
Indigenous Peoples requires IFC clients to seek FPIC for 
projects that involve their relocation, have an impact on the 
lands and resources that are in traditional ownership or cus-
tomary use, or that significantly have an impact on critical 
cultural heritage. This does not necessarily require unanim-
ity and may be achieved even where individuals or groups in 
the community are in express disagreement.
The FPIC concept has recently been applied more gener-
ally to major development projects. There has sometimes 
been confusion about who is the responsible party for con-
ducting and implementing FPIC: the host state or the com-
pany. Ultimately the leading role should be taken by the 
host state, but absent the necessary capacity it may be neces-
sary for the mining company to assist if effective consulta-
tion and consent processes are to be established.
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For protected areas, particularly with respect to the 
natural environment, an initial response is to designate 
such areas according to an internationally accepted scheme 
such as that laid down by the IUCN. The IUCN protection 
area management categories are an attempt to classify pro-
tected areas according to their management objectives 
(IUCN 2013). They are recognized by international bodies 
such as the United Nations and by many national govern-
ments as the global standard for defining and recording 
protected areas.
An indication of the importance that the international 
community sets on this is given by the resolution adopted 
by the World Conservation Congress in 2000 recommend-
ing that its members “prohibit by law, all exploration and 
extraction of mineral resources in protected areas corre-
sponding to IUCN Protected Area Management Categories 
I to IV” (IUCN 2000).58
For culturally significant sites, there are codes of industry 
good practice guidelines such as the IFC’s performance 
standards and the ICMM principles.
9.7 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The fifth chevron in the EI Value Chain is unique in the 
sense that it does not follow sequentially from the preceding 
ones. For EI operations to be truly sustainable, they need to 
have social and environmental elements added throughout, 
particularly in the first chevron.
To achieve development that is sustainable, policies must 
be designed to
 ■ produce clear and lasting (sustainable) benefits from 
extractive industry (EI) activities, and
 ■ address, in a comprehensive and integrated way, the 
potential and actual impacts on environment and 
society.
Comprehensive ESIAs and mitigation plans should be 
required of all EI sector projects, and they usually are. Very 
few countries do not have such regulations. Governments 
should also work to ensure the institutional capacity to 
enforce SEAs (or SESAs) and related regulations. The rea-
sons for this are clear enough. EI sector policies, plans, and 
programs can have significant externalities or spinoff 
impacts—both positive and negative—on society and on 
the physical environments.
Sustainability in the extractives sector has become a mat-
ter of maximizing the social and economic benefits from an 
investment while at the same time minimizing the negative 
impacts on communities and the environment. There are 
now various ways of leveraging extractives projects for 
wider development gains: resources for infrastructure 
arrangements, resource corridors, and local benefit initia-
tives. An attraction of these is that they envisage a partner-
ship relationship between the host government and the 
investors and the relationship is therefore less “legalistic.” 
However, sustainability goes much beyond mitigation. 
It also asks questions about the relevance of a mine or 
 commodity in a sustainable future. In some cases the 
answers will be “no” to a proposed mining or oil and gas 
development.
The relevance of international law in this area is 
 considerable. This extends well beyond the influence of 
international or regional conventions and encompasses 
the design, adoption, and use by countries and non-
state actors like companies of standards. Many issues are 
increasingly perceived as being common concerns since 
they have cross-border effects and therefore require joint 
action in such areas as human rights, environmental pro-
tection, gas flaring, and climate change mitigation, to 
name only the obvious examples. International best prac-
tice is being shaped not only by law making in the tradi-
tional sense (by states) but by international initiatives 
deliberately aimed at involving a variety of actors or stake-
holders, generating a wide consensus and rich body of 
knowledge in specialist areas.
Attempts to tackle the long-standing enclave character of 
mining and oil and gas projects are well under way, with 
resource corridors being one of these, aimed at transform-
ing and leveraging a large but enclave commercial project or 
industry investment and its needs for infrastructure and 
goods and services into a sustainable and diversified eco-
nomic space. Key features in this are the creation of a viable 
financial structure based on expected government revenues 
as a result of the EI activity and the establishment of govern-
ment, private sector, and civil society capacities to develop 
and implement agreed plans. Currently, resource corridors 
have been constrained by a lack of proper ex ante consider-
ation of environmental and community factors, by insuffi-
cient government capacity to plan in an integrated fashion, 
and by a lack of political rationale based on sound economic 
grounds.
Project-specific decommissioning and closure plans 
should be available for each operation. If a commercial-
scale operation does not have, or is not required to have, a 
decommissioning and closure plan, this should be corrected 
and a plan prepared without delay. A decommissioning and 
closure plan is essential even for an operation at the start of 
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production or for an operation with many decades of 
remaining life, since even a conceptual or highly prelimi-
nary plan will inform present operating practices and plan-
ning and indicate possible benefits of reducing both 
short-term and long-term land and water course disruption 
and undertaking ongoing reclamation and restoration 
(INTOSAI 2010, 17–20).
Summary of good practice
Good practice suggests a number of general principles to be 
respected by investors and governments alike in responding 
to social and environmental issues.
Stakeholder involvement. Involve all key  stakeholders— 
government, investors, civil society, and affected 
 communities— to the maximum extent feasible in critical 
decisions with respect to EI sector project development. 
All key documents submitted to government for approval 
by investors and operators, as well as data collection 
reports, impact assessments, and management plans, should 
be made available to communities in the local language. 
Where communities are largely illiterate, meetings should 
be held to present the documents and findings to communi-
ties  verbally—especially to the poorest and most vulnerable 
 segments of communities. Finally, approved documents 
should be provided to communities. If needed, this should 
include summaries in local language or understandable 
form for all the community members.
Grievances and disputes. While much attention is given 
to broad community support at project approval, there is 
often less attention during project implementation and 
operation. Governments, and ideally also companies, 
should ensure that there are easily accessible and affordable 
environmental and social grievance or dispute resolution 
mechanisms that address the needs of the community and 
give an effective voice to the poorest and most vulnerable.
Building trust. Communities are often concerned about 
the following: will the tailings impoundment collapse and 
harm those living below it; will local water sources be pol-
luted or poisoned; will we lose our food self-sufficiency and 
livelihoods because of deforestation and soil degradation? 
Participatory community monitoring can go a long way to 
reducing community concerns about environmental risks 
and building broad-based support for the EI operation 
through social accountability.
Early and continuous engagement. Engage with stake-
holders in a consultation process as early as possible, begin-
ning at, or before, license award and continuously through 
the EI project cycle.
Maximum access to information. To make intelligent 
decisions or contributions and to make those decisions or 
contributions politically legitimate, stakeholders must have 
access to information relative to the EI sector project: his-
torical, current, and forecast.
Legal context. Legislation, regulations, and guidelines 
setting out required responses to social and environmen-
tal impacts in line with international practice should be in 
place, together with credible assurances of enforcement, 
including penalties for noncompliance.
Capacity development and technical assistance. 
Governments should build domestic capacity to deal with 
social and environmental impacts; pending completion 
of that process, they should seek technical assistance from 
qualified international consultants.
Recognition of the long term. Stakeholders should 
recognize that social and environmental safeguarding of 
a project is a long-term process, given project lives of 30 
to 50 years (INTOSAI 2010, 7). Stakeholders should like-
wise recognize that environmental and (negative) social 
impacts must be addressed even after the resource has been 
depleted and should continue through the sensitive phase 
of project decommissioning or closure. Land sterilized by 
mining could be used for other purposes, such as renew-
able energy production sites, horticulture, and water treat-
ment plants. This would enable active site management on 
a long-term basis.
Fair trade and ASM. Those miners falling within the 
ASM category may benefit from engagement with large, 
supportive organizations such as Fair Trade. The CASM 
project analyzed how practical steps could be taken to foster 
community-based engagement in this context of fair trade 
(CASM 2008). Fair Trade has been defined as “a trading 
partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect 
that seeks greater equity in international trade. It contrib-
utes to sustainable development by offering better trading 
conditions to, and securing the rights of, marginalized pro-
ducers and workers—especially in the South. Fair Trade 
organizations (backed by consumers) are engaged actively 
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in supporting producers, awareness raising and in cam-
paigning for changes in the rules and practice of conven-
tional international trade” (Fair Trade 2009).
NOTES
 1. Officially known as Transforming Our World: The 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development. See https://sustainable 
development.un.org/index.php?page=view&type=111&nr 
=8496&menu=35.
 2. Examples include McKinsey Global Institute 2013; 
Barma et al. 2012, particularly chapters 5 and 6; AUC and 
UNECA 2011; and Stanley and Mikhaylova 2011, which 
touches on the subject of mine-related infrastructure; and 
IFC 2013, page 1.
 3. This dissatisfaction is documented in many sources 
from the governments themselves, most notably in the 
African Mining Vision (AU 2009). See also citations through-
out chapter 2 of the Sourcebook.
 4. Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development 
Act, 2010. http://www.placng.org/new/laws/NIGERIAN%20
O I L % 2 0 A N D % 2 0 G A S % 2 0 I N D U S T R Y % 2 0
CONTENT%20DEVELOPMENT%20ACT,%202010.pdf.
 5. Ghana Petroleum (Local Content and Local 
Participation) Regulations 2013 L.I. 2204. http://www 
.reportingoilandgas.org/wp-content/uploads/PETRO 
LEUMLOCAL-CONTENT-AND-LOCAL-PARTIC 
IPATION-REGULATIONS2013.pdf.
 6. Mineral Development Agreement between the 
Government of the Republic of Liberia, China-Union (Hong 
Kong) Mining Co. Ltd., and China-Union Investment 
(Liberia) Bong Mines Co. Ltd. Dated January 19, 2009, article 
11.1 (a): http://www.leiti.org.lr/uploads/2/1/5/6 /21569928 
/152412379-mineral-development-agreement-between-the 
-government-of-the-republic-of-liberia-china-union-hong 
-kong-mining-co-ltd-and-china-union-investment.pdf.
 7. Investment Agreement between the Government of 
Mongolia and Ivanhoe Mines Mongolia Inc LLC and Ivanhoe 
Mines Ltd and Rio Tinto International Holdings Limited, 
October 6, 2009, articles 8.4 and 8.5. http://www.turquoisehill 
.com/i/pdf/Oyu_Tolgoi_IA_ENG.PDF.
 8. Qara Zaghan Gold Project Contract between Afghan 
Krystal Natural Resources Company and the Ministry of 
Mines of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2011, article 
14.1. https://mom.gov.af/Content/files/Mineral%20Contracts 
/File_211_QaraZaghan_Contract-English.pdf.
 9. Republic of Ghana, Ministry of Energy, Local Content 
and Local Participation—Policy Framework, February 26, 
2010. http://ghanaoilwatch.org/images/laws/local_content 
_ policy.pdf
 10. Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development 
Act, 2010. http://www.placng.org/new/laws/NIGERIAN%20
O I L % 2 0 A N D % 2 0 G A S % 2 0 I N D U S T R Y % 2 0
CONTENT%20DEVELOPMENT%20ACT,%202010.pdf.
 11. For examples of local content laws and contractual pro-
visions see “Local Content Laws and Contractual Provisions,” 
Columbia Center on Sustainable Development. http://ccsi 
.columbia.edu/work/projects/ local-content  - laws 
-contractual-provisions/.
 12. Law on Mineral and Coal Mining, Law NQ.4/2009, 
January 12, 2009. http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/ins85947.pdf.
 13. Investment Agreement between the Government of 
Mongolia and Ivanhoe Mines Mongolia Inc LLC and Ivanhoe 
Mines Ltd and Rio Tinto International Holdings Limited, 
October 6, 2009: http://www.turquoisehill.com/i/pdf/Oyu 
_ Tolgoi_IA_ENG.PDF
 14. See RWI et al. 2014, Mining Contracts: How to Read and 
Understand Them, 159–60. In the second category, the 
authors refer to “the challenge of monitoring compliance” 
and “the consequences of a breach.”
 15. DAI Energy and Resources Group. 2016. “Assessing the 
Local Content Landscape for Liquefied Natural Gas in 
Tanzania.” http://dai.com/sites/default/files/erg/wb.pdf.
 16. African Development Bank 2016. “Industrialization 
Strategy for Africa.” http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and -events 
/article/board-approves-afdb-groups -industrialisation 
-strategy-for-africa-2016-2025-15981/.
 17. This view was proposed by a leading mining lawyer, 
M. Stephane Brabant, in a presentation to the mining indaba 
at Cape Town, February 4, 2013, “Resources for Infrastructure 
Swaps.” https://www.google.co.uk/#q=Brabant+Stephane+ 
infrastructure+mines.
 18. For a discussion of the resource corridor concept and 
analysis of several case-studies, see Mtegha et al. 2012.
 19. For a discussion of this see Toledano et al. 2014.
 20. Concern about this is the motivation behind the 
Integrated Resource Corridors Initiative of 2015, funded by 
the U.K. Department of International Development and 
 carried out by the World Wide Fund for Nature and Adam 
Smith International.
 21. For a more detailed overview of the environmental effects 
of the oil and gas industry, see Waskow and Welch 2010.
 22. For a recent review of gas flaring rules and practices, 
with a case study of Kazakhstan, see Nurbekov and Van de 
Putte 2014.
 23. For more on the Global Gas Flaring Reduction 
Partnership, see its website, http://web.worldbank.org 
/ WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTOGMC/EXTGGFR 
/0,,menuPK:578075~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435 
~theSitePK:578069,00.html.
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 24. A contrast is with the U.S. territory in the Gulf of 
Mexico, where more than 1,000 small structures have been 
removed to date with no significant adverse effects. This can-
not be taken as a precedent for decommissioning in deepwa-
ter areas.
 25. For further discussion of coal mining and climate 
change, see Halland et al. 2015. It may be appropriate for 
companies to consider some divestment for environmental 
reasons.
 26. IUCN Definition 2008, from “What Is a Protected Area?” 
https://www.iucn.org/theme/protected-areas/about. IUCN 
categorizes protected areas on its website.
 27. IUCN Definition 2008. Industry has been sensitive to 
issues arising from activities in protected areas. For examples 
of literature on oil and gas activities in protected areas, see 
APPEA 2013; IPIECA 2003; E&P Forum 1991.
 28. Max Planck and BGR 2016. The focus of the study is on 
mining alone, “leaving aside oil and gas, which would 
require a stand-alone study” (7).
 29. See, for example, Eftimie, Heller, and Strongman 2009a; 
Lamber 2007; and Ayassou Sawadogo and Córdova Montes 
2015.
 30. For a review of these issues in the mining sector, see 
Eftimie, Heller, and Strongman 2009a, 2009b.
 31. The World Bank, the IFC, and institutions subscribing 
to the Equator Principles have all published requirements for 
the content of ESIAs.
 32. Oyu-Tolgoi (2009) Investment Agreement.
 33. Qara Zaghan Gold Project Contract between Afghan 
Krystal Natural Resources Company and the Ministry of 
Mines of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Definition 1.10: 
https://mom.gov.af/Content/files/Mineral%20Contracts 
/ File_211_QaraZaghan_Contract-English.pdf
 34. For example, the World Bank has environmental 
 assessment as one of its 10 environmental, social, and legal 
safeguards policies. It is used in the World Bank to identify, 
avoid, and mitigate the potential negative environmental 
impacts associated with the bank’s lending operations. 
See World Bank, “Environmental Assessment,” http://web 
.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS 
/ EXTPOLICIES/EXTSAFEPOL/0,,contentMDK:20543912 
~menuPK:1286357~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309 
~theSitePK:584435,00.html
 35. See Equator Principles, http://www.equator-principles 
.com.
 36. There is a wide body of human rights law at global, 
regional, and national levels. There have also been authorita-
tive interpretations of treaties over the years.
 37. See UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative 
on Business and Human Rights, “Reports to the UN 
Human Rights Council,” https://business-humanrights.org 
/  S p e c i a l Re p Po r t a l / Ho m e / Re p o r t s t o U N Hu m a n 
RightsCouncil.
 38. These can be found on Vimeo, http://vimeo .com 
/25199195.
 39. Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, London, 
http://business-humanrights.org/.
 40. In the United States, there is a growing body of academic 
commentary on the issues in relation to federal and state law. 
Some of the notable contributions include the following: 
Foley 2010; Perry 2011; and Force, Davies, and Force 2011.
 41. See Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement, http://www 
.opol.org.uk/agreement.htm.
 42. The only insurance that is available for blowout is 
Operators’ Extra Expense (OEE) insurance, which, as the 
name suggests, is designed for operators. The only time a 
drilling contractor would procure OEE is when drilling is 
carried out on a turnkey basis. For nondrilling contractors 
(cementing, logging, drilling, fluids, casing, and so on), OEE 
is not available as it is designed for drilling and priced per 
foot drilled. This is not taken out by most contractors, as the 
premiums are prohibitive and only low insured limits are 
available, the maximum capacity post-Macondo being in the 
region of US$500 million, and that would have to cover con-
trol of well, redrill, and pollution cleanup. Obviously, this 
limit is woefully inadequate in a Macondo-type scenario or 
any major blowout spill.
 43. Resolution A.672 (16), adopted October 19, 1989. There 
are no international guidelines on the removal of disused 
pipelines.
 44. OSPAR 98/3 entered into force on February 9, 1999, and 
prohibits the dumping and leaving wholly or partly in place 
of offshore installations. The United Kingdom is a party to 
the OSPAR. Derogations are possible but are tightly drawn. 
The existence of this decision is a principal reason why inter-
est in decommissioning by nongovernmental organizations 
has been muted in recent years, in sharp contrast to the days 
of the Brent Spar incident. A further decision was adopted in 
2006 to address the management of drill cuttings piles.
 45. Mineral Development Agreement between the Government 
of the Republic of Liberia and [           ], November 28, 2008, 
clause 5.5 (c): http://www.sdsg.org/wp-content/uploads 
/2011/06 / liberiadevelopmentagreementtemplate.pdf.
 46. Investment Agreement between the Government of 
Mongolia and Ivanhoe Mines Mongolia Inc LLC and Ivanhoe 
Mines Ltd and Rio Tinto International Holdings Limited, 
October 6, 2009: http://www.turquoisehill.com/i/pdf/Oyu 
_ Tolgoi_IA_ENG.PDF
 47. For a discussion of CDAs, see Brereton, Owen, and Kim 
2011; and World Bank 2012.
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 48. IPIECA has a working group on oil spills enabling the 
exchange of information and best practices. It supports 
industry and promotes government cooperation. For IPIECA’s 
work in social responsibility, see “Social Responsibility,” 
http://www.ipieca.org/our-work/social -responsibility/.
 49. For example, IPIECA and IOGP 2015.
 50. Petroleum Law, March 2012 (draft), article 17.
 51. Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership: http://www 
.worldbank.org/en/programs/gasflaringreduction#1
 52. See, for example, Altit and Igiehon 2009; Hammerson 
2011; Association of International Petroleum Negotiators 
(AIPN) Model International Operating Agreements 2002 and 
2012: www.aipn.org (agreements only available to members); 
AIPN Model International Unitization and Unit Operating 
Agreement 2006: http://www.aipn.org (agreement available 
only to members); Duval et al. 2009, 147–49.
 53. The decommissioning costs were relatively low at £5 
million. See DTI 2007, 30.
 54. Find the Global Reporting Initiative’s numerous 
resources on its website, https://www.globalreporting.org 
/ Pages/default.aspx.
 55. Several studies of gender and mining in Mongolia can be 
found on the University of Queensland website, https://www 
.csrm.uq.edu.au/research/browse-by-theme/gender -and-mining.
 56. See IPIECA, “Sustainable Reporting,” http://www.ipieca 
.org/focus-area/reporting.
 57. See the 2011 Rio Tinto Water Disclosure Project, http://
www.riotinto.com/documents/CDP_Water_Disclosure 
_2011_Information_Request_-_Rio_Tinto_response.pdf . 
Also see ICMM 2012.
 58. The IUCN had a membership at that time of 78 States, 
112 government agencies, 735 NGOs, of which 65 are inter-
national, 35 affiliates, and some 10,000 scientists and experts 
from 181 countries.
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Chapter Title 
C H A P T E R  T H R E E
10.1 KNOWLEDGE CORE
Through the chapters of the Sourcebook, two ideas have 
recurred, sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly. 
The first is that without good governance many, perhaps 
most of the benefits of extractive resource development are 
unlikely to be gained. Governance is about procedural 
 matters, like decision making and communication pro-
cesses; capacity measures, such as sector organization, 
resources, and the degree of professionalization; and 
objective-setting and rule-making. The quality of govern-
ment is critical for making sound decisions in the extrac-
tives sector. However, the Sourcebook approach has been to 
treat governance “as a government’s ability to make and 
enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether 
that government is democratic or not” (Fukuyama 2013). 
In this sense, its approach could be described as infrastruc-
tural or technocratic, in contrast to those approaches 
to governance that have a more political orientation 
(for example, Barma et al. 2012).
The second idea in the Sourcebook is that every country 
not only is sovereign but also has a unique combination of 
circumstances with respect to oil, gas, and mining activity 
and potential, and that governance will ultimately be shaped 
by this national constellation of factors. It includes demog-
raphy, geology and resource abundance, policy choices, 
the legacy of previous extractive activity, local capacity, the 
level of industrial development, and links to international 
organizations such as the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (better known as OPEC) and the 
World Trade Organization. The legal framework and the 
political system are other, critically important factors. 
Even among countries that are neighbors, or in many 
respects similar, this rich tapestry of governance drivers 
ensures that what constitutes good governance in one 
country may be quite inadequate for another. Moreover, it 
will evolve over time, sometimes in unexpected ways. In 
the world of oil, gas, and mining activity, the integrity of 
national choice has long been sanctioned by the doctrine 
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that every country enjoys permanent sovereignty over its 
natural resources in international law.
Generalizing about the quality of government is still pos-
sible despite this diversity. Since governance issues arise at 
each stage of the Extractive Industry (EI) Value Chain, there 
is a vast pool of common experience on which governments 
can draw in a comparative way as a source of good practice. 
It could assist in answering questions about how to make 
rules of law more effective, how to make decision making 
more inclusive, how to make political arrangements more 
stable, how to make fiscal regimes more predictable, and 
how to make bureaucracies more efficient. In any of these 
enquiries it will be found that where transparency and 
accountability are given a high priority the outcomes are 
usually beneficial. These are important indicators of good 
governance. Once they are in place in a country, the chances 
improve for achieving the desired outcomes: poverty reduc-
tion, a more equitable distribution of benefits, better pro-
tection of rights, greater retention of value, protection of the 
environment, and a strong economy. With bad governance, 
such improvements are highly unlikely.
For oil, gas, and mining activities, it seems that the qual-
ity of governance is particularly important. These activities 
raise particular challenges to governance that are perhaps 
less prominent, less frequent, or less intense in other indus-
tries. In other words, they need specific attention and are 
not well addressed by business as usual. Second, the number 
and variety of countries engaged in extractive resource 
development has grown so that the need for knowledge of 
good governance within the EI Value Chain is greater than 
ever. Bodies such as the Natural Resource Governance 
Institute, using a dedicated tool or Index, argue that there is 
a deficit of good governance in oil, gas, and mining in many 
countries around the world (NRGI 2016).
In the following short sections, issues relevant to gover-
nance challenges are examined and recommendations 
given about actions that could lead to improvements in 
governance in the extractives sector. It should be noted that 
the Sourcebook’s approach to governance is broader in 
scope than some other initiatives, such as the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative, which focuses largely 
on revenues; the United Nations Guiding Principles, which 
concern human rights; or the International Monetary 
Fund’s Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency, 
which is concerned with fiscal processes. These have been 
discussed in the Sourcebook chapters, as have many other 
initiatives taken by companies, associations, and civil soci-
ety groups. The Sourcebook approach has aimed at compre-
hensiveness, but it is acknowledged that any such effort will 
never be complete and can at best be a contribution to a 
rapidly evolving and complex subject matter.
10.2 WHAT IS GOVERNANCE?
Key elements in any definition of governance of the oil, gas, 
and mining industries include the following:
Appropriate and adequate content of rules. What are the 
basic rules that guide activities in a society? These would 
include development policies as well as the laws and regula-
tions that are adequate in coverage and appropriate in detail 
to manage the demands of a given society or community.
Effective implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of 
rules. How does a country ensure that actors, both within 
and outside government, have the capabilities, resources, 
and information to effectively implement, monitor, and 
enforce policies, laws, and regulations?
Accountability of actors making the rules. Who determines 
the rules and how is this authority conferred and employed? 
Governance arrangements must allow stakeholders to hold 
decision makers accountable for their conduct, the rules 
they make, and how these rules are implemented.
In sum, these elements suggest that good governance 
requires getting the rules right and getting the implementa-
tion right by means of a process with legitimacy. These ele-
ments are critical if the benefits of private sector investment 
in the development of publicly owned resources are to be 
fully realized by all the parties involved in oil, gas, and min-
ing development.
10.3 WHY DO OIL, GAS, AND MINING GENERATE 
SPECIFIC CHALLENGES?
The challenges lie in two areas: the particulars of oil, gas, 
and mining investments and the movement of investors in 
these industries into new countries and regions. Typically, 
the features of such investment that create difficulties in 
governance are the following:
 ■ Their “enclave” character can limit the width of their 
impact but at the same time create an intense local foot-
print, particularly when the activity is on land rather 
than offshore. The investors tend to be weakly integrated 
into the domestic economy and not covered by the host 
country’s mechanisms for checks and balances.
 ■ The high rents that these investments generate bring 
temptations with them. This allows key officials to 
extract illegal payments from companies and for compa-
nies to bribe officials to obtain privileges. The agencies 
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that deal directly with the extractives sector spread their 
poor governance and corruption to other government 
agencies, “compromising their capacity to deliver quality 
public goods and services” (IMF 2010, 6), and limiting 
the governments’ ability to deliver predictability to inves-
tors over time.
 ■ The fiscal regimes in oil, gas, and mining tend to be 
 complex, exacerbated by the fact that these corporate 
taxpayers tend to be few in number, making payments 
disproportionately large relative to the rest of the tax 
base, as well as being foreign, highly informed, sophisti-
cated, and politically influential. This creates a context in 
which governance of the sector can easily slide downhill.
 ■ The long-term investments with heavy upfront costs and 
high degrees of risk create demands for stable and pre-
dictable long-term operating environments. Meeting 
these demands effectively and fairly is beneficial, but it 
demands capacity that is sometimes lacking.
 ■ Market volatility around prices can make the benefits 
highly unpredictable, and their inherent exhaustibility 
make any benefit timeline finite.
 ■ There are significant social and environmental impacts, 
particularly on local communities, and an asymmetry in 
dealings between expert companies and often-inexpert 
governments.
These and other features of the oil, gas, and mining sector 
were highlighted in chapters 2 and 3.
The challenges have taken on a new character as the 
geography of oil, gas, and mining investments has evolved 
in the 21st century. There is increased presence of such 
investments in countries with weaker capacity, less infra-
structure, and less sector experience than developed 
resource-rich countries. They are often places where the 
benefits of oil, gas, and mining development are sorely 
needed but most difficult to realize. The resulting volatility 
and unpredictability is a concern to public and private 
 parties alike.
Negative outcomes are often attributable to a failure to 
address adequately the governance issues that commonly 
affect the oil, gas, and mining industries. For example, inef-
fective implementation of a licensing regime—whether 
through a lack of capacity of relevant agencies, poor coordi-
nation in the granting of licenses, or the monitoring of 
terms—can sow the seeds of unpredictability and  instability. 
The costs of failure are high, making the imperatives for 
getting it right particularly important. Some suggested 
responses based on the synthesis of good practice in the 
Sourcebook are set out in the following sections.
10.4 RESPONSE 1: APPROPRIATE AND 
ADEQUATE RULES
As chapters 4 and 5 have demonstrated, a wide variety of 
rules and policies need to be developed for the oil, gas, and 
mining sector. They include the following:
 ■ A sector policy framework covering issues such as sover-
eignty, sector roles and responsibilities, treatment of 
state-owned enterprises, private sector participation, 
exploration rights and procedures, local content, fiscal 
objectives, revenue and expenditure management, social 
and environmental considerations, and commitments to 
investors.
 ■ A legislative framework, through comprehensive and 
detailed legislation or through individually legislated 
contracts and agreements, or some combination of 
the two.
 ■ Regulations consistent with good practice to comple-
ment the laws and contracts, typically covering health, 
safety, and the environment.
 ■ Assignment of clear roles and responsibilities to key 
 sector agencies and institutions, including legislative bod-
ies, executive bodies, and sector ministries for individual 
EIs; regulatory agencies; state companies; finance minis-
try; taxation authority; the central bank; the economic 
planning ministry; and the environmental ministry.
 ■ A fiscal regime based on an appropriate selection of fiscal 
instruments, such as mining royalties or hydrocarbon 
production sharing, profit-based taxes, bonuses, pro-
gressive tax instruments, state participation, capital gains 
taxes, import-export duties, value-added tax, discounted 
sales prices, tax holidays, cost recovery, and so forth.
 ■ Policies and fiscal rules for the management and alloca-
tion of oil, gas, and mining revenues. (These should lay 
out a roadmap for spending versus savings and address 
issues such as the resource horizon, the need to balance 
current spending with savings, and whether and how 
revenues will be allocated between central government 
and subnational entities.)
 ■ Policies and programs to foster sustainable development. 
(These may address economic diversification, infrastruc-
ture and transport corridors, regional and community 
development planning, promotion of local benefit, job 
creation, and management of environmental, social, and 
human development challenges.)
The net effect of a sound legal, regulatory, and policy frame-
work is to enhance stability and predictability in the envi-
ronment in which investors operate. Negative features likely 
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to harm the quality of governance include a lack of available 
information on what the rules are, policies adopted or 
announced but then not implemented or policies frequently 
changed or adopted and then postponed, and different rules 
applied to different investors. The effect of any of these fea-
tures is to reduce transparency and consume scarce 
resources on the government side. They are likely to 
increase the challenges of monitoring contracts.
As the Sourcebook has noted, there is a wide variety of 
standardization in the oil, gas, and mining sector, with 
model contracts particularly common in the oil and gas 
 sector. The content of such agreements may differ but many 
of the headings are very similar. Petroleum operations are 
often required to be carried out in accordance with “good 
oilfield practice,” which may be defined in the contract—
as it is in the Kashagan (Kazakhstan) production-sharing 
agreement—as “all those uses and practices that are at the 
time in question then generally accepted in the international 
petroleum industry as good, safe, economical and efficient in 
exploring for, developing, producing, processing and trans-
porting Petroleum” (cited in Bowman 2015). In this way 
industry practices can be transformed into legal obligations. 
By contrast, petroleum laws show a considerable diversity 
and are often much briefer in scope than is typically found 
in the mining sector, where (and perhaps as a result) agree-
ments tend to play a different role in many cases.
One further outcome of the Sourcebook chapters is the 
mapping of the extensive role played by non-legally binding 
standards or quasi-rule-making. Examples would include the 
Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative Standard 
2016 (see chapter 8) and the emerging Responsible Mining 
Standard for industrial-scale mines developed by the Initiative 
for Responsible Mining Assurance (see chapter 9). Companies 
and industry associations often develop standards that have a 
near-mandatory impact on their operations. The International 
Finance Corporation standards are also relevant in this con-
text. In this sense, there is an aspect of good governance that 
is driven by international bodies and organizations.
10.5 RESPONSE 2: EFFECTIVE 
IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING, AND 
ENFORCEMENT
Effective monitoring and management capacity are critical to 
ensuring compliance with the requirements set out in the 
Sourcebook’s chapters. Without the appropriate institutions to 
monitor compliance with laws and standards, however, efforts 
at compliance will have little chance of success. The “resource 
curse” literature has underlined the importance of institutions 
for accountability, such as government auditors and parlia-
mentary commissions (see the discussion in chapter 2).
Governance systems for oversight can take various forms. 
One approach, which may be best suited for smaller coun-
tries with limited capacity, is a prescriptive or audited 
approach from the governmental authorities. For countries 
where there is more capacity, the requirements in the legal 
regime could be supplemented by placing more responsibil-
ity on the operator to work with codes of conduct it develops 
and are agreed with the governmental authorities. Both sys-
tems need the capacity within the authority to manage the 
workload. To some extent, this will be dependent on the size 
of the oil, gas, or mining sector in a country. For example, 
where there is a single mine, oversight capacity does not have 
to be overly elaborate.
Organizational capacity
The relevant laws should specify the authority and responsi-
bility of different institutions (see chapters 5, 6, and 7). As 
chapter 5 has shown, there is a growing body of knowledge 
about the most effective ways of allocating responsibilities 
across government institutions, even though there have been 
setbacks where countries have attempted to introduce new 
systems of oversight. In established EI regimes, such as 
Australia and the United Kingdom, reorganization has 
evolved in line with the changing national EI context, and 
underlined the value of learning from other countries’ prac-
tices in regulatory design. Although not a model, the 
Norwegian approach has been a useful benchmark for new 
EI states in making comparisons and contrasts.
In addition, the allocation of responsibilities should take full 
account of environmental and social protection in the  sector. 
For countries with well-developed environmental monitoring 
capacity, the environmental ministry should be responsible 
for policy and establishing laws and regulations, and a national 
environmental protection agency or local  environmental 
authorities should be responsible for enforcement. The laws 
and regulations should clearly specify which environmen-
tal authority is responsible for monitoring and enforcement. 
They should also specify the procedures for companies to 
 follow in preparing and submitting environmental and social 
performance data and the procedures for verification and 
independent testing by the environmental authorities.
The environmental authority should be able to put in 
place the institutional arrangements and capacity needed 
to respond to serious environmental incidents or acci-
dents, so that they can be controlled rapidly and investi-
gated thoroughly with results disseminated to communities 
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and actions taken to prevent reoccurrence. Where possi-
ble, the environmental authority should maintain staff at 
operations on a permanent basis. In presenting their plans 
for approval by government, oil, gas, and mining sector 
project sponsors may be reasonably required to demon-
strate that they have the organizational capacity to comply 
with social and environmental impact laws and regula-
tions and with undertakings given in the environmental 
and social management plan and the closure plan. 
Environmental performance data should be provided to 
government by the operator of the project. Environmental 
performance data should also be provided to local com-
munities in the local language with annual updates.
Capacity building
Much has been said about the importance of capacity 
building in making good governance feasible. One area 
requires further emphasis, however. Many countries have 
limited environmental oversight and enforcement  capacity. 
Governments should make every effort to see that their 
environmental agencies have sufficient staff with adequate 
knowledge and experience of all the key sectors of the 
economy, including the oil, gas, and mining sector. They 
must have adequate budgets for both wages and other 
costs (such as computers, data, record-keeping systems, 
vehicles, and operational travel) in order to be able to hire 
and retain competent staff, provide training, and have a 
strong presence on the ground, including at mine sites. 
Very close collaboration is needed between the environ-
mental authority and the technical staff at the EI sector 
ministry in reviewing and approving environmental and 
social impact assessments and environmental and social 
management plans. This can help compensate for a lack of 
capacity in countries with weakness in environmental 
areas and environmental staff that have only limited expe-
rience or knowledge of the oil, gas, and mining sector 
(Alba 2009, 8).
Social aspects
In more advanced developing countries, where there is a 
social ministry or a women’s ministry, these ministries 
should be responsible for social and gender issues. However, 
in countries where such dedicated ministries do not exist, 
social and gender issues should be the mandate of whichever 
agency has responsibilities that include such matters, or, if 
this does not exist, then whichever agency has the most 
expertise or was most involved in establishing social 
mitigation measures and local development initiatives for 
the oil, gas, or mining sector project (Liebenthal, Michelitsch, 
and Tarazona 2005, 170). Potentially, as in South Africa, the 
Department of Mineral Resources is the coordinating agency.
Monitoring and reporting
Good practice calls for both internal and external auditing of 
the EI project sponsor’s compliance with measures, promises, 
and obligations made on undertakings throughout the proj-
ect life, and regular public reporting of those audits. This 
requires the environmental authority and the oil, gas, and 
mining sector ministry to work together to have in place a 
well-defined and comprehensive monitoring program that 
identifies serious or potentially serious environmental issues. 
These can include impacts on water quality and availability, 
protection of biodiversity and natural habitats, safe handling 
and storage of hazardous materials, and interventions in place 
to reduce risks.
10.6 RESPONSE 3: ACCOUNTABILITY—
STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION AND 
PARTICIPATION
Successful and sustainable oil, gas, and mining sector 
management depends upon the participation of all key 
stakeholders—parliament, the executive, industry (includ-
ing national resource companies), international financial 
institutions and other investors, civil society, and citizens. 
While objectives and focus may differ among stakeholder 
groups, constructive and successful models of collaboration 
are emerging. In addition to the extensive discussion in 
chapter 9, see box 10.1 for an example of environmental and 
social institutional collaboration.
Identifying stakeholders, seeking their participation, 
and consulting with them in reform or good governance 
agendas across all links of the EI Value Chain have proven 
critical to the successful management of the oil, gas, and 
mining sectors and their impacts. In conflict areas, this has 
proven to be a particular challenge (see chapter 2, sections 
2.3 and 2.4).
Who are the stakeholders?
The principal stakeholders in the EI Value Chain have 
been described in the preceding chapters of the Sourcebook. 
Each deserves to be consulted in any matter with an 
important bearing on oil, gas, and mining sector manage-
ment, and each, at the same time, should be expected to 
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contribute to the process, playing different but comple-
mentary roles:
1. Parliament. Ideally responsive to, and representative of, the 
differing strands of public opinion, parliaments or legisla-
tures can play a unique role in identifying consensus poli-
cies and legislation. They should be consulted on all key 
issues, but at the same time expected to participate through 
the legislative and parliamentary oversight processes.
2. The Executive. The executive arm of a resource-rich gov-
ernment has a central role—in preparing policies and 
drafting legislation as enforcing, and managing these. 
Consultation with each group affected by its actions will 
increase the likelihood of their acceptance and sustain-
ability. Investor home-country governments can also 
play an important role in promoting or enforcing good 
governance practice on the part of their companies.
3. Industry. Beyond the investment and commercial opera-
tions roles, oil, gas, and mining sector industries should 
be reaching out to the societal groups their operations 
most affect, with consultations and informational pro-
grams on their plans and performance. They should 
Box 10.1 Environmental and Social Institutional Arrangements
Environmental protection and closure issues are com-
mon to many countries, and good regulatory frameworks 
are generally available. Thus, the fundamental issue is not 
so much the design of environmental legislation and 
regulation, but more the capacity of the environmental 
agency to monitor and enforce the laws and regulations. 
Without adequate enforcement capacity, even the 
best-designed regulations will be largely ineffective. 
With good capacity, even general environmental pro-
tection requirements can result in significant reduction 
of environmental hazards and risks. 
A key principle is that institutional strengthening of 
the environmental authority is generally the most crucial 
issue for countries with large mineral or petroleum proj-
ects. Social issues involve both mitigation of risks and 
enhancement of local benefits, such as local 
procurement.
A second key principle is that social issues are best 
addressed by a social ministry, because social issues are 
less amenable than environmental impacts to scientific 
measurement and compliance criteria. They require 
different skills sets from environmental issues. 
A ministry for women can also be very effective in 
addressing social issues. In many developing countries, 
women are often more aware of both social risks and 
opportunities.
Building strong and sufficient government capacity 
for environmental and social issues involves the 
following:
1. Having the necessary budget, employment condi-
tions, and capabilities to hire and retain sufficient 
well-qualified and experienced staff to address the 
environmental and social impacts of mineral and 
petroleum investments, with a strong presence on 
the ground at EI sector operations and in nearby 
communities.
2. Ensuring that the institutional arrangements and 
capacity are in place so that any serious environ-
mental or community incidents can be controlled 
rapidly and investigated thoroughly with results 
disseminated to communities and actions taken to 
prevent any reoccurrence.
3. Developing strong coordination and collaboration 
between the environmental and social authori-
ties and the EI sector authorities in reviewing and 
approving 
a. environmental and social impact assessments, 
b. environmental and social management and 
monitoring plans, and 
c. environmental and social monitoring arrange-
ments and results, especially for states with 
limited environmental and social capacity, and 
with staff with only limited experience or little 
knowledge of minerals and petroleum projects 
and their impacts.
4. Supporting and facilitating civil society partici-
pation in environmental and social monitoring, 
which can lead to many more positive environ-
mental and social impacts if mandatory processes 
ensure that all stakeholders and interested parties 
have unrestricted access to environmental and 
social performance data and to key documents 
(such as environmental and social impact assess-
ments and environmental and social management 
plans that specify compliance criteria and the 
obligations and commitments of the investors and 
operators).
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strictly observe good practice codes on the social and 
environmental impacts.
4. Employees. These are the people who do the work on the 
ground, and it is through their efforts that successes are 
achieved. Feedback from employee experience straight 
from the “coalface” can be invaluable. Employees may 
also be represented via trade unions for the purposes of 
collective bargaining and protection.
5. Civil society. Informed civil society can play a central role in 
educating and building local capacity to assess government 
sector policies and practice as well as industry performance 
and impacts, holding government and industry account-
able where inappropriate behavior or abuse is detected.
6. International finance institutions (IFIs). IFIs can use both 
technical assistance and the leverage of their lending to 
encourage good practice.
7. Indigenous peoples. The principle of free, prior, and 
informed consent has been influential here (McKeehan and 
Buppert 2014): the idea is that a community has the right 
to give or withhold its consent to proposed projects includ-
ing EI ones if those projects are likely to affect the lands they 
customarily own, occupy, or otherwise use. It is incorpo-
rated into many international, regional, and national laws 
(Malaysia, Australia, Peru, the República Bolivariana de 
Venezuela, and the Philippines, for example).
Alliances. A relatively recent but very promising develop-
ment is the growing number of multistakeholder groups, 
formed to address sector issues jointly, thereby considerably 
increasing the likelihood of consensus and sustainable poli-
cies and actions (Stacishin de Queiroz et al. 2008, 4).
Especially vulnerable groups. Separate consultations 
should be held by companies and nongovernmental organi-
zations with the poorest and most vulnerable groups in the 
community, including women’s and youth groups, to find 
out directly from them how the sector operation is affecting 
their lives and what their concerns and needs are. This is a 
key prerequisite to enabling them to have a strong voice in 
the company-community dialogue and in decisions affect-
ing their lives (Alba 2009, 21; Liebenthal, Michelitsch, and 
Tarazona 2005, 41–42, 139).
While comprehensive poverty studies can take one to 
two years to complete, consultations can provide an 
immediate and practical indicator of impacts for the 
poorest and most vulnerable. They should include the 
groups that represent poorer women (not elite women) in 
mining, oil, and gas communities to assist in assessing 
whether their lives are improved in addition to areas 
where they may be harmed by mining or hydrocarbons 
operations.
For maximum benefit and results, the consultation 
should be undertaken at a time and place convenient to the 
local women—otherwise they may not be able to attend 
due to child care and other household tasks. Rather than a 
government or company official leading the event, consid-
eration should be given to arranging for the consultation to 
be undertaken by a local woman who is well known and 
respected in the community to avoid the risk that poor 
women will not be forthright with a foreign outsider or 
government official (Liebenthal, Michelitsch, and Tarazona 
2005, 171).
10.7 CONCLUSIONS
The Sourcebook tries to promote and help standardize good 
practice across the EI Value Chain, taking into account the 
many contexts in which that practice is carried out. It empha-
sizes throughout what may be the most basic fact of all—that 
independent nation-states will make their own decisions 
about resource development. As such they will always tend to 
be sensitive to advice that appears to be directed at them 
from outside. The Sourcebook is, therefore, a tool for respon-
sible resource governance rather than a prescription.
The Sourcebook recognizes that many countries that are 
relatively new to the EIs need to pay special attention to 
capacity building and strengthening institutions. It is, for 
example, the way that rents are managed rather than the 
rents themselves that can be a problem. However, this is a 
source book and not a solutions book, and many key deci-
sions will be found by drawing on these and other sources in 
unique contexts. By and large, it remains the task of govern-
ments to discover how best to convert finite, natural capital 
into other forms of capital that can sustain development in 
perpetuity. Such an outcome would sustain  economic 
growth and the benefits it brings to the population. In devel-
opment terms, the extractives are a means to an end rather 
than an end in themselves. The knowledge assembled in the 
Sourcebook should assist governments in achieving their 
goals of social and economic transformation while at the 
same time meeting a high standard of good governance.
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OTHER RESOURCES 
An important strand in research into governance of the 
extractive sector has emerged from the UN Sustainable 
Development Solutions Network (SDSN): http://unsdsn 
.org. This Network plays a critical role in moving for-
ward the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, of 
the which the Sustainable Development Goals are a part. 
Among 12 thematic networks established is one on Good 
Governance of Extractive and Land Resources, provid-
ing a platform from which to share updates and lessons 
learned, to mobilize partnerships and to shape global 
strategies on how to leverage the natural resources sector 
to support sustainable development in general, and 
achievement of the SDGs in particular. The Network will 
also facilitate collaboration at the nexus of sustainable 
development and the governance of natural resources.
A useful source of reference on governance issues that 
pays special attention to the role of law is the World 
Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law (2017, 
Washington, DC: World Bank) (http://www.worldbank 
.org/en/publication/wdr2017).
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